HYBRID WAR IN THE CONTEXT OF FOREIGN POLICY, NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPTS, AND MILITARY DOCTRINES OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION

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Annotation. The foreign policy of the Russian Federation and the state of hybrid warfare are analyzed in detail from the point of view of politics in general and national security. The author gives his own view on the foreign policy of the Russian Federation and practical forms of hybrid warfare.

The article emphasizes that the analysis of the concept of hybrid warfare in the context of foreign policy, national security concepts and military doctrines of the Russian Federation helps to understand why Russia, to a greater extent than other countries, has made hybrid warfare an instrument of its foreign policy. The article describes in detail the repeated systematic pressure from Russia, revealing the hybrid war for four reasons: to get the necessary experience and make sure of its effectiveness (for example, during the war in Chechnya); the use of necessary resources (capabilities, specialists, technologies); low cost of hybrid operations; hybrid warfare has difficulties in identifying the aggressor.

All this is fully explained by the resource extraction model according to Ch . Taliaferro, which shows which strategies are at risk of being implemented in order to increase the likelihood of competitive advantage and survival.

The article gives various definitions of the problems of a hybrid society and how they relate to the international laws of war, suggesting that Russia, faced with external threats, has chosen one of three balancing strategies: immutability, imitation and innovation, which requires the creation of completely new institutions, technologies or management methods.

Keywords: hybrid warfare, international, Russia, immutability, emulation, innovation, strategy, war

Basic provisions

Russian views on international relations and foreign policy exclude intervention in the domestic affairs of third countries, including in the case of human rights, which is often labelled an instrument for intervention.

Together with the increased anti- Western sentiments, it is also noted the feeling of 'being under siege and pushed out in the periphery of international relations.

Introduction

Condemnation with moral arguments the increased influence of the Western countries in the system of the international relations. If the two previously mentioned points had strongly realist character, this one has to do with the messianic role of Russia, as well as with Soviet Union legacy, which led to a creation of a self-image of protector and defender of good counties'- those one which, according Russia, are victims of the reach and unjust West.

Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation

The first Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation was approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on September 9, 2000. Based on it, the Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation was approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation N. 646 of December 5, 2016. It came after the accusations of several countries that Russia wages cyber and information war against several countries. It outlines three main purposes: countering external threats; overcoming the international dis-crimination' of the Russian media; and eliminating the drawbacks and limitations faced by Russia in the domain of information technologies. Opinion exists that the Doctrine is much more aggressive that previous one: The first obiective has a clear aim to establish full state control over the domestic information space.... The second objective is related to the Kremlin's growing despair over losing the benefits of its external propaganda, which cost a fortune and was designed to justify Moscow's unlawful actions at home and abroad to the world audience.... The final objective highlights Moscow's growing concerns that Russia is lagging behind other key players in the domain of IT and cyber security' [1]. In it, information sphere is defined as a combination of information, informatization objects, information systems and websites within the information and telecommunications network of the Internet (herein-after referred to as the Internet'), communications networks, information technologies, entities involved in generating and processing information, developing and using the above technologies, and ensuring information security, as well as a set of mechanisms regulating public relations in the sphere' [1].

Description of materials and methods

As research methods, we used the general scientific methods of analysis and forecasting, as well as the historical method within the framework of considering the main stages of the development of bilateral relations. The article uses general scientific methods, such as the selection of literature and its systematization, which made it possible to create one level for the analysis of various approaches, opinions, and points of view of foreign experts about the hybrid war of the Russian Federation. Analysis as one of the main general logical methods is used to identify the problem posed. Selection of data, including official documents (for example, doctrines), analytical reports of research centers (for example, Rand Corporation), periodicals (The Journal of Slavic Military Studies), etc. we have compiled another level of methodological approaches. The synthesis method made it possible to collect various aspects of the studied issue into a single whole and to obtain research results and formulate conclusions.

