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THE EVOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND THE ADVENT OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS

*Zhumatay G.¹

*¹Narxoz University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

Abstract. The paper explores and analyzes the background and genesis of the Cyprus problem in international relations and the events leading to the 1974 Turkish military intervention and the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). This research problem is relevant and significant against the backdrop of the recent events regarding the pledge of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to comply with the United Nations Security Council resolutions 541 and 550 in 1983, which consider the TRNC as a secessionist illegitimate entity. From this perspective, the study examines the key historical events between 1960 and 1983 from the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus to the creation of the TRNC. As qualitative research, the study employs methods of historical analysis and content analysis. Through these methods, the study examines and analyzes official diplomatic documents, international treaties, the 1960 constitution of Cyprus and other primary sources to investigate the research problem. Besides, the study draws on relevant literature by Turkish, Turkish Cypriot, Greek, Greek Cypriot and scholars and experts from other countries. The establishment of the TRNC is regarded by the international community as incompatible with the international treaties of 1960 and thereby invalid. However, the results of the study have shown that the breach of the treaties and the 1960 constitution of Cyprus was committed by the Greek Cypriots. Having unilaterally and illegally usurped the power, the Greek majority in cahoots with the Greek junta intended to abolish the state of Cyprus and integrate it with Greece. The flagrant breach of the international treaties and the 1960 constitution by both the Greek Cypriots and Greece provoked the Turkish military intervention in July 1974, the division of the island and the establishment of the TRNC as the only viable solution to the Cyprus problem.

Key words: Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, TRNC, treaty, intervention

Introduction

The relevance and significance of the research problem under consideration are linked to the current legal status and international standing of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The results of the study will help us

understand the historical, legal and political basis of the Cyprus conflict and whether the TRNC is a legitimate state entity or vice versa. This has become more relevant since Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan refused to recognize the TRNC despite their close relationship with Turkey. The first Central Asia – European Union summit held in Samarkand on April 4, 2025, seems to have created dissension between Turkey and Turkic states of Central Asia over the legal status of the TRNC. Although the TRNC has been an independent nation state since 1983, it has been recognized only by Turkey. Despite the member states of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) granted the TRNC an observer status at the OTS in 2022, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan officially confirmed their commitment to the 1983 United Nations Security Council resolutions 541 and 550 condemning the establishment of the TRNC and calling on international community not to extend their recognition to this entity. According to these resolutions, the TRNC is an illegal state entity and the only government that legitimately represents Cyprus in the international arena is the Republic of Cyprus under the control of the Greek Cypriots.

This study seeks to gain a proper understanding of why the TRNC has not been recognized as a sovereign political entity by the international community, except Turkey. Besides, the study tries to identify historical, legal and political barriers to the widespread recognition of the TRNC by the international community. Moreover, the study strives to ascertain the root causes of the exclusion of the Turkish Cypriots and monopolization of power in Cyprus by the Greek majority. Furthermore, the study looks into legal issues pertaining to the Cyprus problem, trying to understand why the only Greek Cypriot administration is regarded as the sole legitimate government of Cyprus, while such a legal recognition is outrightly denied to the Turkish Cypriots. To achieve these objectives and respond to the research questions, the study will explore and analyze the historical events and developments in Cyprus between 1960-1983, from the year of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus to the advent of the TRNC.

The study draws upon the historical documents, national legislations and international accords pertaining to the history of Cyprus in 1960-1983. To analyze historical sources and explore the topic, the study employs a variety of research methods such as a historical analysis and content analysis of written materials. After setting the background of the Cyprus conflict, the study will examine the key events and developments leading to the Turkish military intervention in 1974 and the creation of the TRNC. In this sense, the study argues that since the Greek Cypriots unilaterally and illegally usurped and monopolized the power in Cyprus in 1963, both the 1974 Turkish military intervention and the establishment of the TRNC were legitimate and morally justifiable.

Materials and methods

The study draws on relevant literature on the topic and historical data. In examining the research problem, we have analyzed various official diplomatic documents, international treaties and accords, the 1960 constitution of Cyprus and policy proposals. Specifically, we have conducted a historical analysis and content analysis of the 1959 Zürich and London accords, the 1960 the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance and other subsequent international agreements. These international treaties were central to the end of the British colonial rule in Cyprus and establishment of the Republic of Cyprus as a bicultural and bicomunal political entity. The 1959 Zürich agreement between Turkey and Greece laid the legal groundwork for the independence of Cyprus and its political system and the power sharing provisions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. This agreement was also important because it paved the way for the constitution of the state Cyprus, which came into force in August 1960. The 1959 Zürich agreement along with the London agreement highlighted the independence, territorial integrity and indivisibility of the state of Cyprus. Perhaps the most important aspect of these international treaties was ensuring peaceful coexistence and power sharing between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee reaffirmed the independence, territorial integrity and indivisibility of the state of Cyprus and stipulated that as the whole or in part Cyprus could join other states, and its territory could not be partitioned. Besides, the treaty stipulated that Britain, Greece and Turkey as the guaranteeing powers had the exclusive right to intervene if the independence and territorial integrity of the state of Cyprus would be at stake and threatened. All the provisions of the international treaties were incorporated into the 1960 constitution of Cyprus. The breach of these international treaties and the 1960 constitution by the Greek Cypriots in 1963 led to the 1974 Turkish military intervention and the establishment of the TRNC.

Examining and a critical analysis of these international accords and the constitution are essential for providing sound responses to the research questions of the study. As the study relies on official diplomatic documents and sources, the research is qualitative in its character. In this regard, the study utilizes methods of a historical analysis of data and a content analysis of various types of sources. These methods inform and guide our research and help us answer the research questions. Through the employment of methods of historical and content analysis, the study has conducted a systematic and critical analysis of a variety of data from books, journals, websites, letters, speeches and interviews. By using these methods, the study identifies and understands themes and patterns of the events pertaining to the Cyprus problem.

