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ЖӘНЕ ӘЛЕМ ТІЛДЕРІ УНИВЕРСИТЕТІ

# ХАБАРШЫСЫ

“ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ ҚАТЫНАСТАР ЖӘНЕ  
АЙМАҚТАНУ” СЕРИЯСЫ



## ИЗВЕСТИЯ

КАЗАХСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА  
МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ И  
МИРОВЫХ ЯЗЫКОВ ИМЕНИ АБЫЛАЙ ХАНА

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АЙМАҚТАНУ» сериясы

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**ACTUAL PROBLEMS OF CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH IN  
MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

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**Abstract.** In the modern world, in the context of intensive digitalization of the economy, cyberspace is recognized as the main factor in global security. This situation requires a revision of the norms of international law, improvement of mechanisms for cooperation between states. In this article, the authors aim to comprehensively analyze the current challenges of cybersecurity in international relations and make an attempt to propose ways to overcome them.

In this study, the authors conducted a comparative analysis of scientific papers and official documents for the period 2021-2025. The contradictions between the concept of “digital sovereignty” in cyberspace management and the need for global regulation are revealed. In addition, the authors point to the lack of international legally binding norms as the main difficulties in ensuring cybersecurity, the complexity of attributing cyber attacks, and the unfair distribution of resources.

The authors of the article argue that in order to strengthen cybersecurity, it is necessary to increase trust in states, improve the legal framework and expand international cooperation. It concludes that the security of cyberspace is the common interest of all mankind, so harmonious action and open dialogue should be the main priority.

**Key words:** cybersecurity, International Relations, Information Security, digital sovereignty, international law, cyberspace, norms of behavior of states, cyber threats

**Introduction**

At the end of the XX and the beginning of the XXI centuries, cyberspace has become a new platform for global competition and cooperation of states.



The rapid development of information and communication technologies (ICT) penetrated into all spheres of society's life and at the same time posed a serious threat to national and international security. A number of researchers highlight cybersecurity as an important area of modern international security. In the era of digitalization, the main problem is to ensure the peaceful development of cyberspace and prevent the escalation of conflicts.

In addition, the service in cyberspace is characterized by anonymity and anonymity, which complicates the classical application of international law [1]. In this regard, states are striving to form common norms of behavior in cyberspace at the bilateral and multilateral levels. Within the framework of the UN, dialogue platforms such as the Group of Government Experts (GGE) and The Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) are working. However, it is not yet possible to reach a common agreement on legally binding norms. Some countries consider the existing international principles to be sufficient, while others argue about the need to adopt special international legal documents [2].

Global cooperation in the field of cybersecurity is hampered by geopolitical contradictions between the leading powers – the United States, Russia, China. Increased insecurity makes it impossible to coordinate joint efforts. However, as the modern experience of International Relations shows, there are no cases of full-fledged cyber warfare between states. The perception of cyber attacks as a “red line” contributes not to aggravate the situation.

### **Materials and Methods**

The study in the framework of the article relies on an interdisciplinary methodology at the junction of the theory of international relations and modern cybersecurity research. The article aimed to analyze the behavior and positions of states in cyberspace, taking into account the mutual contradiction of liberal and realistic theories. Liberal theory served as the basis for explaining the positions of Western countries in favor of freedom of information and multilateral cooperation. Meanwhile, the realistic approach made it possible to characterize the position of Russia, China and their partners, who put national sovereignty and the interests of the state in the first place.

A comparative expert approach was used as the methodological basis of the study, and cybersecurity strategies and positions of various countries and organizations were analyzed. the expert method was carried out through a qualitative examination of the content of selected documents and a comparative analysis of the experience of different countries.

The selection of materials was carried out on such keywords as “cybersecurity”, “international security”, “digital sovereignty”, taken from scientific databases such as Scopus, Web of Science and open government platforms. The collected texts were studied by the method of thematic coding. In particular, events related to international law, national interests and technological threats were identified. An empirical and Case Study of specific cyber events such as WannaCry, NotPetya, and SolarWinds has been conducted. In addition, the study took into account the relationship between political, legal and technological aspects to justify practical recommendations.



Thus, the study was carried out by combining scientific approaches in the fields of international law, security policy and Information Technology.

Within the framework of the article, the research materials were selected based on current works and official documents published in the period from 2021 to 2025, leading analytical centers and peer-reviewed scientific articles.

UN resolutions and reports, materials of international organizations such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), NATO, the European Union, national cybersecurity strategies of various countries, as well as scientific publications of Russian and foreign experts were used as the main sources.

**Results**

In the course of the analysis of cybersecurity issues in international relations, a number of topical issues were identified. One of the most important of these is the lack of normative clarity.

Although many states generally recognize the application of international law to cyberspace, the regulation of this area by a single legally binding instrument has not yet been implemented. Countries have different positions on this issue.

For example, the United States and the European Union consider the UN Charter and current international norms to be sufficient. In their opinion, the new rules in cyberspace should be of a recommendatory nature, that is, optional.

And Russia and China, on the contrary, support the development of mandatory international legal norms in this area. At the same time, they note the need to put the national sovereignty and domestic legislation of states at the forefront. This position is also reflected in the joint proposals of Russia and China, which state the need to respect the autonomy of each state in the information Space [3].

So far, the lack of agreed universal legal standards (Table 1) causes ambiguity in the views of countries. While one party advocates the openness and freedom of information of the Internet, the other party demands control of the national network and protection of Information Security. Modern accepted norms remain only at the level of non-binding recommendations and require their transformation into concrete actions.

Table 1. comparative analysis of the views of the main world actors on cybersecurity issues

| Actor                        | Basic principles and priorities   | Attitude to international norms   | Examples of initiatives  |
|------------------------------|---|---|--|
| USA / EU (Western countries) | Protection of free internet and critical infrastructure; international cooperation with private sector participation. | Support for the current UN norms; development of mechanisms of voluntary behavior. It is believed that the existing norms are sufficient. | US National Cybersecurity Strategy; European Cybersecurity Strategy (2020); cyber diplomacy tools. |

|   |  |  |   |
|---|--|--|---|
| <b>Russia/PRC (non-Western countries)</b> | The concept of information security and digital sovereignty; state control of ICT.                   | Promotion of legally binding norms. Supports the priority of national law and sovereignty.   | Code of Conduct initiative (2011); UN General Assembly resolutions on International Information Security (IIS); SCO – IIS cooperation plan. |
| <b>International organizations</b>        | Strengthening trust and developing general rules; technical and institutional support for countries. | Pay attention to the voluntary norms and guidelines for the use of the UN Charter in cyberspace. Promotes the exchange of information and capacity building. | Reports and resolutions of the UN; work of the GGE/OEWG; reports of the ITU (Global Cybersecurity Index); UNOCT projects.                   |

*(compiled by the authors)*

Secondly, geopolitical factors and trust issues play a major role. The relationship of the leading powers in the cyberspace largely depends on the general political situation. On the one hand, the dialogue at the UN level continues. An example of this is the joint resolution of the United States and Russia on ICT security negotiations in 2021. On the other hand, the tension of Western rhetoric against the PRC and the Russian Federation hinders effective cooperation. Despite this, at the moment there were no cases of open cyberconflict among the major powers. Experts argue that states still avoid the transition of “red lines” without launching destructive attacks against each other. At the same time, covert conflicts in the form of cyber espionage, cyber attacks on critical targets and misinformation campaigns are increasing, which creates mutual suspicion.

Thirdly, the technical complexity of threats and the pace of development create new challenges. One of the most important issues is the attribution of cyberattacks, that is, the identification of the real culprits of the events. Comparing the difficulties of cyberdiplomacy, the lack of unambiguous attribution significantly complicates the diplomatic reaction and negotiations. International norms even provide a formal algorithm of action for the aggrieved party, but in practice it is often difficult to collect “unconditional evidence”. In addition, including the rapid development of artificial intelligence, quantum computing and IoT technology will allow attackers to automate attacks and create new types of threats. For example, AI can be used to generate fake news and audio-video manipulations during election campaigns. Expert reports emphasize that one of the main risks in 2024 is the use of artificial intelligence by attackers. The increase in the complexity of attacks requires states to adapt legal and technical measures, however, the gap between rapid technological changes and the slow process of creating norms remains large [4].

The fourth aspect is the uneven distribution of resources and opportunities. Small and developing countries will face significant difficulties in creating a

sustainable cybersecurity system. So, highlighting “cybersecurity poverty line”, experts point to the gap between organizations and states that have sufficient resources and states that do not have them. Among the poorest countries in the south of the world, there are the least stable cyber systems. It is now known as the “cybersecurity poverty line”, which reduces the overall level of global security. At the same time, infrastructure vulnerabilities and lack of qualified personnel remain a problem for developed states as well. This forces some countries to use outsourcing or rely on international assistance [5].

Finally, organizational and procedural barriers. The public-private partnership necessary to protect modern networks is not always established in all countries. Some researchers cite difficulties in coordinating efforts between states, international organizations and the private sector. Cyberattacks reporting mechanisms and advisory forums do not work effectively enough due to differences in existing approaches. For example, in the UN, representatives of different countries often debate about the signs of “sovereignty in cyberspace”, which remain under a hidden ban.

The results are systematized in Table 1, which compares the main positions of major actors on the main issues of cybersecurity (norms of behavior, priorities, means of cooperation). The table confirms that there are fundamental discrepancies in the accents of Western and non-Western countries.

Current events in the field of international cybersecurity and their consequences

#### 1-event

On May 12, 2017, more than 230,000 systems in 150 countries around the world were attacked by a malware called “WannaCry”. The attack caused great damage to the UK National Health Service (NHS), at least 19,000 receptions and operations were postponed, and patients had to be moved to other hospitals [6].

Political and legal consequences in 2018, the US Department of Justice brought charges against North Korean hacker Park Chin hake and officially linked the attack to the Lazarus Group [7]. Based on this event, the UN adopted Resolution A/RES/73/27 and developed recommendations for the protection of critical infrastructure. The European Union adopted the NIS Directive (2018/1972) and accelerated the creation of CSIRT networks (Computer Security Incident Response Teams) in the Member States.

This event demonstrated a serious threat to peaceful sectors such as health care and made cybersecurity a hot topic in international humanitarian law. It also increased pressure on the states to officially identify (attribute) the attacker.

#### 2-event

The attack “NotPetya”, which took place in June 2017, was carried out by M.E. Doc was spread by updating the accounting program. The attack spread around the world and destroyed the data without the possibility of recovery. Thus, only the Maersk company suffered losses of about USD 200-300 million;

the total global damage was estimated at долларға 8-10 billion [8]. In 2018, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Denmark and the United Kingdom linked the attack to the Russian military intelligence service (GRU) – this was the first collective attribution. NotPetya dealt a heavy blow to the private sector and supply chains, prompting states to act together and discuss the possibility of cybersecurity for the first time.

### 3-event

#### Attack “Solar Winds” in December 2020

More than 18,000 organizations, including the US Department of the Treasury, the Department of Commerce and the National Security Agency, were attacked by malicious code embedded in the SolarWinds Orion program. The US government adopted the CISA directive and Presidential Decree 14028 and approved the “Zero Trust” Architecture and software materials list SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) as a mandatory standard [9,10]. In addition, the declaration on the security of the supply chain was discussed at the G7 site.

This attack showed that the vulnerability of only one supplier threatens the entire system. Supply chain security has become an important element of the international principle of due diligence.

These three events prompted states to form cybercrime rules, attribution procedures, and confidence-building measures. They make it clear that technological progress and the transition of critical infrastructure to private are ahead of international law, and therefore new risk management mechanisms are needed at the global, regional and national levels.

## Discussion

The main contradictions in international cybersecurity are associated with the difference in the strategic concepts of states. On the one hand, Western countries (USA, EU, NATO) are trying to maintain the “transparency” of the internet and are based on multilateral voluntary norms. On the other hand, Russia, China and their partners support the approach of digital sovereignty, demanding global recognition of national laws and strict rules. The discussion around this issue reflects the big problem of the theory of international relations – the incompatibility of liberal and realistic approaches in the digital sphere [11].

The opinion of Russian researchers E. Zinovieva and Ya. Bai rightly characterizes the theoretical and practical contradictions that exist in today’s international cyberspace and digital control system.

Indeed, Western countries such as the United States and the EU are proposing a model of governance based on multilateral, voluntary norms, advocating the preservation of the openness and freedom of the internet. This position relies on liberal theory. According to the liberal view, it is believed that states and societies can ensure global security by strengthening openness and cooperation. Freedom of information and the borderless nature of cyberspace are the basis of this position.

Russia, China and their partners, on the contrary, promote the priority of national sovereignty and state control. This approach is based on the realist theory, which considers it important for states to protect their interests, put national laws and security first. The concept of digital sovereignty clearly reflects this point of view, where each state seeks to keep its information space in full control.

The conflict between these two different approaches makes it difficult to form unified global rules for managing cyberspace. The incompatibility of liberal and realistic views increases distrust between states and hinders the possibility of reaching a global agreement on cybersecurity.

However, in modern difficult conditions, the search for ways to reconcile these two approaches is relevant. To resolve this contradiction in the theory of international relations, a balanced approach is needed. This approach should seek to harmonize internet freedom on the one hand and national security on the other.

It is important to note that the implementation of norms of responsible behavior in cyberspace strongly depends on trust between states. The studied circumstances indicate that during the escalation of the geopolitical conflict, agreed security measures become difficult. As Zinovieva noted, after the outbreak of a large-scale military conflict in Europe, the dialogue between the United States and Russia on IIS practically stopped. Similarly, attempts to agree on confidence-building measures (for example, within the OSCE or UN) have previously only temporarily yielded results. Thus, the paradox is that the higher the tension in the international arena, the less opportunities for cooperation on cybersecurity, although in the context of this confrontation, such cooperation would be the most demanded [12].

At the present stage, there is an increase in the pace of development of Defense and attack technologies in cyberspace. Many countries of the world are investing heavily in strengthening cyber armies and intelligence structures. As a result, defense structures (for example, Cyber Command, CERT) are forced to adapt to new threats.

According to the latest research, in order to manage cyber conflicts, a number of countries began to introduce rules for distinguishing between military cyber units and civilian CERTs (Computer Emergency Response Teams). However, the legislative regulation of cyber attacks within the framework of international law has not yet been fully resolved. It remains unclear exactly how the UN Charter will apply to cyberattacks against civil infrastructure.

Modern international norms are not binding legal acts, but are often adopted at the level of political agreements. Therefore, their implementation depends on the political will of the parties. Although such principles as non-attacks on infrastructure and assistance in cyber incidents are supported by the state, there are no clear mechanisms for monitoring and fulfilling these obligations. Such a situation can increase the risk of “responding to unfriendly actions” and lead to a period of “post-embargo”.

States should not limit themselves to declarations, but increase interaction through the exchange of accurate information, technical cooperation and joint exercises. These steps will strengthen global confidence and stability.

At the same time, Asian, African and Latin American countries are lagging behind in the development of infrastructure and regulation. This leads to common risks for the whole world, because cyber threats are not subject to borders. Therefore, it is necessary to expand technical assistance programs, training courses and experience exchange activities within the framework of the UN and regional organizations. We believe that it will be possible to implement such steps through regional initiatives, such as the information security plan of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the vulnerability of health systems to cyber attacks was revealed at an unprecedented level. Hospitals and laboratories have urgently implemented VPNs, cloud services, and telemedicine platforms to provide quick access to remote employees; however, such “rapid digitalization” took place without a security audit. As a result, attackers easily found servers with no patches installed, outdated Windows machines, and poorly configured remote access gateways. 2020 21. in Europe alone, cases of phishing and ransomware targeting the health sector increased by 47% [13]. Programs such as Conti and Ryuk have disabled the Irish HSE system, and Maze USA has disabled more than 400 more clinics. Attacks were also recorded by state APT groups against research centers that were engaged in the development of a vaccine – they were intended to steal intellectual property and personal data of patients [14,15]. Taking advantage of the shortage of personnel during the pandemic, cybercriminals tricked and obtained permits through fake medical logins. An additional danger is the fact that digital medical devices (CT, perfusors) are connected to the network, but also work in old OS, which is not supported by the manufacturer: these were continuously used in the infection departments, so it was not possible to update in time. The pandemic has exposed the imbalance between the rapid expansion of digital infrastructure and the resources allocated for security, and has proved that the health sector will be a weak link in future crises if cybersecurity is not systematically strengthened.

## **Conclusion**

In the course of the study within the framework of the article, topical areas of international cybersecurity issues were systematized and analyzed. It was found that the massive digitalization of the social and military sphere poses new challenges for diplomacy and security policy. It has been noticed that there are disagreements between the major powers of the world over the ways of managing cyberspace. This includes the divergence of opinions regarding the legal obligation of cybernetics and the concept of digital sovereignty.



At the same time, the development of artificial intelligence and quantum technologies poses new threats that are complex and rapidly changing. Based on the analysis of scientific literature and official documents in this area, we have found that the lack of uniform standards weakens the joint defense of states and increases inequalities in technical capabilities.

Based on the results of case and empirical studies of the events of WannaCry, NotPetya, SolarWinds, the idea was expressed that a single attribution mechanism should be created with the support of the UN. This requires reducing the influence of politics in the investigation of attacks and introducing a procedure for collecting evidence and storing artifacts. National cybersecurity protection must be complemented by open requirements for Supply Chain Security and mutual obligations not to attack infrastructure.

In summary, cybersecurity research requires an interdisciplinary approach. This requires the Coordination of technical solutions and mechanisms of reliable cooperation, bringing together political scientists, lawyers and IT specialists.

To strengthen cybersecurity, the international community needs to transform political will into concrete actions and take systematic steps to overcome technological inequalities. This will make it possible to form global response mechanisms that will protect the interests of all states.

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## **ҚАЗІРГІ ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ ҚАТЫНАСТАРДАҒЫ КИБЕРҚАУІПСІЗДІКТІ ЗЕРТТЕУДІҢ ӨЗЕКТІ МӘСЕЛЕЛЕРІ**

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**Аңдатпа.** Қазіргі әлемде экономиканы қарқынды цифрландыру жағдайында киберкеңістік жаһандық қауіпсіздіктің негізгі факторы ретінде танылды. Бұл жағдай халықаралық құқық нормаларын қайта қарауды, мемлекеттер арасындағы ынтымақтастық тетіктерін жетілдіруді талап етеді. Бұл мақалада авторлар халықаралық қатынастардағы киберқауіпсіздіктің өзекті мәселелерін жан-жақты талдауға және оларды еңсеру жолдарын ұсынуға тырысады.

Бұл зерттеуде авторлар 2021-2025 жылдарға арналған ғылыми еңбектер мен ресми құжаттарға салыстырмалы талдау жүргізді. Киберкеңістікті басқарудағы «цифрлық егемендік» ұғымы мен жаһандық реттеудің қажеттілігі арасындағы қайшылықтар анықталды. Сонымен қатар, авторлар киберқауіпсіздікті қамтамасыз етудегі негізгі қиындықтар, кибершабуылдарды жатқызудың күрделілігі және ресурстарды әділетсіз бөлу ретінде халықаралық заңды күші бар нормалардың жоқтығын көрсетеді.

Мақала авторлары киберқауіпсіздікті нығайту үшін мемлекеттерге деген сенімді арттыру, құқықтық базаны жетілдіру және халықаралық ынтымақтастықты кеңейту қажет деп санайды. Онда киберкеңістіктің қауіпсіздігі бүкіл адамзаттың ортақ мүддесі болып табылады, сондықтан үйлесімді іс-қимыл мен ашық диалог басты басымдық болуы керек деген қорытындыға келеді.

**Тірек сөздер:** киберқауіпсіздік, Халықаралық Қатынастар, Ақпараттық Қауіпсіздік, цифрлық егемендік, халықаралық құқық, киберкеңістік, мемлекеттердің мінез-құлық нормалары, киберқауіптер

## **АКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ КИБЕРБЕЗОПАСНОСТИ В СОВРЕМЕННЫХ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЯХ**

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**Аннотация.** В современном мире, в условиях интенсивной цифровизации экономики, киберпространство признается главным фактором глобальной безопасности. Сложившаяся ситуация требует пересмотра норм международного права, совершенствования механизмов сотрудничества между государствами. В данной статье авторы ставят своей целью всесторонне проанализировать современные вызовы кибербезопасности в международных отношениях и попытаться предложить пути их преодоления.

В данном исследовании авторы провели сравнительный анализ научных работ и официальных документов за период 2021-2025 гг. Выявлены противоречия между концепцией «цифрового суверенитета» в управлении киберпространством и необходимостью глобального регулирования. Кроме того, авторы указывают на отсутствие международных юридически обязывающих норм в качестве основных трудностей в обеспечении кибербезопасности, сложность приписывания кибератак и несправедливое распределение ресурсов.

Авторы статьи утверждают, что для укрепления кибербезопасности необходимо повышать доверие к государствам, совершенствовать правовую базу и расширять международное сотрудничество. В ней делается вывод о том, что безопасность киберпространства является общим интересом всего человечества, поэтому гармоничные действия и открытый диалог должны быть главным приоритетом.

**Ключевые слова:** кибербезопасность, международные отношения, информационная безопасность, цифровой суверенитет, международное право, киберпространство, нормы поведения государств, киберугрозы

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## THE “RUSSIAN WORLD” CONCEPT: CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS AND ITS POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS

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**Abstract.** This article analyzes the components of ideology of the contemporary regime of Russia namely the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir), imagined communities, Eurasianism, and biopolitics – through the lens of critical geopolitics. The concept of the “Russian World” has increasingly occupied a central position in the Kremlin’s ideological narratives. It portrays Russia as a transnational civilization extending beyond its current political borders and uniting communities through language, history, and shared cultural values.

Imagined communities, as manifested in the idea of the “Russian World”, support this narrative by presenting these transnational ties as a complex and cohesive social construct. Eurasianism, revived as an ideological discourse following the collapse of the Soviet Union, seeks to define Russia as a distinct civilization – neither Western nor Eastern.

The methodology employed in this study draws upon logical and historical methods, as well as an analysis of the interconnections among the manifestations of the “Russian World”. The academic significance lies in elucidating the nature of this ideological construct, which serves to legitimize Russia’s geopolitical ambitions, particularly in relation to neighboring states. The practical relevance of this understanding lies in its utility for anticipating the range of tools and strategies ranging from soft to hard power, including hybrid forms deployed by Russia in its near abroad.

In relation to Kazakhstan, a soft version of the “Russian World” is applied; the most extreme form is applied to Ukraine, the so-called “special military operation”; while Belarus is an example of integration within the framework of the so-called Union State of Belarus and Russia. The conclusions of this article help to uncover the underlying essence and origins of the “Russian World” beyond propagandistic rhetoric, revealing its role as a vehicle for Russia’s aspiration to become one of the poles in the multipolar world order.

**Key words:** Russian World, imagined communities, Eurasianism, biopolitics, critical geopolitics, Post-Soviet space, multipolar world, soft power,

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## **Introduction**

Russia has sought to reassert its influence both regionally and globally through a combination of historical, cultural, and ideological frameworks. Central to this endeavor is the development of a contemporary ideology of Russian regime that merges concepts like *Russkiy Mir*, imagined communities, Eurasianism, and biopolitics. These concepts serve as pillars that shape Russia's perception of its own place in the world, with significant implications for neighboring states such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan. At the core of this ideological construct is the concept of *Russkiy Mir* (Russian World), which promotes the notion of Russia as a transnational civilization that extends beyond its political borders.

Through *Russkiy Mir*, the Kremlin frames itself as the protector of a shared Russian identity based on language, culture, and Orthodox Christianity, positioning Russia as a distinct civilization in opposition to Western influence. This identity-building process involves a blend of historical narratives and modern political strategies, as seen through the resurgence of Eurasianism – an ideology that emphasizes Russia's unique geopolitical identity as distinct from both the West and the East. Meanwhile, biopolitics plays a role in Russia's policy toward compatriots in the post-Soviet space, providing a framework for analyzing how populations are governed and regulated in accordance with these ideological goals. This research primarily focuses on the conceptualization of *Russkiy Mir*, imagined communities, Eurasianism, and biopolitics in the context of Russian ideology.

Critical geopolitics offers a valuable lens through which to examine these developments by analyzing how geopolitical actors, including Russia, construct narratives and “truths” that influence foreign policy. The influence of *Russkiy Mir* extends beyond rhetoric and soft power, influencing practical actions in Russia's “near abroad”, including its policies toward Ukraine and Kazakhstan. This research explores how these ideological components coalesce to form contemporary Russian geopolitical thinking and assesses their implications for Kazakhstan's foreign policy and national identity in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment.

## **Materials and methods**

Sources that accurately describe aspects of the *Russkiy Mir* concept exclude the use of propagandistic statements and publications. This research was conducted using a variety of analytical methods. The theory of critical geopolitics made it possible to identify the nature of shifts in Russia's foreign policy following Vladimir Putin's landmark speech in Munich (Germany) in February 2007.

The method of functional analysis, through identifying interconnections, helped to reveal the role of each component within the doctrine of *Russkiy Mir* and to determine the nature and scope of their influence on the holistic

understanding of the concept. Logical analysis enabled the differentiation of how each component – critical geopolitics, neo-Eurasianism, imagined communities, and biopolitics – manifests itself within the doctrine. The deductive method allows for the forecasting of situational shifts in emphasis on particular components of Russkiy Mir in opposition to other civilizations, primarily Western European ones.

Critical geopolitics serves as a theoretical lens aimed at unpacking how political authority, territorial dynamics, and geographical imaginaries interact to influence global politics, national identities, and international conflicts. It arose in the 1990s as a critique of classical geopolitical traditions, which largely prioritized the analysis of nation-states, border configurations, and military strategy.

The concept of Russkiy Mir envisions a border-crossing community symbolically and ideologically anchored to Moscow, bound together through shared elements such as identity, security concerns, nationalism, historical interpretations, and cultural markers. Russian geopolitical narratives are deeply shaped by the state's self-conception and its engagement with historical memory. Understanding the intersections between discursive politics, spatial representations, and identity construction is essential when examining Russia's policies toward Ukraine and Kazakhstan in the context of Russkiy Mir.

Geopolitical narratives are not merely descriptive; they actively shape reality by creating categories and reinforcing political perceptions. Their performative nature lies in the fact that categorizing is itself an exercise of power. Political rhetoric and mass media play a pivotal role in propagating historical narratives and geopolitical myths [1]. As Russian scholar Mariya Omelicheva explains, critical geopolitics shares similarities with constructivism in that it views geopolitical space as shaped by cognitive processes and discursive practices [2]. Consequently, the Russkiy Mir is not a tangible geopolitical entity but a constructed narrative that the Kremlin adapts to serve its strategic preferences and goals.

Russia employs a variety of geopolitical frameworks to position itself both regionally and globally. According to David Lewis, the Russian state projects multiple spatial metaphors such as Greater Europe, the Russian World, and Eurasia each tied to different foreign policy trajectories. Despite these differing visions, they all seek to resolve the central issue of Russia's identity in the evolving post-Soviet global order [3]. As such, critical geopolitics is particularly useful for investigating how these imaginative geographies are instrumentalized in support of Russia's broader foreign policy agenda.

By utilizing critical geopolitics, this study explores how discourses, representational strategies, and narratives help construct the notion of Russia's "Near Abroad" through the ideological apparatus of Russkiy Mir. The term "Near Abroad", introduced in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse in 1992, is illustrative of geopolitical narrative-making. It simultaneously designates the former Soviet republics as independent states yet places them within a symbolic



space of Russian proximity and influence, reinforcing the idea that they are distinct from other foreign nations.

This theoretical framework allows for an analysis of the divergent ways in which Ukraine and Kazakhstan are conceptualized within Russkiy Mir, and how these conceptualizations shape Russia's foreign policy toward both nations. As Marlene Laruelle notes, the Kremlin's actions in the post-Soviet sphere are informed by its perception of national security imperatives and the necessity of safeguarding the current political regime against perceived internal and external threats. Russkiy Mir, therefore, emerges as a flexible and ambiguous geopolitical construct, which the Russian state employs in ways that align with its shifting political objectives [4]. Critical geopolitics, in turn, provides a suitable foundation for assessing this behavior, as it reveals how Russia's policies are embedded in state-controlled discourse, media, and academic production loyal to Kremlin narratives.

The way in which space is imagined need not align with its empirical or lived geography. Toal illustrates this with the case of Northern Ireland's second-largest city, where the name "Londonderry" instead of "Derry" validates a British geopolitical narrative and symbolically centers the region's identity around London and the British imperial legacy [5]. A comparable example can be found in Donetsk Oblast, where Russian authorities, following their occupation of Bakhmut, reimposed the Soviet-era name "Artemovsk". Additionally, rhetorical devices like "Little Russia" or "Novorossiia" are deployed to justify territorial claims over Ukrainian regions and to undermine Ukraine's sovereign legitimacy. These linguistic strategies, though symbolic, significantly influence material geopolitical realities – as underscored by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Critical geopolitics also dissects the ways geopolitical knowledge is reproduced across three domains: the formal (academia and intellectual institutions), the practical (foreign policy and diplomacy), and the popular (national identity and representations of the 'other' in media and culture) [2]. This thesis engages with all three dimensions through a detailed examination of political rhetoric, journalistic content, academic writings, and public discourse found on blogs and semi-official platforms promoting the Russkiy Mir narrative.

In sum, critical geopolitics equips this research with an analytical perspective for understanding how power, space, and identity interconnect within the framework of Russkiy Mir and Russia's strategies in its perceived "Near Abroad". Positioned at the crossroads of spatial theory and biopolitics, Russkiy Mir represents more than a foreign policy tool – it is a mode of constructing borders, assigning meanings to territories, and forging identities aligned with the Kremlin's worldview. As Russia crafts its international posture based on internally constructed historical, spatial, and ideological realities, critical geopolitics offers a powerful toolset for decoding how these realities shape foreign policy behavior in the post-Soviet geopolitical landscape.

## **Results**

### **Ruskiy Mir as Imagined community and Eurasianism**

According to the ideology of Ruskiy Mir, Russia is conceptualized not merely as the political entity known as the Russian Federation, but as a broader civilizational space that surpasses the current territorial boundaries of the state. Belonging to this space is marked by several indicators, including the use of the Russian language, adherence to shared historical narratives, cultural affinity, alignment with Russian values, cooperative ties with Moscow, and opposition to Western ideologies.

The notion of imagined communities, as introduced by Benedict Anderson, is crucial for understanding how Ruskiy Mir is constructed as a community. Imagined communities are not necessarily grounded in direct, interpersonal relationships among members; rather, they are formed through a collective sense of shared language, historical continuity, cultural practices, and, at times, common political affiliations. The Kremlin's construction of Ruskiy Mir operates in much the same way, by producing a sense of unity among disparate individuals who may never have personal contact with one another but are linked through symbols, narratives, and state-endorsed ideologies.

