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**THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING THE
POLYCENTRIC WORLD ORDER**

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Abstract. This article examines the main theoretical approaches to understanding the polycentric world order in the context of the growing prevalence of unilateral actions and power politics pursued by leading global actors. Drawing on a comparative analysis of realist, liberal, and constructivist theories, as well as the concept of a multiplex world order, the article demonstrates that contemporary interventions by great powers in the domestic affairs of other states do not negate the polycentric nature of the international system. Rather, they reflect a crisis-driven and transitional stage in its ongoing transformation.

The article argues that polycentricity cannot be reduced solely to the redistribution of material power among states. Instead, it reflects a more complex transformation of global politics, encompassing institutional fragmentation, the rise of regional centers of influence, and multi-level interdependence. It is further substantiated that, under contemporary conditions, polycentricity takes on a conflictual character, accompanied by the weakening of universal rules and the intensification of regional dynamics. Particular attention is paid to the conceptual distinction between multipolarity and polycentricity. The contemporary world is characterized by the simultaneous coexistence of different models of international behavior and competing interpretations of what constitutes legitimacy. Under such conditions, polycentricity does not imply automatic stability or universal cooperation; on the contrary, it creates an environment in which states are compelled to continuously adapt and search for new strategies of behavior.

This article contributes to the theoretical debate on the nature of the contemporary world order and provides a conceptual foundation for subsequent applied analyses of states' foreign policy strategies within a polycentric environment.

Keywords: polycentric, world order, multipolarity, multiplex world, power politics, realism, liberalism, constructivism

Introduction

The transformation of the world order at the end of the twentieth and in the twenty-first century has become one of the central topics in international relations research. The collapse of the bipolar system and the subsequent period of U.S. hegemony gave rise to expectations of a stable liberal world order based on institutions, universal norms, and rules. However, already in the 2000s it became clear that the unipolar system was temporary, and that the global system had entered a phase of structural transformation marked by the rise of new centers of power, institutional fragmentation, and stronger regional dynamics.

In this article, the following distinction is used: multipolarity is understood as the distribution of material power among several great powers and refers to structural characteristics of the system [1]. Polycentricity means the presence of multiple centers of influence of different natures (state and non-state), interacting at different levels of global governance. The multiplex order reflects a qualitatively more complex configuration in which diverse norms, institutions, and forms of interaction coexist that cannot be reduced to a single hierarchy [20].

The relevance of a theoretical analysis of the polycentric order is determined not only by changes in the balance of power, but also by the increasing complexity of world politics itself. In particular, it is characterized by the simultaneous coexistence of different, and often competing, understandings of the rules of international relations, as well as by uneven patterns of interdependence among states. As a result, it has become difficult to explain contemporary processes using a single theoretical model. For this reason, the use of multiple theoretical approaches and their combination becomes especially important, as it allows us to identify not only the structural constraints under which states operate, but also the space available for autonomous decision-making and strategic choice.

The purpose of this article is to systematize and analyze the main theoretical approaches in order to understand the polycentric world order, to identify their explanatory strengths and limitations, and to demonstrate how different theoretical traditions complement one another in the analysis of the contemporary international system.

The theoretical contribution of this article is that it clarifies the understanding of a polycentric world order, clearly distinguishing it from multipolar and multiplex order. Furthermore, a holistic approach to its analysis is proposed, integrating three key dimensions of global politics: the distribution of power (realism), the role of institutions (liberalism) and the importance of norms and identities (constructivism). Unlike existing studies, the article demonstrates the polycentricity is not simply the presence of multiple centers of power, but a more complex system of interactions in which various norms, institutions, and regional orders are intertwined.

Materials and Methods

The methodological foundation of this article is a qualitative theoretical analysis aimed at the comparative study of the leading paradigms in international relations theory. The research is based on an interdisciplinary approach that combines elements of political theory, international relations, and comparative studies of world order.