Results

In its turn, information security is grasped as the information security of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the "information security') is the state of protection of the individual, society and the State against internal and external information threats, allowing to ensure the constitutional human and civil rights and freedoms, the decent quality and standard of living for citizens, the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and sustainable socio-economic development

of the Russian Federation, as well as defense and security of the State' [1]. The need of such a strategy is motivated with the fact that according to the Doctrine, some foreign countries build their cyber capabilities for military purposes; because of the multiple intents of cyberespionage; because intents of destabilize internal political situation; because bad intention of some countries to present the events in Russia in a distorted way; Russian mass media often face blatant discrimination abroad, what does not allow Russian journalists are prevented from performing their professional duties; and finally, there is a growing information pressure on the population of Russia, primarily on the Russian youth, with the aim to erode Russian traditional spiritual and moral values.

At the end of the document an appeal to create 'a national system of managing the Russian segment of the Internet.' It woke up the fear that that Putin's government will seek to increase control over content and use of the Internet; fear that proved to be reasonable.

Some final thoughts about the strategic documents

Finishing the analysis of strategic documents of Russia federation, I would like to summarize some - in my view - important issues.

There is no doubt that Russian foreign policy changed after the illegal annexation of Crimea. The basis for the change is the military doctrine (December 25, 2014), Security strategy (signed by Putin almost a year ago) and the Foreign policy concept (November 30, 2016). Despite of the fact that they deeply transformed the security context, they contain some characteristic for Russia elements: its pretentions to be respected as a great power; its view of a new polycentric world where it will have an important role; and the concept 'near abroad? - a belt of friendly states what warrants that it never will be attacked.

However, these three strategic documents contain also a set of newer elements. The first one is the perception that Russia's getting stronger meets hostile attitudes of other great powers which do not recognize its right to have its own foreign policy curse. The second one is especially important for the hybrid wars - Russia recognizes that in the future world competition States will rely on a wider kit tool - political, financial, economic, information instruments, special services, etc. Thirdly, Russia's view that the intention of the West to maintain its leading positions under conditions of eroded political and economic world order leads to greater instability. Forth, Russia's concept that 'Western states and organizations [are] obstacles to the realization of its ambitions in former Soviet countries' [2].

There is a second issue I would like to call the attention. A conviction exists that EU is seen by Russia as a lesser evil than NATO. The careful reading of the strategic documents shows that this is not exactly the truth. There are quite a lot of reasons of Russia's hostile attitudes towards EU. It has been perceived negatively by Russia because of the waves of enlargement as well as because of the aggressive rhetoric of some of its members (Poland, Baltic States). Moreover, since a point of view of values, EU is the major competitor of Russia. It is not by chance that one of the cruelest Russian hybrid attacks aim at European values, in intent to prove that they are values of decadent civilization that go against the nature and God. Then, Russia felt offended by attitude of Brussels, with which it

wants to develop relations based on equality, and not based on norms and standards imposed by Brussels.

Neither should not it be forgotten that Russia sees EU as a geo-political rival in the post-soviet space: Russia is definitely concerned that its neighbors gradually absorbing EU norms and standards will lessen its influence over them - an influence that often materializes through inter-elite channels, informal, sometimes corrupt economic and investment schemes.' [2, p,19]. The same is the situation with the so called Eastern neighbourhood where Russia feeld threaten by EU. And finally, in addition, Russia sees the EU as a kind of a strategio continuation of the United States and NATO, which are associated with the notions of military challenges and hard security problems. The proposed rapprochement between the EU and NATO will hardly alter this Russian approach.' [2, p.21].

A report of RAND corporation also confirms these conclusions. It outlines five general goals of Russian foreign policy that would most likely lead Russia to pursue hostile measures in Europe in the next five years [3].

1. Russia pursues its own security and the preservation of the regime.

This might be because of its geography and history- it lacks major natural bareers and has been attacked several times during his history. Other analysts hypothetize that information policy is an important vector of Russian security - at least because it can contribute to maintain the control over information internally [3, p.7].

2. Russia sees itself as a great power and seeks recognition as one of the world's great powers. In case of peceived lack od respect,

"there are a wide range of hostile measures that Russia could use to bolster its influence, prestige, and autonomy along these lines.?' [3, p.8].

3. Russia pursues influence within its neighborhood. Sociological surveys demonstrate that Russians consider that national interests of their country go beyond its borders (64% - 2008; 43,3% - 2012; 82,3 - 2018) [4, p.8].