Results and Discussion

Setting the background

1960 was marked by the end of the colonial rule of Britain in Cyprus. During British rule over Cyprus, which had started in 1878 after three centuries of Ottoman rule, two distinct and conflicting nationalisms emerged and developed. On the one hand, Greek nationalism, and on other hand, Turkish nationalism gained momentum, which led to the division of the island along ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious lines. Papadakis, Peristianis and Welz point out that while Greek nationalism in Cyprus reflected in the ideology of ‘*enosis*’, as a response, Turkish nationalists strove for ‘*taksim*’ [1, p. 2]. In this regard, ‘*enosis*’ implied the union and unification of Greek Cypriots with Greece, whereas ‘*taksim*’ denoted the partition of the island between the two ethnic and cultural communities [1, p. 2]. Even before the departure of Britain, in the mid-1950s the Greek Cypriot ‘*enosis*’ struggle acquired the form of an armed insurgency and rebellion spearheaded by EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters). As a nationalist guerrilla organization of Greek Cypriots, EOKA pursued the goal of terminating the British colonial rule over Cyprus and ultimate unification with Greece [2, p. 4-5]. As a response to the rising Greek nationalism and armed resistance, in 1958, Turkish Cypriots created their own nationalist resistance movement – TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization). Thus, these two ethnic communities sought to achieve a conflicting and divergent aim. In turn, the British administration strove to exploit the division between Greek and Turkish Cypriots by co-opting Turkish Cypriots and enrolling them as auxiliary police forces [3, p. 46-47]. British policies and practices of divide and rule in Cyprus and the use of Turkish Cypriots as policemen against the EOKA guerrilla led to bloody interethnic clashes and conflicts [3, p. 47]. Yet eventually, Cyprus gained its independence from Britain in 1960 due to the deal between the two conflicting ethnic communities, Greek Cypriots who consisted of 80 percent of the island’s 600,000 population, and Turkish Cypriots whose share stood at 18 percent [1, p. 2]. Besides these two ethnic communities, Britain, Greece and Turkey were also involved in reaching a compromise solution [1, p. 2].

Papadakis, Peristianis and Welz draw attention to how the outcome of 1960 independence appeared not to meet the aspirations and expectations of either of the ethnic and cultural communities, which heralded the bloody protracted interethnic violence in Nicosia and other areas of the island [1, p. 2]. As Turkish communities constituted a minority and thereby the weaker part, were forced to suffer, being subjected to mass killing and ethnic cleansing. Studies provide a variety of data, yet it was documented that between 1963 and 1967, roughly 20 percent of Turkish Cypriots were subjected to displacement and were forced into refugee camps [4; 5]. Experiencing constant intimidation and terror by Greek Cypriots and at the same time, encouraged by their Turkish leadership, Turkish

Cypriots formed enclaves throughout the island. In 1964, the United Nations intervened into the conflict unfolding in Cyprus with the purpose of keeping stability and guarding the so-called Green Line, which is the line dividing the Greek and Turkish communities [6, p. 77]. Although in 1967 the tense situation on the island had stabilized, the ascension of a military junta in Greece disrupted the efforts to establish peace and reconciliation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The military junta in Greece propped up ultranationalists in Cyprus who opposed interethnic conciliation and advocated unification with Greece.

This in turn led to intra-ethnic strife within Greek Cypriots, which led to the 1974 coup, in which the president of the Republic of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios was removed from his office. The removal of Makarios from power was executed by pro-union factions known as EOKA B, which was backed by the junta in Greece. The takeover of ultranationalist pro-unionists backed by Greece soon prompted military intervention by Turkey. When ultranationalist pro-ensis factions under the leadership of Nikos Sampson backed by Greece seized power through a coup d'état in 1974, the Turkish government led by prime minister Bülent Ecevit closely observed unfolding events in Cyprus. The 1974 Turkish military intervention was preceded by several Turkish demands with respect to the situation on the island. Specifically, the Turkish government demanded that Greece should drop its support for Greek Cypriot pro-ensis factions led by Nikos Sampson, withdraw its troops from Cyprus and abide by the international obligations regarding the legal status of Cyprus. However, Greece rejected the demands of the Turkish government. Moreover, an envoy of the United States Joseph Sisco acted as an intermediary, putting greater efforts on convincing Greece to agree to Bülent Ecevit's demands, which included a joint Turkish-Cypriot control of the northern region of the island and initiate negotiations to establish a federal state [1, p. 3].

After all attempts to bring a viable solution to the Cyprus conflict failed to yield expected results and rejection of the Turkish demands by Greece, the Turkish prime minister Bülent Ecevit backed by his coalition partner Necmettin Erbakan decided to act unilaterally, yet in the spirit of the international treaties and obligations. On July 20, 1974, Turkish military forces intervened. The Turkish intervention immediately caused the fall of the military junta in Greece and the removal of the leader of pro-ensis factions in Cyprus Nikos Sampson. The advancement of Turkish military forces prompted the mass movement of Greek Cypriots southward, while Turkish Cypriots moved northward. Studies highlight that the Turkish intervention and advancement inflicted suffering and heavy losses on Greek Cypriots, specifically over a third of Greek Cypriots were forced to flee their homes [1, p. 3].

International and constitutional foundations of the Republic of Cyprus

The end of the British colonial rule and independence of Cyprus preceded by international treaties, upon which Cyprus emerged as a sovereign political entity. The legal and political basis of the state of Cyprus were laid in 1959-1960, which ultimately resulted in the sovereign state of Cyprus on August 16, 1960. The constitution of the Republic of Cyprus resulted from the Zürich agreement between Greece and Turkey on February 11, 1959, and the London agreement on February 19, 1959 [7]. The provisions of the Zürich agreement between Greece and Turkey were incorporated into the London agreement, which Britain was part of as well. The representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots accepted the provisions of the Zürich and London agreements and consented to the agreed terms for the final settlement of the Cyprus problem [7]. These agreements served as the legal foundations for the 1960 the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance and the constitution of Cyprus, which were signed by Britain, Greece, Turkey and the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia on August 16, 1960 [7].

To be more precise, in February 1959, the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey as well as the leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus Archbishop Makarios III and Fazıl Küçük negotiated and agreed to the London and Zürich treaties on the basis of which a constitution of Cyprus was drafted and agreed. In accordance with the London and Zürich treaties, which drafted Cyprus's constitution, envisioned the establishment of a legitimate nation state in Cyprus predicated on peace, stability, harmony, peaceful coexistence, equality and power sharing between the two ethnic, cultural and religious communities inhabiting the island [8]. The London and Zürich treaties of February 1959 stated that the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey were the guarantors of the independence, territorial integrity and constitution of Cyprus as a state, which ought to be inserted in the future constitution of the state of Cyprus [8]. The article 22 of the London and Zürich treaties stipulated that the total or partial unification of the Republic of Cyprus with any other state as well as any idea of the partition of the island ought to be excluded and proscribed [8].