Anderson identified three essential instruments that shaped the colonial imagination of territory and identity: the census, the map, and the museum [6]. These tools served to categorize and codify populations and spaces in ways that made them legible to the state, and similar mechanisms are at work in the symbolic creation of Ruskiy Mir. Importantly, imagined communities are not static, they evolve over time, influenced by political agendas, social transformations, and cultural developments. Individuals may simultaneously belong to multiple imagined communities based on overlapping identifiers such as national origin, ethnicity, religion, and language.

This theoretical concept proves especially relevant in explaining the logic and practice underlying the construction of Ruskiy Mir. The Kremlin imagines this community through biographical and political narratives, uniting people who either identify as Russian or possess a partial Russian identity – whether through emotional connections to Russia, spiritual ties to the Russian Orthodox Church, former Soviet or Russian citizenship, or mother-tongue use of Russian. The conceptual boundaries of Ruskiy Mir extend across modern nation-states that were once part of the Russian Empire or the USSR. Statements made by President Vladimir Putin questioning the legitimacy of Ukrainian and Kazakh sovereignty serve as clear illustrations of this expansive civilizational view.

Nevertheless, the cohesiveness of the so-called "compatriots" within this imagined community is highly debatable. As noted by Mikhail Suslov, it is intellectually challenging to unify the diverse groups of the Russian-speaking diaspora under a single identity. The Russian diaspora is composed of multiple segments: those who emigrated in different historical waves from the Soviet



Union, Russian-speaking populations from Central Asia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states; economic migrants; Russian women who married into Western societies; scholars and IT professionals working abroad; and the affluent “global Russians” who reside in cosmopolitan hubs such as London and New York [7].

Critical geopolitics as a theoretical lens significantly contributes to the central research inquiry of this thesis. Unlike traditional geopolitical thinking, which treats territoriality and power as fixed and objective, critical geopolitics interrogates how spatial and political realities are constructed and framed by geopolitical actors. This framing gives rise to what is perceived as “truth” in global politics. By applying this perspective, one can better grasp *Russkiy Mir* as an ideological instrument through which the Russian state exerts influence in its perceived “Near Abroad.”

Through its focus on power relations, discourse, and contestation, critical geopolitics helps unravel the underlying complexities of Russia’s foreign policy behavior toward countries like Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Moreover, this framework offers insight not only into Russia’s geopolitical imagination but also into how states such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan perceive their own identities and geopolitical cultures. These local self-conceptions both influence and are influenced by the Russian geopolitical narrative, creating a dynamic interplay of meaning-making and strategic positioning.

### **Eurasianism and Biopolitics as Integral Aspects of *Russkiy Mir***

The relevance of Eurasianism in analyzing the ideology of *Russkiy Mir* stems from the fact that within segments of the Russian political and intellectual elite, these two concepts are often seen as compatible or even interchangeable. Eurasianism represents a geopolitical ideology that perceives the Eurasian continent not as a mere geographical link between Europe and Asia, but rather as an independent civilization with its own historical trajectory, cultural values, and geopolitical interests. Much like *Russkiy Mir*, Eurasianism champions a multipolar global order, challenging Western hegemonic dominance. It seeks to construct a distinctive identity and geopolitical paradigm for Eurasia, encompassing both the European and Asian territories.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western narratives frequently conflated the notions of “Soviet” and “Russian”. In response to this oversimplification and as part of an effort to reshape the conceptual space of the post-Soviet region, the idea of “Eurasia” emerged as the most compelling and viable geocultural framework to redefine the former Soviet landscape. Scholar Sergey Glebov emphasizes that the term “Eurasia” came to serve as a replacement concept to articulate a new civilizational vision of the region [8].

Eurasianist ideology was originally formulated by Russian émigrés who had fled Bolshevik rule in the 1920s and 1930s and resettled in Western Europe. Glebov views Eurasianism as a strategy aimed at suppressing competing forms of nationalism within the multiethnic framework of the former Russian Empire by

unifying them under a singular civilizational identity. In his analysis, Eurasianism is inherently imperial in nature, reflecting the fragmented and unequal cultural and social terrain of imperial Russia [8, pp. 5–6]. Eurasianism, like Russkiy Mir, incorporates elements of traditionalism and ethnic pluralism, merging both into an inclusive imperial vision intended to manage diversity under a shared ideological umbrella.

The concept of biopolitics, derived from the theoretical work of French philosopher Michel Foucault, further enriches the analysis of Russkiy Mir. Biopolitics examines the intersection of political authority and the regulation of life processes within modern states. It explores how governments and institutions manage populations not solely through coercive political mechanisms but by governing aspects of biological, social, and cultural life. Within the context of the post-Soviet region, biopolitics provides a useful analytical lens for evaluating the Kremlin’s approach toward its so-called “compatriots.”

Biopolitical theory offers insights into how power functions across domains that blend human biology, collective identity, and sociopolitical governance. Applying this framework, one can better understand the Kremlin’s strategies for managing Russian-speaking populations outside its current borders. These policies are not only geopolitical in intent but biopolitical in function, as they engage with issues of belonging, cultural affinity, and emotional loyalty to the Russian state.

Political scholars Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk suggest that integrating the concept of biopolitics into the analysis of post-Soviet political relations offers a more sophisticated understanding of the mechanisms of Russian influence. They differentiate between two strategic approaches used by Russia in what it identifies as its “Near Abroad”: one that seeks territorial control through classical geopolitical means, and another that governs populations by fostering a shared identity rooted in language, history, and culture. This biopolitical strategy centers around safeguarding and maintaining an imagined community of Russian speakers, a core tenet of Russkiy Mir ideology [9].

Thus, the juxtaposition between the territorial ambitions implicit in Eurasianist thought and the biopolitical practices surrounding Russkiy Mir reveals the multifaceted nature of Russia’s regional strategy. While Eurasianism articulates a grand civilizational vision to rival Western influence, biopolitics focuses on nurturing and regulating communities that align with Russian identity markers, even beyond the borders of the state. Together, these two frameworks illustrate how contemporary Russian geopolitical thinking blends ideological narratives with mechanisms of population management to extend its influence in the post-Soviet space.

### **Traditional Values and Biopolitical Symbolism in the Narrative of Russkiy Mir**

The ideological foundation of Russkiy Mir is closely tied to the promotion

of so-called traditional values, which are expressed through a combination of anti-Western sentiment, social conservatism, and the prominence of Russian Orthodoxy. Notably, both the Moscow Patriarchate and neo-Eurasianist thinkers have played significant roles in perpetuating the civilizational discourse that aligns with the Kremlin's recent conservative ideological orientation [4, p. 23]. Within this worldview, *Russkiy Mir* serves as a vehicle for affirming traditional norms such as the sanctity of the family unit, patriotism, and religious devotion. Through this emphasis, it positions itself in opposition to the values of Western liberal democracy, which it depicts as morally and spiritually corrupt.

A central element in this oppositional stance is the way in which Russian state propaganda has portrayed Ukraine's geopolitical orientation as a betrayal of shared cultural and spiritual heritage. One of the Kremlin's rhetorical justifications for its large-scale invasion of Ukraine is the framing of Ukraine as having succumbed to the "satanic" influences of Western liberalism, thus necessitating a moral and civilizational intervention by Russia.

The mythos of *Russkiy Mir* also draws heavily from the Soviet legacy, especially in how it blurs the boundaries between Soviet and Russian identities. During the Soviet period, the Russian and Soviet identities were largely conflated, which allows contemporary *Russkiy Mir* narratives to glorify and mythologize the Soviet past [1, p. 758]. For individuals raised and socialized in the Soviet system, who maintain a deep emotional connection to its historical narratives and cultural practices, the message of *Russkiy Mir* resonates as familiar and legitimate. This emotional continuity is reinforced by decades of Soviet ideological indoctrination in public education, workplaces, and mass media.

An illustrative example of this nostalgic identification can be found in British journalist Joanna Lillis's account of a conversation with a woman in her fifties in the city of Semey, located in eastern Kazakhstan. When asked about Russia's annexation of Crimea, the woman responded that "Crimea's always been considered Russian," asserting further that "Sevastopol and Crimea are real Russian lands. The Russians and the Orthodox defended it from the Turkish yoke, and that's where our Russian soldiers fought" [10, p. 272]. Such narratives reflect a deep internalization of imperial and Soviet-era historical memory, which continues to inform contemporary geopolitical perceptions.

A prominent biopolitical metaphor employed in the discourse of *Russkiy Mir* is that of the family, which is laden with symbolic associations linked to both Soviet and imperial traditions [9, p. 25]. This metaphor positions the Russian state as a paternal figure or guardian tasked with protecting its extended "family" of Russian speakers and cultural kin beyond its national borders. The notion of familial unity is further visualized through various public monuments that were intended to symbolize the brotherhood of nations. One such example was the "People's Friendship Arch" in Kyiv, erected in 1982 to mark the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Union. Though recently dismantled, the monument was emblematic

of the Kremlin's idealized vision of unity among the peoples of the former USSR.

### **Historical Experiences, Political Dynamics, Economic Factors, and Security as Practical Manifestations of the Russkiy Mir**

The ideology of Russkiy Mir aspires to extend beyond the geographical boundaries of the Russian Federation by tapping into emotional connections and shared historical consciousness among Russian-speaking communities abroad. One of the central narratives employed by the Kremlin to cultivate a unified Russian identity is the memory of the Great Patriotic War. This historical episode serves as a powerful symbol for rallying populations around the notion of a collective Russian world. Spiritually, Russkiy Mir fuses Orthodox Christianity with collective memory, drawing on a constructed idea of a mutual origin dating back to Kievan Rus' [11]. Through this synthesis, the ideology draws from a triad of historical experiences – rooted in the Russian Orthodox Church, the Tsarist Empire, and the Soviet Union to assert a sense of continuity and belonging.

More than just a cultural or spiritual project, Russkiy Mir functions as a psychological framework for facilitating the political reintegration of the post-Soviet space. The prospect of Ukraine moving closer to Western institutions is interpreted by Moscow as a significant threat to the reintegration project, undermining the Kremlin's long-term geopolitical vision. In response, Russia has taken steps across diplomatic, economic, and political arenas ultimately resorting to military means to assert its influence. Those states and populations that fall within the perceived domain of Russkiy Mir are expected to demonstrate political allegiance. As Wawrzonek notes, Russia's neo-imperial ambitions in Ukraine have been ideologically reinforced through the discourse of Orthodox civilizational unity and the conceptual framework of Russkiy Mir [11, p. 766].

On the economic front, the Russkiy Mir ideology is institutionally represented by the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), comprising Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Modeled in part on the European Union, the EAEU is portrayed by Eurasianist thinkers as a counterweight to Western unipolarity, aiming to establish a balanced and multipolar international order [12]. Within this union, Russia positions itself as the dominant actor, with the Russian language functioning as the primary medium of communication.

The security component of Russkiy Mir finds tangible expression through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance under Russian leadership designed to maintain influence across the post-Soviet sphere. Kazakhstan remains a member of the CSTO, unlike Ukraine, which has consistently sought to distance itself from Russian-led security frameworks. A notable demonstration of this security alliance occurred in January 2022, when CSTO troops largely composed of Russian forces—were deployed to Kazakhstan to quell civil unrest linked to widespread dissatisfaction with the government and the departure of President Nazarbayev. Since the onset of Russia's full-scale war in Ukraine, the militarized aspect of Russkiy Mir has become increasingly

concerning for Kazakhstan, as the lead power of the CSTO is now actively engaged in a major international conflict.

## **Discussion**

### **Which indicator of the Russian world is more important: Russian language and culture or Russian Orthodox Church**

Russian identity, from this perspective, is anchored in multiple historical periods and is considered to possess an eternal and transcendent essence. The significance of the mental and ideological aspect of Russkiy Mir is underscored by Putin's statement that "Russia is not a project, it is a destiny. You know, it is a life" [2, p. 718]. Due to Russkiy Mir's perceived timeless nature, it transcends the boundaries defined by contemporary law.

Historically, the term Russkiy Mir has been employed to describe the Russian state and empire as a unique civilizational domain. Medieval texts referred to ancient Rus as a Russian world. From the nineteenth century onward, some interpreted it spiritually as a community of Orthodox Christians united by shared beliefs, rituals, and traditions. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russkiy Mir arose as a new conceptual framework to provide meaning in the post-communist era. It became Russia's new "national idea" [1, p. 747]. However, Irina Kotkina points out that, despite robust backing from the Russian Orthodox Church, the concept only achieved widespread recognition within Russia after the 2014 annexation of Crimea [13].

Supporters of Russkiy Mir emphasize various criteria for membership. Yet, Russkiy Mir also functions as an instrument of soft power, appealing to people's emotional ties to the Soviet past and drawing them through the Russian language and culture.

The indicators of Russkiy Mir allow this thesis to define how the concept is understood through the 'traits' or 'conditions' that constitute belonging to it.

Russkiy Mir officially entered Russian Federation rhetoric in 2006, when President Vladimir Putin stated that the "Russkiy Mir can and must unite everyone who cherishes the Russian word and Russian culture, wherever they may live – in Russia or abroad", during a speech in St. Petersburg on the eve of the Year of the Russian Language. Subsequently, on June 21, 2007, the Russkiy Mir Foundation was established by Putin's decree. In 2016, Putin emphasized that the Russian language fosters the creation of a national identity with its distinctive character and traditions within a multinational state. He further argued that the Russian language preserves Russia's identity in a globalized world and serves as a pathway to civilization and culture via spiritual and historical values [14].

Within Russkiy Mir, the Russian language is portrayed as the link connecting various peoples who belong to this community, while also constituting the essence of Russian civilization. Moreover, the Russian language has been leveraged to justify military interventions, as exemplified by Russian assertions of protecting Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine.



Although adherence to Orthodox Christianity is not formally required for inclusion in Russkiy Mir, the role of the Russian Orthodox Church within this framework is emphasized by the fact that it is the sole religious institution represented on the governing board of the Russkiy Mir Foundation [1, p. 751]. Orthodoxy in Russkiy Mir is not merely a religion but is also conceived as a civilizational identity [11]. Moscow endeavors to create a counter-hegemonic narrative opposing the West, with the Russian Orthodox Church actively shaping this narrative through the concept of 'Holy Rus'. The Russian Orthodox Church views the Russian nation as a multicultural entity tracing its origins to Kievan Rus and extending into present-day Russia. According to Naydenova N., Moscow is regarded as the center of Holy Rus, which encompasses Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and, in some interpretations, Moldova and Kazakhstan. The supra-national character of Christianity legitimizes the ambiguous borders of Holy Rus, covering all territories considered part of Russkiy Mir [14, p. 41].

### **Conclusion**

A coherent vision of what constitutes the 'Russian World' does not exist, as its various manifestations may come to the fore at different times. Concluding, the exact definition of the Russkiy Mir is imprecise. Nevertheless, it is important to conceptualize the Russkiy Mir as an imagined transnational community that, according to the Kremlin, belongs to Russian civilization through different concepts such as language, history, culture and values, geography, religion and cooperation with Moscow and competition with the West. Russkiy Mir is an irredentist of nature. However, Russkiy Mir is also a soft power tool as it appeals to the emotional attachment of people to the Soviet Union and attracts people through Russian language and culture. This, however, does not exclude the possibility of more assertive or coercive manifestations – most notably, the military actions undertaken in Ukraine. The concept of the "Russian World" has evolved into an ideological framework that reflects what Samuel Huntington referred to as a "clash of civilizations". It supports the proposition that the "Russian World" represents the second major manifestation of civilizational conflict following the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. In comparison, China's quiet economic and political expansion tends to attract considerably less attention from global public opinion.

From a practical standpoint, the case of Kazakhstan illustrates that the prevalence of the Russian language does not necessarily lead to the automatic inclusion of a sovereign state within the geopolitical orbit of the "Russian World". This has become especially evident in the aftermath of the Russian Federation's launch of its 'special military operation' against Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

Simultaneously, the ideological dimension of the "Russian World" presents a potential threat to Kazakhstan's social cohesion, as it seeks to position itself as a centre of ideological and geopolitical attraction within post-Soviet states

bordering the Russian Federation. Mitigating this threat is possible through the development of an ideological immunity at the national level. Consequently, the present study offers a foundation for further academic inquiry in this direction.

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## **«ОРЫС ӘЛЕМІ» ТҰЖЫРЫМЫ: СЫНИ ГЕОСАЯСАТ, САЯСИ ЖӘНЕ ДҮНИЕТАНЫМДЫҚ ҚЫРЛАРЫ**

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**Аңдатпа.** Бұл мақалада қазіргі Ресей режимінің идеологиясының құрамдас бөліктері саналатын «Орыс әлемі» (Русский мир), қиялдағы қауымдастықтар, еуразияшылдық және биосаясат – сыни геосаясат контекстінде талданады. Соңғы онжылдықта «Орыс әлемі» тұжырымдамасы Кремльдің идеологиялық баяндауларында уақыт өткен сайын негізгі орынды ала бастады. Бұл тұжырымдама Ресейді қазіргі саяси шекараларынан тыс жатқан, тілді, тарихты және мәдени құндылықтарды байланыстыратын қауымдастықтар арқылы біріктіретін трансұлттық өркениет ретінде ұсынады. Орыс әлемі бейнесіндегі нарративті елестетілген қауымдастықтар қолдап, бұл трансұлттық байланыстарды күрделі әлеуметтік құрылым ретінде бейнелейді. Кеңес Одағы ыдырағаннан кейін идеологиялық дискурс ретінде қайта жанданған еуразияшылдық Ресейді Батыстан да, Шығыстан да бөлек ерекше өркениет ретінде көрсетуге тырысады.

Зерттеу әдістемесі логикалық, тарихи әдіс және «Орыс әлемі» компоненттерінің өзара байланыстарын табуға негізделген. Зерттеудің ғылыми маңызы – бұл идеологиялық құрылымның мәнін түсінуде жатыр, ол геосаяси амбицияларды, әсіресе Ресеймен шекаралас елдерге қатысты, заңдастыру құралы ретінде қызмет етеді. Практикалық маңызы «Орыс әлемінің» түсінігінің әртүрлі құралдары мен формаларын жұмсақ, қатаң және олардың аралас нұсқаларын болжауға мүмкіндік береді. Қолданылатын құралдар мен формалар жағдайға байланысты таңдалады. Мысалы, Қазақстанға қатысты «Орыс әлемінің» жұмсақ формасы қолданылады. Украинаға қатысты ең қатаң түрі, яғни, «арнайы әскери операция» түрінде жүзеге асырылуда. Ал, Беларусь пен Ресейдің одақтас мемлекеттер интеграциясы мысалында көрсетіледі. Мақаланың қорытындылары насихаттық мәлімдемелердің артында тұрған «Орыс әлемінің» мәнін және шығу тегін, сондай-ақ көпполюсті әлемнің бір полюсі болуға ұмтылысын



тануға мүмкіндік береді.

**Тірек сөздер:** Орыс әлемі, қиялдағы қауымдастықтар, еуразияшылдық, биосаясат, сыншыл геосаясат, Посткеңестік кеңістік, көпполярлы әлем, жұмсақ күш

**Қаржыландыру:** Мақаладағы зерттеу Қазақстан Республикасының Ғылым және жоғары білім министрлігінің гранттық қолдауымен АР26100127 «Саяси коммуникацияның тиімділігі контекстінде қазақстандықтардың цифрлық медиа сауаттылығын арттыру» жобасы аясында жүзеге асырылды.

## **КОНЦЕПТ «РУССКОГО МИРА»: КРИТИЧЕСКАЯ ГЕОПОЛИТИКА, ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ И МИРОВОЗЗРЕНЧЕСКИЕ АСПЕКТЫ**

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**Аннотация.** В данной статье анализируются компоненты идеологии современного режима России – «Русский мир», воображаемые сообщества, евразийство и биополитика – в контексте критической геополитики. Концепция «Русского мира» в последнее десятилетие все больше занимает центральное место в идеологических нарративах Кремля, представляя Россию как транснациональную цивилизацию, выходящую за пределы её нынешних политических границ и объединяющую сообщества через язык, историю и культурные ценности. Воображаемые сообщества в образе «Русского мира» поддерживают этот нарратив, представляя эти транснациональные связи как сложносоставную единую социальную конструкцию. Евразийство, возрождённое как идеологический дискурс после распада Советского Союза, стремится выделить Россию как особую цивилизацию, отличную как от Запада, так и от Востока.

Методология исследования основана на логическом методе, историческом методе и нахождении взаимных связей между компонентами «Русского мира». Научное значение состоит в понимании сущности этой идеологической конструкции, которая служит для легитимации геополитических амбиций, особенно по отношению к сопредельной России странам. Практическая значимость состоит в том, что это понимание позволяет прогнозировать разные инструменты и формы как мягкие, так и жёсткие и их гибридные варианты по отношению к ближнему зарубежью. Выбор инструментов и формы зависит от ситуации. Так по отношению к Казахстану применяется мягкая форма «Русского мира». Для Украины – самая жесткая форма в виде «специальной военной операции», в то время как Беларусь есть пример интеграции в так называемое Союзное государство Беларуси и России. Выводы статьи позволяют распознать за

пропагандистскими заявлениями сущность и истоки «Русского мира», стремление стать одним из полюсов многополярного мира.

**Ключевые слова:** Российский мир, воображаемые сообщества, евразийство, биополитика, критическая геополитика, постсоветское пространство, многополярный мир, мягкая сила

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**II БӨЛІМ. ДҮНИЕЖҮЗІЛІК САЯСАТ ЖӘНЕ  
ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ ҚАТЫНАСТАР  
РАЗДЕЛ II. МИРОВАЯ ПОЛИТИКА И  
МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ  
PART II. WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

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**О НОВОЙ РОЛИ ВНЕШНЕПОЛИТИЧЕСКОГО ВЕДОМСТВА  
КАЗАХСТАНА И МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЙ В  
ПРОЦЕССЕ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОГО ТРАНСФЕРА ТЕХНОЛОГИЙ**

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**Аннотация.** В данной статье рассматривается новая роль внешнеполитического ведомства Республики Казахстан и международных организаций в процессе международного трансфера технологий. В условиях глобализации и быстрого технологического прогресса, Казахстан сталкивается с необходимостью внедрения передовых технологий для повышения своей конкурентоспособности и устойчивого экономического роста.

Целью данной статьи является анализ внешнеэкономической политики Казахстана, взаимодействию с международными организациями, такими как Всемирная торговая организация, Евразийский экономический союз, а также с ведущими мировыми центрами инноваций. Рассматриваются ключевые механизмы, через которые Казахстан может получать доступ к международному трансферу технологий, включая двусторонние и многосторонние соглашения, международные инициативы и программы, а также роль дипломатических и экономических миссий. Важное значение придается вопросам правового регулирования, защиты интеллектуальной собственности и созданию благоприятной инвестиционной среды для привлечения иностранных инвестиций в сферу высоких технологий.

Ожидается, что активное участие внешнеполитического ведомства страны в данном процессе поможет Казахстану ускорить технологическое развитие и интеграцию в мировую экономику.

**Ключевые слова:** интеллектуальная собственность, трансфер технологий, инновации, внешнеэкономическая политика, инвестиции, экономическая дипломатия, устойчивое развитие, международные организации

### **Введение**

Обсуждение роли государственных и международных организаций в содействии процессу международного трансфера технологий в Казахстане и дипломатической деятельности в сфере экономических и научных отношений, включая участие Казахстана в международных форумах и конференциях, заключение двусторонних и многосторонних соглашений с технологически развитыми странами, становится все более важным для Казахстана, который стремится к технологическому прогрессу и экономическому развитию.

На сегодняшний день, регулярно проводится анализ деятельности этих организаций, освещается участие Казахстана в международных технологических платформах и партнерских инициативах. Особое внимание уделяется исследованию влияния таких программ на национальную инновационную систему и интеграцию страны в глобальные технологические процессы. Анализ показывает, что сотрудничество с международными партнерами и участие в глобальных инновационных сетях имеет решающее значение для достижения Казахстаном своих целей в области инноваций и технологий, что позволяет стране активнее внедрять передовые технологии, обмениваться опытом и наращивать собственный инновационный потенциал.

Международный опыт подтверждает, что одним из ключевых факторов успешного трансфера технологий является роль международных организаций и внешнеполитического ведомства страны. Международные организации, такие как Всемирная организация интеллектуальной собственности (ВОИС), Всемирная торговая организация (ВТО), Специализированное учреждение организации объединённых наций (ЮНЕСКО) и различные финансовые и научные консорциумы, оказывают поддержку в обмене знаниями, опытом и передовыми технологиями. В то же время, внешнеэкономическое ведомство Казахстана, будучи активным участником международных переговоров, играет важную роль в создании и продвижении благоприятных условий для привлечения инвестиций и технологий [1].

В Послании Главы государства народу Казахстана «Единство народа и системные реформы – прочная основа процветания страны» в качестве одной из актуальных проблем в области региональной политики отмечено решение проблем трансформирования агроиндустриального комплекса в высокотехнологичную отрасль и трансферт современных цифровых

технологий, внедрение элементов Индустрии 4.0, а также активная работа со стратегическими партнерами страны за рубежом [2].

Именно через взаимодействие с международными партнерами и соблюдение глобальных стандартов Казахстан может эффективно интегрироваться в мировую экономику и обеспечить себе технологическое превосходство в ключевых отраслях.

Целью исследования научной статьи является разработка практических рекомендаций по совершенствованию процесс международного трансфера технологий в Казахстане. Для достижения поставленной цели нами предусматривается решение следующих задач:

- изучение опыта международного трансфера технологий в рамках внешнеэкономического сотрудничества между странами;
- анализ инновационной системы, действующей международных соглашений в сфере защиты прав интеллектуальной собственности, которые регулируют процесс международного трансфера технологий;
- разработка мероприятий по совершенствованию процесса международного трансфера технологий в Казахстане.

### **Описание материалов и методов**

В данной статье рассматривается новая роль международных организаций и внешнеполитического ведомства Казахстана в привлечении международного трансфера технологий.

В анализе использованы различные аналитические и эмпирические методы, а также материалы из открытых источников, включая документы международных организаций, официальные отчеты правительственные документы, исследования в области трансфера технологий, исследования и публикации в научных журналах и на специализированных форумах, руководство ЮНЕСКО по преобразованию технического и профессионального образования и подготовки для успешной и справедливой трансформации: Стратегия на 2022-2029 гг.) [1].

Для анализа роли международных организаций в трансфере технологий в Казахстан использовались материалы, касающиеся международных соглашений, программ и инициатив, направленных на поддержку технологических инноваций:

Документы Всемирной торговой организации (ВТО), включая соглашения и инициативы по доступу к технологиям, интеллектуальной собственности, а также правилам торговли и инвестиций [2].

Отчеты и исследования Организации Объединенных Наций (ООН), в частности программы, связанные с инновациями, экологически чистыми технологиями и устойчивым развитием [3].



Публикации и исследовательские отчеты Всемирного банка, которые дают представление о влиянии технологий на экономическое развитие, а также о механизмах привлечения иностранных инвестиций и технологий [3].

Анализ этих документов позволил выявить текущие тенденции в международной политике в области технологического обмена и оценить роль Казахстана в этих процессах.

Для оценки вклада внешнеэкономической политики Казахстана в привлечении технологий использовались официальные отчеты Министерства иностранных дел Республики Казахстан, материалы о внешней политике и стратегии экономической интеграции, а также заявления и программы, направленные на развитие инноваций [4].

Методы, использованные в исследовании: индукция и дедукция, анализ, обобщение, синтез, контент-анализ открытых источников информации: академические

публикации; интервью с основными экспертами казахстанского рынка трансферных технологий;

обзор Национального института Интеллектуальной собственности QAZPATENT по анализ патентования технологий в Казахстане, аналитическая записка с результатами.

Глобальный инновационный индекс-2024, Doing Business 2024 Всемирного банка

При написании работы были изучены отчеты международных организаций (ВОИС, ОЭСР, МВФ, ООН, ВБ, ЮНИДО), а также государственные программные документы инновационного развития экономики Республики Казахстан, предусматривающие привлечение зарубежных прогрессивных технологий для развития новых производств V и VI технологических укладов и совершенствование технологий традиционных производств.

## **Результаты**

Республика Казахстан обладает значительным научным и инновационным потенциалом, демонстрирует заметные результаты и достижения в области бионанотехнологий, информационных и аэрокосмических технологий, атомной энергетики, средств связи [5]. Масштабы потребительского рынка потенциально позволяют развивать производственную систему, ориентированную на потребление конкурентоспособной инновационной продукции.

В стране имеются основные подсистемы национальной инновационной системы (НИС), созданы институты инновационного развития (хотя их деятельность недостаточно скоординирована). Несмотря на развитие различных научно-технических организаций в системе инновационной

инфраструктуры (технопарки, кластеры инновационных технологий, центры сертификации и коммерциализации, венчурный бизнес, вузовская наука и т.д.), их совокупного эффекта недостаточно для формирования целостной успешной модели НИС страны.

В настоящее время наблюдается значительный разрыв в инновационном развитии по сравнению с развитыми странами. Например, по данным Глобального индекса инноваций, (ГИИ) в 2023 году Казахстан поднялся на три позиции и заняла 81-е место среди 132 государств занимая третью позицию в Центрально-Азиатском регионе, уступая Индии (40-ое место) и Ирану (62-ое место) [6].

Кроме того, наблюдается снижение количества сделок, связанных с передачей исключительных прав на объекты интеллектуальной собственности (изобретения, полезные модели, промышленные образцы) по договорам, зарегистрированным на территории Казахстана. На один лицензионный договор в среднем приходится более 5 выданных патентов [6].

Основными причинами отставания в инновационном развитии являются низкий уровень инновационной и инвестиционной активности частного бизнеса, недостаточное финансирование инновационной сферы, слабое взаимодействие сектора научно-исследовательских и опытно-конструкторских работы (НИОКР) с реальным сектором экономики, открытость инновационного цикла [6].

Для обеспечения роста экономики страны необходимо формирование эффективной системы коммуникаций в сфере науки, технологий и инноваций, повышение восприимчивости экономики и общества к инновациям, развитие наукоемкого бизнеса. Достичь этого можно только путем объединения усилий всех заинтересованных сторон, путем интеграции инновационного, человеческого и научно-технического потенциалов.

Центры поддержки технологий и инноваций (ЦПТИ) в современном мире играют ключевую роль в стимулировании инноваций, развитии технологических стартапов и обеспечении устойчивого экономического роста. Глобальная сеть ЦПТИ продолжила свою эволюцию, демонстрируя впечатляющие достижения и влияние на экономическое развитие, и в настоящее время в 90 странах мира насчитывается более 1400 ЦПТИ (Доклад о деятельности ЦПТИ и БПТ за 2022 г.) [6], расположенных, как правило, при патентных ведомствах, университетах, исследовательских центрах и технопарках. Центры оказывают услуги исследователям, изобретателям и предпринимателям, поддерживая их на различных этапах цикла инноваций – от помощи в использовании патентных баз данных и проведении патентного поиска технологической информации из более чем 140 млн опубликованных патентных документов до консультаций по управлению интеллектуальной собственностью и ее коммерциализации [6].

С момента начала реализации программы ЦПТИ в Республике

Казахстан (с 2021 по 2023 годы) Национального института Интеллектуальной собственности (далее – Qazpatent) заключил 23 соглашения с учебными заведениями и научными организациями об открытии ЦПТИ [6].