The analytical basis of the study consists of classical and contemporary scholarly works in international relations theory, including research on structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism, constructivism, and comparative regionalism.

The study employs several methods. First, a comparative-theoretical method is used to compare interpretations of the polycentric order across different theoretical schools and to identify their key differences. Second, a structural-analytical method is applied to examine the world system as a set of interconnected levels. Finally, conceptual analysis is used to clarify the concepts of “multipolarity”, “polycentricity”, and the “multiplex world order”.

Results

This section examines realism and neorealism in relation to the topic of this study. Classical realism is based on the assumption that the international system is inherently anarchic, and that states rely primarily on their own military power and resources while seeking security and survival. Within this theoretical framework, polarity is understood as the distribution of power among key centers of influence, which in turn shapes both the level of conflict and the stability of the world system.

The theories of realism and neorealism in the context of our topic could be analyzed, as classical realism, for instance, is based on the assumption that the international system is inherently anarchic, and that states rely on their own military power and resources and strive for security and survival. Polarity in this theory is understood as the distribution of power among key centers of strength, which determine the conflict potential and stability of the world system.

A more structured and internally consistent explanation of international politics is offered by structural realism, developed by the American scholar Kenneth Waltz. According to this approach, the international system is defined by a specific ordering of relations among states, forming a structure characterized by several core features: anarchy, understood as the absence of a supreme authority; the primary function of the state, which is the protection of sovereignty; and the unequal distribution of power. While the first two characteristics remain relatively stable over time, the distribution of power changes, thereby shaping states' foreign policy behavior and altering the configuration of the system, which may take unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar forms [1, pp. 111–114].

As Kenneth Waltz predicted in the early 1990s, the U.S.-led unipolar world

proved to be unstable due to the uneven distribution of power [3, p. 55]. Moreover, even NATO allies have increasingly pursued balancing policies in response to the dominant position of the hegemon. From Waltz's perspective, the international system is moving toward multipolarity as a more balanced structure, with the emergence of new major powers.

At the same time, the realist tradition does not offer a single, unified interpretation of how the balance of power emerges and operates. In classical realism, Hans Morgenthau viewed the balance of power as an equilibrium among great powers and associated it primarily with a multipolar system. By contrast, Kenneth Waltz's structural realism considered bipolarity to be the most stable configuration [1, pp. 161–176]. Other approaches, such as George Modelski's theory of long cycles [4, pp. 52–53] and Robert Gilpin's theory of hegemonic stability [5, pp. 212–213], emphasized unipolar arrangements, while the historical-systemic approach developed by Paul Kennedy supported the idea of multipolarity [6, p. 110]. As a result, definitions of the balance of power as a systemic condition have varied significantly, and some of these interpretations directly contradict one another. For example, K. Waltz and P. Kennedy emphasized relative equality among major powers, whereas R. Gilpin and G. Modelski associated balance with the maintenance of the status quo under the leadership, or hegemony, of a single dominant state. Despite these disagreements, neorealist scholars generally agree that the logic of balancing remains the main guiding principle shaping state behavior in the international system.

From a realist perspective, multipolarity can be understood as an objective reflection of broader global trends, including the growing military, economic, and political capabilities of non-Western states and the relative weakening of the United States as the world's leading power. Neorealism, in turn, treats multipolarity as a systemic characteristic of the international system that directly influences state behavior [7, p. 135].

According to realist theory, the emergence of a multipolar world is driven by two closely related processes: the rise of new centers of power and the gradual decline of U.S. global dominance. British scholar David Blagden argues that the international system is returning to multipolarity primarily due to the shift of economic power from the West to the East, particularly toward new industrial centers such as China, Brazil, Russia, and India. Under certain conditions, he suggests, economic power can be converted into military power if supported by sufficient political will [8].

The growing trend toward multipolarity has also been noted by policymakers and experts in Australia. For example, the 2017 *Independent Intelligence Review* stated that “the geopolitical consequences of economic globalization are creating new centers of power and encouraging new strategic ambitions among states” [9].