In fact, it was Greece and Turkey who had drafted and agreed upon the character and constitution of the state of Cyprus on February 11, 1959 [9]. The Constitution and the Treaties, agreed upon in Zürich and London in February 1959, entered into force August 16, 1960. Here basically all the terms of the London and Zürich treaties were enshrined in the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee was signed by Britain, Greece and Turkey was the signatory state. The article I of the treaty stipulated that the Republic of Cyprus, as an independent political entity recognized by the three major external signatory countries, was obliged to ensure the maintenance of its sovereignty, security, territorial integrity as well as the constitution of the country, which

granted equal rights and protection to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots [10]. In addition, the Republic of Cyprus was obliged to undertake “not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island” [10]. Thus, according to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots were obliged to adhere to the treaty and the constitution of the country. The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee also stipulated the rights and obligations of Britain, Greece and Turkey. Specifically, these three powers as the guarantors of the treaty were obliged to recognize, respect and guarantee the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity as well as the terms of the constitution of Cyprus [10]. Besides granting the recognition and guarantee, the three powers were obliged to prevent and rule out any attempts to incorporate Cyprus into any other state or divide the island [10]. The 1960 treaty also stated explicitly that in the event of a violation of the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee, the three powers first ought to consult together with reference to what measures necessary to undertake in order to restore the constitutional order on the island and the compliance with the provisions [10]. If joint concerted actions may fail or may not be feasible, each of the three guaranteeing powers had the right to take needed steps with the purpose of restoring the state of affairs stipulated in the treaty [10].

Thus, the Zürich accord of 1959, the London accord of 1959, and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee came into existence as a result of negotiations and agreements between Britain, Greece, Turkey as well as the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. They in turn gave birth to the constitution of Cyprus and the state of Cyprus. According to the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, the state of Cyprus was a democratic society with equal rights of all its citizens, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots [11]. The international treaties and the constitution placed legal constraints and barriers on the possible domination of one ethnic group over another, ensuring equal rights and opportunities between the majority Greek Cypriots and the minority Turkish Cypriots. Despite the demographic primacy of the Greeks, the constitution ensured that power would be shared by both communities, in which the president of Cyprus would be Greek, while vice-president Turk [11]. The president and vice-president would share power, notably most crucial executive powers. They both had the right to veto any law or decision by the Council of Ministers concerning foreign affairs, defence, security and other matters [11]. Article 3 clearly granted both Greek and Turkish the status of the official languages of Cyprus [11].

A prominent American expert in international law Monroe Leigh indicates that the basic articles of the constitution of Cyprus were designed to ensure equality and equal rights of both ethnic communities and their rights to share power and all the attributes of sovereignty [12]. As the binding international

treaties and the constitution granted equal legal and political status to both Greek and Turkish communities, they pledged to establish a single state on the island and govern that state together on an equal footing [12]. Moreover, the articles of the constitution ensured that neither Greeks nor Turks could take unilateral actions without the other's consent [12]. The constitution contained all the provisions of the international treaties concluded in 1959-1960 with respect guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity and indivisibility of the Republic of Cyprus [11]. Since the 1959 Zürich and London accords as well as the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance had constitutional force, they could not be amended or repealed [11]. The article 185 stipulated that the state of Cyprus would be one and indivisible and thereby any attempts to incorporate the island in whole or in part as well as any separatist movement would be excluded [11].

The end of the inclusive Greco-Turkish political regime in Cyprus in 1963

Leigh draws attention to how this meticulously balanced and internationally sanctioned political regime turned out to be short-lived, lasting only three years [12]. The constitutional order and balance of power were shattered by the Greek Cypriots when in November 1963, the president of the Republic of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios publicly put forth 13 points with the intention to change and amend the constitution of Cyprus in favor of the Greek majority [13, p. 22; 14, p. 2; 15, p. 62; 16, p. 254; 17, p. 83]. The breach of the international binding accords and the 1960 constitution by the Greek Cypriots in November 1963 is attributed by scholars to the tacit and overt objection of the leaders of the Greek majority to the status quo on the island in the aftermath of independence [18, p. 300]. In this regard, Calvo-coressi point out that in fact the Greek Cypriots had accepted the international treaties and the constitution with great reluctance, including Archbishop Makarios who had even declared them unworkable [18, p. 300]. Moreover, many ultranationalist Greek Cypriots who strongly adhered to 'enosis', that is political unification of the island with Greece, believed that the consent of the Greek Cypriots to the international treaties and an idea of coexistence with the Turkish Cypriots was tantamount to the betrayal of the cause of 'enosis' [18, p. 300]. The dream of merging with Greece was disrupted by the international accords. Nonetheless, the Greek Cypriots shared Makarios's view that the constitution turned out to be unworkable and could not be implemented [19, p. 38]. This was because the Greek majority outrightly rejected any idea of legal, civil and political equality with the Turkish minority.

Ultrationalism and extremism of Greek Cypriots in collusion with right-wing chauvinists and hawks in Greece were about to take apart the island. They coveted the whole island through unleashing unspeakable terror and atrocities against Turkish Cypriots, subjecting them to mass killing, ethnic cleansing and expulsion. They sought to translate their demographic primacy into political dominance over the Turkish minority by brazenly violating the

fundamental provisions of the 1960 constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and the international treaties. The materialization of enosis would threaten the very existence of the Turkish communities in Cyprus. Furthermore, the amalgamation of Cyprus with Greece would lead to the replication of the Crete scenario of the first quarter of the 20th century when owing to the rebellion of Greeks in Crete against the Ottoman Empire and their subsequent merge with Greece in 1908, which resulted in the ethnic cleansing and mass expulsion of Turkish Cretans. The Turkish Cypriots rightly indicated that the president Makarios's proposal to amend the constitution resembled the Akritas Plan, which was intended to ensure the Greek dominance over the island at the expense of the Turkish community [19, p. 38; 20, p. 52; 21, p. 21; 22, p. 249]. The Akritas Plan was developed by pro-enosis Greek ultranationalists with the aim to break the backbone of the Turkish Cypriots and fully subjugate them before the external help would arrive, namely before Turkey would intervene [20, p. 52]. The constitutional amendment proposals by Makarios and the Greek pressure on the Turks to accept them were seen by the Turkish Cypriots as the flagrant violation of the international treaties and the constitution and as intentional assaults on their inalienable constitutional, civil and political rights [18, p. 300].