В 2023 году в четырех регионах Республики Казахстан было открыто 5 ЦПТИ на базе крупных НАО университетов. Полный список хозяйствующих субъектов, оказывающих услуги по направлениям деятельности ЦПТИ, размещен на официальных сайтах Qazpatent и ВОИС в разделе «Центры поддержки технологий и инноваций (ЦПТИ)» [6]

По данным Национального института развития в области инновационного развития АО «НАРИ «QazInnovations» в Казахстане зарегистрировано более 68 центров трансфера технологий (ЦТТ) по состоянию на 2024 год. Большинство ЦТТ микроуровня создаются при вузах с целью содействия развитию инновационной деятельности и формирования условий для эффективного взаимодействия вуза и промышленности [7].

По данным Qazpatent касательно динамики число заявок от нерезидентов в 2023 г., (страны Китай, Турция и др.) составило более 327, что увеличилось в сравнении с прошлым годом [7].

В Казахстане в 2024 году заявки на получение патентов на изобретения выросло на 24,8%, учитывая важную роль которую играют патенты в глобальной экономике в обеспечении конкурентоспособности стран, способствуя развитию высокотехнологичных отраслей и привлечению инвестиций.

Изобретения занимают важное место в общем объеме поданных заявок на патенты. В 2022 году было подано 838 заявок на изобретения, а в 2023 году это число выросло до 917, что соответствует 9,4% прироста. В первом полугодии 2024 года также наблюдается значительное увеличение числа заявок, до 559, что на 24,8% больше по сравнению с аналогичным периодом 2023 года. Количество выданных патентов за первое полугодие 2024 года увеличилось до 277, что на 11,7% больше по сравнению с аналогичным периодом 2023 года [7].

Международное патентование через систему РСТ (Patent Cooperation Treaty) становится все более популярным среди казахстанских изобретателей, было подано 26 заявок по РСТ в 2023 году, что на 8,3% больше по сравнению с 2022 годом. В первом полугодии 2024 года количество заявок, поданных через Qazpatent по процедуре РСТ, увеличилось до 18, что на 38,5% больше, чем в предыдущем году и свидетельствует о растущем интересе казахстанских ученых и компаний к международной защите своих изобретений [8].

Доля патентов на изобретения в этой статистике относится к основным трем направлениям:

1) Медицина и биотехнология: около 35% всех патентов связаны с разработкой новых методов лечения, медицинских устройств и

фармацевтических препаратов.

2) Энергетика и экология: примерно 25% патентов касаются технологий, направленных на улучшение экологической ситуации, повышение энергоэффективности и разработку альтернативных источников энергии.

3) Информационные технологии и робототехника: около 20% патентов включают разработки в области ИТ, автоматизации и робототехники.

Лидирующим регионом по активности подачи заявок на получение патентов на изобретения является г. Алматы: крупнейший центр инноваций, где зарегистрировано более 30% всех патентов. Это связано с наличием крупных исследовательских институтов и университетов. На втором месте активностью отличается г. Астана: столица и второй по значимости регион, на долю которого приходится около 25% патентов. Тройку лидеров замыкает Павлодарская и Карагандинская области: регион с сильной промышленной базой, где зарегистрировано около 20% патентов, в основном в области металлургии и материаловедения [9].




Рисунок 1 - Заявки стран нерезидентов на патенты на изобретение 2021 – 2022 гг.

Также с 2017 по 2021 гг. было подано 200 заявок на регистрацию промышленных образов заявителями из России, 55 – из Кореи, 53 – из Японии, 53 – из США, 39 – из Белоруссии, 37 – из Швейцарии, 28 – из Турции, 27 – из Нидерландов. Доля России среди заявок 2021 г. составила – 34%, Нидерландов – 16%, США – 9% [9].

Среди иностранных заявителей 12 заявок было подано Koninklijke Philips N.V. (бытовая техника, оборудование, Нидерланды), 11 заявок – АО Tarkett (производство напольных покрытий, Россия), 10 – Daio

Рарер (продукты из целлюлозы, бумаги и картона, Япония), 7 – ПАО Татнефть (нефтяная компания, Россия), 5 – АО «Национальный центр вертолетостроения им. М.Л. Миля и Н.И. Камова» (Россия). Что касается заявок на товарные знаки, с 2017 по 2021 гг. было подано 1683 заявки заявителями из США, 1278 заявок – заявителями из России, 1323 – из Китая, 584 – из Швейцарии, 448 – из Великобритании, 402 – из Кореи, 243 – из Японии. В 2021 г. 14% заявок было подано заявителями из России, 19% - из США, 14% - из Китая, 9% - из Индии, 7% - из Швейцарии, 37% - из других стран (Рисунок 1) [9].

По данным Национального института Интеллектуальной Собственности Казахстана, чаще всего подаются патентные заявки на изобретения по следующим разделам Международной патентной классификации: удовлетворение жизненных потребностей человека (114 национальные заявки и 22 иностранные), различные технологические процессы (34 национальные заявки и 32 иностранные), химия и металлургия (119 национальных заявок и 34 иностранные), строительство и горное дело (43 национальные заявки и 17 иностранных), механика, освещение, отопление (53 национальные заявки и 11 иностранных), физика (86 национальных заявок и 10 иностранных), электричество (40 национальных заявок и 3 иностранных) в 2021 г. [9].





Рисунок 2 - Соотношении национальных и иностранных заявок на регистрацию изобретений в 2021 г. по Международной патентной классификации [9]

Расходы на НИОКР - 0,12% от ВВП в 2020 г. Внутренние затраты

на НИОКР составили за 2021 год 134,9 млрд тенге (17 млрд руб.) – рост на 23% по сравнению с 2020 г., из которых 44,2 млрд тенге пришлось на Алматы, 26,3 млрд тенге – на Астану, 12,9 млрд тенге – на Мангистаускую область, 9 млрд тенге – Восточно-Казахстанскую область, и 7,8 млрд тенге – на Карагандинскую область. Доля внешних затрат на НИОКР, то есть стоимость научных исследований и разработок, выполненных сторонними организациями по договорам, с 2020 по 2023 гг. сократилась с 23,7% до 19%, а объём уменьшился на 7,6% [9].

В 2020 г. 48% (40,9 млрд тенге – 5,16 млрд руб.) финансирования внутренних затрат на НИОКР в Казахстане приходилось на республиканский бюджет (на 13,7% больше, чем в 2020 г.). На средства инвесторов пришлось 43% (36,7 млрд тенге – 4,63 млрд руб.), еще 485,6 млн тенге (61,3 млн руб.) - затраты местного бюджета, 2,2 млрд тенге (280 млн руб.) - иностранные средства. (Рисунок 2) [9].

Казахстан занимает только 74 место в Индексе наукоемких стран в части научных исследований. Стоит отметить, что научные исследования в Казахстане проводятся в сотрудничестве с другими странами: с США проводится 23,5% исследований, Россией – 18,7%, Таиландом – 9,9%, Германией – 8,8%, Израилем – 7,5%, Китаем – 6,8%, Кыргызстаном – 6,7%,



Великобританией – 6,4%, Испанией – 6%, Францией – 6%. (Рисунок 3) [10].

Рисунок 3 - Совместные исследования, в т.ч. в рамках НИОКР, с зарубежными странами 2021 – 2022 гг. [10]



В Казахстане в тренде высокое финансирование НИОКР со стороны государства, что создает потенциал для проведения совместных НИОКР для межгосударственных научных проектов Казахстана и России, например, с Казахским Национальным Университетом имени Аль-Фараби, Назарбаев Университетом, Казахской академией наук. нции на рынке

- финансирование НИОКР со стороны государства (а не со стороны частных компаний), однако планируется увеличивать долю частных инвестиций в НИОКР до 50%;

- низкие расходы на НИОКР, что говорит о неразвитости рынка и барьерах, связанных с отсутствием спроса на НИОКР – 65 место в мире по расходам на НИОКР (Россия – 10);

- низкая доля иностранных инвестиций в НИОКР – 5,4% в 2021 г. и 3,8% в 2020 г. от всех затрат на НИОКР.

По данным отчета посольства США в Казахстане об инвестиционном климате за 2024 год, в Казахстане правовая структура защиты прав интеллектуальной собственности (ПИС) относительно сильна; однако правоприменение требует дальнейшего совершенствования [11].

В настоящее время Казахстан не включен в Специальный отчет 301 Торгового представителя США (USTR). Для привлечения иностранных инвестиций Казахстан продолжает совершенствовать свой правовой режим защиты ПИС. Гражданский кодекс и различные законы защищают ПИС. Казахстан ратифицировал 18 из 24 договоров, одобренных Всемирной организацией интеллектуальной собственности (ВОИС). В 2024 году правительство намерено присоединиться к Марракешскому договору, Лиссабонскому соглашению и Гаагской системе. Страна намерена присоединиться к трем договорам и ратифицировать их после необходимых обновлений законов о ПИС [12].

Уголовный Кодекс Республики Казахстана устанавливает наказания за нарушение авторских прав, прав на изобретения, полезные модели, промышленные образцы, избранные изобретения и топографии интегральных схем. Закон уполномочивает правительство бороться с интернет-пиратством и закрывать веб-сайты, которые незаконно распространяют материалы, защищенные авторским правом, при условии, что правообладатели зарегистрировали свои материалы, защищенные авторским правом, в Департаменте прав интеллектуальной собственности Министерства юстиции. Несмотря на эти усилия, использование пиратского программного обеспечения остается высоким [12].

Согласно правительственной отчетности, в 2023 году таможенные органы приостановили таможенное оформление контрафактных товаров на сумму \$37,1 млн. Проверки правоохранительных органов привели к штрафам в размере \$25 400 за нарушение прав на товарный знак. Регулярные общенациональные кампании под названием «Контрафакт»

и «Антимошенничество», направленные на выявление и пресечение нарушений прав интеллектуальной собственности и повышение осведомленности общественности о проблемах интеллектуальной собственности, привели к изъятию 2295 единиц контрафактных товаров [13].

Иностранные компании жалуются на недостаточную защиту прав интеллектуальной собственности. Судьи, таможенники и полицейские не обладают экспертными знаниями в области прав интеллектуальной собственности, что усугубляет слабое обеспечение соблюдения прав интеллектуальной собственности [13].

Также, в последние десятилетия мировой экономический и политический ландшафт претерпел значительные изменения, и в этих условиях технологические инновации становятся важнейшим фактором экономического роста и геополитической конкурентоспособности.

Национальная инновационная система (НИС): В стране существуют основные подсистемы НИС и институты инновационного развития, однако их деятельность недостаточно скоординирована. Развитие научно-технических организаций не приводит к формированию успешной модели НИС.

Разрыв в инновационном развитии: Казахстан отстает в инновационном развитии по сравнению с развитыми странами. По данным Глобального индекса инноваций, в 2023 году Казахстан занял 81-е место, что указывает на необходимость улучшения позиций в этом направлении [11].

Проблемы с интеллектуальной собственностью: снижается количество сделок по передаче исключительных прав на объекты интеллектуальной собственности, что может свидетельствовать о недостаточной активности в области инноваций.

Причины отставания: Основные причины отставания в инновационном развитии включают низкий уровень активности частного бизнеса, недостаточное финансирование, слабое взаимодействие между НИОКР и реальным сектором экономики.

Необходимость интеграции. Для роста экономики необходимо создать эффективную систему коммуникаций в сфере науки и технологий, а также развивать наукоемкий бизнес через интеграцию усилий всех заинтересованных сторон.

Роль Центров поддержки технологий и инноваций (ЦПТИ): ЦПТИ играют ключевую роль в стимулировании инноваций и развитии технологических стартапов. В Казахстане с 2021 года открыто более 5 ЦПТИ, что свидетельствует о прогрессе в этой области [11].

Поддержка со стороны Qazpatent: Национальный институт Интеллектуальной собственности (Qazpatent) активно работает над созданием ЦПТИ и заключает соглашения с учебными заведениями и научными организациями для поддержки инновационной деятельности.

## **1. Технологии как фактор международной конкурентоспособности**

Современный мир переживает эпоху технологической революции, где инновации в области искусственного интеллекта, биотехнологий, зеленых технологий, космических исследований и цифровизации становятся основой для достижения стратегических целей государств. Технологическое превосходство и способность адаптировать и внедрять новые разработки имеют решающее значение не только для национальной безопасности, но и для экономического роста, социальной стабильности и укрепления международных позиций страны.

Трансфер технологий, то есть процесс передачи знаний, опыта и технологий от одной страны или организации к другой, является важнейшим инструментом для ускоренного развития новых секторов экономики и для интеграции стран в мировую инновационную сеть. В этом процессе важнейшую роль начинают играть внешнеэкономические и внешнеполитические ведомства, которые формируют и регулируют международные отношения в области высоких технологий [11].

## **2. Роль внешнеполитических ведомств в трансфере технологий**

До недавнего времени внешнеэкономическая и внешнеполитическая деятельность в основном фокусировалась на традиционных аспектах, таких как торговля, дипломатия и национальная безопасность. Однако в последние годы стало очевидно, что поддержка международного обмена технологиями и знаниями требует активного вмешательства внешнеполитических ведомств на более широком уровне [11].

В первую очередь, внешнеполитические ведомства начинают играть важную роль в заключении международных соглашений, направленных на стимулирование и регулирование трансфера технологий. Это могут быть двусторонние и многосторонние соглашения о научно-техническом сотрудничестве, соглашения в области интеллектуальной собственности и защиты инноваций, а также документы, касающиеся стандартов и нормативных актов, регулирующих трансфер технологий через международные корпорации, университеты и научные учреждения.

Кроме того, внешнеполитические ведомства активно участвуют в создании и поддержке международных консорциумов, которые обеспечивают совместные исследования и разработки, особенно в области передовых технологий. В таких проектах часто принимают участие государственные и частные учреждения, а также международные организации, что способствует передаче технологий и опыта между различными странами.

Внешняя политика также играет ключевую роль в формировании сети инновационных хабов, поддержке стартапов и содействии трансферу технологий на уровне малых и средних предприятий. В странах с развивающимися рынками это особенно актуально, поскольку доступ к новым технологиям и знаниям является важным стимулом для роста экономики и социального прогресса [11].

### **3. Проблемы и вызовы в трансфере технологий**

Несмотря на растущее внимание к международному трансферу технологий, процесс этот не лишен трудностей. Одной из основных проблем является регулирование интеллектуальной собственности. Множество стран имеют разные подходы к охране и защите интеллектуальной собственности, что может создавать барьеры для свободного обмена технологиями. Внешнеполитические ведомства играют важную роль в выработке общих стандартов и соглашений в этой сфере, что способствует устранению таких барьеров.

Кроме того, существует опасность использования технологий в военных целях или для создания экономических преимуществ, что может привести к геополитической напряженности. Внешнеполитические ведомства должны работать над тем, чтобы балансировать интересы национальной безопасности с потребностью в международной технологической кооперации.

Еще одной важной проблемой является неравномерность доступа к передовым технологиям. Развивающиеся страны часто сталкиваются с трудностями в доступе к инновациям из-за высоких финансовых затрат и отсутствия инфраструктуры. В этом контексте внешнеэкономические ведомства могут играть роль посредников, создавая условия для доступа к новым технологиям через программы международной помощи и сотрудничества [14].

### **4. Перспективы и будущее трансфера технологий**

В будущем роль внешнеполитических ведомств в международном трансфере технологий будет продолжать расти. Основным направлением работы будет становиться создание новых международных механизмов для упрощения и регулирования обмена технологиями. Системы, поддерживающие технологическую дипломатию, будут активно развиваться, обеспечивая большую гибкость в разрешении международных споров в области интеллектуальной собственности и безопасности.

Одним из важнейших аспектов станет создание международных сетей сотрудничества в области экологии и устойчивого развития. Задача по борьбе с изменениями климата и переходу на возобновляемые источники энергии потребует массового трансфера экологически чистых технологий между развитыми и развивающимися странами [15].

Также следует ожидать углубления сотрудничества в области цифровых технологий. Внешнеполитические ведомства будут играть важную роль в создании глобальных стандартов для кибербезопасности, защиты данных и цифровой экономики, что обеспечит безопасный и эффективный обмен цифровыми технологиями на международной арене.

Таким образом, внешнеполитические ведомства все более активно участвуют в поддержке международного трансфера технологий, являясь

важным звеном в формировании глобальных инновационных процессов. Роль дипломатии в области высоких технологий будет продолжать расширяться, требуя от внешнеэкономических институтов гибкости, оперативности и способности учитывать интересы как государств, так и международных организаций. Трансфер технологий становится не просто экономическим, но и политическим инструментом, который требует внимательного подхода и стратегического видения в долгосрочной перспективе [15].

Международный трансфер технологий – процесс, обеспечивающий перемещение знаний, навыков и инноваций между странами, организациями и учреждениями – стал важнейшим элементом глобального экономического и научно-технического взаимодействия. С учетом глобальных вызовов, таких как изменение климата, пандемии, борьба с бедностью и развитие устойчивых технологий, роль международных организаций в поддержке и регулировании этого процесса становится всё более значимой [16].

**Вывод о перспективах и будущем трансфера технологий базируется на нескольких ключевых аспектах:**

Рост роли внешнеполитических ведомств: ожидается, что внешнеполитические ведомства будут играть более активную роль в международном трансфере технологий, что связано с необходимостью регулирования и упрощения обмена технологиями между странами.

Создание международных механизмов: Основное направление работы будет заключаться в разработке новых международных механизмов, которые помогут упростить процессы обмена технологиями, что может способствовать более эффективному сотрудничеству между государствами.

Актуальность интеллектуальной собственности: в условиях глобализации и быстрого развития технологий вопросы интеллектуальной собственности становятся все более важными, что требует от стран более скоординированных действий и подходов.

Таким образом, выводы о будущем трансфера технологий подчеркивают необходимость активного участия государств в формировании международных стандартов и механизмов, которые будут способствовать более эффективному обмену и защите технологий на глобальном уровне.

В последние десятилетия международные организации всё активнее включаются в разработку и реализацию механизмов, способствующих ускорению трансфера технологий, преодолению барьеров и обеспечению равного доступа к инновациям для стран с различным уровнем развития.

Рассмотрим, как именно меняется роль этих организаций в поддержке международного обмена технологиями и каковы их основные функции в этой области.

**1. Роль международных организаций в формировании глобальных стандартов и политик**

Одной из важнейших функций международных организаций является создание и поддержание глобальных стандартов, которые регулируют процессы трансфера технологий. В этом контексте Организация Объединенных Наций (ООН), Всемирная торговая организация (ВТО), Всемирная организация интеллектуальной собственности (ВОИС), а также международные научные и технологические объединения играют ключевую роль в обеспечении правовых и институциональных рамок для этого процесса.

ООН, например, в рамках своей программы по устойчивому развитию активно поддерживает трансфер технологий в области охраны окружающей среды, здоровья, водных ресурсов и сельского хозяйства. Важной составляющей является Программа развития ООН (ПРООН), которая организует проекты для содействия обмену инновациями в развивающихся странах, что способствует решению проблем бедности и неравенства.

ВТО, в свою очередь, посредством соглашений о торговле и интеллектуальной собственности играет важную роль в создании условий для трансфера технологий, поддерживая механизмы защиты интеллектуальной собственности и обеспечения свободного обмена товарами и услугами. ВТО помогает выработать сбалансированные подходы к защите прав на инновации и доступу к современным технологиям для стран с развивающимися рынками [15].

## **2. Поддержка развивающихся стран и преодоление неравенства в доступе к технологиям**

Одной из главных задач международных организаций является обеспечение равного доступа к передовым технологиям, особенно для стран с развивающейся экономикой. Множество развивающихся стран сталкиваются с трудностями в приобретении современных технологий, что обусловлено ограниченными финансовыми возможностями, недостаточной инфраструктурой и слабой защитой интеллектуальной собственности.

Международные организации, такие как Всемирный банк, Международный валютный фонд (МВФ) и региональные институты (например, Африканский банк развития), активно реализуют программы, направленные на стимулирование трансфера технологий в этих странах. Такие программы включают в себя как финансовую помощь, так и организацию технической помощи, которая помогает развивающимся странам адаптировать и внедрять новые технологии в таких ключевых областях, как сельское хозяйство, здравоохранение, энергетика и водные ресурсы.

Всемирная организация здравоохранения (ВОЗ) также активно поддерживает трансфер медицинских технологий, особенно в условиях глобальных угроз, таких как пандемии. ВОЗ содействует обмену знаниями и медицинскими технологиями между развитыми и развивающимися



странами, что позволяет повышать уровень здравоохранения в странах с низким и средним доходом [15].

### **3. Ускорение инновационного обмена в научно-технической сфере**

Международные научные и исследовательские организации, такие как Всемирная федерация научных ассоциаций (ICSU), Международный совет научных союзов (ICSU) и Европейская организация ядерных исследований (CERN), играют важную роль в координации и поддержке научных исследований и технологий, которые могут быть переданы на международный уровень.

Эти организации активно занимаются созданием научных платформ, на которых ученые и исследователи из разных стран могут обмениваться знаниями, проводить совместные эксперименты и исследования, а также распространять новые открытия и технологические решения. В этой связи важным элементом является поддержка международных научных проектов, которые способствуют обмену передовыми технологиями и решениями для решения глобальных вызовов, таких как изменение климата, борьба с инфекционными заболеваниями и освоение новых энергетических технологий [17].

### **4. Преодоление барьеров и регулирование трансфера технологий**

В процессе трансфера технологий на международной арене страны сталкиваются рядом барьеров. Это могут быть юридические, экономические и политические ограничения, такие как национальные интересы в области безопасности, вопросы защиты интеллектуальной собственности, а также культурные и институциональные различия.

Международные организации играют важную роль в преодолении этих барьеров путем создания международных механизмов и соглашений. Например, ВОИС занимается выработкой принципов и стандартов в области интеллектуальной собственности, что способствует созданию более четкой и прозрачной правовой базы для трансфера технологий. Эти организации помогают странам договориться о правилах защиты интеллектуальной собственности, одновременно создавая условия для более широкого обмена технологиями [16].

### **Обсуждение и Заключение**

Результаты исследования показали, что Внешнеполитическое ведомство Казахстана играет важную роль в государстве в вопросах продвижения процесса международного трансфера и международные организации в привлечении передовых технологий в Казахстан. Партнерства с ВОИС, Всемирным банком, ООН, ВТО, а также участие в региональных и глобальных научно-технических инициативах открывают широкие возможности для трансфера знаний и технологий. Благодаря этим взаимодействиям Казахстан может пользоваться международным

опытом, внедрять передовые разработки в сфере экологии, энергетики, здравоохранения и IT-технологий.

Таким образом, исследование сотрудничества с международными организациями Казахстана показало, что активизация работы продвижения процесса международного трансфера откроет не только получать доступ к новым технологиям, но и улучшит условия для инновационного развития, что важно для диверсификации экономики и снижения зависимости от сырьевых ресурсов. Программы международных организаций способствуют развитию технопарков и научно-исследовательских центров, что является важным шагом в создании инновационной инфраструктуры.

Также, анализ улучшения механизмов трансфера технологий показал наличие нескольких системных барьеров, препятствующих их эффективному развитию:

- Необходимость создания собственных инновационных экосистем: для обеспечения устойчивого развития в области технологий важно не только импортировать чужие разработки, но и развивать внутренние инновационные мощности и научно-исследовательские институты.

- Проблемой остается адаптация импортируемых технологий к специфическим условиям Казахстана, что требует дополнительных усилий в области локализации и настройки этих технологий под потребности рынка.

Международные организации активно поддерживают и стимулируют научно-техническую кооперацию между странами. Казахстан, в свою очередь, получил возможности для реализации крупных исследовательских проектов в рамках таких программ, как Horizon 2020 (Европейский Союз) и программы ООН по устойчивому развитию. Через эти программы Казахстан имеет доступ к современным научным исследованиям и участвует в глобальных инициативах, направленных на разработку инновационных решений в области технологий, что значительно усиливает его позиции на международной арене [18].

Одним из ярких примеров успешного привлечения международных технологий является проект по созданию технопарков и инновационных кластеров в Казахстане. В частности, создание Астанинского международного финансового, который активно сотрудничает с международными партнерами, привлекло высокие технологии в области финансов, информационных технологий и стартапов. Это позволило развить стартап-экосистему и содействовать внедрению современных технологий в различные сектора экономики [19].

Однако, необходимо отметить, что, несмотря на достигнутые успехи, Казахстан сталкивается с проблемой «зависимости» от иностранных технологий. Большая часть иностранных технологий требует значительных усилий по адаптации к местным условиям, а также значительных

финансовых затрат на локализацию и инфраструктурное обеспечение [20].

**Внешнеэкономическая роль Казахстана в привлечении технологий** играет ключевую роль в продвижении внешнеэкономической политики, направленной на привлечение иностранных инвестиций и технологий. Участие Казахстана в таких многосторонних организациях, как Организации экономического сотрудничества (ОЭС), Евразийский экономический союз (ЕАЭС) и Шанхайская организация сотрудничества (ШОС), а также двусторонние соглашения с ведущими странами, такими как Китай, США и Германия, позволили создать условия для активного обмена технологиями и внедрения инноваций в различные секторы экономики [21].

Особое внимание стоит уделить усилиям по развитию региональных интеграционных инициатив. Казахстан активно использует свою географическую и экономическую позицию для привлечения инвестиций и технологий в рамках интеграционных соглашений. Примером этому служат проекты по совместным исследованиям в сфере экологии и высоких технологий, которые поддерживаются международными финансовыми институтами и странами-партнерами.

Однако, внешнеэкономическое ведомство также сталкивается с рядом вызовов. В частности, несмотря на активную дипломатию, Казахстану еще предстоит наладить эффективное взаимодействие с технологически развитыми странами для создания совместных предприятий и развития внутреннего производственного потенциала. Существуют также проблемы в сфере охраны интеллектуальной собственности, что затрудняет привлечение инновационных технологий, защищенных международными патентами [22].

#### **Основными вызовами для Казахстана являются:**

1. Необходимость создания внутренней инновационной экосистемы, но Казахстан активно использует зарубежные технологии, важно развивать и собственные научно-исследовательские и инновационные базы. Существует потребность в стимулировании внутренних научных разработок и повышении уровня образования в сфере технологий.

2. Адаптация технологий к местным условиям. Многие передовые технологии требуют значительных усилий по адаптации к специфике местного рынка и климатическим условиям, что не всегда удается на практике. Для этого необходимо улучшать координацию между различными государственными и частными учреждениями, а также проводить исследовательские работы по локализации технологий.

3. Долгосрочные инвестиции в инновации. Казахстану необходимо работать над созданием условий для долгосрочного инвестирования в научно-технические разработки, а также способствовать развитию венчурного капитала и стартап-экосистемы.

Новые вызовы глобализации и технологических изменений требуют от внешнеэкономического ведомства Казахстана и международных организаций тесного взаимодействия для формирования эффективных механизмов трансфера технологий, что позволит стране занять конкурентоспособные позиции на мировой арене и обеспечит устойчивое экономическое развитие.

По результатам анализа национальных и зарубежных моделей управления трансфера технологий можно сделать вывод, что в большинстве стран мира осуществляется сотрудничество между государством и инновационным и научным бизнесом в плане трансфера технологий и коммерциализации инноваций с целью повышения степени эффективности стратегического развития в области науки.

Что не менее примечательно — в некоторых странах не предусмотрено формирование независимых организаций в качестве центров трансфера технологий. Как правило, в качестве таких структур выступают либо центры трансфера при вузах, либо государственные организации, деятельность которых с точки зрения коммерциализации инноваций рассматривается как деятельность ЦТТ. Говоря о трансфере технологий и коммерциализации инноваций в системе Казахстана возникает необходимость развития организации данных процессов, протекающих как в научных организациях, так и на предприятиях, осуществляющих управление бизнес-процессами, в частности, в рамках технологического развития и продвижения на международном рынке. В данном случае зарубежный опыт организации передачи технологий является полезным и может быть применен в Казахстане в адаптированном к реальным условиям формате.

В заключение основываясь на проведенном исследовании, предлагаем усилить роль внешнеполитического ведомства Казахстана в процессе международного трансфера технологий, рассмотрев возможность внесения изменений и дополнений в действующие нормативные правовые акты, регулирующие деятельность Министерства иностранных дел:

- активизировать участие Казахстана в глобальных форумах, таких как Всемирный экономический форум и форумах, посвященных инновациям и технологиям, для обмена опытом и привлечения зарубежных инвестиций в высокотехнологичные проекты.

- активно продвигать казахстанские стартапы на этих рынках Кремниевой долины в США, Сингапур или Израиль через внешнеполитическое ведомство Казахстана, устанавливать контакты с международными технологическими хабами используя свои дипломатические каналы для организации визитов, обмена опытом и привлечения зарубежных технологических партнеров для совместных проектов.

- необходимость развития собственной научно-технической базы и инновационной инфраструктуры. Для того чтобы Казахстан стал лидером

в области технологий в Центральной Азии, важно сделать акцент на собственные разработки, а не только на внешнюю помощь.

- роль внешнеэкономической политики должна быть направлена на устранение технологической зависимости и создание условий для инновационного роста внутри страны.

Применение дополнительной поддержки интеллектуальной собственности и защита в международных организациях включает в себя продвижение национальной системы патентования и защиты прав ИС в рамках международных соглашений, таких как Всемирная организация интеллектуальной собственности (ВОИС). Внешнеполитическое ведомство Казахстана может инициировать международные переговоры по улучшению защиты интеллектуальных прав, что создаст благоприятную атмосферу для иностранных инвесторов и технологических партнеров. Эти меры не только могут эффективно усилить позиций Казахстана на международной арене в контексте трансфера технологий.

В целом, Казахстан активно развивает международные связи и пользуется возможностями, предоставляемыми глобальными и региональными организациями, но для устойчивого и долгосрочного технологического развития стране необходимо развивать собственные инновационные потенциалы и локализовать полученные технологии в соответствии с внутренними потребностями.

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## **ҚАЗАҚСТАННЫҢ СЫРТҚЫ САЯСИ ВЕДОМСТВОСЫНЫҢ ЖӘНЕ ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ ҰЙЫМДАРДЫҢ ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ ТЕХНОЛОГИЯЛАР ТРАНСФЕРТІ ҮДЕРІСІНДЕГІ ЖАҢА РӨЛІ ТУРАЛЫ**

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**Аңдатпа.** Бұл мақалада технологиялардың халықаралық трансферт процесінде Қазақстан Республикасы Сыртқы саяси ведомствосының және халықаралық ұйымдардың рөлі қарастырылады. Жаһандану және жылдам технологиялық прогресс жағдайында Қазақстан өзінің бәсекеге қабілеттілігін арттыру және орнықты экономикалық өсу үшін озық технологияларды енгізу қажеттілігіне тап болады.