Simultaneously, not all scholars agree that economic growth alone is sufficient to produce a truly multipolar system. Italian researcher Stefano Conti argues that China, the United States, Russia, and the European Union should be considered the primary global actors, while Brazil and India, in their view, lack the necessary capabilities to play a comparable global role. According to this position, economic potential by itself is not enough to ensure global influence [10].

A group of European scholars has proposed an original approach to understand the polarity in the contemporary world. According to this view, multipolarity is forming primarily in the economic sphere, while the military sphere remains largely unipolar. The environmental domain is described as inter-polar, whereas the political and cultural sphere is characterized by non-polarity [11].

As noted above, one of the key preconditions for multipolarity is the decline of the United States' role in global affairs. Multipolarity, as one possible scenario for the future, is often linked to the claim that the creation of alternative orders by China and Russia, together with China's economic growth, will lead to a situation in which the United States becomes one of several great powers rather than the sole arbiter of international politics [12].

At the same time, a number of scholars argue that the United States will retain its position as a central actor in the international system. American researcher Bruce Jones maintains that the United States should be viewed not as a "declining" power, but as a "resilient" one that continues to play a key global role [13, p. 78]. A more explicit position is taken by a scholar from the Republic of Korea, who emphasizes that polarity should be assessed at the global rather than the regional level. From this perspective, the United States significantly surpasses other states in terms of military expenditure and overall power capabilities. As a result, the actions of countries such as China and Russia are interpreted not as evidence of a changing global hierarchy, but rather as attempts to assert their positions within the existing system [14, p. 15].

There is also a substantial group of experts who argue that the world is moving not toward multipolarity, but toward a new form of bipolarity. In this context, the work of Russian scholar D. A. Degtyarev is particularly relevant. Based on an analysis of the capabilities of the BRICS countries, the G7, as well as the United States and China, he concludes that the contemporary world order is evolving toward a "new bipolarity" rather than toward a multipolar system [15].

Thus, from the perspective of political realism, multipolarity is defined by two key factors. First, it involves the growth of economic, political, and military capabilities among new centers of power, whether individual states or alliances. Second, it reflects the decreasing ability of the United States to continue acting as

a global hegemon. At the same time, within the realist framework, the question of a transition to a multipolar world order remains highly contested. Some scholars continue to view the system as unipolar, others argue that a shift to multipolarity has already occurred, while a third group maintains that the world is moving toward bipolarity.

One of the foundational traditions in international relations theory is the liberal paradigm. Within this framework, scholars differ in their assessments of the implications of multipolarity for international stability and security. French scholar Zaki Laïdi describes multipolarity as a “transition without hegemony”, in which rising non-Western states challenge Western dominance but lack sufficient strength and cohesion to offer a coherent alternative world order [16]. A similar position is advanced by Sean Butler, who argues that the emergence of new powers seeking greater autonomy in foreign policy may weaken multilateralism. In his view, the development of multipolarity poses risks to international stability by making it more difficult to address issues that require collective action, such as maintaining peace through collective security mechanisms [17, p. 27].

Russian scholar A. Kortunov argues that the concept of multipolarity should be left behind and that the foundation of a new world order should instead be a model of multilateralism. This model should be based on multilateral agreements, international regimes, and greater consideration of the interests of weaker states [18]. Moreover, this scholar suggests that contemporary multilateralism “will emerge not within traditional institutions, but around shared problems and specific projects” [19].

In sum, from the perspective of the liberal paradigm, multipolarity should be viewed in a balanced way. On the one hand, a multipolar world order is often perceived as undesirable or even as a threat to liberal values and the liberal international order, and consequently to the stability of the international system itself. On the other hand, a more multipolar world order does not necessarily have to lead to destabilization of the international environment, the refusal of new centers of power to cooperate, and the transition to a state of “war of all against all”.