To translate their plan into practice and force their will upon the Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Cypriots unleashed large-scale violence and terror on Turkish communities. The Turkish side perceived the unfolding events since Makarios had made his proposals as attempts by the Greek Cypriots to monopolize the power, limit and ultimately exclude the Turkish Cypriots from power, legitimizing their absolute domination and subordination of the Turkish Cypriots. Besides, the Turkish side suspected that the ultimate goal of the Greek Cypriots was to implement 'enosis', full incorporation of the island into Greece. Despite the fact that Turkish communities across the island were subjected to extreme violence and terror, the Turkish Cypriot forwarded their request, conveyed by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), to restore their power accorded by the constitution and take their seats in the government and other state bodies [19, p. 37]. Yet the Greek side rejected the request and forwarded their demand that the Turkish Cypriots ought to accept significant limitations to their political rights and powers [19, p. 37]. As can be seen, despite the request of the Turkish Cypriots to take their official positions in power, being eager to impose their majority rule, the Greek Cypriots intentionally blocked the constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriots. In this regard, Dodd indicates that this event refutes the claims of the Greek Cypriots that since 1963 the government of Cyprus has operated without the engagement of the Turkish Cypriots, who allegedly disengaged themselves from their responsibilities and duties [19, p. 37].

The Turkish Cypriots were convinced that bi-communalism and peaceful coexistence of the two ethnic communities came to an end with the brazen usurpation and monopolization of the power by the Greek Cypriots in 1963. In this case, the Turkish Cypriots claim that the breach of the international treaties, the constitution, usurpation of the power, systematic terror and violence, exclusion of the Turkish communities and imposition of the blockade on Turkish enclaves by the Greek Cypriots left the Turkish Cypriots with no option other than take the matter into their hands and govern themselves within the enclaves where they were confined [19, p. 37-38]. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriots maintained that by violating the international treaties and the constitution, the Greek Cypriots drastically and dramatically altered the economic, legal, political and social balance in their favor at the expense of the Turkish Cypriots. Even if the Greek Cypriots came to the conclusion that the constitution turned out to be unworkable, instead of resorting to terror to impose their rule on the Turkish Cypriots, they should have addressed this crucial issue in a constitutional and constructive way by engaging the Turkish Cypriots as well as Britain, Greece and Turkey as the guaranteeing powers.

Since the Greek majority were not able to impose their will upon the Turkish minority by peaceful means, soon the Greek side resorted to violence to translate their aim into reality and achieve their paramount goal of domination of the island and subjugation of the Turkish side. In his study, Hughes-Wilson refers to a Greek Cypriot General George Karayiannis who in June 1965 stated that when the Turkish side outrightly turned down Makarios's constitutional plan, the Greek side decided to leverage their demographic, political and military advantage to force the Turkish Cypriots to kneel down before the Greek majority and accept their reduced status [23]. Moreover, George Karayiannis mentioned the "Akritas" plan devised by the Greek Cypriots to wipe out the Turkish communities and integrate the island with Greece [23]. In this regard, Papadakis calls attention to subsequent terror unleashed by the Greek Cypriots, and ensuing intercommunal and interethnic conflict between 1963-1967, in which as the weaker side, the Turkish communities suffered the greater losses [24, p. 152]. Numerous Turkish Cypriots were subjected to mass terror and ethnic cleansing, being compelled to abandon their homes and moving to areas of the island that later became enclaves under their rule and control [24, p. 152].

Yilmaz describes the period between 1963-1974 as the time of Turkish grief and suffering as they were forced to flee their homes and move into other areas, namely enclaves which constituted only 5 percent of the island, in contrast, before 1963, they had owned roughly 30 percent of the island's territory [17, p. 84]. The Greek Cypriot assaults led to the chain of bloody events known as "Bloody Christmas", in which in December 1963 and the following 1964 many Turkish were killed and ethnically cleansed [25, p. 120]. It was estimated that in

1963-1964, roughly 25,000 Turkish Cypriots or around a quarter of the Turkish population of the island were expelled from their homes [13, p. 3; 14, p. 9; 25, p. 120]. In contrast, the number of Greek Cypriots being forced to abandon their homes was estimated to stand at 700, including 500 Armenians who were also displaced [13, p. 3; 14, p. 9]. In the period between December 1963 and August 1964, the Turkish Cypriots were compelled to abandon their homes from 72 mixed and 24 pure Turkish villages [14, p. 9].

The role of external actors in addressing the Cyprus problem

As all the international accords of 1959-1960 leading to the establishment of the bi-national and bi-cultural state of Cyprus and its constitution were flagrantly breached by the Greek Cypriot majority, Turkey and Britain as the guarantor powers of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus threatened to intervene to bring an end to the conflict and restore order prescribed by the constitution [23]. First, Britain installed its military troops in Cyprus, which was followed by the United Nations who dispatched its peacekeeping force known as the UNFICYP. Yet the involvement of Britain and the United Nations were not insufficient to pacify the island and reinstate the constitutional order. In this case, Hughes-Wilson stresses that the Turkish Cypriots as a minority were turned into refugees in their own land and became frightened of further Greek violence and terror [23]. Only external power who had the willingness and capacity to put an end to the plight of the Turkish Cypriots and restore the constitutional order was Turkey who had the right and obligation to do so in accordance with the 1959-1960 international treaties. Although Turkey was ready and eager to militarily intervene in the conflict in Cyprus, the United States foiled Turkey's military engagement [18, p. 301]. In his letter to prime minister of Turkey İsmet İnönü on June 5, 1964, president of the United States Lyndon Baines Johnson although acknowledged Turkey's right to intervene under the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, the American president highlighted that such move by Turkey would lead to the partition of the island, which was not permissible [8].