This means at least control on its neighborhood, part of which is Europe. (Reynolds 2008: 8). But which territories covers this control? Some scholars consider these will be the three Baltic states; Dugin suggests Lithuania and Poland; the above-mentioned strategic documents and policies, however, show that 'Russia has a more active policy in the non-Baltic former Soviet countries (including Central Asia, Be larus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) than in the Baltics or other EU and NATO members'
Russia secks economic prosperity, which in turn, likely requires some level of cooperation, trade, and investment with Europe [3, p.10]. That's why even in times of hardes rethoric against EU, Russian governing circles confirmed their readiness to cooperate with it.

Related to many of the aforementioned obiectives, Russia seeks to stop EU and NATO enlargement and to undermine EU and NATO activities in Russia's perceived sphere of influence [3, p.12]. It has been expressed more than one time by several Russian politicians: Putin, for example, argued that the EU's integration effort with Ukraine was mistakenly intended 'to disrupt an attempt to re-create the Soviet Union, while Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin also connected

Ukraine's decision to sign the Association Agreement with eventual NATO membership' [5]. (Aleksashenko, 2014)

6. Valery Gerasimov and doctrine on hybrid war

The ideas and theories on hybrid war, as well foreign policy concepts, doctrines for national security and the military doctrine of Russia, together with Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, provide that framework, in which it is possible to understand the ideas of Valery Gerasimov in a proper way. Such kind of contextualization is always, if no required, quite useful to catch the roots and the development of a given process or event. Is it by chance that three generation of Russian military and political analysts and practitioners, living under different regimes and forms of government, develop the same idea? I would rather answer negatively. Just the opposite - the fact that people with different political preferences and epochs but belonging to the same national political and strategic culture shows that some norms of the latter are so deeply interiorized, that could be nor impacted, neither eradicated by political change, whatever it be.

Speaking about the case of Doctrine Gerasimov, it should be said that connection between hybrid war and the name of Gerasimov was established by Western journalists. In practice, the doctrine was already in existence - systematized by Messner (under tsarism), developed by Isserson and others (during communist time, under one of the bloodiest regimes in the history of mankind - Stalinism and completed by Dugin (in postSoviet epoch).

Gen. Gerasimov, 57, was born in the city of Kazan, on the Volga River and capital of the ethnic Tatars. He began his military career in 1977 with the Northern Group of Forces. After serving in the Far Eastern and Baltic Military Districts, he became chief of staff of the 58 Army in the North Caucasus Military District in 1999. The journalist Anna Politkovskaya, a vocal critic of the Chechen conflict who was murdered in 2006, described him as a man who was able to preserve an officer's honor during the war. (BBC, 2012). In 2001, at the height of the Chechen conflict, Gen. Gerasimov was appointed commander of the 58th Army. In 2003-2005 he became chief of staff of the Far Eastern Military District.

Later he went on to serve as commander of the military districts covering St Petersburg and Moscow, before becoming deputy chief of general staff. The text which contains his main views in fact is a summary of his report, presented a bit earlier to the general assembly of the Academy of military sciences.

The 2000-word article, The Value of Science Is in the Foresight, was published in the weekly Russian trade paper Military-Industrial Courier on 26 February 2013. [6]. What is important to mention is that Gerasimov never uses 'hybrid war' in it. Instead, he applies the term 'indirect and asymmetric methods', which was interpreted by Western scholars as hybrid war. In the article gen. Gerasimov searches answer to several questions: What is the modern war? What shall the army must be prepared for? How it should be armed? What forms and methods should be employed for the development of the armed forces?

The text begins with a claim that in the XXI century the differences between war and peace are blurred: In the 21st century we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace.

Wars are no longer declared and having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template'. The recent experience from the military conflicts has demonstrated that even stable and flourishing countries can succumb in few months or weeks to enemy aggression and become arena of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe and civil war.