To summarize the theoretical approaches considered and to identify their analytical potential, their comparative characteristics is presented (Table 1).

Table 1 – Comparative analysis of theoretical approaches to understanding world order

Approach	Key idea	Interpretation of world order	Limitations of the approach
Realism / neo-realism	Balance of power and anarchy of the system	Distribution of material power between states	Insufficient consideration of the role of norms and institutions

Liberalism	Institutions and interdependence	The system of international regimes and rules	Presupposes a higher level of cooperation than exists in practice
Constructivism	Norms, identities and discourses	A set of competing narratives and norms	Not always easy to apply to specific cases
Regionalism	Regional subsystems	Different regional orders with their own centers of influence	Works better at the regional level than at the global level
Multiplex approach	Pluralization of interactions	A world order without a single center, with different levels of interaction	Conceptual uncertainty

[made by the author]

As table 1 depicts various theoretical approaches interpret the nature of world order differently, emphasizing either the distribution of power, institutions, or norms and identities. This demonstrates that no single theoretical paradigm can provide a comprehensive explanation for the contemporary transformations of the international system.

Discussion

A comparison of the presented theoretical approaches allows to move from description to analytical synthesis. This comparative analysis reveals that the differences between them carry not only methodological but also ontological character, as each theory defines the nature of centers of power and the mechanisms of their interaction differently.

In this context, a polycentric world order can be interpreted as the result of the overlap of several logics: structural (the distribution of power), institutional (the functioning of international regimes) and normative (the competition of values and identities). This multilayered nature explains why contemporary international processes do not fit within the framework of a single theoretical model.

From the perspective of a polycentric order, the liberal approach allows this phenomenon to be viewed not only as a “redistribution of power”, but also as a network of overlapping international regimes and organizations in which influence is more widely dispersed. Studies of the liberal international order show that regimes related to free trade, democratic peace, and “pluralistic security communities” create an institutional framework within which the “polycentrization” of governance takes place. In this context, rules are not formed or revised by a single hegemon, but emerge through complex interactions among coalitions, institutions, and actors.

Understanding the essence of multipolarity in contemporary international relations also requires engagement with key ideas of constructivism, which

emphasizes that world politics is shaped through ideas, concepts, and narratives. The model of a multipolar world order is actively supported and developed within Russian foreign policy discourse. For example, O. A. Alekseeva-Karnavali argues that the world cannot be clearly described as multipolar, unipolar, or bipolar. In her view, multipolarity represents a Russian discourse supported by China, which operates mainly within its own political bloc, where its assumptions are shared and accepted. At the same time, “none of the existing narratives, despite their claims to universality, are sufficient to structure the international system as a whole” [20]. From this perspective, multipolarity cannot function as a universally accepted model of world order, as it is not recognized by all major international actors.

The phenomenon of multipolar populism has been identified by American scholars Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon. They argue that many contemporary populist leaders, including those in countries such as Serbia and Italy, increasingly refer to a multipolar world order, emphasize the availability of new international partners, especially Russia and China; and thereby justify policies that are more independent from the liberal West [21].

From a constructivist standpoint, a polycentric order involves not only the distribution of material power, but also a set of competing and overlapping norms, identities, and narratives. Different centers of power promote their own interpretations of what constitutes a legitimate world order, while states and regions position themselves as members of particular normative “communities”.

Amitav Acharya’s concept of “Global IR” further develops this idea by emphasizing that regions should be understood as socially constructed spaces shaped by shared narratives, historical experiences, and regional norms [22]. In his work on the “end of the American world order”, Acharya shows that the weakening of Western hegemony is accompanied by the rise of alternative normative projects and regional “worlds”, reinforcing the polycentric rather than merely multipolar character of the international system.