President Lyndon Johnson emphasized that Turkish intervention would put Turkey and Greece on the verge of war, which was unthinkable and unacceptable due to the fact that both nations were part of NATO, whose members would not be allowed to engage militarily with one another [8]. Referring to Germany and France who had been able to bury the hatchet and cease their centuries-old animosity by becoming NATO members, the American president advised that Turkey and Greece ought to do exactly the same as NATO allies [8]. Moreover, Lyndon Johnson drew İnönü's attention to the possible involvement of the Soviet Union if Turkey would launch its intervention [8]. Johnson stressed that if the Soviet Union would engage in the Cyprus conflict because of the Turkish military move, its NATO allies may not come to rescue Turkey [8]. Moreover, Johnson emphasized the obligations of Turkey as a member of the UN and how the UN

forces were engaged in peacekeeping operations and contributing to reducing the incidents of violence in Cyprus [8]. In the end, Johnson called on İsmet İnönü to show restraint, delay and refrain from military actions. In his response to Johnson, İsmet İnönü pointed out that although the Turkish government had postponed its decision to exercise its right of a unilateral action in Cyprus bestowed by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, the American president's message was disappointing for Turkey as the US ally [8]. Furthermore, İnönü called attention to the exigency and significance of a military intervention in Cyprus on the strength of Treaty of Guarantee, which had been felt several times since the December of 1963 [8].

Thus, all attempts of the Turkish government under the leadership of İnönü to exercise its right to militarily intervene in Cyprus to restore the constitutional order were primarily thwarted by the US. On the other hand, as British involvement was limited and futile, Britain shunned addressing the Cyprus problem and sought to hand it over to NATO [26, p. 36-37]. Although Greece and Turkey were in favor of the British proposal, the president of Cyprus Makarios exhibited his objection and other members of NATO were less willing to get involved in this conflict [18, p. 301]. When it had become clear that NATO's engagement was out of question, Britain consented to the involvement of the UN [26, p. 37]. As a result, on March 4, 1964, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 186, which established the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) [26, p. 37; 27]. In March 1964, when Turkey was about to carry out a military operation in Cyprus, the UN intervened with peacekeeping forces from Canada, Ireland, Denmark, Finland and Sweden [18, p. 301].

According to the UN Security Council Resolution 186, the conflict in Cyprus was seen as a threat to international peace, stability and security [27]. Therefore, the UN Security Council called on all members to refrain from the threat or from using force against independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus [27]. Besides, the UN Security Council called on the government of Cyprus to take all necessary steps to put an end to bloodshed and conflict on the island [27]. In relation to resolution 186, Ker-Lindsay draws attention to the fact that despite the absence of the Turkish representatives, the UN SC referred to the government of Cyprus, entirely dominated by the Greek Cypriots, as an internationally recognized legitimate political regime [26, p. 37-38]. In this regard, the UN as the highest international authority seems to have deliberately disregarded the inalienable rights of the Turkish Cypriotes accorded to them by the international treaties and the 1960 constitution, and at the same time, legitimized the unlawful seizure of the power by the Greek Cypriots. Ker-Lindsay highlights that this situation has persisted to this day, which is deeply resented by the Turkish side, who insist that without their inclusion and participation, any government of Cyprus is in fact illegal [26, p. 38].

In accordance with resolution 186, the UN appointed an ad hoc mediator,

who was tasked with facilitating negotiations between the parties and peaceful settlement of the Cyprus conflict [27]. Yet it should be noted that overall, the UN appointed two mediators, namely Sakari Tuomioja, a Finnish diplomat, and Galo Plaza Lasso, an Ecuadorian statesman, who appeared to sympathize with the Greek Cypriot cause. Despite having recognized the Cyprus conflict as an international issue, the first mediator Sakari Tuomioja came to believe that Cyprus's eventual integration with Greece was the most appropriate solution to the problem [26, p. 38]. After Tuomioja's sudden death, the UN appointed Plaza Lasso who although shared his predecessor's vision regarding eventual incorporation of Cyprus into Greece, he argued that enosis ought to be faded into the background for the meanwhile. Notwithstanding, Plaza Lasso also explicitly favored the Greek Cypriot cause, underlying that the Turkish Cypriots ought to discard their demands for a federal state and consent to the Greek majority rule [26, p. 38]. Plaza Lasso's proposal angered the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, who demanded his resignation, whereas the Greek Cypriots rejected the appointment of a different mediator. In fact, Plaza Lasso was the last official UN mediator in Cyprus [26, p. 39].

The 1974 Turkish intervention and the establishment of the TRNC

With the usurpation and monopolization of the power, the government of the Republic of Cyprus transformed into an ethnocratic regime solely under the rule of the Greek Cypriots, who have since claimed to be the sole legitimate government of the state of Cyprus established in 1960 based on the international treaties and the constitution [13, p. 13]. The Greek Cypriot majority preferred only a government dominated by them and an exclusivist discriminatory political status for the Turkish Cypriots. Yet their unchanging and ultimate goal was enosis. The Greek Cypriots were convinced that only Turkey had the ability to seriously threaten and eventually dismantle their plan for domination and enosis. As a result, from the beginning, the Greek Cypriots feared any idea of Turkish military intervention [20, p. 53]. For that reason, the Greek Cypriots sought to subdue the Turkish Cypriots through coercion, intimidation and violence to get their acquiescence to the Greek majority rule and then to enosis with Greece. They tried to accomplish their aim within a short time before Turkey could contemplate a military intervention. Yet as Dodd points out, the Greek Cypriots underestimated the ability and agency of the Turkish Cypriots to fight and defend themselves [20, p. 53]. Papadakis, Peristianis and Welz call attention to the collective amnesia of the Greek Cypriots in relation to the bloody events and atrocities committed by the Greek majority between 1963-1974 [1, p. 12]. At the same time, these scholars pay attention to narratives among the Turkish Cypriots regarding their collective persecution and suffering in 1963-1974. To be precise, the Turkish Cypriots came to perceive that period as the decisive and turning point in their history, which clearly proved that their peaceful coexistence with

the Greek Cypriots was out of question and thereby the only viable option was to create a separate political entity [1, p. 12].