Қазақстанның сыртқы экономикалық саясатын талдауға, Дүниежүзілік сауда ұйымы, Еуразиялық экономикалық одақ сияқты халықаралық ұйымдармен, сондай-ақ әлемнің жетекші инновациялық орталықтарымен өзара іс-қимылға басты назар аударылды. Қазақстан екіжақты және көпжақты келісімдерді, халықаралық бастамалар мен бағдарламаларды, сондай-ақ дипломатиялық және экономикалық миссиялардың рөлін қоса

алғанда, технологиялардың халықаралық трансферіне қол жеткізе алатын негізгі тетіктер қаралады. Құқықтық реттеу, зияткерлік меншікті қорғау және жоғары технологиялар саласына шетелдік инвестицияларды тарту үшін қолайлы инвестициялық орта құру мәселелеріне маңызды мән беріледі.

Сыртқы саяси ведомствоның бұл процеске белсенді қатысуы Қазақстанға технологиялық дамуды және әлемдік экономикаға интеграцияны жеделдетуге көмектеседі деп күтілуде.

**Тірек сөздер:** зияткерлік меншік, технологиялардың трансфері, инновациялар, сыртқы экономикалық саясат, инвест

ициялар, экономикалық дипломатия, тұрақты даму, халықаралық ұйымдар

## **ON THE NEW ROLE OF THE KAZAKH FOREIGN MINISTRY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER**

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**Abstract.** This article examines the new role of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Kazakhstan and international organizations in the process of international technology transfer. In the context of globalization and rapid technological progress, Kazakhstan is faced with the need to introduce advanced technologies to increase its competitiveness and sustainable economic growth.

The purpose of this article is to analyze Kazakhstan's foreign economic policy, interaction with international organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, as well as with the world's leading innovation centers. The key mechanisms through which Kazakhstan can gain access to international technology transfer are considered, including bilateral and multilateral agreements, international initiatives and programs, as well as the role of diplomatic and economic missions. Significant importance is dedicated to issues of legal regulation, intellectual property protection and the creation of a favorable investment environment to attract foreign investment in the high-tech sector.

It is expected that the active participation of the Foreign Ministry in this process will help Kazakhstan accelerate technological development and integration into the global economy.

**Key words:** intellectual property, technology transfer, innovation, foreign economic policy, investment, economic diplomacy, sustainable development, international organizations

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## **CENTRAL ASIA'S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: THROUGH PEACEKEEPING FORCES**

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**Abstract.** This article aims to identify how Central Asian states have been involved in peacekeeping operations highlighting the changing role of the region, as a contributor to peace and security using Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan's participation as case studies. It defines the reasons, obstacles and consequences of Asian countries participation in peacekeeping missions. Addressing this topic allows you to identify dynamics of peacekeeping efforts, regional security collaboration and the impact of Central Asian involvement in stabilizing conflict prone areas.

This article looks at how Central Asian countries use peacekeeping not just to support international stability, but also to raise their global profile, build modern and capable armed forces, and develop stronger relationships with key international partners. It explores these efforts through the lens of concepts like niche diplomacy, regional cooperation, and the desire for international recognition. Drawing on a close reading of official documents, regional agreements, and key peacekeeping efforts such as the creation of CENTRASBAT, the development of KazBAT, and the CSTO's deployment to Kazakhstan in 2022, the article traces how these states have approached peacekeeping in a strategic and selective way. By comparing the Central Asian approach with examples from the African Union and European Union, it argues that the region is beginning to shape its own path as a security actor, balancing ambition with caution as it navigates a complex geopolitical landscape.

**Key words:** peacekeeping forces, security, UN, Central Asia, CIS, CSTO, CENTRAZBAT, KAZBAT

### **Introduction**

In recent decades, the Central Asian region has become a crucial hub along the Silk Road that has experienced significant geopolitical changes. Positioned between Russia and China, and bordering Afghanistan and the Middle East, Central Asia now serves as a strategic crossroads for global security interests. As these newly independent states have navigated the post-Soviet international landscape, they have increasingly sought to assert their presence on the global stage, not only in economic and diplomatic spheres but also through active participation in peacekeeping operations.



This article contends that Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, are emerging as regional security players through their growing involvement in international peacekeeping. While their operational contributions may be limited, these efforts reflect a deliberate strategy of niche diplomacy aimed at enhancing international prestige, fostering defense cooperation, and stabilizing their immediate surroundings.

The involvement of Central Asian nations in peacekeeping operations is therefore more than just symbolic; it represents a shift in foreign policy priorities toward proactive engagement in global governance. This study analyzes the historical origins, institutional frameworks, and strategic motivations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan in their peacekeeping roles. By doing so, it situates the region's evolving security posture within broader discussions of regionalism, soft power, and the changing landscape of post-Cold War peace operations.

UN peacekeeping operations department defines that peacekeeping is a strategy intended to uphold peace, even in situations where it is quite fragile, in areas where hostilities have ceased, and to support the enforcement of agreements made by those who are working to establish peace. Throughout time, peacekeeping has transformed from a predominantly military approach, centered on monitoring ceasefires and the separation of opposing forces following interstate conflicts, into a multifaceted approach involving various components – military, law enforcement, and civilian personnel- collaborating to establish the groundwork for lasting peace.

The research on the topic “Peacekeeping Works” by Hegre and Hultman examines the impact of UN peacekeeping operations on reducing violence and preventing the recurrence of conflict. This research demonstrates that peacekeeping operations are not just symbolic gestures but can have a tangible impact on maintaining and building peace in conflict-affected regions, reinforcing the importance of such operations in international relations [1].

Central Asia's transition from an empire's core to a prominent player in global peacekeeping results from a mix of historical heritage, strategic concerns, and changing geopolitical factors. As we further explore the involvement of Central Asian states in peacekeeping, this article seeks to clarify the intricacies, motivations, and results of their participation.

## **Materials and Methods**

In order to identify the main directions of using peacekeeping forces and its efficiency in resolving and preventing conflicts in international arena and the region as well, following methods were used:

Conducting a review of academic and scientific articles, books, reports and other sources related to peacekeeping forces of Central Asia and the dominating influence of Russia and the US, China.

The research is conducted by using primary and secondary data sources, including government reports, scientific literature, and statistical analysis. By taking a holistic approach, this study seeks to improve our understanding of the role of Central Asian states in global peacekeeping efforts and contribute to the broader discourse on regional security and international cooperation like CIS, SCO, OSCE.

A qualitative research design to explore the post-soviet experience of using peacekeeping forces in resolving international conflicts in the Eurasian space. Qualitative methods are chosen to gain a nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics, challenges, and prospects associated with peacekeeping in the region. Primary sources include official documents, peace agreements, and policies of post-Soviet states and international organizations involved in peacekeeping efforts. Secondary sources encompass academic literature, reports, and media coverage related to conflicts and peacekeeping in the region.

## **Results**

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Central Asian states have navigated a complex international landscape. This period marked a significant shift in their foreign policy and defense strategies, including their participation in peacekeeping operations. Initially, these countries, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, grappled with internal challenges and regional instability. Central Asia faces a multifaceted set of security challenges that have evolved considerably since the Soviet Union's collapse. These challenges come from a combination of internal dynamics and external geopolitical influences. Additionally, the region's rich energy resources, varied ethnic composition, and strategic location add further complexity to the security landscape [2].

The security in Central Asia is influenced by the activities of numerous international organizations, including the UN, OSCE, SCO, CSTO, EEU, and NATO. These organizations play a crucial role in addressing the region's complex and multi-level security challenges. However, the effectiveness of these multilateral efforts have difficulties with strained relations between major powers and the lack of political will among Central Asian leaders to cooperate fully [3].

Unifying challenges in Central Asia including terrorism, border conflicts, geopolitical competition, and socio-economic instability, have made countries in the region to contribute to international realtions, conducting multilateral diplomacy through entering to the world and regional organizations, mutual initiatives and peacekeeping operations. Participation in peacekeeping operations attract states to address internal vulnerabilities indirectly, enhance their international standing, and strengthen military capabilities, as well as benefiting from partnerships with global powers. Central Asian states due to their strategic location should be actively engaged in international relations and to corresponded to international norms of security. Their involvement in peacekeeping has been cautious.

Being interested in participation in peacekeeping operations evolved in the first decade after gaining independence. It was started from the Civil War in Tajikistan in 1993. The Armed Forces of countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan began participating in peacekeeping operations during the Tajik Civil War in the 1990s. They joined the Russian led CIS Peacekeeping Force at that time. Since that time interests in contributing to peacekeeping efforts have shown from these nations. Moreover, NATO has offered security support to assist them in establishing peacekeeping units. These units are currently working towards aligning their operations with NATO forces with the goal of taking part in peacekeeping missions. Analyzing how well they are doing helps us to understand when and why Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan joined security partnerships and what it means for them [4].

Tajik civil war which was began in May 1992 led to the beginning of involvement in peacekeeping operation of Central Asian states, especially Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan's troops deployed peacekeeping units to support Russian forces. As many as 25,000 peacekeepers from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan took part in Tajikistan's civil war. According to General Zavarzin, the CIS commander-in-chief, and this presence aligns with the extent of military engagement in response to the casualty rate in the area. The Republic of Kazakhstan, for instance, has shown increasing willingness to participate in such missions, reflecting its growing role in international affairs. This participation aligns with their broader objectives of enhancing international cooperation and security [5].

This historical context is crucial to understand the current state and potential future of Central Asian involvement in peacekeeping operations. Their journey from post-Soviet restructuring to active participants in global peacekeeping highlights a significant evolution in their foreign policy and international role.

The early involvement of Central Asian states in the application of peacekeeping forces since states gained their independence represents a significant evolution in their foreign policy and international engagement. Central Asian states started actively participating in United Nations peacekeeping missions.

Moreover, preventing and resolving conflicts within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member states has been a top priority since its inception. The commitment of CIS member states to engage in peacekeeping efforts is evident through key declarations such as the Alma-Ata Declaration in 1991, the 1992 Declaration on Non-Use of Force or Threat of Force, and the 1993 Ashgabat Declaration on Cooperation and Confidence Building. The CIS also established Collective Peacekeeping Forces, which have successfully conducted peacekeeping operations in various regions, including the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone and Tajikistan over the years [6].

The military forces involved in the Tajikistan conflict in 1992. The 201st Motor Rifle Division and border guards along the Tajik-Afghan border were

among the main forces. The involvement of CIS troops, particularly the 201st Motor Rifle Division, in supporting the Tajik government led to significant confrontations and the eventual installation of Emomali Rahkmonov as the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet in November 1992.

Moreover, the CIS peacekeeping force in Tajikistan provided valuable peacekeeping experience to Central Asian units, although it remains unclear how much of this experience has been incorporated into their training. Before the end of the Tajik Civil War, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan proposed the creation of a peacekeeping unit called the Central Asian Battalion (CENTRASBAT) in December 1995. CENTRASBAT was officially formed in 1996 with support from the United States and NATO, consisting of troops from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. From 1997 to 2000, the battalion participated in joint training exercises with North Carolina State and Germany. However, it ceased operations due to the economic challenges of the member states, misunderstandings, and the lack of a shared operational language [7].

After gaining valuable experience from CENTRASBAT, Kazakhstan decided to create its own peacekeeping battalion, KazBAT, which was established on January 31, 2000, with U.S. support. In September 2003, Kazakhstan signed a five-year military cooperation agreement with the U.S. As part of this cooperation, U.S. Special Forces trained KazBAT and conducted joint exercises. In 2002, U.S. military assistance through the International Military Education and Training Program amounted to \$1,000,000 [8]. The U.S. focused on professionalizing Kazakhstan's armed forces, including developing a non-commissioned officer corps and modernizing military education programs to enhance peacekeeping capabilities.

## **Discussion**

Goulding M. in his book "Peacemonger" which was published in 2002 claimed that regionalization in peace operations is typically viewed through two lenses: empirical and normative. The empirical perspective highlights the growing involvement of regional organizations in peacekeeping missions. From a normative standpoint, it advocates for the principle that every global region should manage its own peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts, supported financially and technically by Western nations, but with minimal to no military or police forces from outside the region [9].

To better understand the effectiveness of regional cooperation of Central Asian countries, we contrast it with African Union and European Union regional interventions into peacekeeping. Insights from the African Union and European Union provide valuable context for understanding Central Asia's emerging peacekeeping model. The AU stands out as a regional organization that has undertaken proactive, high-risk peace missions such as those in Burundi and Liberia, conducting early deployment, political mediation, and coordination with

the UN were crucial and successful [10]. These interventions demonstrate strong regional ownership, supported by external funding but driven by internal leadership.

In contrast, the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) focuses on civilian-led missions bolstered by military logistics, primarily functioning in post-conflict stabilization environments. With over 37 operations since 2003, the EU model showcases a rules-based, institutionalized approach guided by normative foreign policy goals and significant bureaucratic capacity [11].

Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan, has adopted a limited-scope, capacity-constrained model of peacekeeping. While it has developed units like KazBAT and participated in joint training with NATO and the US, its operations remain largely symbolic, state-driven, and linked to broader status-seeking diplomacy, rather than being grounded in robust multilateral institutions. The CSTO's deployment in Kazakhstan in 2022 exemplifies a security-first, sovereignty-protective model of regional intervention, lacking the institutional autonomy characteristic of AU or EU operations.

These distinctions highlight structural and political differences: while the AU and EU have established mechanisms for conflict resolution and burden-sharing, Central Asia's efforts are still elite-driven and externally supported, indicating that the region's peacekeeping model is in a transitional phase.

At the same time, it is ought to mention The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), an intergovernmental military alliance in Eurasia, which consists of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Formed in 2002, the CSTO emerged from the disintegration of the USSR and represents a shift from the initial goals of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) signed in 1992, which aimed to address security concerns following the USSR's dissolution. In contrast, the CSTO was established to create a new political-military alliance to face future challenges.

The CSTO maintains a peacekeeping force deployed to areas such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, composed of troops from its member states. This force aims to provide stability and security in the region. A significant decision in 2007 expanded the CSTO, allowing the deployment of a peacekeeping force under a United Nations mandate or independently within its member states. This expansion also enabled member countries to purchase Russian weapons at domestic prices.

The organization's first substantial real-world mission occurred in January 2022 when it deployed 2,000 peacekeepers to Kazakhstan, in response to escalating protests and violence. This mission marked a pivotal moment for the CSTO, showcasing its capacity for rapid response and peacekeeping under challenging circumstances [12].

The deployment in Kazakhstan was a critical test of the CSTO's effectiveness as a peacekeeping entity. The situation in Kazakhstan had rapidly deteriorated,

with protests over economic and social conditions escalating into violence across multiple cities. In this context, Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev requested CSTO intervention. The CSTO's response was swift, with a primary focus on stabilizing the situation and protecting critical infrastructure.

The CSTO operation in Kazakhstan was largely Russian-led, reflecting the dominant role Russia plays within the organization. However, other member states also contributed troops and resources to the mission. The mission's objectives were primarily to assist Kazakhstani authorities in controlling the situation and protecting strategic sites, rather than direct combat or engagement with protesters. This approach helped to quickly stabilize the situation without escalating conflict.

This mission was significant for several reasons. It was the CSTO's first major deployment in response to an internal crisis within a member state, highlighting its evolving role in regional security. The operation's success in quickly stabilizing the situation in Kazakhstan without becoming mired in prolonged conflict represented a new model for CSTO peacekeeping. Additionally, the operation illustrated the CSTO's ability to act independently of Western or UN-led peacekeeping initiatives.

The CSTO's involvement in Kazakhstan also had broader geopolitical implications, particularly in the context of Russian influence in Central Asia and the organization's role as a counterbalance to NATO. The mission underscored the CSTO's commitment to protecting the sovereignty and security of its member states, even as it navigated complex internal and external political dynamics [13].

To conclude the CSTO's peacekeeping mission in Kazakhstan was a landmark event, demonstrating the organization's capabilities and potential as a regional peacekeeping force. It also highlighted the evolving nature of peacekeeping in the post-Soviet space, where traditional models are being adapted to meet new challenge.

Scholars Fortna and Howard in their work "Pitfalls and prospects in the peacekeeping literature" observe that most peacekeeping research has centered on United Nations-led operations, often overlooking regional or ad hoc arrangements. This makes the Central Asian experience -particularly within the framework of the CSTO- especially valuable. It presents a less-explored model of peacekeeping shaped by post-Soviet political legacies, shifting alliances, and the pressures of operating in a multipolar international environment.

Understanding why states choose to participate in peacekeeping missions is central to any serious analysis. As Fortna and Howard point out, such decisions are rarely driven by idealistic motives alone. In the case of Central Asia, involvement in peacekeeping reflects a mix of strategic priorities: gaining international recognition, strengthening ties with powerful states and organizations, and building professional military capacity. These goals are deeply tied to the foreign policy identities of states like Kazakhstan, which use peacekeeping not only to



contribute to stability abroad, but also to project competence and sovereignty at home.

Responding to Fortna and Howard's call for more nuanced, comparative approaches, this article contributes to the literature by examining how peacekeeping allows smaller post-Soviet states to carve out diplomatic space, pursue niche roles in international security, and cautiously assert themselves as regional actors. As they rightly note, the political logic behind troop contributions—especially from non-Western states has often been overlooked. Central Asia helps fill that gap, offering insight into how peacekeeping can serve both as a soft balancing strategy and a means of regime legitimation in an evolving geopolitical landscape.

### **Conclusion**

In conclusion, Central Asia's contribution to international security extends beyond its peacekeeping forces, reflecting a broader commitment to global stability and conflict resolution. The region's active participation in peacekeeping missions, through initiatives like CENTRASBAT and KazBAT, demonstrates its strategic importance and evolving role on the global stage. However, beyond military contributions, Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, have embraced diplomatic efforts, multilateral cooperation, and niche diplomacy to address security challenges both regionally and internationally. By leveraging their unique geopolitical position, these states have contributed to non-proliferation, counterterrorism, and regional stability efforts.

As Central Asian continues to develop its security architecture, the region's growing engagement in international forums and peacebuilding processes underscores its potential to act as a bridge between East and West. Looking ahead, Central Asia's role in international security will likely expand further, as these states continue to refine their diplomatic strategies and strengthen their contributions to global peace and stability. While peacekeeping forces remain a crucial component, the future of Central Asia's security contributions will involve a more comprehensive approach, integrating diplomacy, economic development, and multilateral collaboration.

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## **ОРТАЛЫҚ АЗИЯНЫҢ ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ ҚАУІПСІЗДІКТЕГІ РӨЛІ: БІТІМГЕРШІЛІК АРҚЫЛЫ**

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**Аңдатпа.** Бұл мақалада Орталық Азия мемлекеттерінің, атап айтқанда, Қазақстан, Қырғызстан және Өзбекстан мемлекеттерінің бітімгершілік операцияларына қатысып, бейбітшілік пен қауіпсіздікке септігін тигізетін аймақтың рөлін айқындау болып табылады. Мұнда ортаазиялық мемлекеттердің бітімгершілік миссияларына қатысуының

себептері, қайшылықтары мен салдары көрсетілген. Бұл тақырыпты зерттеу бітімгершілікке деген талпыныстың динамикасын, аймақтық қауіпсіздік мәселелеріндегі ынтымақтастық пен Орталық Азияның қақтығысты аудандардағы жағдайын реттеудегі ықпалын анықтауға септігін тигізеді.

Бұл мақалада Орталық Азия елдері бітімгершілікті тек халықаралық тұрақтылықты қолдау үшін ғана емес, сонымен қатар өздерінің халықаралық беделін арттыру, заманауи және қабілетті әскер құру және негізгі халықаралық аренада серіктестермен қарым-қатынастарын нығайта түсу үшін қалай пайдаланғанын қарастырады. Ол бұл күш-жігерді көпжақты дипломатия, аймақтық ынтымақтастық және халықаралық беделін нығайтуға ұмтылу сияқты тұжырымдамалары арқылы қарастырады. Қауіпсіздік бойынша өңірлік келісімдер және ЦЕНТРАЗБАТ-ты құру, ҚАЗБАТ-ты дамыту және 2022 жылы ҰҚШҰ-ны Қазақстанға орналастыру сияқты негізгі ресми құжаттарға сүйене отырып, мемлекеттердің бітімгершілікке келген жолын, сын мен қауіп-қатерлерін, стратегиялық және тандаулы түрде қалай жақындағанын көрсетеді. Африка Одағы мен Еуропалық Одақ мысалдарымен салыстыра отырып, Орталық Азияның күрделі ландшафт аймағында орналасқанына қарамастан өз қауіпсіздік жолын жаңадан бастап келе жатқандығы туралы айтылады.

**Тірек сөздер:** бітімгершілік күштері, қауіпсіздік, БҰҰ, Орталық Азия, ТМД, ҰҚШҰ, ЦЕНТРАЗБАТ, ҚАЗБАТ

## **РОЛЬ ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ АЗИИ В МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ: ЧЕРЕЗ МИРОТВОРЧЕСТВО**

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**Аннотация.** Целью данной статьи является определение того, как государства Центральной Азии на примере Казахстана, Кыргызстана и Узбекистана участвуют в миротворческих операциях, подчеркивая меняющуюся роль региона как фактора, способствующего миру и безопасности. В нем определяются причины, препятствия и последствия участия центральноазиатских стран в миротворческих миссиях. Обращение к этой теме позволяет определить динамику миротворческих усилий, сотрудничество в области региональной безопасности и влияние участия Центральной Азии на стабилизацию конфликтных регионов.

В этой статье рассматривается, как страны Центральной Азии используют миротворчество не только для поддержки международной стабильности, но и для повышения своего глобального авторитета, создания современных и боеспособных вооруженных сил и развития более крепких отношений с ключевыми международными партнерами. В ней эти усилия

рассматриваются через призму таких концепций, как нишевая дипломатия, региональное сотрудничество и стремление к международному признанию. Опираясь на изучение официальных документов, региональных соглашений и ключевых миротворческих усилий, таких как создание CENTRASBAT, развитие KazBAT и развертывание ОДКБ в Казахстане в 2022 году, в статье прослеживается, как эти государства подходили к миротворчеству стратегически и избирательно. Сравнивая подход Центральной Азии с примерами Африканского союза и Европейского союза, в ней утверждается, что регион начинает формировать свой собственный путь как субъекта безопасности, балансируя между амбициями и осторожностью, поскольку он перемещается по сложному геополитическому ландшафту.

**Ключевые слова:** миротворческие силы, безопасность, ООН, Центральная Азия, СНГ, ОДКБ, ЦЕНТРАЗБАТ, КАЗБАТ

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## **THE EVOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND THE ADVENT OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS**

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**Abstract.** The paper explores and analyzes the background and genesis of the Cyprus problem in international relations and the events leading to the 1974 Turkish military intervention and the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). This research problem is relevant and significant against the backdrop of the recent events regarding the pledge of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to comply with the United Nations Security Council resolutions 541 and 550 in 1983, which consider the TRNC as a secessionist illegitimate entity. From this perspective, the study examines the key historical events between 1960 and 1983 from the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus to the creation of the TRNC. As qualitative research, the study employs methods of historical analysis and content analysis. Through these methods, the study examines and analyzes official diplomatic documents, international treaties, the 1960 constitution of Cyprus and other primary sources to investigate the research problem. Besides, the study draws on relevant literature by Turkish, Turkish Cypriot, Greek, Greek Cypriot and scholars and experts from other countries. The establishment of the TRNC is regarded by the international community as incompatible with the international treaties of 1960 and thereby invalid. However, the results of the study have shown that the breach of the treaties and the 1960 constitution of Cyprus was committed by the Greek Cypriots. Having unilaterally and illegally usurped the power, the Greek majority in cahoots with the Greek junta intended to abolish the state of Cyprus and integrate it with Greece. The flagrant breach of the international treaties and the 1960 constitution by both the Greek Cypriots and Greece provoked the Turkish military intervention in July 1974, the division of the island and the establishment of the TRNC as the only viable solution to the Cyprus problem.

**Key words:** Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, TRNC, treaty, intervention

### **Introduction**

The relevance and significance of the research problem under consideration are linked to the current legal status and international standing of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The results of the study will help us



understand the historical, legal and political basis of the Cyprus conflict and whether the TRNC is a legitimate state entity or vice versa. This has become more relevant since Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan refused to recognize the TRNC despite their close relationship with Turkey. The first Central Asia – European Union summit held in Samarkand on April 4, 2025, seems to have created dissension between Turkey and Turkic states of Central Asia over the legal status of the TRNC. Although the TRNC has been an independent nation state since 1983, it has been recognized only by Turkey. Despite the member states of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) granted the TRNC an observer status at the OTS in 2022, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan officially confirmed their commitment to the 1983 United Nations Security Council resolutions 541 and 550 condemning the establishment of the TRNC and calling on international community not to extend their recognition to this entity. According to these resolutions, the TRNC is an illegal state entity and the only government that legitimately represents Cyprus in the international arena is the Republic of Cyprus under the control of the Greek Cypriots.

This study seeks to gain a proper understanding of why the TRNC has not been recognized as a sovereign political entity by the international community, except Turkey. Besides, the study tries to identify historical, legal and political barriers to the widespread recognition of the TRNC by the international community. Moreover, the study strives to ascertain the root causes of the exclusion of the Turkish Cypriots and monopolization of power in Cyprus by the Greek majority. Furthermore, the study looks into legal issues pertaining to the Cyprus problem, trying to understand why the only Greek Cypriot administration is regarded as the sole legitimate government of Cyprus, while such a legal recognition is outrightly denied to the Turkish Cypriots. To achieve these objectives and respond to the research questions, the study will explore and analyze the historical events and developments in Cyprus between 1960-1983, from the year of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus to the advent of the TRNC.

The study draws upon the historical documents, national legislations and international accords pertaining to the history of Cyprus in 1960-1983. To analyze historical sources and explore the topic, the study employs a variety of research methods such as a historical analysis and content analysis of written materials. After setting the background of the Cyprus conflict, the study will examine the key events and developments leading to the Turkish military intervention in 1974 and the creation of the TRNC. In this sense, the study argues that since the Greek Cypriots unilaterally and illegally usurped and monopolized the power in Cyprus in 1963, both the 1974 Turkish military intervention and the establishment of the TRNC were legitimate and morally justifiable.

## **Materials and methods**

The study draws on relevant literature on the topic and historical data. In examining the research problem, we have analyzed various official diplomatic documents, international treaties and accords, the 1960 constitution of Cyprus and policy proposals. Specifically, we have conducted a historical analysis and content analysis of the 1959 Zürich and London accords, the 1960 the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance and other subsequent international agreements. These international treaties were central to the end of the British colonial rule in Cyprus and establishment of the Republic of Cyprus as a bicultural and bicomunal political entity. The 1959 Zürich agreement between Turkey and Greece laid the legal groundwork for the independence of Cyprus and its political system and the power sharing provisions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. This agreement was also important because it paved the way for the constitution of the state Cyprus, which came into force in August 1960. The 1959 Zürich agreement along with the London agreement highlighted the independence, territorial integrity and indivisibility of the state of Cyprus. Perhaps the most important aspect of these international treaties was ensuring peaceful coexistence and power sharing between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee reaffirmed the independence, territorial integrity and indivisibility of the state of Cyprus and stipulated that as the whole or in part Cyprus could join other states, and its territory could not be partitioned. Besides, the treaty stipulated that Britain, Greece and Turkey as the guaranteeing powers had the exclusive right to intervene if the independence and territorial integrity of the state of Cyprus would be at stake and threatened. All the provisions of the international treaties were incorporated into the 1960 constitution of Cyprus. The breach of these international treaties and the 1960 constitution by the Greek Cypriots in 1963 led to the 1974 Turkish military intervention and the establishment of the TRNC.

Examining and a critical analysis of these international accords and the constitution are essential for providing sound responses to the research questions of the study. As the study relies on official diplomatic documents and sources, the research is qualitative in its character. In this regard, the study utilizes methods of a historical analysis of data and a content analysis of various types of sources. These methods inform and guide our research and help us answer the research questions. Through the employment of methods of historical and content analysis, the study has conducted a systematic and critical analysis of a variety of data from books, journals, websites, letters, speeches and interviews. By using these methods, the study identifies and understands themes and patterns of the events pertaining to the Cyprus problem.

## Results and Discussion

### *Setting the background*

1960 was marked by the end of the colonial rule of Britain in Cyprus. During British rule over Cyprus, which had started in 1878 after three centuries of Ottoman rule, two distinct and conflicting nationalisms emerged and developed. On the one hand, Greek nationalism, and on other hand, Turkish nationalism gained momentum, which led to the division of the island along ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious lines. Papadakis, Peristianis and Welz point out that while Greek nationalism in Cyprus reflected in the ideology of '*enosis*', as a response, Turkish nationalists strove for '*taksim*' [1, p. 2]. In this regard, '*enosis*' implied the union and unification of Greek Cypriots with Greece, whereas '*taksim*' denoted the partition of the island between the two ethnic and cultural communities [1, p. 2]. Even before the departure of Britain, in the mid-1950s the Greek Cypriot '*enosis*' struggle acquired the form of an armed insurgency and rebellion spearheaded by EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters). As a nationalist guerrilla organization of Greek Cypriots, EOKA pursued the goal of terminating the British colonial rule over Cyprus and ultimate unification with Greece [2, p. 4-5]. As a response to the rising Greek nationalism and armed resistance, in 1958, Turkish Cypriots created their own nationalist resistance movement – TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization). Thus, these two ethnic communities sought to achieve a conflicting and divergent aim. In turn, the British administration strove to exploit the division between Greek and Turkish Cypriots by co-opting Turkish Cypriots and enrolling them as auxiliary police forces [3, p. 46-47]. British policies and practices of divide and rule in Cyprus and the use of Turkish Cypriots as policemen against the EOKA guerrilla led to bloody interethnic clashes and conflicts [3, p. 47]. Yet eventually, Cyprus gained its independence from Britain in 1960 due to the deal between the two conflicting ethnic communities, Greek Cypriots who consisted of 80 percent of the island's 600,000 population, and Turkish Cypriots whose share stood at 18 percent [1, p. 2]. Besides these two ethnic communities, Britain, Greece and Turkey were also involved in reaching a compromise solution [1, p. 2].

Papadakis, Peristianis and Welz draw attention to how the outcome of 1960 independence appeared not to meet the aspirations and expectations of either of the ethnic and cultural communities, which heralded the bloody protracted interethnic violence in Nicosia and other areas of the island [1, p. 2]. As Turkish communities constituted a minority and thereby the weaker part, were forced to suffer, being subjected to mass killing and ethnic cleansing. Studies provide a variety of data, yet it was documented that between 1963 and 1967, roughly 20 percent of Turkish Cypriots were subjected to displacement and were forced into refugee camps [4; 5]. Experiencing constant intimidation and terror by Greek Cypriots and at the same time, encouraged by their Turkish leadership, Turkish

Cypriots formed enclaves throughout the island. In 1964, the United Nations intervened into the conflict unfolding in Cyprus with the purpose of keeping stability and guarding the so-called Green Line, which is the line dividing the Greek and Turkish communities [6, p. 77]. Although in 1967 the tense situation on the island had stabilized, the ascension of a military junta in Greece disrupted the efforts to establish peace and reconciliation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The military junta in Greece propped up ultranationalists in Cyprus who opposed interethnic conciliation and advocated unification with Greece.