In a 2023 article titled “*Multipolarity or Multiplexity? Interaction Capacity, Global Cooperation, and World Order*,” Acharya, A. Estevadeordal, and L. V. Goodman propose the concept of multiplexity as a more appropriate framework for analyzing the changing world order, instead of multipolarity or liberal hegemony. Rather than focusing on traditional indicators such as economic or military power, they use “interaction capacity”; that is, the ability of states to exercise leadership and organize cooperation as a key measure of world order. Using a new dataset based on international treaties concluded since World War II, the authors find that the world order is shifting away from U.S. leadership toward a more decentralized and pluralistic, or multiplex system. In this system, the relative dominance of great powers declines, while the interaction capacity of middle and small powers increases, along with the importance of cooperation clusters that are not

necessarily based on geographic proximity. The authors conclude that although leadership in global cooperation is becoming more diversified across actors and issue areas, it is neither collapsing nor becoming excessively transactional. These findings should guide discussions about the future of world order and the reform of international institutions. While policymakers must prepare for the transition from a unipolar moment and the rise of non-Western countries, they should avoid unjustified pessimism about the collapse of global cooperation, which is based on the long-term dynamics of interoperability between countries [2].

The concept of multiplexity thus broadens our understanding of the increasingly complex nature of global interactions. It also helps to clarify whether global politics, in the context of rising non-Western powers, is becoming more chaotic and transactional, or whether cooperation remains viable in the long term. A multiplex order allows for the coexistence of cooperation and confrontation, as well as the parallel functioning of universal and regional institutions.

From a constructivist perspective, multipolarity can be summarized in two key points. First, it functions as a foreign policy discourse and a social construct that seeks not only to describe reality but also to shape it. Second, the spread of multipolar discourse reflects both the desire of some states to pursue policies more independent from the liberal West and the recognition of changing power relations in the international system.

According to A. Kostin and V. Izotov, the most likely characteristic of the future global structure is integration–confrontational polycentrism. In this model, integration systems act as centers of power that compete with one another for political and economic space [23, pp. 17–19]. The formation of regional orders is linked to the growing capabilities of regional powers and the simultaneous weakening of U.S. positions in global politics. Similarly, Indian scholar Sreeram Chaulia argues that rapidly rising powers in different regions may fill the vacuum created by the declining international role of the United States and provide order, security, and prosperity within their respective regions [24].

It is important to note that polycentricity does not imply the disappearance of power politics. On the contrary, it is often accompanied by increased competition and higher risks. According to William C. Wohlforth, although the United States continues to maintain significant military and technological advantages, it has lost the ability to establish stable rules of behavior for the entire international system [25]. This creates conditions in which other powers, including Russia and China, more actively challenge the status quo, resulting in a more conflict-prone form of polycentricity.

Liberal institutionalism offers a more critical assessment of the current transformation of the world system. G. John Ikenberry argues that the “America First” policy undermines the institutional foundations of the liberal order by weakening multilateral regimes and reducing trust in international rules [26].

From this perspective, contemporary polycentricity appears “distorted”: centers of power exist, but coordination mechanisms and institutional constraints are weakened. In later work, Ikenberry, together with D. Deudney, emphasizes that the U.S. retreat from its role as an institutional leader does not restore classical sovereignty, but instead increases instability and conflict in the international environment [27, p. 19]. Similar assessments appear in analytical reports by the Council on Foreign Relations, which describe the current system as “World Order 2.0” – less manageable, more fragmented, and lacking a stable center [28].

Turkish analyst Efe Can Gürkan notes that in the context of a crisis in global governance and the weakening of U.S. leadership, world politics is becoming increasingly polarized. Eurasian regionalism promoted by Russia and China is emerging as a key driver of geopolitical multipolarity. In response to the crisis of global governance, Eurasia presents itself as a leading region and develops alternative institutions outside U.S. influence, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) [29, pp. 135–139].