Gerasimov gives the Arab Spring as example of the modern war: it is a war with different rules, where non-military means are used to achieve political and strategic goals and they have proven to be very effective. So far military has never been interested in such type of con-Ricks, but for the future they should become their main interest and will probably set the model for the future war. The change of rule consists in the wide application of political, economic, information, humanitarian, and other similar measures, used together with the rebelling potential of the local population. Even when military measures are used, they are disguised. Gerasimov points out that 'military means of a concealed character is … carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions of special-operations forces'. Together with this, he claims that 'peacekeeping and crisis regulation' are also disguised military.

Gerasimov tries as well to establish a connection between the technological advancement and the way the wars are carried out. According to him: New information technologies have enabled significant reductions in the spatial, temporal, and informational gaps between forces and control organs. Frontal engagements of large formations of forces at the strategic and operational level are gradually becoming a thing of the past. Long-distance, contactless actions against the enemy are becoming the main means of achieving combat and operational goals. The defeat of the enemy's objects is conducted throughout the entire depth of his territory. The differences between strategic, operational, and tactical levels, as well as between offensive and defensive operations, are being erased. The application of high-precision weaponry is taking on a mass character. Weapons based on new physical principals and automatized systems are being actively incorporated into military activity' [7].

Gerasimov also mentions the importance and the role of the asymmetric activities in the modern war, which allow to achieve superiority over stronger enemy. In this category, the author includes the use of Special Forces, the actions of the internal opposition and the information activities.

There are different views on Gerasimov's first article. Some people claim that it doesn't contain anything new and just openly states everything that the Russian army has always done. Other think that it legitimizes the imperial policy of Putin. Molly K. McKew describes it in the following way: 'The article is considered by many to be the most useful articulation of Russia's modern strategy, a vision of total warfare that places politics and war within the same spectrum of activities - philosophically, but also logistically' [8]. According to him, the main approach is guerrilla with rich arsenal of symmetric and asymmetric, military and non-military

tools. What Gerasimov doctrine does, is to build a framework for those tools and clearly state that non-military instruments are not auxiliary to the kinetic, but the preferred ones. They are not a preparation of war, but war itself.

Roger N. McDermott argues in his article Does Russia Have a Gerasimov Doctrine?' that Gerasimov ideas and intentions were largely mis-understood, since Western scholars failed to take into account the specific Russian approaches, traditions, uniqueness and context. Examples of these include:

- 'Historically Russian army has avoided entering in a military conflict without careful preparation of the battlefield, which means conducting an analysis of the operational environment and making tangible efforts to shape it according to the requirements of the mission'

Russian officers are prone to examine the historical example of wars, especially the German invasion in Russia and the followed Great Patriotic War, to draw conclusions about the present-day and future operations and wars. This point is especially important for the Russian military thought and can be seen as well in Gerasimov, whose famous article which is widely believed to be the root of the Russian hybrid warfare is also within the historical framework of the Great Patriotic War and the need to be prepared for future conflicts in order not to be taken by surprise as it happened in 1941. As pointed out, one of the main tasks of the Russian military science is to gain foresight in terms of future conflicts. The historical framework of the Great Patriotic War, used by Gerasimov can also be explained by the context. The article comes shortly after the change Of the defense minister, who was removed from office together with other high ranked military officers in a corruption scandal and by writing it, Gerasimov wanted to establish himself as a supportive to Sergey Shoygu and to appeal to other military officers in attempt to repair the damage in their relations followed the staff changes. The choice of media, (Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer), also suggests that the targeted audience is very limited. The journal is mainly of interest to Russian military theorists, and the choice to publish there and not in other military journals which are more spread in other circles, also speaks clearly of the purpose of the article.

In his article Gerasimov does not speak of new approach for the Russian army. On the contrary, his logic leads to Alexandr Svechin's idea that 'war is difficult to predict'. Therefore Gen. Gerasimov points out the uniqueness of every conflict which requires understanding of the specific logic behind it. In this sense, rather than setting a new course for the Russian army (such as 'Hybrid warfare doctrine'), he advices Russian politicians and military personnel to be open for new ideas and new 'unconventional approaches, which are not limited to trying to link technol ogy and power. He recommended measures aimed to produce counter-measures, able to expose enemy vulnerabilities. Instead of shaping the operations on a specific model such as hybrid model', he recommends shaping military operations according to the specific conditions.