This in turn led to intra-ethnic strife within Greek Cypriots, which led to the 1974 coup, in which the president of the Republic of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios was removed from his office. The removal of Makarios from power was executed by pro-union factions known as EOKA B, which was backed by the junta in Greece. The takeover of ultranationalist pro-unionists backed by Greece soon prompted military intervention by Turkey. When ultranationalist pro-enosis factions under the leadership of Nikos Sampson backed by Greece seized power through a coup d'état in 1974, the Turkish government led by prime minister Bülent Ecevit closely observed unfolding events in Cyprus. The 1974 Turkish military intervention was preceded by several Turkish demands with respect to the situation on the island. Specifically, the Turkish government demanded that Greece should drop its support for Greek Cypriot pro-enosis factions led by Nikos Sampson, withdraw its troops from Cyprus and abide by the international obligations regarding the legal status of Cyprus. However, Greece rejected the demands of the Turkish government. Moreover, an envoy of the United States Joseph Sisco acted as an intermediary, putting greater efforts on convincing Greece to agree to Bülent Ecevit's demands, which included a joint Turkish-Cypriot control of the northern region of the island and initiate negotiations to establish a federal state [1, p. 3].

After all attempts to bring a viable solution to the Cyprus conflict failed to yield expected results and rejection of the Turkish demands by Greece, the Turkish prime minister Bülent Ecevit backed by his coalition partner Necmettin Erbakan decided to act unilaterally, yet in the spirit of the international treaties and obligations. On July 20, 1974, Turkish military forces intervened. The Turkish intervention immediately caused the fall of the military junta in Greece and the removal of the leader of pro-enosis factions in Cyprus Nikos Sampson. The advancement of Turkish military forces prompted the mass movement of Greek Cypriots southward, while Turkish Cypriots moved northward. Studies highlight that the Turkish intervention and advancement inflicted suffering and heavy losses on Greek Cypriots, specifically over a third of Greek Cypriots were forced to flee their homes [1, p. 3].

***International and constitutional foundations of the Republic of Cyprus***

The end of the British colonial rule and independence of Cyprus preceded by international treaties, upon which Cyprus emerged as a sovereign political entity. The legal and political basis of the state of Cyprus were laid in 1959-1960, which ultimately resulted in the sovereign state of Cyprus on August 16, 1960. The constitution of the Republic of Cyprus resulted from the Zürich agreement between Greece and Turkey on February 11, 1959, and the London agreement on February 19, 1959 [7]. The provisions of the Zürich agreement between Greece and Turkey were incorporated into the London agreement, which Britain was part of as well. The representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots accepted the provisions of the Zürich and London agreements and consented to the agreed terms for the final settlement of the Cyprus problem [7]. These agreements served as the legal foundations for the 1960 the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance and the constitution of Cyprus, which were signed by Britain, Greece, Turkey and the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia on August 16, 1960 [7].

To be more precise, in February 1959, the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey as well as the leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus Archbishop Makarios III and Fazıl Küçük negotiated and agreed to the London and Zürich treaties on the basis of which a constitution of Cyprus was drafted and agreed. In accordance with the London and Zürich treaties, which drafted Cyprus's constitution, envisioned the establishment of a legitimate nation state in Cyprus predicated on peace, stability, harmony, peaceful coexistence, equality and power sharing between the two ethnic, cultural and religious communities inhabiting the island [8]. The London and Zürich treaties of February 1959 stated that the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey were the guarantors of the independence, territorial integrity and constitution of Cyprus as a state, which ought to be inserted in the future constitution of the state of Cyprus [8]. The article 22 of the London and Zürich treaties stipulated that the total or partial unification of the Republic of Cyprus with any other state as well as any idea of the partition of the island ought to be excluded and proscribed [8].

In fact, it was Greece and Turkey who had drafted and agreed upon the character and constitution of the state of Cyprus on February 11, 1959 [9]. The Constitution and the Treaties, agreed upon in Zürich and London in February 1959, entered into force August 16, 1960. Here basically all the terms of the London and Zürich treaties were enshrined in the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee was signed by Britain, Greece and Turkey was the signatory state. The article I of the treaty stipulated that the Republic of Cyprus, as an independent political entity recognized by the three major external signatory countries, was obliged to ensure the maintenance of its sovereignty, security, territorial integrity as well as the constitution of the country, which

granted equal rights and protection to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots [10]. In addition, the Republic of Cyprus was obliged to undertake “not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island” [10]. Thus, according to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots were obliged to adhere to the treaty and the constitution of the country. The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee also stipulated the rights and obligations of Britain, Greece and Turkey. Specifically, these three powers as the guarantors of the treaty were obliged to recognize, respect and guarantee the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity as well as the terms of the constitution of Cyprus [10]. Besides granting the recognition and guarantee, the three powers were obliged to prevent and rule out any attempts to incorporate Cyprus into any other state or divide the island [10]. The 1960 treaty also stated explicitly that in the event of a violation of the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee, the three powers first ought to consult together with reference to what measures necessary to undertake in order to restore the constitutional order on the island and the compliance with the provisions [10]. If joint concerted actions may fail or may not be feasible, each of the three guaranteeing powers had the right to take needed steps with the purpose of restoring the state of affairs stipulated in the treaty [10].

Thus, the Zürich accord of 1959, the London accord of 1959, and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee came into existence as a result of negotiations and agreements between Britain, Greece, Turkey as well as the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. They in turn gave birth to the constitution of Cyprus and the state of Cyprus. According to the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, the state of Cyprus was a democratic society with equal rights of all its citizens, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots [11]. The international treaties and the constitution placed legal constraints and barriers on the possible domination of one ethnic group over another, ensuring equal rights and opportunities between the majority Greek Cypriots and the minority Turkish Cypriots. Despite the demographic primacy of the Greeks, the constitution ensured that power would be shared by both communities, in which the president of Cyprus would be Greek, while vice-president Turk [11]. The president and vice-president would share power, notably most crucial executive powers. They both had the right to veto any law or decision by the Council of Ministers concerning foreign affairs, defence, security and other matters [11]. Article 3 clearly granted both Greek and Turkish the status of the official languages of Cyprus [11].

A prominent American expert in international law Monroe Leigh indicates that the basic articles of the constitution of Cyprus were designed to ensure equality and equal rights of both ethnic communities and their rights to share power and all the attributes of sovereignty [12]. As the binding international



treaties and the constitution granted equal legal and political status to both Greek and Turkish communities, they pledged to establish a single state on the island and govern that state together on an equal footing [12]. Moreover, the articles of the constitution ensured that neither Greeks nor Turks could take unilateral actions without the other's consent [12]. The constitution contained all the provisions of the international treaties concluded in 1959-1960 with respect guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity and indivisibility of the Republic of Cyprus [11]. Since the 1959 Zürich and London accords as well as the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance had constitutional force, they could not be amended or repealed [11]. The article 185 stipulated that the state of Cyprus would be one and indivisible and thereby any attempts to incorporate the island in whole or in part as well as any separatist movement would be excluded [11].

***The end of the inclusive Greco-Turkish political regime in Cyprus in 1963***

Leigh draws attention to how this meticulously balanced and internationally sanctioned political regime turned out to be short-lived, lasting only three years [12]. The constitutional order and balance of power were shattered by the Greek Cypriots when in November 1963, the president of the Republic of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios publicly put forth 13 points with the intention to change and amend the constitution of Cyprus in favor of the Greek majority [13, p. 22; 14, p. 2; 15, p. 62; 16, p. 254; 17, p. 83]. The breach of the international binding accords and the 1960 constitution by the Greek Cypriots in November 1963 is attributed by scholars to the tacit and overt objection of the leaders of the Greek majority to the status quo on the island in the aftermath of independence [18, p. 300]. In this regard, Calvocoressi point out that in fact the Greek Cypriots had accepted the international treaties and the constitution with great reluctance, including Archbishop Makarios who had even declared them unworkable [18, p. 300]. Moreover, many ultranationalist Greek Cypriots who strongly adhered to 'enosis', that is political unification of the island with Greece, believed that the consent of the Greek Cypriots to the international treaties and an idea of coexistence with the Turkish Cypriots was tantamount to the betrayal of the cause of 'enosis' [18, p. 300]. The dream of merging with Greece was disrupted by the international accords. Nonetheless, the Greek Cypriots shared Makarios's view that the constitution turned out to be unworkable and could not be implemented [19, p. 38]. This was because the Greek majority outrightly rejected any idea of legal, civil and political equality with the Turkish minority.

Ultrationalism and extremism of Greek Cypriots in collusion with right-wing chauvinists and hawks in Greece were about to take apart the island. They coveted the whole island through unleashing unspeakable terror and atrocities against Turkish Cypriots, subjecting them to mass killing, ethnic cleansing and expulsion. They sought to translate their demographic primacy into political dominance over the Turkish minority by brazenly violating the

fundamental provisions of the 1960 constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and the international treaties. The materialization of enosis would threaten the very existence of the Turkish communities in Cyprus. Furthermore, the amalgamation of Cyprus with Greece would lead to the replication of the Crete scenario of the first quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> century when owing to the rebellion of Greeks in Crete against the Ottoman Empire and their subsequent merge with Greece in 1908, which resulted in the ethnic cleansing and mass expulsion of Turkish Cretans. The Turkish Cypriots rightly indicated that the president Makarios's proposal to amend the constitution resembled the Akritas Plan, which was intended to ensure the Greek dominance over the island at the expense of the Turkish community [19, p. 38; 20, p. 52; 21, p. 21; 22, p. 249]. The Akritas Plan was developed by pro-enosis Greek ultranationalists with the aim to break the backbone of the Turkish Cypriots and fully subjugate them before the external help would arrive, namely before Turkey would intervene [20, p. 52]. The constitutional amendment proposals by Makarios and the Greek pressure on the Turks to accept them were seen by the Turkish Cypriots as the flagrant violation of the international treaties and the constitution and as intentional assaults on their inalienable constitutional, civil and political rights [18, p. 300].

To translate their plan into practice and force their will upon the Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Cypriots unleashed large-scale violence and terror on Turkish communities. The Turkish side perceived the unfolding events since Makarios had made his proposals as attempts by the Greek Cypriots to monopolize the power, limit and ultimately exclude the Turkish Cypriots from power, legitimizing their absolute domination and subordination of the Turkish Cypriots. Besides, the Turkish side suspected that the ultimate goal of the Greek Cypriots was to implement 'enosis', full incorporation of the island into Greece. Despite the fact that Turkish communities across the island were subjected to extreme violence and terror, the Turkish Cypriot forwarded their request, conveyed by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), to restore their power accorded by the constitution and take their seats in the government and other state bodies [19, p. 37]. Yet the Greek side rejected the request and forwarded their demand that the Turkish Cypriots ought to accept significant limitations to their political rights and powers [19, p. 37]. As can be seen, despite the request of the Turkish Cypriots to take their official positions in power, being eager to impose their majority rule, the Greek Cypriots intentionally blocked the constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriots. In this regard, Dodd indicates that this event refutes the claims of the Greek Cypriots that since 1963 the government of Cyprus has operated without the engagement of the Turkish Cypriots, who allegedly disengaged themselves from their responsibilities and duties [19, p. 37].

The Turkish Cypriots were convinced that bi-communalism and peaceful coexistence of the two ethnic communities came to an end with the brazen usurpation and monopolization of the power by the Greek Cypriots in 1963. In this case, the Turkish Cypriots claim that the breach of the international treaties, the constitution, usurpation of the power, systematic terror and violence, exclusion of the Turkish communities and imposition of the blockade on Turkish enclaves by the Greek Cypriots left the Turkish Cypriots with no option other than take the matter into their hands and govern themselves within the enclaves where they were confined [19, p. 37-38]. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriots maintained that by violating the international treaties and the constitution, the Greek Cypriots drastically and dramatically altered the economic, legal, political and social balance in their favor at the expense of the Turkish Cypriots. Even if the Greek Cypriots came to the conclusion that the constitution turned out to be unworkable, instead of resorting to terror to impose their rule on the Turkish Cypriots, they should have addressed this crucial issue in a constitutional and constructive way by engaging the Turkish Cypriots as well as Britain, Greece and Turkey as the guaranteeing powers.

Since the Greek majority were not able to impose their will upon the Turkish minority by peaceful means, soon the Greek side resorted to violence to translate their aim into reality and achieve their paramount goal of domination of the island and subjugation of the Turkish side. In his study, Hughes-Wilson refers to a Greek Cypriot General George Karayiannis who in June 1965 stated that when the Turkish side outrightly turned down Makarios's constitutional plan, the Greek side decided to leverage their demographic, political and military advantage to force the Turkish Cypriots to kneel down before the Greek majority and accept their reduced status [23]. Moreover, George Karayiannis mentioned the "Akritas" plan devised by the Greek Cypriots to wipe out the Turkish communities and integrate the island with Greece [23]. In this regard, Papadakis calls attention to subsequent terror unleashed by the Greek Cypriots, and ensuing intercommunal and interethnic conflict between 1963-1967, in which as the weaker side, the Turkish communities suffered the greater losses [24, p. 152]. Numerous Turkish Cypriots were subjected to mass terror and ethnic cleansing, being compelled to abandon their homes and moving to areas of the island that later became enclaves under their rule and control [24, p. 152].

Yilmaz describes the period between 1963-1974 as the time of Turkish grief and suffering as they were forced to flee their homes and move into other areas, namely enclaves which constituted only 5 percent of the island, in contrast, before 1963, they had owned roughly 30 percent of the island's territory [17, p. 84]. The Greek Cypriot assaults led to the chain of bloody events known as "Bloody Christmas", in which in December 1963 and the following 1964 many Turkish were killed and ethnically cleansed [25, p. 120]. It was estimated that in

1963-1964, roughly 25,000 Turkish Cypriots or around a quarter of the Turkish population of the island were expelled from their homes [13, p. 3; 14, p. 9; 25, p. 120]. In contrast, the number of Greek Cypriots being forced to abandon their homes was estimated to stand at 700, including 500 Armenians who were also displaced [13, p. 3; 14, p. 9]. In the period between December 1963 and August 1964, the Turkish Cypriots were compelled to abandon their homes from 72 mixed and 24 pure Turkish villages [14, p. 9].

### ***The role of external actors in addressing the Cyprus problem***

As all the international accords of 1959-1960 leading to the establishment of the bi-national and bi-cultural state of Cyprus and its constitution were flagrantly breached by the Greek Cypriot majority, Turkey and Britain as the guarantor powers of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus threatened to intervene to bring an end to the conflict and restore order prescribed by the constitution [23]. First, Britain installed its military troops in Cyprus, which was followed by the United Nations who dispatched its peacekeeping force known as the UNFICYP. Yet the involvement of Britain and the United Nations were not insufficient to pacify the island and reinstate the constitutional order. In this case, Hughes-Wilson stresses that the Turkish Cypriots as a minority were turned into refugees in their own land and became frightened of further Greek violence and terror [23]. Only external power who had the willingness and capacity to put an end to the plight of the Turkish Cypriots and restore the constitutional order was Turkey who had the right and obligation to do so in accordance with the 1959-1960 international treaties. Although Turkey was ready and eager to militarily intervene in the conflict in Cyprus, the United States foiled Turkey's military engagement [18, p. 301]. In his letter to prime minister of Turkey İsmet İnönü on June 5, 1964, president of the United States Lyndon Baines Johnson although acknowledged Turkey's right to intervene under the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, the American president highlighted that such move by Turkey would lead to the partition of the island, which was not permissible [8].

President Lyndon Johnson emphasized that Turkish intervention would put Turkey and Greece on the verge of war, which was unthinkable and unacceptable due to the fact that both nations were part of NATO, whose members would not be allowed to engage militarily with one another [8]. Referring to Germany and France who had been able to bury the hatchet and cease their centuries-old animosity by becoming NATO members, the American president advised that Turkey and Greece ought to do exactly the same as NATO allies [8]. Moreover, Lyndon Johnson drew İnönü's attention to the possible involvement of the Soviet Union if Turkey would launch its intervention [8]. Johnson stressed that if the Soviet Union would engage in the Cyprus conflict because of the Turkish military move, its NATO allies may not come to rescue Turkey [8]. Moreover, Johnson emphasized the obligations of Turkey as a member of the UN and how the UN

forces were engaged in peacekeeping operations and contributing to reducing the incidents of violence in Cyprus [8]. In the end, Johnson called on İsmet İnönü to show restraint, delay and refrain from military actions. In his response to Johnson, İsmet İnönü pointed out that although the Turkish government had postponed its decision to exercise its right of a unilateral action in Cyprus bestowed by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, the American president's message was disappointing for Turkey as the US ally [8]. Furthermore, İnönü called attention to the exigency and significance of a military intervention in Cyprus on the strength of Treaty of Guarantee, which had been felt several times since the December of 1963 [8].

Thus, all attempts of the Turkish government under the leadership of İnönü to exercise its right to militarily intervene in Cyprus to restore the constitutional order were primarily thwarted by the US. On the other hand, as British involvement was limited and futile, Britain shunned addressing the Cyprus problem and sought to hand it over to NATO [26, p. 36-37]. Although Greece and Turkey were in favor of the British proposal, the president of Cyprus Makarios exhibited his objection and other members of NATO were less willing to get involved in this conflict [18, p. 301]. When it had become clear that NATO's engagement was out of question, Britain consented to the involvement of the UN [26, p. 37]. As a result, on March 4, 1964, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 186, which established the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) [26, p. 37; 27]. In March 1964, when Turkey was about to carry out a military operation in Cyprus, the UN intervened with peacekeeping forces from Canada, Ireland, Denmark, Finland and Sweden [18, p. 301].

According to the UN Security Council Resolution 186, the conflict in Cyprus was seen as a threat to international peace, stability and security [27]. Therefore, the UN Security Council called on all members to refrain from the threat or from using force against independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus [27]. Besides, the UN Security Council called on the government of Cyprus to take all necessary steps to put an end to bloodshed and conflict on the island [27]. In relation to resolution 186, Ker-Lindsay draws attention to the fact that despite the absence of the Turkish representatives, the UN SC referred to the government of Cyprus, entirely dominated by the Greek Cypriots, as an internationally recognized legitimate political regime [26, p. 37-38]. In this regard, the UN as the highest international authority seems to have deliberately disregarded the inalienable rights of the Turkish Cypriotes accorded to them by the international treaties and the 1960 constitution, and at the same time, legitimized the unlawful seizure of the power by the Greek Cypriots. Ker-Lindsay highlights that this situation has persisted to this day, which is deeply resented by the Turkish side, who insist that without their inclusion and participation, any government of Cyprus is in fact illegal [26, p. 38].

In accordance with resolution 186, the UN appointed an ad hoc mediator,



who was tasked with facilitating negotiations between the parties and peaceful settlement of the Cyprus conflict [27]. Yet it should be noted that overall, the UN appointed two mediators, namely Sakari Tuomioja, a Finnish diplomat, and Galo Plaza Lasso, an Ecuadorian statesman, who appeared to sympathize with the Greek Cypriot cause. Despite having recognized the Cyprus conflict as an international issue, the first mediator Sakari Tuomioja came to believe that Cyprus's eventual integration with Greece was the most appropriate solution to the problem [26, p. 38]. After Tuomioja's sudden death, the UN appointed Plaza Lasso who although shared his predecessor's vision regarding eventual incorporation of Cyprus into Greece, he argued that enosis ought to be faded into the background for the meanwhile. Notwithstanding, Plaza Lasso also explicitly favored the Greek Cypriot cause, underlying that the Turkish Cypriots ought to discard their demands for a federal state and consent to the Greek majority rule [26, p. 38]. Plaza Lasso's proposal angered the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, who demanded his resignation, whereas the Greek Cypriots rejected the appointment of a different mediator. In fact, Plaza Lasso was the last official UN mediator in Cyprus [26, p. 39].

#### ***The 1974 Turkish intervention and the establishment of the TRNC***

With the usurpation and monopolization of the power, the government of the Republic of Cyprus transformed into an ethnocratic regime solely under the rule of the Greek Cypriots, who have since claimed to be the sole legitimate government of the state of Cyprus established in 1960 based on the international treaties and the constitution [13, p. 13]. The Greek Cypriot majority preferred only a government dominated by them and an exclusivist discriminatory political status for the Turkish Cypriots. Yet their unchanging and ultimate goal was enosis. The Greek Cypriots were convinced that only Turkey had the ability to seriously threaten and eventually dismantle their plan for domination and enosis. As a result, from the beginning, the Greek Cypriots feared any idea of Turkish military intervention [20, p. 53]. For that reason, the Greek Cypriots sought to subdue the Turkish Cypriots through coercion, intimidation and violence to get their acquiescence to the Greek majority rule and then to enosis with Greece. They tried to accomplish their aim within a short time before Turkey could contemplate a military intervention. Yet as Dodd points out, the Greek Cypriots underestimated the ability and agency of the Turkish Cypriots to fight and defend themselves [20, p. 53]. Papadakis, Peristianis and Welz call attention to the collective amnesia of the Greek Cypriots in relation to the bloody events and atrocities committed by the Greek majority between 1963-1974 [1, p. 12]. At the same time, these scholars pay attention to narratives among the Turkish Cypriots regarding their collective persecution and suffering in 1963-1974. To be precise, the Turkish Cypriots came to perceive that period as the decisive and turning point in their history, which clearly proved that their peaceful coexistence with



the Greek Cypriots was out of question and thereby the only viable option was to create a separate political entity [1, p. 12].

After 1967, bi-communal clashes and conflicts in Cyprus subsided. Although the Greek Cypriots could not subdue the Turkish side, due to their greater strength, they managed to confine the Turkish Cypriots in the ghettos or small enclaves. In these ethnic ghettos, the Turkish Cypriots did not feel safe and lived in constant fear and terror of persecution and killing by the Greek Cypriots. The ultimate goal of the Greek Cypriots and their president Archbishop Makarios remained enosis. In this case, Bora describes Makarios as an extremist and a fanatical pro-enosis leader, who never diverged from his course [28, p. 36]. Makarios announced that he would not abide by the provisions of the international accords and the 1960 constitution, which stressed peaceful coexistence between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and power sharing and prohibited any attempts to undermine the independence and territorial integrity of the state of Cyprus. Yet Makarios and his followers considered the international accords and the constitution as a temporary measure and a stepping-stone towards enosis and integration with Greece [23]. Bora attributes the breach of the 1960 constitution and ensuing bloody bi-communal hostilities and conflict to Makarios's reckless decisions and actions [28, p. 36-37].

1967 was marked by the reduction of intercommunal hostilities and the rise of a military junta in Greece who was profoundly committed to enosis and an idea of a Greater Greece [19, p. 130]. The advent of a military junta ruled by extremist nationalists had serious repercussions for Cyprus and a balance of power in the region. Specifically, Papadakis points out that although the Greek Cypriots and their leader Makarios remained strongly committed to enosis and saw integration with Greece as an ideal solution to the problem, the government of Cyprus exhibited caution and shunned any close cooperation with the fascist regime in Greece [24, p. 152]. Papadakis highlights that even though Makarios always prioritized enosis, he openly abhorred the military junta in Greece, which was perceived by him as an overtly odious fascist, extremist and anticommunist regime [24, p. 152]. Moreover, the president Makarios allied himself with the Greek communists (AKEL), who would have lost their ground and been subjected to persecution, had he opted for enosis with Greece [24, p. 152]. Moreover, the protracted crisis in Cyprus convinced Makarios that enosis was now unattainable and a distant goal [25, p. 147]. As a result, Makarios had to postpone enosis until a favorable political regime would be established in Greece. Therefore, in the eyes of the Greek junta, Makarios became a serious obstacle to enosis and thereby his removal was a paramount task. This in turn led to a civil war among Greek Cypriots [29, p. 131]. Since the leaders of the junta viewed Cyprus as an extension of Greece, they sought to carry out enosis. In June 1971, the Greek junta forwarded proposals to the president Makarios about the establishment of a

‘unitary state’ with the incorporation of Cyprus into Greece [20, p. 97]. However, Makarios rejected the proposals, which angered the junta and its leader Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos [20, p. 97].

In November 1973, Georgios Papadopoulos was toppled from power by a Greek officer Dimitrios Ioannidis who replaced him as the new leader of the junta [30, p. 328]. Unlike Papadopoulos, Ioannidis was more committed to enosis and eager to remove Makarios. As a hard-liner, Ioannidis decided to carry out a coup against Makarios in Cyprus in early 1974 [20, p. 103-104]. Despite having been aware of the imminent Turkish intervention in case of Greek intervention in Cyprus, Ioannidis disregarded this danger [20, p. 104]. In January 1974, Bülent Ecevit came to power in Turkey, who held a more recalcitrant and unyielding attitude towards the Cyprus problem. Yet this could not hold back Ioannidis in his attempts to overthrow Makarios and establish Greek primacy over the island. In this regard, Dodd indicates that Ioannidis was moving towards trouble and his fall [20, p. 104]. Among Greek Cypriots, the head of EOKA George Grivas was an ardent supporter of unification with Greece. In 1971, Grivas created EOKA-B with the goal of advancing his agenda of enosis. After the death of Grivas in early 1971, a member of EOKA, an ardent Greek Cypriot nationalist and pro-enosis figure, Nikos Sampson was backed by the junta in Athens. With the support of Greek army officers, EOKA-B militants engaged in terrorism and unleashed a campaign of intimidation and mass killings against Makarios and his communist allies [24, p. 152]. The turmoil in Cyprus soon developed into the Greek civil war in which at least 3,000 supporters of Makarios were killed by EOKA-B militants and junta officers [23]. Having witnessed an unfolding civil war and fratricide in the Greek part of Cyprus, many Turkish Cypriots stressed that nothing good should be expected from Greeks who were butchering one another, and they would show no mercy to Muslim Turks as their historical foes [28, p. 38].

On July 15, 1974, Ioannidis staged a coup against the president Makarios through the National Guard composed of Greek officers [30, p. 329]. According to Evryviadis, the coup against Makarios was orchestrated by Athens and carried out by junta officers stationed in Cyprus [31]. Evryviadis also notes that Ioannidis demanded from Nikos Sampson to bring him the head of Makarios [31]. Scholars emphasize the sheer incompetence of the junta in Athens in engineering a coup in Cyprus [31]. Yet Makarios was able to escape from Cyprus with the help of Britain. The Greek junta chose Nikos Sampson as the president of Cyprus. Hughes-Wilson argues that on the orders of Ioannidis, Nikos Sampson and his EOKA-B terrorists were about to carry out mass extermination of the Turkish Cypriots and implement full unification with Greece [23]. Later Nikos Sampson divulged the plan of genocide of the Turkish Cypriots, stating that “Had Turkey not intervened, I would not only have proclaimed enosis, but I would have annihilated the Turks in Cyprus as well” [23]. Yet this long-awaited plan of ethnic

cleansing was thwarted by a swift and effective Turkish military intervention on July 20, 1974, which prompted the downfall of the junta in Athens and the Sampson regime in Cyprus.

The 1959-1960 international treaties accorded external powers such as Britain, Greece and Turkey to intervene should the constitutional order in Cyprus established in 1960 be threatened and dismantled. As soon as the Greek junta in Athens spearheaded a military coup in Cyprus, predicted on the authority conferred by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, the Turkish government under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit launched a military intervention known as a “Peace Operation”, “Operation Attila” and the “Conqueror of Cyprus” (“Kıbrıs Fatihi”) in Turkey [32, 33, p. 97]. Turkey’s military intervention was justified by its leaders as an attempt to restore the constitutional order and safeguard the Turkish Cypriots from further persecution and terror imposed by the Greek side [30, 329-331]. Before undertaking a military intervention, the Turkish government led by Bülent Ecevit followed all necessary procedures as they were stipulated in the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. After the coup in Cyprus, Turkey immediately consulted with the British side, calling on Britain to exercise its right to intervene under article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee [28, p. 39]. However, Britain refrained from intervening, thereby leaving no option for Turkey other than to take this matter into its hands. In the early morning on July 20, 1974, prime minister Bülent Ecevit announced via Turkish National Radio about the decision of his government to launch a military operation in Cyprus [36, p. 1]. In his statement, Bülent Ecevit highlighted that Turkish action was “a great service to all mankind and to peace... We in fact are going to carry peace and not war to the island, and not only to the Turks but also to the Greeks... We have had to make this decision after we had exhausted all diplomatic and political methods” [36, p. 1].

The Turkish military was able to advance and establish its control over 38 percent of Cyprus, eventually dividing it into the southern section under Greek Cypriot control and the northern area under the Turkish Cypriot rule [17, p. 84; 30, p. 332]. Turkish military intervention did not last long yet prompted a great humanitarian catastrophe in Cyprus. It is estimated that roughly 180,000 Greek Cypriots were forced to flee to the south, while about 50,000 Turkish Cypriots were compelled to move to the north [28, p. 40]. O’Malley and Craig provide different data in relation to the number of refugees caused by Turkish intervention [36, p. 221]. Out of the 600,000 population of Cyprus at that time, around 200,000 Greek and 60,000 Turkish Cypriots were uprooted [36, p. 221]. According to the reports by the government of Cyprus, 16,000 Greek Cypriots became casualties, of which 4000 lost their lives and others were wounded and disappeared [36, p. 221]. An estimated 1000 Turkish Cypriots lost their lives or were missing [36, p. 221]. In Sakkas’s estimation, roughly 250,000 people were forcefully expelled from their homes [30, p. 332].

Despite the paramount goal of Turkish military intervention was to restore the 1960 constitutional order in Cyprus [30, p. 331], the Greek side and their proponents increasingly question the validity of the Turkish rationale for intervention [37]. The Greek Cypriots, Greece as well as the European Union have since placed the blame on Turkey, arguing that Turkish intervention was the starting point of the Cyprus issue in international affairs [33, p. 97]. The Greek and Greek Cypriot narratives claim that the incompetent and treasonous junta in Greece in conjunction with its thugs in Cyprus staged a coup, which provoked a Turkish military intervention and the division of the island [30, p. 332; 34, p. 333]. Besides the junta, the Greek tend to place the blame upon the United States who was allegedly in favor of Turkish military intervention [30, p. 332]. The Greek narratives view the uprooting of Greek Cypriots in 1974 as the second national catastrophe after the Greek exodus from Asia Minor in 1923 [30, p. 332]. Anastasakis and Lagos argue that Cyprus was the ultimate casualty of the Greek junta's reckless behavior and its coup against Makarios [38, p. 341]. As opposed to this discourse, the Turkish narratives tend to consider the "Peace Operation" as an outcome of addressing the Cyprus problem [33, p. 97]. Moreover, as opposed to the Greek narratives, counter-narratives promoted by the Turkish Cypriots claim that the history of living together has shown the impossibility and infeasibility of coexistence with the Greek Cypriots and a single state [24, p. 152]. The arguments forwarded by the Turkish Cypriots proved to be accurate and sound in 2004 when 76 percent of Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan plan about the reunification of the two ethno-cultural and religious communities into a single nation, while 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots approved the plan [28, p. 40]. Thus, despite all efforts of Turkey to restore the constitutional order and ensure reconciliation, they were in vain. Therefore, the "Peace Operation" eventually led to a separate Turkish Cypriot political entity and establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 [33. p. 97].