Earlier, Amitav Acharya suggested that the emerging world should be described in terms of “regiopolarity” rather than multipolarity or other polarity-based concepts [30]. According to this view, no rising power will be able to fully replace the United States at the global level, and most will remain primarily anchored within their respective regions [31]. This logic implies a division of global space into limited zones of influence, which broadly aligns with the idea of multipolarity. In this sense, multipolarity can be formed and strengthened as regions “emerge” and become isolated, regional connections develop, and a unique economic, political, and cultural space is created within a specific regional cluster.

Research on “complex regionalism” highlights that the contemporary order is characterized by a multi-layered architecture involving global, interregional, and subregional institutions. These institutions include not only great powers, but also middle and small states [32]. From this perspective, a polycentric world consists of interacting regional subsystems such as Europe, the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, Eurasia, and Africa, each with its own internal logic of centers and peripheries.

In conclusion, when examining multipolarity from a regional perspective, two key points should be emphasized. First, multipolar world order is grounded in expanding processes of regionalization, the development of regional ties, and the growth of regional integration systems. Second, the strengthening of regional dynamics and the formation of regional orders are directly linked to the rising capabilities of new centers of power – regional states – and the weakening of the United States’ position in the global system.

Conclusion

There is no single, widely accepted understanding of multipolarity within the academic community. Scholars representing different theoretical schools and national traditions define and evaluate the core meaning of multipolarity in different ways. Realism views multipolarity as an objective reflection of broader global trends, rooted in the weakening of the United States' position as the world's leading power and the growing economic, military, and political capabilities of non-Western states. Neorealism treats multipolarity as a characteristic of the international system that shapes state behavior. The regional approach emphasizes the intensification of regionalization processes and the development of regional integration systems, which contribute to the emergence of multipolarity as regional powers gain strength and the global influence of the United States declines. Liberal approaches focus primarily on assessing the implications of multipolarity for international stability and security. Alongside the more skeptical view of multipolarity as a potential threat to peace and security, liberal scholarship also offers more optimistic interpretations. Constructivism, in turn, understands multipolarity both as a foreign policy discourse and as a project advanced by a number of states.

Overall, the theoretical analysis conducted in this study allows for several important conclusions regarding the nature of the contemporary world order and the applicability of the concept of polycentricity to current international realities. Firstly, the comparison of realist, liberal, and constructivist approaches demonstrates that polycentricity cannot be reduced solely to the number of centers of power or to the redistribution of material resources. Instead, it reflects a deeper transformation of world politics, involving normative pluralism, institutional fragmentation, and multi-level interdependence.

Secondly, an examination of leading expert assessments suggests that the active use of force, sanctions, and political pressure by major powers does not indicate the persistence of an old hegemonic or bipolar world order. Rather, such practices point to a declining capacity of individual states to manage the international system through commonly accepted institutions and rules. In this sense, contemporary "power politics" is not an alternative to polycentricity, but one of its manifestations – a sign of a conflictual and still incomplete transition from a more hierarchical world order toward a more complex and decentralized system.

Thirdly, the idea of a multiplex world order provides a useful lens for understanding these dynamics, as it takes into account not only the distribution of power, but also the diversity of norms, rules, and forms of interaction. The contemporary international system is characterized by the coexistence of different models of international behavior and competing interpretations of what is considered legitimate. Under such conditions, polycentricity does not lead

automatically to stability or universal cooperation. On the contrary, it creates an environment in which states are required to continuously adapt and develop new strategies of behavior.

It is important to emphasize that the polycentric world order should not be viewed as a stage of transition from unipolarity to multipolarity, but as a qualitatively new form of organization of the international system, characterized by a plurality of centers, levels, and norms of interaction.

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ПОЛИЦЕНТРЛІ ӘЛЕМДІК ТӘРТІПТІ ТҮСІНУДІҢ ТЕОРИЯЛЫҚ ТӘСІЛДЕРІ

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Андатпа. Мақалада жетекші әлемдік акторлар тарапынан біржақты әрекеттер мен күш саясатының күшеюі жағдайында полицентрлі әлемдік тәртіпті ұғынудың теориялық тәсілдері қарастырылады. Реализм, либерализм және конструктивизм теориялары, сондай-ақ көпқабатты әлемдік тәртіп тұжырымдамасы негізінде жүргізілген салыстырмалы талдау қазіргі ірі державалардың басқа мемлекеттердің ішкі істеріне араласуы халықаралық жүйенің полицентрлі сипатын жоққа шығармайтынын, керісінше оның қайта қалыптасуының дағдарысты әрі өтпелі кезеңін көрсететінін дәлелдейді.