Some scientists however consider that article should be seen as a direct guidelines for the development of Russian military capabilities by 2020: 1) from direct destruction to direct influence; 2) from direct annihilation of the opponent to its inner decay; 3) from a war with weapons and technology to a culture war; 4)

from a war with conventional forces to specially prepared forces and commercial irregular groupings; 5) from the traditional (3D) battleground to information/psychological warfare and war of perceptions; 6) from direct clashes to contactless war; 7) from a superficial and compartmented war to a total war, including the enemy's internal side and base; 8) from war in the physical environment to a war in the human consciousness and in cyber-space; 9) from symmetric to asymmetric warfare by a combination of political, economic, information, technological, and ecological campaigns; 10) from war in a defined period of time, to a state of permanent war as the natural condition in national life [9].

In 2016 Gerasimov published his second article called "The hybrid war requires high tech weapon and scientific argumentation' [6]. This is the first time the term 'hybrid war' has been used and defined in the following way: 'It is more than clear that the development of the technologies for armed fight is not the only reason for the improve. ment of the forms and the means for action of the army or other armed forces. Today, in the age of globalization, weakened national borders, development of communication, the most important factor remains the changed forms of international conflicts. In the modern conflicts it has become more important to apply a complex array of political, economic, information and other non-military means, made with strong back up of military means. This are the so-called hybrid wars'

Gerasimov presents a detailed description of their nature, underlining the following: 'Their essence is not simply achieving political objectives with minimal use of military means against the enemy'. It happens mostly through undermining enemy's military and economic potential, informational-psychological manipulation, active support for the internal opposition and partisan groups. This is possible thanks to the organization of 'color revolutions', which should lead to non-violent transition of power. The author is very critical about them: Every color revolution is in its nature a form of coup d'état staged from outside. In their basis lay the information technologies, carrying manipulations on the protest potential of the local population, combined with other non-military means'.

This is so, because with the time every information resource becomes a powerful weapon, and its use could allow any country to be shaken from inside in a matter of days. He advices, in the course of hybrid war, to make use of force only if the situation requires it as a last resort, under the form of peacekeeping missions or similar. The conclusion is that the indirect and asymmetric actions of the hybrid war will deprive the enemy of sovereignty without occupying its territory'. Gerasimov also underlines that if the methods of the classic wars are well-known, the methods of the indirect war can only be guessed. Nevertheless, it is obvious, according to him, that the state, victim of the hybrid war quickly falls into chaos, internal political crisis and economic collapse. The results of color revolutions on the other hand are visible in the murders carried out on national or religious motivation, increased crime, mass-immigration etc.

With the conflicts from Syria and Irag, Gerasimov proves that the hybrid war is not a 'future war, it is already conducted one - in reality; in every military

conflict in the world today there is a combination of military and non-military means and the scenario is always the same: the internal conflicts are transformed into violent or military actions of the opposition. These actions, with the help of foreign instructors, become organized. Later on, the terroristic organizations appear, with help from outside. Gerasimov claims that important part of the hybrid war is the falsification of the events and the usage of the mass-media for this purpose.

The effect of the mass-media, according to him, is equal with the effect of large-scale use of military force.

The third article of Gerasimov appeared in March 2017 and was published under the title Peace on the edge of the war', again in the same newspaper (Герасимов, Мир на гранях войны, 2017). It starts with the claiming that new classification of wars is needed. Hybrid wars are understood as actions during period, which can't be classified neither as peace, nor as war. According to Gerasimov, the Russian scholars have established far more balanced approach to the classification of the modern conflicts, which accounts for bigger number of indicators. Another interesting claim of gen. Gerasimov is that adopted the term hybrid war' has been accepted recently, after the experience of only few conflicts in the last decade such as the NATO operation in Yugoslavia, which opened the path for the wars without contact, or the operations in Libya and Syria, in which US and NATO applied 'hybrid strategies' since those are usually not considered a form of aggression. Gerasimov admits that in the beginning of the XXI century the transformation of the military conflicts is a fact. It is clear that the border between war and peace is blurred. The other side of the 'hybrid war' is its perception in peace time, when there is no open military aggression against a country, but its national security and sovereignty are threatened and can be destroyed. In the same time the spectrum of reasons for use of military force is being expanded. Today more and more we can see how wars are being fought for economic interests of specific country or countries, but under the disguise of 'defense of democracy' or democratic values. The non-military forms of war, through the technological advancement, become formidable and very dangerous means. Their use can lead to collapse of the bank system, economy, information, electricity or other systems, which are essential for any country. As example gen. Gerasimov gives the cyber-attacks on the Iranian energetic infrastructure in 2015. According to him, however, there is still no reason to give up on the use of military force in the wars, as in all of the upper mentioned conflicts the military force was used at some point and to some extent.