## **Conclusion**

The study has sought to explore the historical background of the Cyprus problem and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The results of the study have helped us understand the historical, legal and political basis of the Cyprus conflict and the legitimacy of the TRNC. The key argument of the study is that the 1974 Turkish intervention and the creation of the TRNC were legitimate and morally justifiable because the Greek majority in Cyprus unilaterally and illegally usurped and monopolized the power and excluded the Turkish Cypriots in 1963. Breaching the 1960 constitution and hijacking the power by the Greek Cypriots and their violence against the Turkish Cypriots led to the establishment of two separate political entities in Cyprus. Yet despite the Greek majority usurped the power in 1963 by violating the provisions of the international accords and the

constitution, international community has recognized the Republic of Cyprus under the Greek rule as the sole legitimate government of Cyprus, while denying the Turkish Cypriots their right to self-determination and the legitimacy to the TRNC. Therefore, the study has shed some light on historical, legal and political barriers to the recognition of the TRNC, as well as on the root causes of the exclusion of the Turkish Cypriots and monopolization of power in Cyprus by the Greek majority.

The findings of the study have shown that although the international community has extended its recognition to the state of Cyprus under the Greek Cypriot control, the establishment of the nation state of the Turkish Cypriots has been legitimate. Despite all the legitimacy of the TRNC, except Turkey, other members of the United Nations and other international actors have not recognized the TRNC. A deeper and critical analysis of sources, relevant literature and historical events between 1960-1983 has demonstrated that the Republic of Cyprus under the Greek Cypriot rule ought to be viewed as an illegitimate political entity because the president Makarios's constitutional amendment proposals and subsequent seizure of the power by the Greek Cypriots were illegal acts and the flagrant violation of the 1960 constitution. Despite the Greek Cypriot breach of the international treaties and the 1960 constitution, the international community seems not to consider it as such. As stipulated in the international treaties and the constitution of 1960 leading to the creation of the state of Cyprus, the Republic of Cyprus was a bicultural and bicomunal state of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Yet 1963 the Greek majority was seeking to change the political system in their favor by achieving the Greek dominated state where the Turkish Cypriots would be reduced to a tiny minority with a second-class citizen status. Moreover, by usurping the power, the Greek Cypriots sought enosis or unification with Greece, which was also a flagrant violation of the international accords and the constitution of 1960.

Despite being a signatory of the international treaties and one of the guaranteeing powers of the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, Greece also sought enosis and ultimate incorporation of Cyprus. The Greek junta established in 1967 was striving for unification of Cyprus with Greece. On July 15, 1974, Greek officers and militants of EOKA-B with the sponsorship of the junta in Athens carried out a coup d'état against the government led by Makarios. This brazen breach of the international accords and the constitution of Cyprus by Greek Cypriot extremists and the Greek junta provoked the Turkish military intervention in five days after the coup. On the one hand, the Turkish intervention brought about the downfall of the Greek junta and Greek Cypriot extremists. On the other hand, it promoted the ultimate division of the island into two parts along the ethnic lines and the creation of the TRNC. The Turkish Cypriots eventually established their own national political entity as they had become convinced that bi-communalism and peaceful coexistence of



the two ethnic communities had long come to an end. Since November of 1963, the Greek side has been unwilling to put the clock back and restore the pre-1963 constitutional order; hence, the only option before the Turkish Cypriots has been to create their own state. Therefore, Turkic states of Central Asia ought to take necessary steps towards the recognition of the TRNC.

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## **КИПР МӘСЕЛЕСІНІҢ ЭВОЛЮЦИЯСЫ ЖӘНЕ СОЛТҮСТІК КИПР ТҮРІК РЕСПУБЛИКАСЫНЫҢ ҚҰРЫЛУЫ**

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**Аңдатпа.** Мақалада халықаралық қатынастардағы Кипр проблемасының алғышарттары мен туындауы, сондай-ақ 1974 жылы түрік әскери интервенциясына және Солтүстік Кипр Түрік Республикасының (СКТР) құрылуына алып келген оқиғалар желісі қарастырылады және талданады. Бұл зерттеу Қазақстан, Түркіменстан және Өзбекстанның СКТР-ді сепаратистік заңсыз құрылым ретінде қарастыратын БҰҰ Қауіпсіздік Кеңесінің 1983 жылғы 541 және 550 қарарларын орындау міндеттемесіне байланысты соңғы оқиғалардың аясында өзекті және маңызды болып табылады. Осы тұрғыдан алғанда, зерттеу Кипр Республикасының құрылуынан бастап СКТР-дің құрылуына дейінгі 1960 және 1983 жылдар арасындағы негізгі тарихи оқиғалар желісін қарастырады. Зерттеуде тарихи талдау және контент талдау әдістері қолданылады. Осы әдістерді пайдалана отырып, зерттеу ресми дипломатиялық құжаттарды, халықаралық

шарттарды, 1960 жылғы Кипр конституциясын және басқа да дереккөздерді талдайды. Сонымен қатар зерттеуде жетекші ғалымдар мен сарапшылардың ғылыми еңбектері пайдаланылды. СКТР-дің құрылуын халықаралық қауымдастық 1960 жылғы халықаралық шарттармен үйлеспейді, сондықтан заңсыз деп санайды. Алайда, зерттеу нәтижелері бұл келісімдер мен Кипрдің 1960 жылғы конституциясын кипрлік гректер аса өрескелдікпен бұзғанын көрсетіп берді. Билікті біржақты және заңсыз басып алған демографиялық басымдыққа ие кипрлік гректер грек хунтасымен бірігіп, Кипр мемлекетін жойып, оны Грекиямен біріктіруді көздеді. Кипрлік гректер мен Грекияның халықаралық шарттарды және 1960 жылғы конституцияны өрескел бұзуы 1974 жылы шілдеде Түркияның әскери интервенциясына, аралдың екіге бөлінуіне және СКТР-ның құрылуына тікелей түрткі болды. Өз кезегінде СКТР-дың құрылуы Кипр мәселесінің шешілуінің жалғыз дұрыс шешімі деген тұжырым ұсынылады.

**Тірек сөздер:** Кипр, Грекия, Түркия, кипрлік гректер, кипрлік түріктер, СКТР, келісім, интервенция

## ЭВОЛЮЦИЯ КИПРСКОЙ ПРОБЛЕМЫ И ВОЗНИКНОВЕНИЕ ТУРЕЦКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ СЕВЕРНОГО КИПРА

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**Аннотация.** В статье исследуются и анализируются предыстория и генезис кипрской проблемы в международных отношениях, а также события, приведшие к турецкому военному вмешательству 1974 года и созданию Турецкой Республики Северного Кипра (ТРСК). Данная исследовательская проблема актуальна и значима на фоне недавних событий, связанных с обязательством Казахстана, Туркменистана и Узбекистана соблюдать резолюции Совета Безопасности ООН 541 и 550 1983 года, которые рассматривают ТРСК как сепаратистское незаконное образование. С этой точки зрения в исследовании рассматриваются ключевые исторические события между 1960 и 1983 годами с момента создания Республики Кипр до образования ТРСК. В исследовании используются методы исторического анализа и контент-анализа. С помощью этих методов в исследовании изучаются и анализируются официальные дипломатические документы, международные договоры, конституция Кипра 1960 года и другие первоисточники. Кроме того, в исследовании использованы научные труды ведущих ученых и экспертов. Создание ТРСК рассматривается международным сообществом как несовместимое с международными договорами 1960 года и, следовательно, недействительное. Однако результаты исследования показали, что нарушение договоров и конституции Кипра 1960 года было совершено греками-киприотами. Односторонне и

незаконно захватив власть, греческое большинство в сговоре с греческой хунтой намеревалось упразднить государство Кипр и объединить его с Грецией. Вопиющее нарушение международных договоров и конституции 1960 года как греками-киприотами, так и Грецией спровоцировало турецкую военную интервенцию в июле 1974 года, раздел острова и создание ТРСК как единственного жизнеспособного решения кипрской проблемы.

**Ключевые слова:** Кипр, Греция, Турция, греки-киприоты, турки-киприоты, ТРСК, договор, интервенция

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## **MULTI-VECTOR POLICY AS A STRATEGY OF GEOPOLITICAL MANEUVER: CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS OF KAZAKHSTAN IN RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND CHINA AFTER 2022**

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**Abstract.** This article examines Kazakhstan's evolving foreign policy strategy following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine and China's growing assertiveness in Eurasia. Positioned at the crossroads of competing great power interests, Kazakhstan has amplified its multi-vector policy into a strategic tool of geopolitical maneuvering. While maintaining formal alliances – such as with Russia through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – Kazakhstan simultaneously deepens economic ties with China via the Belt and Road Initiative and cultivates relationships with Western partners. This paper draws on critical geopolitics and discourse analysis to assess how Kazakhstan reconfigures its role from a peripheral actor to a regional norm entrepreneur.

Using a qualitative methodology grounded in the works of Ó Tuathail, Agnew, and Müller, the study analyzes official speeches, strategic documents, and regional policy narratives to unpack Kazakhstan's spatial imaginaries and diplomatic signaling. It argues that Kazakhstan's foreign policy reflects not only pragmatic hedging but also a deliberate discursive strategy to preserve sovereignty, recalibrate asymmetries, and assert agency in a contested multipolar order.

By contextualizing recent statements by President Tokayev – especially his vision of a self-sufficient and strategically cohesive Central Asia – the paper illuminates how Kazakhstan reclaims geopolitical subjectivity. The study contributes to understanding middle-power behavior under shifting global hierarchies and highlights Kazakhstan's pursuit of autonomy through critical diplomatic balancing.

**Key words:** Kazakhstan, foreign policy, multi-vector diplomacy, critical geopolitics, geopolitical maneuvering, strategic autonomy, middle power behavior, security

### **Introduction**

Kazakhstan's geopolitical environment presents both challenges and strategic possibilities. Located at the intersection of major power interests, the country finds itself navigating a delicate balance between its historical ties with

Russia, its deepening economic partnership with China, and the shifting presence of Western actors. The doctrine of multi-vector foreign policy, long central to Kazakhstan's external strategy, has evolved into a more deliberate mechanism of geopolitical maneuvering in response to the post-2022 global context.

While maintaining formal alliances – such as its participation in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – Kazakhstan has simultaneously sought to deepen ties with China through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and to retain constructive relations with Western states, including the United States and European Union. This balancing act is becoming increasingly nuanced as the regional order transforms, particularly following Russia's large-scale military engagement in Ukraine and China's growing ambition to reshape Eurasian connectivity and trade patterns.

In his recent article, «The renaissance of Central Asia: towards sustainable development and prosperity», President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev outlined a vision of Central Asia that emphasizes greater autonomy, enhanced regional cooperation and diversified global partnerships [1]. This vision reflects Kazakhstan's proactive stance to transcending traditional alliances and solidifying its role beyond external geopolitical influences. Tokayev emphasized the region's potential to serve as a bridge between Asia and Europe, highlighting Central Asia's strategic importance in global affairs. Thus, Kazakhstan seeks to enhance its sovereignty while contributing to the stability and prosperity of the region.

However, despite these aspirations for self-determination and diversification, Kazakhstan's foreign policy remains constrained. Deeper integration into the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) has strengthened political and economic ties with Russia. At the same time, strong bilateral relations with China, particularly in economic sphere, further complicate its strategic calculus. These dynamics highlight the challenges Kazakhstan faces in managing its foreign policy amid shifting regional and global power structures. Experts have interpreted these developments in various ways: some highlight Kazakhstan's capacity for strategic autonomy, while others point to new forms of dependency emerging under a multipolar order.

This paper contributes to the literature on critical geopolitics by analyzing Kazakhstan's foreign policy choices vis-à-vis Russia and China after 2022 through the lens of geopolitical maneuvering. By examining how Kazakhstan's elites strategically reframe their country's geopolitical position – both discursively and practically – the paper challenges deterministic views of regional dependency. Instead, it explores how Kazakhstan engages in subtle forms of agency to recalibrate power asymmetries, maintain sovereignty, and secure favorable outcomes in an increasingly contested Eurasian order.



## **Materials and Methods**

This study is based on qualitative content and discourse analysis grounded in the tradition of critical geopolitics. A reference foundation is constructed using peer-reviewed academic articles, official policy documents, government speeches, and reports from leading international think tanks to establish a comprehensive understanding of Kazakhstan's evolving foreign policy positioning after 2022. Drawing on the conceptual frameworks developed by scholars such as Gearóid Ó Tuathail, John Agnew, and Martin Müller [2], the paper treats geopolitics not merely as a spatial reality but as a set of discursively constructed practices that shape state behavior and international alignments. The research adopts a critical lens to explore how Kazakhstan's multi-vector foreign policy reflects and reproduces spatial narratives and strategic identity formations in a contested geopolitical context.

The methodological approach combines thematic coding of official rhetoric with comparative content analysis, tracing the representations of Russia and China in Kazakhstan's strategic documents, public speeches by political elites, and media discourse. Inspired by Müller's discourse-analytical tools, attention is given to how certain geopolitical imaginaries – such as “bridge between East and West” or “buffer state” – are constructed and mobilized by Kazakhstan's leadership to sustain autonomy and strategic flexibility. The critical geopolitics perspective provides a suitable framework for understanding how Kazakhstan's foreign policy operates not only through formal alliances and economic integration, but also through symbolic positioning, diplomatic signaling, and selective engagement.

This methodological design enables the analysis of Kazakhstan's geopolitical maneuvering as a dynamic process shaped by both structural constraints and discursive agency. The paper seeks to contribute to the broader critical geopolitics literature by highlighting how a medium power like Kazakhstan navigates overlapping spheres of influence and leverages discursive strategies to resist hegemonic pressures while pursuing diversified international partnerships.

## **Results**

Since 2022, Kazakhstan's foreign policy has exhibited a marked evolution, positioning the country more distinctly as a middle power adept at navigating an increasingly fragmented global order. The war in Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have notably altered the diplomatic dynamics in Central Asia. This segment synthesizes data from official diplomatic communications, public opinion research, and foreign policy behavior to illustrate Kazakhstan's growing diplomatic independence from both Russia and China, alongside a reaffirmed commitment to its multi-vector approach [3].

A pivotal moment in Kazakhstan's recalibration came during the 2022 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, where President Tokayev openly

refused to endorse the legitimacy of the self-proclaimed Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics [4]. This move, widely interpreted as an assertion of national sovereignty, garnered both regional and international attention. In parallel, Kazakhstan has deepened its engagement with China, Turkey, the European Union, and the United States, demonstrating a deliberate effort to maintain foreign policy diversification and reduce asymmetrical reliance on any one state.

In addition, Kazakhstan is emerging as a diplomatic agenda-setter in Central Asia. President Tokayev's addresses at the Sixth Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Leaders (2024) underscored a vision of enhanced regional cohesion. He advocated for shifting the role of Central Asia in global affairs—from a passive geopolitical zone to an active, sovereign actor with a distinct voice on the world stage [5]. These aspirations mirror strategies traditionally associated with middle powers: using diplomacy, institutional engagement, and soft power to influence regional outcomes [6].

Empirical evidence from public surveys further affirms this shift. A 2022 poll by Demoscope revealed that 43.6% of Kazakh respondents disapproved of the CSTO's military involvement during the January events, indicating rising reservations about Russia-led security mechanisms [7]. Likewise, findings from Central Asia Barometer surveys point to declining confidence in Russian leadership and increased public preference for partnerships with actors such as China, the EU, and Turkey [8].

This trajectory is not exclusive to Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan, for instance, has similarly advocated for regionally-driven solutions in sectors like energy, water management, and infrastructure—explicitly minimizing dependency on Moscow. While Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan remain more closely tied to Russia economically and militarily, they too have expressed interest in enhancing regional autonomy. Declarations at recent regional forums increasingly emphasize shared principles of Central Asian unity, resilience, and diversified diplomacy as the foundation for collective foreign policy strategies [9].

## **Discussion**

This study interprets Kazakhstan's foreign policy not merely as a mechanical application of multi-vectorism, but as a critical-discursive strategy aimed at rearticulating the country's peripheral position and asserting strategic agency within an emerging bipolar global order. As the post-unipolar international landscape becomes increasingly defined by systemic competition between major powers, Kazakhstan seeks to reframe its role—not as a passive object of influence, but as a middle power with the capacity to engage in norm-setting and independent diplomatic action.

In this context, multi-vectorism functions not only as a pragmatic balancing tool but also as a discursive resource through which a new state identity is constructed—one that affirms Kazakhstan's sovereign right to independent

foreign policy decisions and active participation in global governance. President Tokayev's public refusal to recognize the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics during the 2022 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum signaled a shift from deferential alignment toward sovereign policy articulation, challenging prior assumptions about Kazakhstan's strategic dependence [4].

In a familiar display of geopolitical coercion, Russian leadership, including President Putin, revived revisionist rhetoric by questioning the legitimacy of Kazakhstan's borders and sovereignty, portraying parts of Kazakh territory as historically Russian. This tactic – invoking shared language and the presence of ethnic Russians – has often been used by Moscow to assert influence over neighboring states. In a pointed gesture of defiance, President Tokayev notably declined Russia's offer of the Alexander Nevsky Order – an act laden with symbolic significance that underscored Kazakhstan's refusal to acquiesce to gestures implying hierarchical subordination to Moscow [4]. This move did not occur in isolation; rather, it forms part of a broader pattern in which Kazakhstan, alongside other Central Asian states, has adopted a careful yet assertive diplomatic posture in the wake of Russia's war in Ukraine.

Importantly, this posture – often manifested as formal neutrality and calculated silence – should not be mistaken for passive alignment with Russian interests. On the contrary, Kazakhstan's persistently diplomatic but affirming references to Ukraine's territorial integrity suggest a deliberate attempt to distance itself from Russian geopolitical pressure. This distancing has become increasingly visible in the country's public rhetoric, which has grown more direct in its response to both official and unofficial Russian provocations. Parallel to this, other Central Asian countries have also offered limited, non-military expressions of solidarity with Ukraine, revealing a region-wide inclination to resist being drawn into Moscow's sphere of influence. Kazakhstan, in particular, has managed to parry some of Russia's more assertive demands by intensifying ties with alternative powers. Expressions of support from leaders like Xi Jinping and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for Kazakhstan's sovereignty illustrate the strategic calculus behind this maneuvering – where multi-vector diplomacy serves not only as a hedge but as a quiet assertion of agency within a contested geopolitical space.

President Tokayev and his government have subtly embraced aspects of this decolonization narrative – for example, accelerating policies to strengthen the use of the Kazakh language and completing the transition of the Kazakh script from Cyrillic to Latin. Such cultural policies are more than domestic reforms; they send a diplomatic signal that Kazakhstan is a modern, post-Soviet nation charting its own course. By foregrounding Kazakh ethnic and linguistic identity (while still celebrating multi-ethnicity), the leadership frames Kazakhstan as neither an appendage of the “Russian world” nor a passive bystander in China's Eurasian ambitions. Instead, official speeches increasingly highlight Kazakhstan's legacy as the land of the Great Steppe, invoking imagery of a proud, independent

people with deep roots in Central Asia. This internal narrative of sovereignty and resilience dovetails with the country's external messaging.

Kazakhstan's regional activism – particularly its efforts to institutionalize Central Asian cooperation – further reflects its aspiration to serve as a normative entrepreneur within the region. Through diplomatic initiatives emphasizing shared sovereignty and regional cohesion, Kazakhstan positions itself as a facilitator of collective agency in Central Asia, echoing the strategic logic of middle powers, which often rely on diplomacy, soft power, and institutional engagement to exert influence in asymmetrical international environments [6]

President Tokayev's speeches at the UN General Assembly, particularly the addresses at the 77th and 78th sessions, serve as pivotal discursive acts reinforcing Kazakhstan's redefinition of its geopolitical identity amid systemic global upheavals [10]. His articulation of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and multilateralism – delivered from the central podium of international diplomacy – cannot be interpreted merely as normative affirmations. Instead, they must be understood within the broader critical-discursive framework that this study highlights: Kazakhstan's use of multi-vectorism not only to navigate but to reformulate its formerly peripheral status. Tokayev's appeals for a new global security paradigm, the rule of law in international affairs, and an equitable global economic order position Kazakhstan as a normative agent – a middle power-seeking strategic subjectivity under conditions of emerging bipolarity. These speeches thus underscore a deliberate shift: from reactive diplomacy toward proactive narrative construction, seeking to entrench Kazakhstan's voice in shaping the evolving architecture of global governance.

This performative role of Kazakhstan as a middle power is further substantiated by President Tokayev's address at the VI Consultative Meeting and his strategic speech, *The Renaissance of Central Asia: Towards Sustainable Development and Prosperity* (2024). In both, Tokayev articulates a bold reconceptualization of Central Asia – not as a mere transit corridor or passive geopolitical periphery, but as a self-sustaining and strategically pivotal epicenter within the broader Eurasian transformation. His discursive framing of the region as a cohesive civilizational entity reflects Kazakhstan's ambition to reconstitute regional subjectivity through the language of unity, shared history, and synchronized development. This signals a transition from reactive regionalism toward proactive regional norm-setting, wherein Kazakhstan seeks to institutionalize cooperative sovereignty as a regional doctrine and operationalize multi-vector diplomacy at the intra-regional level.

By invoking the historical and civilizational integrity of Central Asia, Tokayev's discourse aligns seamlessly with Kazakhstan's broader critical-discursive strategy: the transformation of its inherited peripheral identity into a deliberate project of strategic centrality. The vision of a "Central Asian Five" functioning as a politically stable, economically integrated, and diplomatically

autonomous bloc represents a reframing of the region's geopolitical ontology. Rather than existing as an object of great power contestation, Central Asia is reimagined as a regional subject with agency, capable of articulating and implementing its own developmental agenda. Tokayev's emphasis on water-energy cooperation, shared infrastructure such as the Middle Corridor, and youth-driven innovation further reinforces this normative ambition, positioning the region not as a passive recipient of external agendas but as an originator of globally resonant initiatives.

In this context, Kazakhstan's multi-vector foreign policy transcends its conventional interpretation as a balancing mechanism among external powers. It emerges instead as a discursive and strategic project aimed at recalibrating the region's structural positioning in the international order. The conceptual and institutional articulation of Central Asia as a «center of gravity» serves as empirical evidence of Kazakhstan's effort to shift the narrative from one of marginal dependency to purposeful protagonism. This evolution reflects a form of discursive sovereignty – a soft power modality through which Kazakhstan advances a middle power identity grounded in norm advocacy, institutional entrepreneurship, and regional coalition-building [11]. Through this lens, Kazakhstan's global positioning strategy is not merely adaptive but generative, seeking to shape global and regional governance by exporting localized norms of cooperative resilience and multilateral inclusivity.

This discursive reorientation reflects a growing emphasis on soft power and diplomatic agency. Kazakhstan is not only adapting to external pressures but also shaping its surroundings by promoting norms of regional cooperation, institutional engagement, and strategic autonomy. The country's integration into China's Belt and Road Initiative, launched in Astana in 2013, alongside active participation in European and Middle Corridor infrastructure programs, demonstrates this approach. These initiatives are framed not as concessions to foreign powers, but as expressions of Kazakhstan's sovereign role as a connector between East and West.

Moreover, Kazakhstan's foreign policy discourse increasingly draws upon cultural and historical references to its Turkic and Central Asian identity. Engagement with the Organization of Turkic States and long-term programs such as "Vision 2040" allow Astana to construct an alternative geopolitical narrative that does not center Russia or China. Simultaneously, Kazakhstan promotes its international credentials by emphasizing its contributions to nuclear disarmament, religious tolerance, and conflict mediation – further projecting itself as a responsible and principled actor in global affairs.

These strategic narratives help legitimize Kazakhstan's multi-directional diplomacy both at home and abroad. By drawing on national history, regional identity, and international credibility, the country's leadership signals that its partnerships stem from sovereign agency rather than dependence. This carefully



constructed geopolitical narrative enables Kazakhstan to assert itself in a volatile and polarized world without provoking confrontation. It exemplifies the principles of critical geopolitics by demonstrating how discursive frameworks and historical memory can be mobilized to defend national sovereignty and expand diplomatic space.

The strategic balancing act between Russia and China continues to define Kazakhstan's foreign policy calculus. While Moscow retains a dominant role in the domains of military infrastructure and energy transit – particularly through its control over key pipelines and its influence via the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – Beijing has eclipsed it economically, emerging as Central Asia's foremost trade partner and infrastructure investor through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) [12]. Yet Kazakhstan's engagement with these powers is far from passive or binary. Rather than succumbing to dependency, Kazakhstan strategically navigates this dual influence through what can be termed «institutional multiplicity with embedded autonomy».

Kazakhstan's cooperation with China, particularly through the BRI and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), is guided by a conscious effort to localize benefits and mitigate asymmetries. Kazakhstan's leadership consistently emphasizes principles of transparency, mutual benefit, and domestic stakeholder involvement in BRI-linked projects, thereby asserting agency within structurally asymmetrical partnerships [13]. This discursive framing is not abstract – it is explicitly voiced in Tokayev's July 2024 interview with Xinhua, where he reaffirmed Kazakhstan's support for the BRI while underscoring the importance of local industrialization, trade diversification, and strategic transport development, including use of the Lianyungang port and Khorgos SEZ [14]. Tokayev's remarks highlight a deeper logic: Astana seeks not only to benefit from Chinese capital but also to embed its own development priorities within the BRI framework.

Furthermore, Tokayev's emphasis on the SCO as a platform for dialogue, ecological sustainability, and equitable security architecture – reiterated in his role as chair during the 2024 Astana Summit – reinforces Kazakhstan's strategic aim to steer multilateral institutions toward inclusive regionalism. By declaring 2024 the SCO Year of Ecology and launching high-level UN-SCO environmental initiatives, Tokayev advances a form of “eco-diplomacy” that simultaneously elevates Kazakhstan's regional status and deepens Sino-Kazakh cooperation on normative grounds.

This dual-track diplomacy – engaging both the infrastructural and ideational dimensions of China's presence – epitomizes Kazakhstan's strategic behavior as a middle power. Rather than passively accommodating external pressures, Astana operationalizes its multi-vector foreign policy to recalibrate power asymmetries, embedding its national priorities into initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In doing so, Kazakhstan transforms structurally uneven partnerships into arenas of negotiated agency, asserting its



role as a normative entrepreneur in an increasingly multipolar environment.

Concurrently, Kazakhstan's efforts to counterbalance Russian political and economic coercion are reflected in its diversification of strategic export corridors. The development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route and the deepening energy alliance with Azerbaijan signify more than infrastructural pragmatism – they represent a deliberate geopolitical maneuver to reduce dependency on Russian-controlled routes [15]. These infrastructural recalibrations signal a conscious effort to reposition Kazakhstan as a logistically autonomous and politically sovereign actor within Eurasia.

Taken together, these multidirectional engagements illustrate the strategic hedging behavior typical of middle powers. By balancing great power relations and maximizing policy flexibility, Kazakhstan reinforces its image as a regional convener and institutional innovator, rather than a passive periphery state. Its foreign policy architecture – underpinned by multi-vectorism – therefore becomes a dynamic instrument of discursive sovereignty, enabling Astana to shape the evolving norms and structures of Eurasian cooperation.

This strategic shift is further legitimized by domestic political sentiment. Public disillusionment with Russian-led security institutions, particularly following the CSTO's controversial intervention during Kazakhstan's January 2022 unrest, has catalyzed broader societal support for foreign policy diversification. In this context, Kazakhstan's diplomacy functions not as a rigid doctrinal framework but as an adaptive repertoire of geopolitical maneuvering – one that expands the country's decision-making space while mitigating the vulnerabilities of asymmetric entanglements.

## **Conclusion**

Kazakhstan's foreign policy trajectory should be understood as a sophisticated response to the evolving competitive-cooperative dynamic between China and Russia in Central Asia. While these two powers often present a united front in opposing Western hegemony, their interests in the region are increasingly differentiated – China is solidifying its economic dominance through the Belt and Road Initiative, whereas Russia clings to its traditional role as a security guarantor. However, this tacit “division of labor” is not immune to shifts. Beijing's expanding footprint is increasingly viewed as encroaching upon Russia's former hegemony, even as both continue to navigate their uneasy coexistence.

In this context, Kazakhstan has not remained a passive bystander. On the contrary, its diplomacy exemplifies what Cooley [16] and Collins describe as strategic balancing by regional elites. Kazakhstan's multi-vector foreign policy – first articulated in the 1990s to prevent overdependence on Russia – has evolved into a highly pragmatic and institutionalized model of international engagement. It enables Astana to maintain productive ties with all major powers while prioritizing national sovereignty and regional agency.

The aftermath of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine further validated this strategy. Rather than severing ties with Moscow, Kazakhstan diversified its external partnerships, intensifying cooperation with China, the EU, Turkey, and the United States. This pragmatic diplomacy reflects a broader regional shift in which Central Asian states assert themselves as active participants – rather than passive arenas – in shaping the strategic dynamics of a multipolar world.

Kazakhstan's leadership, particularly through President Tokayev's discursive framing – at the UN, in the 2024 Xinhua interview, and in his "Renaissance of Central Asia" speech – emphasizes the country's commitment to equal partnerships and regional ownership. By promoting intra-regional mechanisms like the "Central Asian Five" and resisting asymmetric dependency, Kazakhstan actively repositions itself as both a regional convener and a global norm.

In sum, Kazakhstan exemplifies middle-power diplomacy in practice. Through a combination of normative advocacy, infrastructural realignment, and calibrated engagement with great powers, it is not merely maneuvering within a multipolar world – it is helping shape the terms of that world's reconfiguration.

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## **КӨПВЕКТОРЛЫ САЯСАТ ГЕОСАЯСИ БҰЛТАРЫС ҚҰРАЛЫ РЕТІНДЕ: 2022 ЖЫЛДАН КЕЙІНГІ ҚАЗАҚСТАННЫҢ РЕСЕЙ ЖӘНЕ ҚЫТАЙМЕН ҚАТЫНАСЫНДАҒЫ СЫНДЫҚ ГЕОСАЯСИ БАҒЫТЫ**

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**Аннотация.** Бұл мақалада Ресейдің Украинадағы ауқымды әскери операциясы және Қытайдың Еуразия кеңістігіндегі белсенділігінің артуы аясында Қазақстанның сыртқы саяси стратегиясының өзгеруі қарастырылады. Жетекші әлемдік державалардың мүдделері тоғысқан

аймақта орналасқан Қазақстан көпвекторлы саясатын геосаяси бұлтарыс құралына айналдырды. Қазақстан ресейлік Ұжымдық қауіпсіздік туралы шарт ұйымы (ҰҚШҰ) шеңберіндегі одақтастық қатынастарды сақтай отырып, сондай-ақ, Қытаймен «Бір белдеу, бір жол» бастамасы аясындағы экономикалық ынтымақтастықты нығайта отырып, Батыс елдерімен де байланыстарын кеңейтуде.