Мақалада полицентрлік ұғымының тек мемлекеттер арасындағы материалдық қуаттың қайта бөлінуімен шектелмейтіні көрсетіледі. Ол әлемдік саясаттағы анағұрлым күрделі өзгерістерді, атап айтқанда институционалдық бөлшектенуді, аймақтық ықпал орталықтарының өсуін және көпдеңгейлі өзара тәуелділікті қамтиды. Қазіргі жағдайдағы полицентрліктің қақтығысты сипатта екені, әмбебап ережелердің әлсіреуімен және аймақтық динамиканың күшеюімен қатар жүретіні негізделеді. Көпполярлық пен полицентрлік арасындағы тұжырымдамалық айырмашылыққа ерекше назар аударылады.

Қазіргі әлем халықаралық мінез-құлықтың әртүрлі модельдерінің қатар өмір сүруімен және заңдылық туралы бәсекелес түсініктердің болуымен сипатталады. Мұндай жағдайда полицентрлік автоматты түрде

тұрақтылықты немесе жалпы ынтымақтастықты білдірмейді, керісінше мемлекеттерді үнемі бейімделуге және жаңа мінез-құлық әрекет ету үлгілерін іздеуге мәжбүр ететін орта қалыптастырады.

Бұл мақала қазіргі әлемдік тәртіптің сипаты жөніндегі теориялық пікірталасқа үлес қосып, полицентрлі орта жағдайындағы мемлекеттердің сыртқы саяси стратегияларын кейінгі қолданбалы талдау үшін негіз қалыптастырады.

Тірек сөздер: полицентрлі, әлемдік тәртіп, көпполярлық, көпқабатты әлем, күш саясаты, реализм, либерализм, конструктивизм

ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКИЕ ПОДХОДЫ К ПОНИМАНИЮ ПОЛИЦЕНТРИЧНОГО ПОРЯДКА

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Аннотация. В статье рассматриваются теоретические подходы к осмыслению полицентричного мирового порядка в условиях усиления односторонних действий и политики силы со стороны ведущих мировых акторов. На основе сравнительного анализа реалистских, либеральных и конструктивистских теорий, а также концепции мультиплексного мирового порядка, показано, что современные вмешательства великих держав во внутренние дела других государств не опровергают полицентричный характер международной системы, а отражают кризисный и переходный этап ее трансформации.

В статье показано, что полицентричность не сводится исключительно к перераспределению материальной мощи между государствами. Она отражает более сложную трансформацию мировой политики, включающую институциональную фрагментацию, рост региональных центров влияния и многоуровневую взаимозависимость. Обосновывается тезис о том, что полицентричность в современных условиях носит конфликтный характер, сопровождаясь ослаблением универсальных правил и ростом региональной динамики. Особое внимание уделяется концептуальному различию между многополярностью и полицентричностью. Современный мир характеризуется одновременным существованием разных моделей международного поведения, конкурирующих представлений о том, что считается легитимным. В таких условиях полицентричность не означает автоматической стабильности или всеобщего сотрудничества, а, напротив, создает среду, в которой государства вынуждены постоянно приспособляться и искать новые стратегии поведения.

Данная статья вносит вклад в теоретическую дискуссию о характере современного мирового порядка и формирует основу для последующего прикладного анализа внешнеполитических стратегий государств в полицентричной среде.

Ключевые слова: полицентричный, мировой порядок, многополярность, мультиплексный мир, политика силы, реализм, либерализм, конструктивизм

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