After 1967, bi-communal clashes and conflicts in Cyprus subsided. Although the Greek Cypriots could not subdue the Turkish side, due to their greater strength, they managed to confine the Turkish Cypriots in the ghettos or small enclaves. In these ethnic ghettos, the Turkish Cypriots did not feel safe and lived in constant fear and terror of persecution and killing by the Greek Cypriots. The ultimate goal of the Greek Cypriots and their president Archbishop Makarios remained enosis. In this case, Bora describes Makarios as an extremist and a fanatical pro-enosis leader, who never diverged from his course [28, p. 36]. Makarios announced that he would not abide by the provisions of the international accords and the 1960 constitution, which stressed peaceful coexistence between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and power sharing and prohibited any attempts to undermine the independence and territorial integrity of the state of Cyprus. Yet Makarios and his followers considered the international accords and the constitution as a temporary measure and a stepping-stone towards enosis and integration with Greece [23]. Bora attributes the breach of the 1960 constitution and ensuing bloody bi-communal hostilities and conflict to Makarios's reckless decisions and actions [28, p. 36-37].

1967 was marked by the reduction of intercommunal hostilities and the rise of a military junta in Greece who was profoundly committed to enosis and an idea of a Greater Greece [19, p. 130]. The advent of a military junta ruled by extremist nationalists had serious repercussions for Cyprus and a balance of power in the region. Specifically, Papadakis points out that although the Greek Cypriots and their leader Makarios remained strongly committed to enosis and saw integration with Greece as an ideal solution to the problem, the government of Cyprus exhibited caution and shunned any close cooperation with the fascist regime in Greece [24, p. 152]. Papadakis highlights that even though Makarios always prioritized enosis, he openly abhorred the military junta in Greece, which was perceived by him as an overtly odious fascist, extremist and anticommunist regime [24, p. 152]. Moreover, the president Makarios allied himself with the Greek communists (AKEL), who would have lost their ground and been subjected to persecution, had he opted for enosis with Greece [24, p. 152]. Moreover, the protracted crisis in Cyprus convinced Makarios that enosis was now unattainable and a distant goal [25, p. 147]. As a result, Makarios had to postpone enosis until a favorable political regime would be established in Greece. Therefore, in the eyes of the Greek junta, Makarios became a serious obstacle to enosis and thereby his removal was a paramount task. This in turn led to a civil war among Greek Cypriots [29, p. 131]. Since the leaders of the junta viewed Cyprus as an extension of Greece, they sought to carry out enosis. In June 1971, the Greek junta forwarded proposals to the president Makarios about the establishment of a

‘unitary state’ with the incorporation of Cyprus into Greece [20, p. 97]. However, Makarios rejected the proposals, which angered the junta and its leader Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos [20, p. 97].

In November 1973, Georgios Papadopoulos was toppled from power by a Greek officer Dimitrios Ioannidis who replaced him as the new leader of the junta [30, p. 328]. Unlike Papadopoulos, Ioannidis was more committed to enosis and eager to remove Makarios. As a hard-liner, Ioannidis decided to carry out a coup against Makarios in Cyprus in early 1974 [20, p. 103-104]. Despite having been aware of the imminent Turkish intervention in case of Greek intervention in Cyprus, Ioannidis disregarded this danger [20, p. 104]. In January 1974, Bülent Ecevit came to power in Turkey, who held a more recalcitrant and unyielding attitude towards the Cyprus problem. Yet this could not hold back Ioannidis in his attempts to overthrow Makarios and establish Greek primacy over the island. In this regard, Dodd indicates that Ioannidis was moving towards trouble and his fall [20, p. 104]. Among Greek Cypriots, the head of EOKA George Grivas was an ardent supporter of unification with Greece. In 1971, Grivas created EOKA-B with the goal of advancing his agenda of enosis. After the death of Grivas in early 1971, a member of EOKA, an ardent Greek Cypriot nationalist and pro-enosis figure, Nikos Sampson was backed by the junta in Athens. With the support of Greek army officers, EOKA-B militants engaged in terrorism and unleashed a campaign of intimidation and mass killings against Makarios and his communist allies [24, p. 152]. The turmoil in Cyprus soon developed into the Greek civil war in which at least 3,000 supporters of Makarios were killed by EOKA-B militants and junta officers [23]. Having witnessed an unfolding civil war and fratricide in the Greek part of Cyprus, many Turkish Cypriots stressed that nothing good should be expected from Greeks who were butchering one another, and they would show no mercy to Muslim Turks as their historical foes [28, p. 38].

On July 15, 1974, Ioannidis staged a coup against the president Makarios through the National Guard composed of Greek officers [30, p. 329]. According to Evryviadis, the coup against Makarios was orchestrated by Athens and carried out by junta officers stationed in Cyprus [31]. Evryviadis also notes that Ioannidis demanded from Nikos Sampson to bring him the head of Makarios [31]. Scholars emphasize the sheer incompetence of the junta in Athens in engineering a coup in Cyprus [31]. Yet Makarios was able to escape from Cyprus with the help of Britain. The Greek junta chose Nikos Sampson as the president of Cyprus. Hughes-Wilson argues that on the orders of Ioannidis, Nikos Sampson and his EOKA-B terrorists were about to carry out mass extermination of the Turkish Cypriots and implement full unification with Greece [23]. Later Nikos Sampson divulged the plan of genocide of the Turkish Cypriots, stating that “Had Turkey not intervened, I would not only have proclaimed enosis, but I would have annihilated the Turks in Cyprus as well” [23]. Yet this long-awaited plan of ethnic

cleansing was thwarted by a swift and effective Turkish military intervention on July 20, 1974, which prompted the downfall of the junta in Athens and the Sampson regime in Cyprus.

The 1959-1960 international treaties accorded external powers such as Britain, Greece and Turkey to intervene should the constitutional order in Cyprus established in 1960 be threatened and dismantled. As soon as the Greek junta in Athens spearheaded a military coup in Cyprus, predicted on the authority conferred by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, the Turkish government under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit launched a military intervention known as a “Peace Operation”, “Operation Attila” and the “Conqueror of Cyprus” (“Kıbrıs Fatihi”) in Turkey [32, 33, p. 97]. Turkey’s military intervention was justified by its leaders as an attempt to restore the constitutional order and safeguard the Turkish Cypriots from further persecution and terror imposed by the Greek side [30, 329-331]. Before undertaking a military intervention, the Turkish government led by Bülent Ecevit followed all necessary procedures as they were stipulated in the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. After the coup in Cyprus, Turkey immediately consulted with the British side, calling on Britain to exercise its right to intervene under article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee [28, p. 39]. However, Britain refrained from intervening, thereby leaving no option for Turkey other than to take this matter into its hands. In the early morning on July 20, 1974, prime minister Bülent Ecevit announced via Turkish National Radio about the decision of his government to launch a military operation in Cyprus [36, p. 1]. In his statement, Bülent Ecevit highlighted that Turkish action was “a great service to all mankind and to peace... We in fact are going to carry peace and not war to the island, and not only to the Turks but also to the Greeks... We have had to make this decision after we had exhausted all diplomatic and political methods” [36, p. 1].