Implementing Russian hybrid war concept in practice

It would be a great mistake to think that what we see in Russian-Ukrainian crisis is only the implementation of modern doctrines, strategies, and concepts. The acts of Russian Federation show that it has strictly followed the views of fathers-founders of hybrid war - military and civil scholars. If it is so successful, it is also because of deeply rooted strategic culture that tolerates coups, insurgency and hidden action, and due to immense experience that Russian army has in the field.

Almost all toolkit of hybrid warfare has been used and developed in this crisis. In what follows, I will mention some examples.

Open military force

Russian Federation applied openly military force only in 2018. It happened on November 25, when Russian warships opened fire on a group of Ukrainian warships. Russian authorities have arrested Ukrainian vessels and seamen on charges of attempting to cross the Kerch Strait (the Kerch-Enikal Canal) illegally; Kerch Strait which connects the Black Sea with the Azov Sea. The crisis in the Sea of Azov is the first case since the beginning of the conflict to this day in which Russia attacks its smaller neighbor openly, with forces under the Russian flag, instead of green men' without distinctive military signs. Sea of Azov is important for both countries because here are the key ports of Donbass - Mariupol and Berdyansk. Russia began to impose itself in the Azov Sea in 2015 when construction of the long-planned bridge over the Kerch Strait began. At the same time, Moscow introduced a restrictive regime for the entry of ships into the Azov Sea and the Kerch Strait and adopted tonnage limits for passing ships. The bridge extended from Russia to the territory of Eastern Crimea, annexed sovereign part of Ukraine. The purpose of the facility was to help ship even more weapons, soldiers, and equipment to the Peninsula. Russia designs the bridge in such a way as to limit the movement of ships between north and south, i.e. from and to the Ukrainian ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk, which are crucial for the Ukrainian export of grain and steel. The Kerch Bridge is only 33 meters high, which virtually prevents the passage of larger ships at full load. The strait itself is narrow, even before the bridge was built, ships often had to wait before they could cross. As a result, traffic dropped by a quarter and Kiev estimated its losses at $ 38.5 million.

Discussions

Hidden use of military force

Since the very beginning, Russian Federation makes use of hidden military force. In a joined publication, Sweden defense University, Center for asymmetric studies and The European Centre of Excellence for countering hybrid threats describe in the next way the taking of Crimea:

On February 22, 2014, battalions of Spetsnaz (elite Russian military intelligence infantry) and Vozdushno-Desantnye Voyska (Airborne Forces or VDV) began mobilization. Two days later, the city council of Sevastopol installed Aleksei Chaliy, a Russian citizen and businessman, as mayor. Naval units arrived in the city square in armed personnel carriers and 200 Special Forces arrived on February 25 by way of Alligator-class landing ship. These troops were Special Operations Command [KSO], a small unit designed to operate 'independently and abroad.' In order to mask further movement of troops, Russia launched a snap exercise...

The next day, KSO special forces, VDV, and Spetsnaz, claiming to be a local 'self-defense militia', barricaded themselves inside the Crimean Parliament building and raised the Russian flag' (Treverton, G. et al., 2017). Unmarked Special Forces extended their control on Belbek air base, Simferopol airport, Ukrainian naval air base at Novofedorovka, and closing Crimean border crossings.