Мақалада сындық геосаясат және дискурсивтік талдау әдістері (Г. О'Туатейл, Дж. Эгню және М. Мюллердің тұжырымдамалары негізінде) қолданылып, Қазақстанның геосаяси рөлінің перифериялық мемлекеттен аймақтық нормалар мен стандарттарды қалыптастырушы белсенді акторға өзгеру үдерісі зерделенеді. Ресми баяндамалар, стратегиялық құжаттар мен аймақтық саяси дискурстарға сапалық талдау жүргізу арқылы мемлекет басшылығының кеңістік туралы көзқарастары мен дипломатиялық ескертулері зерттеледі.

Мақалада Қазақстанның сыртқы саясаты сыртқы күш орталықтары арасындағы икемді теңгерімді сақтау жөніндегі прагматикалық көзқарасты ғана емес, сонымен қатар егемендікті сақтауға, асимметрияларды қайта қарауға және көпполярлы және бәсекеге қабілетті халықаралық тәртіпте субъективтілікті бекітуге бағытталған саналы дискурсивті тәжірибені білдіреді деп көрсетілген.

Президент Қасым-Жомарт Тоқаевтың соңғы баяндамаларына, әсіресе стратегиялық тұтастыққа негізделген және толыққанды Орталық Азия жөніндегі көзқарасына сүйене отырып, мақала Қазақстанның геосаяси субъектілігін қалпына келтіру және нығайтуға деген ұмтылысын ашады. Осылайша, зерттеу қазіргі жаһандық иерархия өзгеріс жағдайындағы «орташа державалардың» мінез-құлқын талдауға үлес қосып, Қазақстанның стратегиялық автономияға жету жолындағы сындарлы дипломатиялық теңгерімділігін көрсетеді.

**Тірек сөздер:** Қазақстан, сыртқы саясат, көпвекторлы дипломатия, сындық геосаясат, геосаяси маневр, стратегиялық автономия, орта державалардың мінез-құлқы, қауіпсіздік

## **МНОГОВЕКТОРНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА КАК СТРАТЕГИЯ ГЕОПОЛИТИЧЕСКОГО МАНЕВРИРОВАНИЯ: КРИТИЧЕСКАЯ ГЕОПОЛИТИКА КАЗАХСТАНА В ОТНОШЕНИЯХ С РОССИЕЙ И КИТАЕМ ПОСЛЕ 2022 ГОДА**

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**Аннотация.** В статье анализируется трансформация внешне-политической стратегии Казахстана в условиях после 2022 года, на фоне полномасштабной военной операции России в Украину и нарастающей активности Китая в Евразии. Географически расположенный на перекрестке



интересов ведущих мировых держав, Казахстан превратил многовекторную политику в инструмент стратегического геополитического маневрирования. Сохраняя формальные союзнические обязательства - в частности, в рамках Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности (ОДКБ) с Россией - Казахстан одновременно углубляет экономическое сотрудничество с Китаем через инициативу «Один пояс, один путь» и укрепляет связи с западными партнерами.

В статье используется теоретико-методологический подход критической геополитики и дискурсивного анализа (в частности, концепции Г. О'Туатейла, Дж. Эгню и М. Мюллера) для оценки того, как Казахстан переосмысляет и конструирует свою роль – от периферийного субъекта к региональному нормообразующему актору. На основе качественного анализа официальных речей, стратегических документов и региональных политических нарративов исследуются пространственные представления и дипломатические сигналы, транслируемые казахстанским руководством.

В работе утверждается, что внешняя политика Казахстана отражает не только прагматичную стратегию «хеджирования», но и осознанную дискурсивную практику, направленную на сохранение суверенитета, переосмысление асимметрий и утверждение субъектности в условиях многополярного и конкурентного международного порядка.

Анализируя последние выступления Президента Касым-Жомарта Токаева – в особенности его концепцию самодостаточной и стратегически консолидированной Центральной Азии — статья раскрывает, как Казахстан стремится восстановить и укрепить свою геополитическую субъектность. Тем самым исследование вносит вклад в изучение поведения «средних держав» в условиях меняющейся глобальной иерархии и акцентирует внимание на стремлении Казахстана к стратегической автономии через критически выверенное дипломатическое балансирование.

**Ключевые слова:** Казахстан, внешняя политика, многовекторная дипломатия, критическая геополитика, геополитическое маневрирование, стратегическая автономия, поведение средних держав, безопасность

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## **ANALYSIS OF BILATERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN ITALY AND KAZAKHSTAN: AN ENERGY PERSPECTIVE**

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**Abstract.** This scientific article provides critical assessment of bilateral relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Italian Republic. The time frame of the study covers the period from the establishment of official diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1992 and the development of relations to the present day. The main objective of this study is to identify the energy aspect of cooperation through the study of key documents concluded between Italy and Kazakhstan, as well as joint meetings, events and forums, also using the findings of various authors, including, C. Dario, and P. Sorbello. In addition, the study uses data from open government resources of Italy and Kazakhstan, reports and data from international organizations.

A special attention is given to the strategic interests of Italy in this cooperation and the development of its presence through Italian energy company ENI in the energy sector of Kazakhstan. In addition, the study examines Italy's goals to diversify its energy supply sources, as well as Kazakhstan's desire to attract foreign investment. In addition, key areas of energy cooperation, such as the supply of sources and the exchange of technological experience, are analyzed. The author concludes the article by highlighting the strategic complementarity of cooperation between Italy and Kazakhstan and the importance of bilateral partnership for ensuring energy security of both countries.

This article may be useful to specialists in the field of international relations research, especially those interested in energy security issues.

**Key words:** Italy, Kazakhstan, energy cooperation, energy security, oil and gas, renewable energy, ENI, multilateral diplomacy

### **Introduction**

Contemporary system of international relations is characterized by cooperation as a key aspect in maintaining stability and security. It is a process of interaction between actors of international relations – states, international organizations, and transnational corporations – where one of the main goals is to achieve mutual benefits. This includes the exchange of information, resources, technology, and joint efforts to solve countries' urgent issues.

One of these tasks is to ensure energy security – the need to meet humanity’s growing needs for energy resources taking into account the requirements for sustainable development, that is to say, without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs [1, p. 1]. At the same time, even minor interruptions of energy supply can lead to serious financial, economic and social losses [2, p. 113]. Considering the interdependence nature of the energy system [3], each country faces the need to develop its foreign policy for the successful cooperation in the energy sector taking into account current trends and challenges.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Kazakhstan has developed a certain course of political cooperation which is called a multi-vector foreign policy “based on developing friendly and predictable relations with all the geopolitical actors” [4, p. 83]. Being used in foreign policy and geopolitical relations, over time it began to cover various areas, notably the energy sector. As a result, this policy has become “of great importance for the country’s energy diversification” [5, p. 2]. Indeed, at present, it is a characteristic feature of Kazakhstan’s foreign energy policy, where the main task is balancing the interests of leading powers to obtain the greatest advantages.

Furthermore, Kazakhstan is a country rich in natural resources, mainly, oil, coal and gas. Notwithstanding this potential, the state has been actively advocating for economic diversification by developing the production of renewable energy resources, particularly, solar and wind, and, over the last years, aiming at constructing first nuclear power plant. Kazakhstan aims to ensure diversified supplies of essential raw materials to world markets to achieve global net-zero emissions goals [6]. Such energy profile reflects the country’s role as a key player in global energy market and a strategic partner for many countries.

As a result, leading actors show interest in the energy policy and strategy of Kazakhstan, including the European Union (EU), where, revealing multi-vector nature of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, Italy seems one of the most promising countries for an open energy dialogue. Here, cooperation in the energy sector represents an important aspect of relations between these two countries, since Italy and Kazakhstan have significant potential in this sector. This interaction reflects the desire of both states to develop sustainable and innovative approaches to the energy sector, which contributes to countries’ diversification and strengthening energy security.

## **Materials and Methods**

Methodologically, this study is based on the critical assessment of the available data and literature on Italian-Kazakh cooperation, giving a special attention to the key aspects of the cooperation in energy security. In the historical analysis of the development of relationships between these two countries, the author uses official documents and agreements, as well as research of significant publications of Kazakh and foreign experts on Italian-Kazakh relations. In

addition, the study uses data from government resources of Italy and Kazakhstan, reports and data from international and Kazakh open sources. The purpose of this scientific article is to assess the historical development of relations between Italy and Kazakhstan on bilateral level with a special attention on the energy aspect.

The main research question of this study is: Were the relations between Italy and Kazakhstan initially of the nature of cooperation in energy security or they were transformed taking into account modern trends in the transformation of diplomatic relations to strategically economic ones? Therefore, the research particularly focuses on tracing the energy issue in the sources used in this article.

## **Results**

Official diplomatic relations between Italy and Kazakhstan were established on August 21, 1992 with the signing of the “Agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Italy and the Republic of Kazakhstan”. Since then, the two countries have begun to take important steps in developing mutual cooperation. For the period of more than thirty years there were official visits, bilateral negotiations, and the organization of events and business forums.

An important year for the cooperation between these two countries was 1994 – the first official visit of Kazakhstan’s former President Nursultan Nazarbayev to Italy. At that time, a series of documents were signed, such as the “Joint Declaration on the Principles of Relations” and the “Joint Declaration on Economic Cooperation”. The main goals of these documents were to promote the development and facilitation of economic relations between Italy and Kazakhstan. Already at that time, Nazarbayev emphasized that these documents are of historical significance for the beginning of relations between the two countries and provide businessmen with a broader opportunity to work [7, p. 233]. In addition, two countries expressed a common interest in creating many platforms for the development of mutually beneficial cooperation.

Three years later, official visits to Almaty by the then President of the Italian Republic Oscar Luigi Scalfaro (May), and a few months later (September) by the then Chairman of the Council of Italy, Romani Prodi took place. This allowed the ratification of the “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” (1997). Kazakhstan and Italy agreed to assist each other in solving the technical aspects of industrial activities, giving attention to the energy sector, modernization of infrastructures and related communications. In addition to that, two states recognized the importance of the security and stability of the supply of electricity, oil, and natural gas for the development of economic cooperation and attracting potential investors, taking into account the norms and principles of the European Energy Charter Treaty, noting the research, use and transportation of hydrocarbons, gas and electricity [8].

Since then, followed a number of official meetings between the two parties. But it is with the signature of the “Treaty on Strategic Partnership” (2009) that Italy and Kazakhstan put the grounds for an extensive cooperation in the area of international security and economic partnership. A passage of such law states: “realizing that interaction of the two countries in the energy field is of strategic value for maintenance of energy security” [9]. In a few years, Italy became the main destination of crude petroleum export from Kazakhstan and, according to data of 2020, Italy imported Kazakh oil for an amount equal to 26% of the total exported rate [10].

A turning point was the year 2014, when the then Italian Prime Minister Renzi signed two agreements of cooperation with the then President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev. The first agreement sanctioned a cooperation between ENI and KazMunaiGas (KMG) in activities of offshore exploration of new oilfield in the Caspian Sea; the second agreement introduced mechanisms of cooperation in the industrial vehicle sector between Italian company Iveco and the Kazakh Ministry of Industry. In successive meetings, the two countries negotiated further bilateral agreements in the areas of infrastructural development, agricultural production and, once more, energy cooperation.

It is also noteworthy to mention the Expo context in this cooperation: from Expo Milan 2015 to Expo Astana 2017. In the context of Expo 2015, the two countries signed 25 trade agreements worth a total of 500 million dollars. The regime of cooperation seems promising because the Italian entrepreneurial system can offer an important contribution in terms of experience and technologies, while Kazakhstan has a richness in renewable energetic resources (included a growing export market for hydrogen) and rare-earth elements. As claimed by former Italian Ambassador Marco Alberti, “there are all the necessary conditions to scale up the Italy-Kazakh privileged relations on the traditional energy to a strategic partnership on the green energy domain” [11].

The institutional cooperation between the two countries was further strengthened with the bilateral organization of a business forum in Astana in 2019, another one online (due to Covid-19 pandemic) in 2021, Italian-Kazakhstan business forum in 2023, and Kazakh-Italian business and investment forum in 2024 in Milan. The last event was attended by more than 50 Kazakhstani enterprises from various sectors, with also from oilfield sector. Moreover, Kazakh Minister of Trade Arman Shakkaliyev emphasized the importance of Italy as one of Kazakhstan’s key trading partners in the European Union and in order to strengthen cooperation, Kazakhstan proposes to introduce the “Made with Italy” concept, which promotes products manufactured in joint ventures with the participation of Italian companies [12].

In January 2024, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev made an official trip to Rome. At the investment round table titled “Kazakhstan-Italy”, Tokayev explained to the Italian entrepreneurs the practical and legislative

measures that Kazakhstan plans to take to expand the influx of foreign direct investments into the country's economy. What is particularly important is that Tokayev also noted the energy sector as the main area of economic cooperation between these two countries [13]. During the visit, agreements were reached on investments in renewable energy, infrastructure and technology. This visit "marked a fundamental shift in relations between Kazakhstan and Italy, moving beyond traditional economic cooperation to a more diverse and strategically complex cooperation, in line with Kazakhstan's economic diversification plan and Italy's growing interest in Central Asia as a significant trade and investment centre" [14, p. 15]. Kazakhstan is interested in attracting investment and technology to increase production while reducing its impact on the environment, while one of Italy's strategic goals is to diversify its energy supplies. Thus, these mutually beneficial interests form a sustainable win-win platform based on energy, trade, and investment.

### **Discussion**

An interesting question of discussion is why, considering the whole post-Soviet arena, Italy is developing strict relations specifically with Kazakhstan. According to Dario Cristiani, three factors must be taken into consideration:

1. Italy is counting on Kazakhstan as a long-term reliable partner in the energetic sphere;
2. Italy has a dynamic foreign policy strategy in the Central Asian region and it has also built a noteworthy net of business relations with Russia;
3. There is the perception in Italy that Kazakhstan is a land of opportunities and it might provide a high profitable market for Italian exports [15].

In support of the last point, already during former Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev's visit to Rome in 1994, then Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi noted that these countries were created to complement each other: on the one hand, Kazakhstan is a country rich in natural resources, on the other hand, Italy is poor in natural resources, but rich in human resources [7, p. 233]. In other words, Kazakhstan and Italy have complementary advantages, which makes their cooperation particularly promising and fruitful.

As follows from this, Italy, with its high technology and experience in the energy sector, is actively involved in the development of energy projects in Kazakhstan. In 1992 ENI, Italian extracting company, entered into the Kazakh market to conduct activities of oil and gas fields exploration. According to Paolo Sorbello, "some of the oil and gas fields in the region were either underdeveloped or developed under low-tech industrial regimes, so the arrival of Italian companies, as well as other trans-national companies (TNCs), helped develop these fields" [16, p. 208]. Since then, Eni has been active in Kazakhstan, participating in the development of natural resource fields such as Karachaganak and in various renewable energy projects. Moreover, the company cooperates



with Kazakh partners such as KazMunayGas and Samruk-Kazyna in the field of energy transition and carbon reduction [17]. As a result, Italy, through its energy company Eni, since 90-s, is developing its presence in the Kazakhstan energy sector.

### **Conclusion**

The relationships between Italy and Kazakhstan demonstrates stable dynamics in fruitful cooperation in energy security. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992, Italy has gradually expanded its presence in Kazakhstan's energy sector. This is evidenced by the signing of interstate treaties and agreements such as the "Joint Declaration on the Principles of Relations", the "Joint Declaration on Economic Cooperation", "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" and "Treaty on Strategic Partnership", and the holding of various events, like from Expo Milan 2015 to Expo Astana 2017, and business forums, in Astana and Italy, where one way or another, the issue of energy cooperation always takes place.

In addition, Italy is considered as Kazakhstan's main European trading partner in 2024, after Russia and China [18] and Italian company like ENI already operates in the Kazakh energy market since several years. As a result, a mutually beneficial pattern is observed – on one side, Italian expertise in technology, innovation and infrastructure that could be constructively used to develop the use of renewable and enhance energy efficiency in Kazakhstan; on the other side, Kazakhstan has a significant reserve of that raw materials that can contribute to Italy's energy diversification. In another words, Italy remains a reliable European partner and investor, and Kazakhstan is a stable supplier of traditional energy resources.

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## АНАЛИЗ ДВУСТОРОННЕГО СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВА МЕЖДУ ИТАЛИЕЙ И КАЗАХСТАНОМ: ЭНЕРГЕТИЧЕСКАЯ ПЕРСПЕКТИВА

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**Аннотация.** В данной научной статье автор дает критическую оценку двусторонних отношений между Республикой Казахстан и Итальянской Республикой. Временные рамки исследования охватывают период с момента установления дипломатических отношений между этими двумя странами в 1992 году, их дальнейшее развитие и современное состояние этих отношений. Основной целью данного исследования, является определение энергетического аспекта сотрудничества посредством изучения ключевых документов, заключенных между Италией и Казахстаном, а также совместных встреч, мероприятий и форумов, в том числе с использованием работ авторов, занимающихся исследованием данной темы, среди которых, следует отметить С. Dario, and P. Sorbello. Кроме того, в этом исследовании используются данные из открытых государственных ресурсов Италии и Казахстана, отчеты и данные международных организаций.

Особое внимание уделяется стратегическим интересам Итальянской Республики в этом сотрудничестве и развитию ее присутствия через итальянскую энергетическую компанию «ENI» в энергетическом секторе Казахстана. Кроме того, в исследовании рассматриваются цели Италии по диверсификации источников поставок энергоносителей, а также стремление Казахстана привлекать иностранные инвестиции. В дополнении к этому, автором анализируются ключевые направления энергетического сотрудничества, такие как поставка источников энергии и обмен технологическим опытом. В конце проведенного исследования, автор подчеркивает стратегическую взаимодополняемость сотрудничества Италии и Казахстана и важность двустороннего партнерства для обеспечения энергетической безопасности обеих стран.

Данная статья может быть полезна специалистам в области исследования международных отношений, особенно тем, кто интересуется вопросами энергетической безопасности.

**Ключевые слова:** Италия, Республика Казахстан, энергетическое сотрудничество, энергетическая безопасность, нефть и газ, возобновляемые источники энергии, Государственное управление по углеводородам, многосторонняя дипломатия

## **ИТАЛИЯ МЕН ҚАЗАҚСТАН АРАСЫНДАҒЫ ЕКІЖАҚТЫ ЫНТЫМАҚТАСТЫҚТЫ ТАЛДАУ: ЭНЕРГЕТИКАЛЫҚ ПЕРСПЕКТИВА**

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**Аңдатпа.** Осы ғылыми мақалада автор Қазақстан Республикасы мен Италия Республикасы арасындағы екіжақты қатынастарға сыни баға береді. Зерттеудің уақыт шеңбері 1992 жылы осы екі ел арасында дипломатиялық қатынастар орнатылған сәттен бастап кезеңді, олардың одан әрі дамуы мен осы қатынастардың қазіргі жай-күйін қамтиды. Аталған зерттеудің негізгі мақсаты Италия мен Қазақстан арасында жасалған негізгі құжаттарды, сондай-ақ бірлескен кездесулерді, іс-шаралар мен форумдарды, оның ішінде осы тақырыпты зерттеумен айналысатын авторлардың жұмыстарын пайдалана отырып, ынтымақтастықтың энергетикалық аспектісін анықтау болып табылады, олардың арасында С. Dario мен Р. sorbello атап өткен жөн. Бұдан басқа, бұл зерттеуде Италия мен Қазақстанның ашық мемлекеттік ресурстарының деректері, халықаралық ұйымдардың есептері мен деректері пайдаланылады.

Осы ынтымақтастықта Италия Республикасының стратегиялық мүдделеріне және оның Қазақстанның энергетикалық секторында «ENI» итальяндық энергетикалық компаниясы арқылы қатысуын дамытуға ерекше назар аударылады. Бұдан басқа, зерттеуде Италияның энергия көздерін әртараптандыру жөніндегі мақсаттары, сондай-ақ Қазақстанның шетелдік инвестицияларды тартуға ұмтылуы қаралады. Бұған қосымша, автор энергия көздерін жеткізу және технологиялық тәжірибе алмасу сияқты энергетикалық ынтымақтастықтың негізгі бағыттарын талдайды. Жүргізілген зерттеу соңында автор Италия мен Қазақстан ынтымақтастығының стратегиялық өзара толықтырушылығын және екі елдің энергетикалық қауіпсіздігін қамтамасыз ету үшін екіжақты серіктестіктің маңыздылығын атап өтті.

Бұл аңдатпа халықаралық қатынастарды зерттеу саласындағы мамандарға, әсіресе энергетикалық қауіпсіздік мәселелеріне қызығушылық танытқандарға пайдалы болуы мүмкін.

**Тірек сөздер:** Италия, Қазақстан, энергетикалық ынтымақтастық, энергетикалық қауіпсіздік, мұнай және газ, жаңартылатын энергия, Көмірсутектер жөніндегі мемлекеттік әкімшілік, көпжақты дипломатия

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## **THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL TRENDS AND NATIONAL FEATURES**

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**Abstract.** This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolutionary processes of political systems in the context of modern global trends, considering the national specifics of various government entities. Based on the application of the comparative method of analysis of democratic, authoritarian and hybrid regimes, the main trajectories of institutional adaptation and mechanisms ensuring the stability of political systems in the face of global challenges are identified. A special emphasis in the study is placed on the dialectical interaction between global imperatives and local socio-cultural contexts that determine the unique vectors of development of national political systems. As a result of the conducted research, the determinants that have a stimulating or inhibitory effect on the effectiveness of the evolutionary processes of political systems in the context of global challenges of the XXI century have been identified. The revealed patterns make it possible to predict potential scenarios for the further evolution of political systems, considering the intensification of global processes. The results of the study make a significant contribution to the development of the theory of political institutions and comparative political science. An in-depth analysis of the correlation between the specifics of political culture and the effectiveness of institutional adaptations to global challenges seems to be a promising area for further research.

**Key words:** political systems, global trends, national peculiarities, institutional adaptation, hybrid regimes, digital transformation, state stability, evolution of institutions

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### **Introduction**

The modern architecture of international relations is characterized by an unprecedented level of interconnectedness and dynamism, which inevitably affects the transformation of the political systems of individual States. Globalization processes, the digital revolution, climate change, demographic shifts and the redistribution of economic power are forming a new reality in which traditional



ideas about the functioning and evolution of political institutions require significant rethinking. The political systems of different countries are forced to adapt to global trends, while preserving national specifics and responding to the internal demands of societies.

At the beginning of the third decade of the XXI century, we are witnessing fundamental changes in the nature of the interaction between global and national levels of political development. The crisis of the liberal world order, the intensification of geopolitical competition between the great Powers, and the growing uncertainty in international relations create a new context for the evolution of political systems. At the same time, nation-states remain key actors whose institutional, cultural, and historical features largely determine the trajectories of transformation of political regimes.

The relevance of studying the evolution of political systems through the prism of the interaction of global trends and national characteristics is due to several factors. First, there is the need to overcome the methodological limitations of the traditional comparative approach, which often underestimates the role of the international context in political development. Secondly, there is a need for a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of adaptation of political institutions to the cross-border challenges of our time. Thirdly, the practical importance of developing analytical tools for predicting the trajectories of political transformation in conditions of high uncertainty.

The theoretical and methodological basis of the research is a synthesis of the neo-institutional approach, the concept of multilevel management and the theory of complex adaptive systems. This allows us to consider political systems as dynamic institutional complexes that evolve under the influence of multiple internal and external factors. Special attention is paid to the processes of institutional isomorphism, diffusion of political practices and localization of global norms in national contexts.

The empirical basis of the study consists of data on the transformation of political systems in the period 2000-2023 in states representing different regions and types of political regimes. The work uses a mixed methodology that combines a quantitative analysis of the indices of democracy, quality of public administration and political stability with a qualitative analysis of specific cases of institutional change.

The scientific novelty of the proposed research lies in the study of an integrative model of the evolution of political systems, which considers the multilevel nature of political processes in the modern world and overcomes the limitations of methodological nationalism. The practical significance of the work is determined by the possibility of using its results to analyze and predict the trajectories of political development in the context of growing global interdependence and uncertainty.

## **Materials and methods**

In modern studies of the evolution of political systems, the neo-institutional paradigm plays a significant role, considering institutions as a key factor in political development. The work of D. North et al. [1] remains fundamental in this context, presenting the concept of «limited and open access orders» as a model for understanding the long-term evolution of political systems. Developing this approach, D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson [2] in their work «The Narrow Corridor» explore the balance between state power and public control as a key condition for successful political development.

Significant contributions to institutional theory have been made by the works of J. Mahoney and K. Thelen [3], who proposed a model of «gradual institutional change» that helps explain the evolution of political systems through the accumulation of incremental transformations. This model is particularly relevant for analyzing complex interactions between global trends and national institutions. As part of the study of «varying capitalisms», P. Hall and R. Taylor [4] develop an understanding of how national political and economic systems respond differently to global challenges. Their analysis demonstrates that the trajectories of institutional evolution are determined not only by external factors, but also by the internal logic of institutional complexes.

The transformation of state sovereignty in the context of globalization has been the subject of numerous studies. A. Slaughter [5], in his work *The New World Order*, analyzes the emergence of transnational governance networks and their impact on traditional political systems. R. Keohane and J. Nye [6] develop the concept of «complex interdependence», demonstrating how global connections transform the space for national policy. An important area of research is represented by works focusing on the «hybridization» of global governance. Thus, M. Barnett and M. Finnemore [7] analyze the role of international organizations in the transformation of national political systems, emphasizing their autonomous influence as bureaucratic structures. J. Rennstich [8] investigate the phenomenon of «vertical fragmentation of power», in which decision-making powers are distributed between subnational, national and supranational levels.

A critical approach to global governance is presented in the works of B. Buzan and O. Wever [9], who develop the theory of «regional security complexes», which allows analyzing how global trends are refracted through the prism of regional features. In turn, A. Hurrell [10] explores the normative aspects of the global order, emphasizing the importance of cultural and civilizational diversity in shaping international norms. The methodology of comparative historical analysis remains one of the key approaches to studying the evolution of political systems. D. Collier and J. Mahoney [11] analyze the advantages and limitations of comparative historical research methods, including critical junctures and path dependence.

G. Capoccia and R. Kelemen [12] are developing a methodology for analyzing «critical moments» that allows them to identify periods when structural constraints weaken and opportunities for fundamental institutional changes open. This approach is particularly relevant for understanding how global crises (the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2008 financial crisis) affect the trajectories of political development. Digital transformation has become one of the key factors in the evolution of political systems in the XXI century. P. Lorenz-Spreen and L. Oswald [13] fundamental research analyzes the impact of digital technologies on democratic institutions, identifying both new opportunities for political participation and the risks of manipulation and polarization. Developing this analysis, Sena Eksi [14] focuses on the phenomenon of «digital populism» and its impact on the transformation of traditional political systems.

The literature review demonstrates the diversity of theoretical approaches and empirical research on the evolution of political systems in the context of global trends and national characteristics. An in-depth analysis of the interaction between global, regional and local levels of political processes, as well as the study of institutional innovation mechanisms in various national contexts, seems to be a promising area for further research. Special attention should be paid to the problem of the stability of political systems in the context of multiple crises and uncertainty that characterize the modern era.

The study of the evolution of political systems in the context of global trends and national peculiarities is based on a comprehensive methodological approach combining quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis. The methodological basis of the work is a neo-institutional approach that allows us to consider political systems as a set of formal and informal institutions that interact dynamically.

Within the framework of this study, a comparative analysis was used aimed at identifying common patterns and national characteristics of political evolution in various regions of the world. The comparative analysis covered the main types of political regimes according to the classification of the V-Dem Institute [15]. The countries were grouped according to the regional principle and typological characteristics of political systems, which made it possible to identify both universal trends and specific trajectories of political transformation.

To assess the dynamics of democratic processes, The Freedom House [16] and The Economist Intelligence Unit [17] democracy indices for the period 2010-2024 were used, which provided triangulation of the data and increased reliability of the results. Statistical analysis of quantitative indicators was carried out using regression analysis to identify correlations between various factors of political development.

The system analysis made it possible to integrate the data obtained by various methods and form a holistic view of the multifactorial process of the evolution of political systems. The application of the principle of methodological

triangulation has increased the reliability and validity of research results.

The time range of the study was from 2010 to 2024, which made it possible to trace the dynamics of changes in political systems over a significant historical interval, including several global economic and political crises that had a significant impact on the trajectories of political development.

## **Results and Discussion**

The study of comparative processes of adaptation of political systems to modern global challenges demonstrates significant variability due to the uniqueness of national contexts. The results of the comprehensive analysis indicate the existence of several distinct patterns of institutional adaptation that manifest themselves in different regions of the world. The East Asian model of «adaptive democracy», the Eastern European «illiberal democracy» and the multidirectional transformations in the Middle East and North Africa are the most illustrative examples of the variability of political transformation processes. This article presents a systematic analysis of the factors determining the trajectories of political transformation in the context of the global challenges of the XXI century.

East Asian countries, particularly Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, demonstrate successful integration of traditional values and liberal democratic institutions, creating a model of «adaptive democracy» [18]. This model has shown significant resilience in the face of large-scale economic shocks and the COVID-19 pandemic, while maintaining basic institutional stability. The East Asian experience shows the possibility of a harmonious combination of cultural specifics with universal democratic procedures, provided they are interpreted adaptively. The key factor in the success of this model is not the mechanical borrowing of Western institutions, but their creative adaptation to local conditions while maintaining functional efficiency.

Political evolution in Eastern European countries follows a different trajectory, characterized by the development of the phenomenon of «illiberal democracy» [19]. This model is characterized by a gradual weakening of the system of checks and balances while formally maintaining basic electoral procedures. The study shows signs of institutional erosion in the long term, despite the appearance of short-term political stability in a few Eastern European states. The transformation processes in this region reflect the complex dynamics of the interaction between the democratic expectations of society and the traditional paternalistic attitudes of political elites.

Of particular interest is the analysis of models of political transformation in the Middle East and North Africa after the events of the Arab Spring. Our research has identified three different development scenarios:

- return to authoritarianism in a modified form (Egypt);
- protracted internal conflict with elements of fragmentation of statehood (Syria, Libya);
- gradual institutionalization of democratic practices (Tunisia).

A comparative analysis of these scenarios shows that the presence of civil society traditions is a critical factor in successful democratization, which confirms the fundamental thesis of D. Putnam [20] on the importance of social capital for successful political transformations.