The Turkish military was able to advance and establish its control over 38 percent of Cyprus, eventually dividing it into the southern section under Greek Cypriot control and the northern area under the Turkish Cypriot rule [17, p. 84; 30, p. 332]. Turkish military intervention did not last long yet prompted a great humanitarian catastrophe in Cyprus. It is estimated that roughly 180,000 Greek Cypriots were forced to flee to the south, while about 50,000 Turkish Cypriots were compelled to move to the north [28, p. 40]. O’Malley and Craig provide different data in relation to the number of refugees caused by Turkish intervention [36, p. 221]. Out of the 600,000 population of Cyprus at that time, around 200,000 Greek and 60,000 Turkish Cypriots were uprooted [36, p. 221]. According to the reports by the government of Cyprus, 16,000 Greek Cypriots became casualties, of which 4000 lost their lives and others were wounded and disappeared [36, p. 221]. An estimated 1000 Turkish Cypriots lost their lives or were missing [36, p. 221]. In Sakkas’s estimation, roughly 250,000 people were forcefully expelled from their homes [30, p. 332].

Despite the paramount goal of Turkish military intervention was to restore the 1960 constitutional order in Cyprus [30, p. 331], the Greek side and their proponents increasingly question the validity of the Turkish rationale for intervention [37]. The Greek Cypriots, Greece as well as the European Union have since placed the blame on Turkey, arguing that Turkish intervention was the starting point of the Cyprus issue in international affairs [33, p. 97]. The Greek and Greek Cypriot narratives claim that the incompetent and treasonous junta in Greece in conjunction with its thugs in Cyprus staged a coup, which provoked a Turkish military intervention and the division of the island [30, p. 332; 34, p. 333]. Besides the junta, the Greek tend to place the blame upon the United States who was allegedly in favor of Turkish military intervention [30, p. 332]. The Greek narratives view the uprooting of Greek Cypriots in 1974 as the second national catastrophe after the Greek exodus from Asia Minor in 1923 [30, p. 332]. Anastasakis and Lagos argue that Cyprus was the ultimate casualty of the Greek junta's reckless behavior and its coup against Makarios [38, p. 341]. As opposed to this discourse, the Turkish narratives tend to consider the "Peace Operation" as an outcome of addressing the Cyprus problem [33, p. 97]. Moreover, as opposed to the Greek narratives, counter-narratives promoted by the Turkish Cypriots claim that the history of living together has shown the impossibility and infeasibility of coexistence with the Greek Cypriots and a single state [24, p. 152]. The arguments forwarded by the Turkish Cypriots proved to be accurate and sound in 2004 when 76 percent of Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan plan about the reunification of the two ethno-cultural and religious communities into a single nation, while 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots approved the plan [28, p. 40]. Thus, despite all efforts of Turkey to restore the constitutional order and ensure reconciliation, they were in vain. Therefore, the "Peace Operation" eventually led to a separate Turkish Cypriot political entity and establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 [33, p. 97].

Conclusion

The study has sought to explore the historical background of the Cyprus problem and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The results of the study have helped us understand the historical, legal and political basis of the Cyprus conflict and the legitimacy of the TRNC. The key argument of the study is that the 1974 Turkish intervention and the creation of the TRNC were legitimate and morally justifiable because the Greek majority in Cyprus unilaterally and illegally usurped and monopolized the power and excluded the Turkish Cypriots in 1963. Breaching the 1960 constitution and hijacking the power by the Greek Cypriots and their violence against the Turkish Cypriots led to the establishment of two separate political entities in Cyprus. Yet despite the Greek majority usurped the power in 1963 by violating the provisions of the international accords and the

constitution, international community has recognized the Republic of Cyprus under the Greek rule as the sole legitimate government of Cyprus, while denying the Turkish Cypriots their right to self-determination and the legitimacy to the TRNC. Therefore, the study has shed some light on historical, legal and political barriers to the recognition of the TRNC, as well as on the root causes of the exclusion of the Turkish Cypriots and monopolization of power in Cyprus by the Greek majority.

The findings of the study have shown that although the international community has extended its recognition to the state of Cyprus under the Greek Cypriot control, the establishment of the nation state of the Turkish Cypriots has been legitimate. Despite all the legitimacy of the TRNC, except Turkey, other members of the United Nations and other international actors have not recognized the TRNC. A deeper and critical analysis of sources, relevant literature and historical events between 1960-1983 has demonstrated that the Republic of Cyprus under the Greek Cypriot rule ought to be viewed as an illegitimate political entity because the president Makarios's constitutional amendment proposals and subsequent seizure of the power by the Greek Cypriots were illegal acts and the flagrant violation of the 1960 constitution. Despite the Greek Cypriot breach of the international treaties and the 1960 constitution, the international community seems not to consider it as such. As stipulated in the international treaties and the constitution of 1960 leading to the creation of the state of Cyprus, the Republic of Cyprus was a bicultural and bicomunal state of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Yet 1963 the Greek majority was seeking to change the political system in their favor by achieving the Greek dominated state where the Turkish Cypriots would be reduced to a tiny minority with a second-class citizen status. Moreover, by usurping the power, the Greek Cypriots sought enosis or unification with Greece, which was also a flagrant violation of the international accords and the constitution of 1960.