Nowadays they continue fighting in illegal Donetsk and Lugansk Republics. Russia never recognized their engagement, despite the fact that the International Volunteer Community

'Inform Napalm' identified in Donbas war invasion of the artillerymen of the 136th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (MRB of the Russian Armed Forces into Ukraine in August 2014; 291st Artillery Brigade of the 58th Field Army, invading the territory of Ukraine in summer and autumn 2014, which led to deaths of hundreds of Ukrainian citizens (Inform Napalm, 2017); Artillerymen of the Russian 7th Military Base involved in the cross-border shelling of Ukraine in September-November 2014 have been also identified.

Lawfare

The conflict in the Sea of Azov has shifted to the legal front as well.

The status of the sea is the subject of several agreements and ongoing legal disputes. In 2003, Ukraine and Russia decided to treat the Azov Sea as 'historic inland waters' belonging equally to both sides, leaving it without demarcation lines. Now, some Ukrainian nationalists are calling on Petro Poroshenko to cancel the agreement and claim ownership of the territorial waters 12 miles offshore (22.2 km). However, this can lead to recognition of Russia's right to control most of the Sea of Azov and leave Ukraine without access through the Kerch Strait, as it will not be able to impose its power on the territorial waters of Crimea. Ukraine has filed a complaint against Russia under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, alleging that Russian ships prevent the country from exercising its coastal state rights in the maritime zones belonging to the Crimea in the Black and Azov Seas and the Kerch Strait. The 2003 agreement did not create common check mode and it is ensure protection of the rights of specific countries. Ships traveling between Russian ports or to Rostov-on-Don, for example, are not stopped. Delays in shipping are associated with significant financial costs. Turkish vessels suffer the most from the crisis, but Bulgarian and Romanian crews, as well as other EU-flagged ships, also face prolonged and expensive unplanned shutdowns.

Russia's goal is to repel international business from the region in long term.

Washington Post calls it 'covert influence operation'; other use psychological operation; still another put another label. I will stick the term 'disinformation campaign' in the sense I described it in the chapter about toolkit of hybrid war.

Conclusion

The analysis of the concept of hybrid war in the context of foreign policy, national security concepts, and military doctrines of Russian federation helps in many ways to understand why Russia converted hybrid war in a tool of its foreign policy more than any other country. Put in the explanatory framework of neoclassical realism, it contributes to realize processes and events that otherwise are difficult to be explained.

There is no doubt that systemic pressures in several occasions determined the reaction of Russia. In such occasions it recurred to hybrid war because of the next four reasons: 1. It had accumulated the needed experience and was convinced in its efficiency (as for example during war in Chechnya); 2. It disposed of needed resources (capabilities, experts, technology); 3. It understood the low price of

hybrid operations; 4. Hybrid war arise difficulties to identify the aggressor. All this is completely explicable through the Taliaferro's resource extraction model, which points out which strategies are threatened stated likely to implement in order to enhance competitive advantage and probability of survival. Facing external threat, Russia had the choice among three balancing strategies: non change, emulation and innovation. It has chosen innovation, which requires creation of entirely new institutions, technologies, or governing practices. Russian's concept of hybrid war is a response to this perceived misbalance and an intention to shift balance of power in its favor. It is that innovation which gave Russia chance of balance of power without great economic resources it does not dispose with. It is also compatible with the norms of Russian strategic and military culture to wage successfully irregular warfare since Napoleonic war till today.

Secondly, not all choices of Russia to use hybrid war were dictated by international security environment, just as not all foreign political choices were determined by systemic influences. Several scholars consider that the West's actions were a factor but not the core driver- in Putin's foreign policy' (Bugayova, 2019). In the spirit of Soviet legacy, Putin blamed the West for all misfortunes of Russians, who didn't get more rights, jobs or money for the 3 terms of his government. The development of the political process in Russia illustrates the extent to which Russian foreign and defense policies are increasingly driven by domestic factors, specifically by the growing challenges to Putin's ability to maintain power.' (Goure, 21) Russian ruling elite used hybrid war to strength its control over Russian in Russia. Benjamin Fordham's model explains it while establishing relations between foreign and domestic policy.

Once again, actions of Russia can be explained by different points of view, but the cluster of realist views are, in my opinion, the most convenient.