Despite being a signatory of the international treaties and one of the guaranteeing powers of the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, Greece also sought enosis and ultimate incorporation of Cyprus. The Greek junta established in 1967 was striving for unification of Cyprus with Greece. On July 15, 1974, Greek officers and militants of EOKA-B with the sponsorship of the junta in Athens carried out a coup d'état against the government led by Makarios. This brazen breach of the international accords and the constitution of Cyprus by Greek Cypriot extremists and the Greek junta provoked the Turkish military intervention in five days after the coup. On the one hand, the Turkish intervention brought about the downfall of the Greek junta and Greek Cypriot extremists. On the other hand, it promoted the ultimate division of the island into two parts along the ethnic lines and the creation of the TRNC. The Turkish Cypriots eventually established their own national political entity as they had become convinced that bi-communalism and peaceful coexistence of

the two ethnic communities had long come to an end. Since November of 1963, the Greek side has been unwilling to put the clock back and restore the pre-1963 constitutional order; hence, the only option before the Turkish Cypriots has been to create their own state. Therefore, Turkic states of Central Asia ought to take necessary steps towards the recognition of the TRNC.

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КИПР МӘСЕЛЕСІНІҢ ЭВОЛЮЦИЯСЫ ЖӘНЕ СОЛТҮСТІК КИПР ТҮРІК РЕСПУБЛИКАСЫНЫҢ ҚҰРЫЛУЫ

***Жұматай Ф.Б.¹**

***¹ Нархоз университеті, Алматы, Қазақстан**

Аңдатпа. Мақалада халықаралық қатынастардағы Кипр проблемасының алғышарттары мен туындауы, сондай-ақ 1974 жылы түрік әскери интервенциясына және Солтүстік Кипр Түрік Республикасының (СКТР) құрылуына алып келген оқиғалар желісі қарастырылады және талданады. Бұл зерттеу Қазақстан, Түркіменстан және Өзбекстанның СКТР-ді сепаратистік заңсыз құрылым ретінде қарастыратын БҰҰ Қауіпсіздік Кеңесінің 1983 жылғы 541 және 550 қарарларын орындау міндеттемесіне байланысты соңғы оқиғалардың аясында өзекті және маңызды болып табылады. Осы тұрғыдан алғанда, зерттеу Кипр Республикасының құрылуынан бастап СКТР-дің құрылуына дейінгі 1960 және 1983 жылдар арасындағы негізгі тарихи оқиғалар желісін қарастырады. Зерттеуде тарихи талдау және контент талдау әдістері қолданылады. Осы әдістерді пайдалана отырып, зерттеу ресми дипломатиялық құжаттарды, халықаралық

шарттарды, 1960 жылғы Кипр конституциясын және басқа да дереккөздерді талдайды. Сонымен қатар зерттеуде жетекші ғалымдар мен сарапшылардың ғылыми еңбектері пайдаланылды. СКТР-дің құрылуын халықаралық қауымдастық 1960 жылғы халықаралық шарттармен үйлеспейді, сондықтан заңсыз деп санайды. Алайда, зерттеу нәтижелері бұл келісімдер мен Кипрдің 1960 жылғы конституциясын кипрлік гректер аса өрескелдікпен бұзғанын көрсетіп берді. Билікті біржақты және заңсыз басып алған демографиялық басымдыққа ие кипрлік гректер грек хунтасымен бірігіп, Кипр мемлекетін жойып, оны Грекиямен біріктіруді көздеді. Кипрлік гректер мен Грекияның халықаралық шарттарды және 1960 жылғы конституцияны өрескел бұзуы 1974 жылы шілдеде Түркияның әскери интервенциясына, аралдың екіге бөлінуіне және СКТР-ның құрылуына тікелей түрткі болды. Өз кезегінде СКТР-дың құрылуы Кипр мәселесінің шешілуінің жалғыз дұрыс шешімі деген тұжырым ұсынылады.

Тірек сөздер: Кипр, Грекия, Түркия, кипрлік гректер, кипрлік түріктер, СКТР, келісім, интервенция

ЭВОЛЮЦИЯ КИПРСКОЙ ПРОБЛЕМЫ И ВОЗНИКНОВЕНИЕ ТУРЕЦКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ СЕВЕРНОГО КИПРА

*Жұматай Ф.Б.¹

^{*1} Университет Нархоз, Алматы, Казахстан

Аннотация. В статье исследуются и анализируются предыстория и генезис кипрской проблемы в международных отношениях, а также события, приведшие к турецкому военному вмешательству 1974 года и созданию Турецкой Республики Северного Кипра (ТРСК). Данная исследовательская проблема актуальна и значима на фоне недавних событий, связанных с обязательством Казахстана, Туркменистана и Узбекистана соблюдать резолюции Совета Безопасности ООН 541 и 550 1983 года, которые рассматривают ТРСК как сепаратистское незаконное образование. С этой точки зрения в исследовании рассматриваются ключевые исторические события между 1960 и 1983 годами с момента создания Республики Кипр до образования ТРСК. В исследовании используются методы исторического анализа и контент-анализа. С помощью этих методов в исследовании изучаются и анализируются официальные дипломатические документы, международные договоры, конституция Кипра 1960 года и другие первоисточники. Кроме того, в исследовании использованы научные труды ведущих ученых и экспертов. Создание ТРСК рассматривается международным сообществом как несовместимое с международными договорами 1960 года и, следовательно, недействительное. Однако результаты исследования показали, что нарушение договоров и конституции Кипра 1960 года было совершено греками-киприотами. Односторонне и

незаконно захватив власть, греческое большинство в сговоре с греческой хунтой намеревалось упразднить государство Кипр и объединить его с Грецией. Вопиющее нарушение международных договоров и конституции 1960 года как греками-киприотами, так и Грецией спровоцировало турецкую военную интервенцию в июле 1974 года, раздел острова и создание ТРСК как единственного жизнеспособного решения кипрской проблемы.

Ключевые слова: Кипр, Греция, Турция, греки-киприоты, турки-киприоты, ТРСК, договор, интервенция

Information about author:

Zhumatay Gabit - Candidate of historical sciences, Associate Professor, School of Law and Public Policy, Narxoz University, Almaty, Kazakhstan, e-mail: gzhumatay@gmail.com

Автор туралы мәлімет:

Жұматай Ғабит Бекенұлы – тарих ғылымдарының кандидаты, қауымдастырылған профессор, Құқық және мемлекеттік басқару мектебі, Нархоз Университеті, Алматы, Қазақстан, e-mail: gzhumatay@gmail.com

Сведения об авторах:

Жұматай Ғабит Бекенұлы – кандидат исторических наук, ассоциированный профессор, Школа права и государственного управления, Университет Нархоз, Алматы, Қазақстан, e-mail: gzhumatay@gmail.com

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