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РЕСЕЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИЯСЫНЫҢ СЫРТҚЫ САЯСАТЫНЫҢ, ҰЛТТЫҚ ҚАУІПСІЗДІК ТҰЖЫРЫМДАРЫНЫҢ ЖӘНЕ ӘСКЕРИ ДОКТРИНАЛАРЫНЫҢ МӘНМӘТІНДЕГІ ГИБРИДТІ СОҒЫС

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Аңдатпа: Мақалада Ресей Федерациясының сыртқы саясаты және гибридтік соғыс жағдайы, жалпы саясат және ұлттық қауіпсіздік тұрғысынан егжей-тегжейлі талданған. Автор Ресей Федерациясының сыртқы саясаты мен гибридтік соғысты жүргізудің практикалық нысандары туралы өзіндік көзқарасын береді.

Мақалада гибридтік соғыс тұжырымдамасын сыртқы саясат контекстіндегі талдау, Ресей Федерациясының ұлттық қауіпсіздік тұжырымдамалары мен әскери доктриналары басқа елдерге қарағанда, Ресейдің гибридтік соғысты неліктен басымырақ етіп жасағанын түсінуге көмектесетіні, сыртқы саясатының құралы атап өтілген.

Мақалада төрт себеп бойынша гибридті соғысты ашу үшін Ресей тарапынан қайталанатын жүйелі қысым егжей-тегжейлі сипатталған: қажетті тәжірибе жинақтау және оның жұмыс істейтініне көз жеткізу (мысалы, Шешенстандағы соғыс кезінде); қажетті ресурстарды (мүмкіндіктер, мамандар, технологиялар) пайдалану; гибридті операциялардың төмен құны; гибридті соғыста агрессорды анықтау қиынға соғады.

Мұның барлығы бәсекелестік артықшылықтар мен өмір сүру ықтималдығын арттыру үшін қандай стратегиялардың жүзеге асырылу қаупі бар екенін көрсететін Ч. Талиаферро ресурстарын өндіру моделімен толық түсіндіріледі.

Мақалада гибридтік қоғамның мәселелеріне және олардың халықаралық соғыс заңдарымен қалай байланысатынына әртүрлі анықтамалар берілген. Ресей сыртқы қауіп-қатерлерге тап болған кезде теңдестірудің үш стратегиясының мүлде жаңа институттар, технологиялар немесе басқару әдістері бірін таңдағанын болжайды: өзгермейтіндік, еліктеу және құруды талап ететін инновация.

Тірек сөздер: гибридтік соғыс, халықаралық, Ресей, өзгермеу, эмуляция, инновация, стратегия, соғыс

ГИБРИДНАЯ ВОЙНА В КОНТЕКСТЕ ВНЕШНЕЙ ПОЛИТИКИ, КОНЦЕПЦИЙ НАЦИОНАЛЬНОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ И ВОЕННЫХ ДОКТРИН РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

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Аннотация. В статье подробно анализируются внешняя политика Российской Федерации и состояние гибридной войны с точки зрения политики в целом и национальной безопасности. Автор дает собственный взгляд на внешнюю политику Российской Федерации и практические формы ведения гибридной войны.

В статье подчеркивается, что анализ концепции гибридной войны в контексте внешней политики, концепций национальной безопасности и военных доктрин Российской Федерации помогает понять, почему Россия в большей степени, чем другие страны, сделала гибридную войну инструментом своей внешней политики. В статье подробно описывается неоднократное систематическое давление со стороны России,

раскрывая гибридную войну по четырем причинам: получить необходимый опыт и убедится в его эффективности (например, во время войны в Чечне); использование необходимых ресурсов (возможности, специалисты, технологии); низкая стоимость гибридных операций; гибридная война имеет трудности в идентификации агрессора.

Все это полностью объясняется моделью добычи ресурсов по Ч. Талиаферро, которая показывает, какие стратегии рискуют быть реализованными, чтобы повысить вероятность конкурентного преимущества и выживания.

В статье даны различные определения проблем гибридного общества и то, как они соотносятся с международными законами войны, предполагая, что Россия, столкнувшись с внешними угрозами, выбрала одну из трех стратегий балансирования: неизменность, подражание и новаторство, что требует создания совершенно новых институтов, технологий или методов управления.