Table 1 – Comparative table of the evolution of political systems

| <b>Comparison criterion</b>                                     | <b>Liberal democracy</b>  | <b>Authoritarian regimes</b>   | <b>Hybrid regimes</b>   |
|---|---|--|---|
| <b>Characteristic features</b>                                  | Separation of powers, rule of law, regular free elections   | Concentration of power, limited civil liberties, control over the media            | Combining democratic institutions with authoritarian practices  |
| <b>Attitudes towards globalization</b>                          | Promoting integration, openness of markets, and international institutions                                  | Electoral participation, protection of sovereignty, control over information flows | A pragmatic approach, a combination of inclusiveness and protection of national interests                 |
| <b>Mechanisms of legitimization</b>                             | Elections, public opinion, economic efficiency  | Economic growth, national security, traditional values                             | Limited popular participation, economic development, stability  |
| <b>Regional features</b>  | They are most stable in Western Europe and Anglo-Saxon countries.   | Different forms in Asia, the Middle East, and selected African countries           | They are distributed in the post-Soviet space, Latin America, and parts of Africa.                        |
| <b>Modern challenges</b>  | Populism, polarization, inequality, crisis of representation  | Economic efficiency, internal stability, international legitimacy                  | Balancing the demands of development and maintaining power  |
| <b>Development trends</b>                                       | Transformation under the influence of new challenges, the search for a balance between security and freedom | Technological modernization while maintaining political control                    | Evolution towards greater openness or strengthening of authoritarian tendencies, depending on the context |
| Source: compiled by the authors based on data from [15, 16, 17] |   |  |   |

The conducted research revealed the complex nature of the interaction of endogenous and exogenous factors in the evolution of political systems. Contrary to popular beliefs about the defining role of globalization, the results show that the effectiveness of the implementation of borrowed political institutions and practices significantly depends on their compatibility with local socio-cultural norms and traditions. According to the concept of D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson [2], «successful adaptation of political institutions occurs only with their inclusive transformation, taking into account the local context».

Our analysis of political reforms in various regions of the world confirms this hypothesis, demonstrating that successful reforms were 76% more likely to occur with the active participation of local actors in adapting international models. This

conclusion is of fundamental importance for the formation of effective strategies to support democratization at the international level, as it indicates the limitations of approaches based on the mechanical transfer of institutional models without considering local specifics. The processes of political transformation demonstrate a high degree of contextual conditioning, requiring a fine understanding of local socio-cultural dynamics [16].

The results of the study also indicate the importance of the mechanisms of «regional diffusion» of political practices [21]. Countries in the same region with similar historical and cultural heritage show a marked tendency to borrow political innovations from each other. This model of «horizontal learning» turns out to be much more effective than the vertical imposition of models from traditional centers of global power. The phenomenon of regional diffusion requires a rethinking of classical ideas about the mechanisms of spreading democracy and demonstrates the importance of regional leaders as catalysts for political change.

A comparative analysis of the processes of political transformation in the countries of the «third wave of democratization» demonstrates significant differences in the effectiveness of horizontal and vertical institutional transfer mechanisms. The study confirms Weyland's thesis [21] on the priority of regional models of the diffusion of democratic practices in comparison with the direct impact of global actors. The experience of successful democratization in Latin America and East Asia testifies to the importance of the regional context as a mediator of global trends in political development.

An analysis of institutional transformations in East Asia shows that traditional Confucian values, when creatively reinterpreted, can act not as an obstacle, but as a resource for building effective democratic institutions. The experience of Japan and South Korea demonstrates the possibility of integrating collectivist values with the principles of the rule of law, which creates a unique model of «communitarian democracy» [22]. This model is characterized by a high degree of social cohesion while maintaining basic democratic procedures and citizens' rights.

In the context of global crises, different types of political regimes demonstrate different adaptive capacity. A comparative analysis of responses to the COVID-19 pandemic reveals that the effectiveness of anti-crisis measures is determined not so much by the formal type of political regime, but rather by the quality of public administration, the level of public trust, and the flexibility of the institutional structure [23]. Successful responses to the pandemic crisis have been observed in both liberal democracies (Taiwan, New Zealand) and authoritarian regimes (Singapore, Vietnam), which requires a more nuanced approach to assessing the benefits of different political models.

The analysis of the processes of political transformation in the post-Soviet space demonstrates a high degree of variability of development trajectories with common initial conditions. A comparison of the experiences of the Baltic States,



Central Asia, and the South Caucasus reveals the key role of the historical legacy of the pre-Soviet period, ethnocultural homogeneity, and proximity to alternative centers of influence in determining the nature of political evolution [24]. This comparative analysis confirms the importance of long-term historical factors in shaping modern political trajectories.

The phenomenon of the «democratic recession» [25], observed globally in the last decade, requires a rethinking of classical ideas about the linearity and irreversibility of democratization processes. Our analysis shows that successful consolidation of democracy is possible only with the formation of a broad public consensus on the basic rules of the political game that goes beyond elite pacts. The experience of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe demonstrates that the formal implementation of democratic procedures without a corresponding transformation of political culture creates risks of authoritarian rollback in the long term.

A comparative analysis of the processes of political transformation in Latin American countries reveals the phenomenon of «cyclical democratization», characterized by alternating periods of democratic development and authoritarian reaction. This cyclical pattern is associated with the unresolved fundamental problems of social inequality and economic dependence [26]. The Latin American experience shows the need for an integrated approach to democratization that considers not only the political, but also the socio-economic aspects of transformation.

Democratic transits in countries with a dominant role of informal institutions face the problem of «infiltration» of formal democratic procedures by informal patron-client relations practices. An analysis of the experience of democratization in South and Southeast Asia shows that formal electoral democracy can coexist with stable systems of clientelism and nepotism [27]. This phenomenon requires a rethinking of classical ideas about democratization as a process of formal institutionalization and emphasizes the need to consider the cultural and social contexts of the functioning of democratic institutions.

A comparative analysis of the processes of political transformation in the Islamic world reveals significant differences in development trajectories depending on historical heritage, ethnocultural homogeneity and peculiarities of interpretation of religious norms. Contrary to the thesis of the incompatibility of Islam with democracy, the study shows that Muslim societies exhibit a significant variety of political trajectories, including both authoritarian and democratic development options [28]. The experience of Indonesia, Malaysia and Tunisia demonstrates the possibility of adapting democratic institutions to the Islamic socio-cultural context, provided they are interpreted creatively.

The phenomenon of «color revolutions» in the post-Soviet space and in the Middle East is a specific form of political mobilization in hybrid regimes, characterized by a combination of mass protest with an intra-elite split. The

analysis shows that the success of the «color revolutions» as a mechanism of democratization significantly depends on the presence of a consolidated opposition, autonomous economic resources and a favorable international context [29]. The experience of post-revolutionary development in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan demonstrates the complexity of institutional transformation processes after regime change and the risks of authoritarian rollback in the absence of deep structural reforms.

The study of the role of the military in the processes of political transformation reveals the ambiguous nature of their influence on the trajectory of democratization. On the one hand, military institutions are traditionally viewed as a conservative force opposing democratic reforms, on the other hand, in certain historical contexts, the military can act as a modernization elite and a catalyst for democratic transformation [30]. The experience of Turkey, South Korea and Brazil demonstrates the complex evolution of the role of the military in the processes of modernization and democratization.

The results of the study show that the evolution of political systems in the modern world is influenced by two contradictory trends: globalization and the desire to preserve national identity. The analysis demonstrates that successful political transformations consider both global democratic standards and the historically established institutional features of specific societies. An important factor determining the stability of a political system is its ability to adapt global governance practices to local socio-cultural conditions without losing legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. The study confirms that attempts to mechanically transfer political models without considering the national context often led to institutional failures and increased social tension. Empirical evidence suggests the formation of hybrid political systems combining elements of different regimes, reflecting the global trend towards institutional convergence while preserving cultural diversity.

### **Conclusion**

The evolution of political systems in the modern world demonstrates the complex interaction of global trends and national characteristics, forming unique trajectories of political development of various states. The universal trends of democratization, digitalization and globalization are reflected through the prism of historical experience, cultural traditions and socio-economic conditions of specific countries, which leads to the formation of hybrid political models. Contrary to early predictions about the convergence of political systems within the framework of the liberal democratic paradigm, we are witnessing a steady diversity of political regimes adapting global institutional patterns to the national context.

Modern States are forced to seek a balance between the demands of international integration and the preservation of national sovereignty, which is

reflected in the specifics of the transformation of their political institutions. The crisis of traditional models of representative democracy is stimulating the search for new forms of civic participation and responsible governance, including the development of e-democracy institutions and deliberative practices.

Digitalization of political processes transforms the mechanisms of legitimization of power, communication between the state and society, creating both new opportunities for democratization and the risks of technological authoritarianism. The rise of populism and radical ideologies reflects a crisis of trust in traditional political elites and institutions, requiring a rethink of models of political representation. The success of political development is increasingly determined by the ability of States to adapt their institutions to the challenges of climate change, technological revolution and demographic transformations while maintaining social stability.

National models of political modernization demonstrate various combinations of traditional and innovative elements, while those systems that can organically integrate global practices into the national context turn out to be the most stable. The increasing interdependence of States in the context of global challenges requires the development of multi-level management systems, including supranational, national and subnational institutions. The future of political systems is linked to their ability to ensure not only effective governance and economic development, but also social justice, environmental sustainability and the protection of human rights in the face of increasing uncertainty of global development. Thus, the evolution of political systems is a continuous process of adaptation and innovation, in which those models that can harmoniously combine universal principles of effective governance with unique national traditions and values are successful.

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## **ЖАҒАНДЫҚ ТРЕНДТЕР МЕН ҰЛТТЫҚ ЕРЕКШЕЛІКТЕР КОНТЕКСТІНДЕГІ САЯСИ ЖҮЙЕЛЕРДІҢ ЭВОЛЮЦИЯСЫ**

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**Аңдатпа.** Бұл мақалада әртүрлі мемлекеттік құрылымдардың ұлттық ерекшеліктерін ескере отырып, қазіргі заманғы жаһандық трендтер контекстіндегі саяси жүйелердің эволюциялық процестеріне кешенді талдау жасалды. Демократиялық, авторитарлық және гибриді режимдерді талдаудың компаративистік әдісін қолдану негізінде институционалдық бейімделудің негізгі траекториялары мен жаһандық сын-қатерлер жағдайында саяси жүйелердің тұрақтылығын қамтамасыз ететін тетіктер анықталды. Зерттеуде ұлттық саяси жүйелердің дамуының бірегей векторларын анықтайтын жаһандық императивтер мен жергілікті әлеуметтік-мәдени контексттер арасындағы диалектикалық өзара әрекеттесуге ерекше назар аударылады. Зерттеу нәтижесінде ХХІ ғасырдың жаһандық сын-қатерлері жағдайында саяси жүйелердің эволюциялық процестерінің тиімділігіне ынталандырушы немесе тежеуші әсер ететін детерминанттар анықталды. Анықталған заңдылықтар жаһандық процестердің қарқындылығын ескере отырып, саяси жүйелердің одан әрі эволюциясының ықтимал сценарийлерін болжауға мүмкіндік береді. Зерттеу нәтижелері саяси институттар теориясы мен салыстырмалы саясаттанудың дамуына айтарлықтай үлес қосады. Әрі қарайғы зерттеулердің перспективалық бағыты саяси мәдениеттің ерекшелігі мен жаһандық сын-қатерлерге институционалдық бейімделудің тиімділігі арасындағы өзара байланысты терең талдау болып табылады.

**Тірек сөздер:** саяси жүйелер, жаһандық трендтер, ұлттық ерекшеліктер, институционалдық бейімделу, гибриді режимдер, цифрлық трансформация, мемлекеттік тұрақтылық, институттар эволюциясы

**Қаржыландыру:** Мақала Қазақстан Республикасы Ғылым және жоғары білім министрлігі Ғылым комитетінің бағдарламалық-мақсатты қаржыландыру шеңберінде дайындалған (BR27195711 «Қазақстандағы әлеуметтік-саяси процестер (1980-2020): демократияландыру тәжірибесі және Әділетті мемлекеттің қалыптасуы»).

## **ЭВОЛЮЦИЯ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ СИСТЕМ В КОНТЕКСТЕ ГЛОБАЛЬНЫХ ТРЕНДОВ И НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫХ ОСОБЕННОСТЕЙ**

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**Аннотация.** В данной статье осуществлен комплексный анализ эволюционных процессов политических систем в контексте современных глобальных трендов с учетом национальной специфики различных государственных образований. На основе применения компаративистского метода анализа демократических, авторитарных и гибридных режимов идентифицированы основные траектории институциональной адаптации и механизмы, обеспечивающие устойчивость политических систем в условиях глобальных вызовов. Особый акцент в исследовании сделан на диалектическом взаимодействии между глобальными императивами и локальными социокультурными контекстами, детерминирующими уникальные векторы развития национальных политических систем. В результате проведенного исследования выявлены детерминанты, оказывающие стимулирующее либо ингибирующее воздействие на эффективность эволюционных процессов политических систем в условиях глобальных вызовов XXI столетия. Выявленные закономерности позволяют прогнозировать потенциальные сценарии дальнейшей эволюции политических систем с учетом интенсификации глобальных процессов. Результаты исследования вносят существенный вклад в развитие теории политических институтов и сравнительной политологии. Перспективным направлением дальнейших исследований представляется углубленный анализ корреляции между спецификой политической культуры и эффективностью институциональных адаптаций к глобальным вызовам.

**Ключевые слова:** политические системы, глобальные тренды, национальные особенности, институциональная адаптация, гибридные режимы, цифровая трансформация, государственная устойчивость, эволюция институтов



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III. БӨЛІМ. АЙМАҚТАНУ  
РАЗДЕЛ III. РЕГИОНОВЕДЕНИЕ  
PART III. REGIONAL STUDIES

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**TURKEY'S MILITARY AND POLITICAL COOPERATION  
WITH CENTRAL ASIAN STATES**

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**Abstract.** In the framework of multipolarity, the paper analyzes Turkey's political and military collaboration with Central Asian nations as a crucial component of contemporary regional security and the establishment of new centers of influence. The growing rivalry between global and regional countries over vital locations in Central Asia determines the topic's importance, making the examination of Turkish foreign policy action especially pertinent. The study's goal is to pinpoint the main trends, contributing elements, and outcomes of Turkey's expanding relations with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan.

The analysis of official papers, agreements, joint defense projects, arms transfer statistics, and military training programs in Turkish academies for the years 2020–2025 served as the basis for this work. The provision of Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles, joint production projects for armored vehicles and communication system modernization, the creation of a UAV operator training center, and Turkey's role in institutionalizing military-political interaction within the Organization of Turkic States are just a few of the topics covered in the article.

The study's findings demonstrate that Turkey is effectively utilizing both the ideological components of Turkic unity and the practical interests of Central Asian nations in modernizing its military. Potential hazards are also noted, including the necessity to maintain a strategic balance, the complexity of ties with other external actors in the region, and technological dependency on Turkey. In summary, it is emphasized that in order to advance military-political cooperation, Central Asian nations must actively handle new issues and take the shifting global environment into consideration.

**Key words:** Turkey, Central Asia, political-military cooperation, Bayraktar TB2, Organisation of Turkic States, regional security, international relations, defence industry

## **Introduction**

High levels of volatility, escalating competition for influence in strategically significant parts of the world, and the expanding involvement of middle powers are characteristics of contemporary international relations. Due to its advantageous geographic location and abundant natural resources, Central Asia is increasingly becoming a battleground for major regional and international players. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the strengthening of Turkey's military and political ties with Central Asian nations, which has recently taken on new forms and become more institutionalized.

Analysis of new forms of Turkey's foreign policy activity, identification of mechanisms and factors for strengthening its relationship with the Turkic-speaking states of the region, and evaluation of the effects of these processes on regional security and the international system at large are necessary conditions for the topic's relevance. In light of the evolving global political landscape, this study aims to pinpoint the unique characteristics, contributing elements, and future potential of Turkey's military-political cooperation with Central Asia. The study's subject is the manifestations, processes, and outcomes of Turkey's military-political ties with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan.

## **Materials and methods**

The study's methodology is based on the international relations theories of regionalism, constructivism, and political realism. The study's analysis of political and defense processes is founded on the ideas of comprehensiveness and interdisciplinarity. The study looks at specific instances of military-political interaction using the case study approach, comparative analysis, systemic and structural analysis, and content analysis of official documents.

The study's empirical foundation consists of publications in peer-reviewed scientific journals, materials from the Organization of Turkic States, analytical reports from international research centers, and official documents from the ministries of foreign affairs and defense of Turkey and Central Asian nations. The study's 2020–2025 timeframe allows for consideration of current international relations trends as well as the dynamics of regional processes.

## **Results**

The analysis has demonstrated that Turkey's political and military cooperation with Central Asian nations is evolving along a number of important axes, representing Ankara's cultural and identity ambitions as well as pragmatic interests.

The institutionalization of interaction within the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) framework is one of the key components. The creation of the Turkic Military Committee, defense minister meetings, and the creation of cooperative

security projects have all contributed to the recent escalation in defense-related activity. Within the OTS, combating cyber threats, transnational crime, and terrorism has taken center stage, indicating Turkey's and the states' aim to develop a coordinated security strategy.

In bilateral ties, military-technical cooperation plays a significant role. Modern weapons, particularly the Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles, which are effectively employed in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan's defense systems, are being actively supplied by Turkey to Central Asian nations. Promising possibilities also include cooperative projects on modernizing communication and troop control systems and producing light armored vehicles. The region's nations are more reliant on Turkish technology as a result of Turkey's provision of maintenance services, expert training, and infrastructure development in addition to equipment delivery.

Regular joint exercises help to test operational cooperation mechanisms between the armed forces in a real-world setting. Along with other bilateral maneuvers, the TurAz Qartalı exercises between Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan help to improve military compatibility, share current battle expertise, and foster trust among military leaders.

In Turkey, military training is highly valued. Central Asian nations are able to train officers with contemporary standards of warfare and defense organization thanks to the allocation of quotas for training at Turkish military colleges. Short-term training in demining, information security, and counterterrorism is a crucial component that satisfies the regional countries' demands for the development of pertinent competencies.

Promoting the concepts of Turkic peoples' solidarity internationally is one way that Turkey engages in political and diplomatic activities. Central Asian nations' foreign policy endeavors are actively coordinated by Ankara, which also supports their actions at the UN, OIC, and other international organizations. Turkey presents itself as a protector of the region's nations' independence and sovereignty, which is crucial given the escalating rivalry for influence in Central Asia between China, Russia, and the West.

## **Discussion**

Ankara's comprehensive strategy, which harmoniously integrates elements of both hard and soft power, underpins the steady expansion of Turkey's military and political cooperation with the Central Asian republics [1]. By employing a combination of economic incentives, military-technical collaboration, and appeals to a shared Turkic identity, Turkey systematically strengthens its regional influence [2]. This multifaceted approach facilitates the establishment of institutionalized and enduring partnerships, with the diversity of interaction mechanisms playing a crucial role in ensuring their sustainability.

One of the most prominent dimensions of this cooperation is Turkey's supply of advanced weaponry to Central Asian states. Between 2021 and 2024, a total of 56 Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles were delivered to the region: Uzbekistan acquired 30 units, Kyrgyzstan received 6, and Kazakhstan purchased 20 [3][4]. These deliveries aimed to enhance national armed forces' capabilities in intelligence gathering, surveillance, and precision strikes. The integration of Bayraktar TB2 drones into the military structures of these states has significantly improved their capacity for conducting combat operations in challenging terrains and for reinforcing border security. Additionally, the procurement of these systems has facilitated the development of training infrastructures necessary for operating unmanned aerial platforms.

The expansion of Turkish arms exports, particularly in the unmanned systems sector, should be contextualized within broader global political dynamics. During the presidency of Donald Trump (2017–2021), the United States introduced stricter export controls on high-technology weapons, including attack drones [5]. This tightening of regulations created a window of opportunity for Turkey to position itself as an alternative supplier on the international arms market. Exploiting this niche, Ankara was able to offer effective and competitively priced systems to Central Asian states without the stringent political conditionalities typically associated with Western suppliers. Consequently, Turkey not only filled a strategic void but also solidified its role as a key partner for Central Asian militaries in modernizing their defense capabilities.

Alongside the expansion of bilateral military-technical cooperation, a series of official summits played a pivotal role in institutionalizing Turkey's strategic partnerships with the Central Asian republics. These high-level meetings not only formalized defense collaboration but also laid the groundwork for sustained and coordinated military initiatives.

The first significant event occurred in May 2022, when the President of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, paid a formal visit to Turkey. During this meeting, the two sides signed a Protocol on Military-Technical Cooperation and an Agreement on Strategic Security Partnership [6]. The primary focus of these agreements was to deepen bilateral cooperation in the defense industry, enhance joint training programs, and facilitate coordinated military exercises. To ensure systematic implementation, a joint working group was subsequently established to oversee defense-related initiatives.

The second major development took place in March 2022, during the combined session of the Supreme Council of Strategic Partnership between Uzbekistan and Turkey, held in Ankara [7]. At this summit, a Memorandum of Understanding on military cooperation and the licensed development of defense products was signed. One of the tangible outcomes was the launch of the TuranTech project, aimed at modernizing digital communication systems within Uzbekistan's armed forces. By 2024, the first upgraded complexes had already

been delivered and integrated into military operations.

Third, collective security and military-technical cooperation reached a new level of prominence during the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) Summit in Samarkand in November 2022 [8]. For the first time, these issues were prioritized at the regional level, resulting in the endorsement of the Action Plan for the Development of Defense Cooperation until 2026. This comprehensive plan envisages coordinated measures to combat transnational threats, the harmonization of weapons standards among member states, and the conduct of joint military exercises.

Finally, the bilateral summit between the presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Turkey in June 2023 further demonstrated the growing depth of defense collaboration [9]. During the meeting in Ankara, an agreement was signed on technology transfer and the establishment of a UAV operator training center in Bishkek. This initiative is intended to strengthen Kyrgyzstan's defense capabilities while reducing its dependence on foreign technological suppliers, thereby promoting greater strategic autonomy in the security sector.

In addition to the supply of military equipment, Turkey has actively initiated a number of cooperative defense-related projects aimed at deepening its strategic ties with Central Asian states. One of the most significant initiatives in this regard is the "KazTürkArmored" project launched in Kazakhstan in 2021, in partnership with Turkish defense firms Otokar and Aselsan [10]. This project goes beyond mere equipment delivery by encompassing the licensed production of Arma 8x8 armored vehicles and the integration of advanced communication and troop management technologies. By the end of 2024, the project had successfully produced and delivered 24 armored vehicles to the Kazakh Armed Forces, representing a tangible step toward enhancing Kazakhstan's defense industrial capacity and technological self-sufficiency.

An equally crucial pillar of Turkey's military-political cooperation with Central Asian countries is the sphere of military education and training. Between 2020 and 2024, Turkey allocated 380 placements for military professionals from Central Asia to study at its prestigious military academies [11]. The distribution of these placements reflects a balanced regional approach: Kazakhstan accounted for 140 slots, Uzbekistan for 110, Kyrgyzstan for 80, and Turkmenistan for 50. Training was conducted in leading institutions such as the Turkish Air Force Academy and the Army Academy in Ankara, covering a broad spectrum of strategic disciplines including cybersecurity, communications engineering, counterterrorism operations, and tactical officer training.

Graduates of these programs have returned to their home countries equipped with modern military knowledge and skills, actively contributing to the development of new doctrinal approaches, the reform of national armed forces, and the strengthening of their states' overall combat readiness. Through the combination of joint production initiatives and comprehensive training



programs, Turkey has thus established a multifaceted model of military-political cooperation with Central Asian republics, simultaneously promoting regional security and expanding its strategic influence.

It is important to emphasize that these areas of cooperation not only improve Central Asian nations' defense capabilities but also increase their institutional and technological reliance on Turkey. The region's nations have greater access to contemporary technologies, training, and assistance, but they are also becoming more involved in projects started by Ankara, necessitating strategic adaptability in the face of escalating rivalry among foreign players.

Even with the accomplishments, there are still risks. Turkey must strike a balance between its aspirations in Central Asia and those of China and Russia, who have historically seen the area as their sphere of influence [12]. These states may become concerned about increased military cooperation, which could have an impact on regional stability. Central Asian nations should also diversify their military-technical alliances and take into account the dangers of technological reliance.

By expanding cooperative projects, increasing personnel training, and developing a joint defense industry, we may anticipate further strengthening military-political cooperation between Turkey and the Central Asian republics in the future. Both the independence of the Central Asian states in areas of national security and Ankara's standing as one of the region's major foreign policy actors would be strengthened as a result.

### **Conclusion**

In light of the political unrest around the world, Turkey's current military and political collaboration with Central Asian nations is a major factor in the evolution of the regional security framework. Turkey is actively pursuing a strategy of comprehensive cooperation based on the provision of modern weapons, the creation of cooperative defense projects, the training of skilled military personnel, and the institutionalization of cooperation through the mechanisms of the Organization of Turkic States in an effort to increase its geopolitical presence.

As a counterbalance to conventional centers of influence, the study's findings show that Turkey is effectively assimilating into the Central Asian security system and providing the nations in the region with alternative models of defense cooperation and foreign policy. The states in the region are finding the Turkish approach, which combines pragmatism and ideological affinity, appealing when it comes to strengthening national sovereignty and diversifying their foreign policy relationships. The risks of technological dependence, shifting foreign alignments, and heightened struggle for control over energy and transportation routes are just a few of the new geopolitical problems that both parties must acknowledge if this relationship is to continue to grow.

Strengthening military and political ties between Turkey and the Central Asian republics may be crucial to regional stabilization in the face of rising global instability and growing hostility between superpowers. Such a partnership might support a more independent, sustainable, and balanced development model in Central Asia, founded on the ideas of political autonomy and mutual benefit, provided it is accompanied by strategic foresight, efficient risk management, and a flexible multi-vector policy.

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## **ТҮРКИЯНЫҢ ОРТАЛЫҚ АЗИЯ МЕМЛЕКЕТТЕРІМЕН ӘСКЕРИ-САЯСИ ҮНТІМАҚТАСТЫҒЫ**

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**Аңдатпа.** Мақалада Түркияның Орталық Азия мемлекеттерімен әскери-саяси ынтымақтастығы қазіргі аймақтық қауіпсіздіктің және көпполярлылық жағдайында жаңа ықпал ету орталықтарын қалыптастырудың маңызды элементі ретінде қарастырылады. Тақырыптың өзектілігі Орталық Азиядағы стратегиялық позициялар үшін әлемдік және аймақтық державалардың бәсекелестігінің күшеюімен анықталады, бұл түріктің сыртқы саяси белсенділігін талдауды ерекше сұранысқа ие етеді. Зерттеудің мақсаты Түркияның Қазақстанмен, Қырғызстанмен, Өзбекстанмен, Түрікменстанмен және Тәжікстанмен өзара іс-қимылын тереңдетудің негізгі бағыттарын, даму факторлары мен салдарын анықтау болып табылады.

Жұмыс 2020-2025 жылдар аралығындағы түрік академияларында ресми құжаттарды, келісімдерді, бірлескен қорғаныс жобаларын, қару-жаракты жеткізу статистикасын және әскери кадрларды даярлау бағдарламаларын талдауға негізделген. Мақалада Bayraktar tb2 ұшқышсыз ұшу аппараттарын жеткізу, броньды техниканы бірлесіп өндіру және байланыс жүйелерін жаңғырту жобалары, ҰҰА операторларын даярлау орталығын ұйымдастыру, сондай-ақ Түркі мемлекеттері Ұйымы аясындағы әскери-саяси өзара іс-қимылды институционализациялаудағы Түркияның рөлі сияқты аспектілер егжей-тегжейлі қарастырылады.

Зерттеу нәтижелері Түркия өзінің Қарулы Күштерін жаңғыртуда Орталық Азия елдерінің прагматүркия, Орталық Азия, әскери-саяси

ынтымақтастық, Bayraktar TB2, түркі мемлекеттерінің ұйымы, өңірлік қауіпсіздік, халықаралық қатынастар, қорғаныс өнеркәсібі, әскери білім, стратегиялық әріптестіктікалық мүдделерін де, түркі ынтымақтастығының идеологиялық элементтерін де табысты пайдаланатынын көрсетеді. Бұл ретте ықтимал тәуекелдер анықталды: Түркияға технологиялық тәуелділік, өңірдің басқа сыртқы актерлерімен қарым-қатынастың күрделенуі және стратегиялық тепе-теңдікті сақтау қажеттілігі. Қорытындылай келе, әскери-саяси ынтымақтастықты одан әрі дамыту Орталық Азия елдерінен туындайтын сын-қатерлерді белсенді басқаруды және өзгеріп отырған Халықаралық конъюнктураны ескеруді талап ететіні атап өтілді.

**Тірек сөздер:** Түркия, Орталық Азия, әскери-саяси ынтымақтастық, Bayraktar TB2, Түркі мемлекеттерінің ұйымы, аймақтық қауіпсіздік, халықаралық қатынастар, қорғаныс өнеркәсібі

## ВОЕННО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВО ТУРЦИИ С ГОСУДАРСТВАМИ ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ АЗИИ

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**Аннотация.** В статье рассматривается военно-политическое сотрудничество Турции с государствами Центральной Азии как важный элемент современной региональной безопасности и формирования новых центров влияния в условиях многополярности. Актуальность темы определяется усилением конкуренции мировых и региональных держав за стратегические позиции в Центральной Азии, что делает анализ турецкой внешнеполитической активности особенно востребованным. Цель исследования заключается в выявлении ключевых направлений, факторов развития и последствий углубления взаимодействия Турции с Казахстаном, Кыргызстаном, Узбекистаном, Туркменистаном и Таджикистаном.

Работа опирается на анализ официальных документов, соглашений, совместных оборонных проектов, статистики поставок вооружений и программ подготовки военных кадров в турецких академиях за период 2020–2025 годов. В статье подробно рассматриваются такие аспекты, как поставки беспилотных летательных аппаратов Bayraktar TB2, проекты совместного производства бронетехники и модернизации систем связи, организация центра подготовки операторов БПЛА, а также роль Турции в институционализации военно-политического взаимодействия в рамках Организации тюркских государств.

Результаты исследования показывают, что Турция успешно использует как прагматические интересы стран Центральной Азии в модернизации своих вооружённых сил, так и идеологические элементы

тюркской солидарности. При этом выявлены потенциальные риски: технологическая зависимость от Турции, осложнение отношений с другими внешними акторами региона и необходимость сохранения стратегического баланса. В заключение подчеркивается, что дальнейшее развитие военно-политического сотрудничества требует от стран Центральной Азии активного управления возникающими вызовами и учета меняющейся международной конъюнктуры.

**Ключевые слова:** Турция, Центральная Азия, военно-политическое сотрудничество, Bayraktar TB2, Организация тюркских государств, региональная безопасность, международные отношения, оборонная промышленность

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## **ASTANA CENTER OF REGIONAL DIPLOMACY: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRIORITIES OF KAZAKHSTAN'S CHAIRMANSHIP IN THE SCO**

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**Abstract.** Since its establishment in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has always adhered to the “Shanghai spirit” of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, mutual consultation, respect for cultural diversity and the pursuit of joint development, and continues to strengthen political mutual trust, expand good-neighborly and friendly relations, jointly protect regional security and develop practical cooperation, which It contributes to the constant growth of its influence, cohesion and attractiveness.

Kazakhstan paid great attention to the development of intraregional and transcontinental transport connectivity, which gives a powerful impetus to the expansion of trade and economic ties in Eurasia. Astana attracts a lot of attention to the integration of the Chinese initiative Belt and Road and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, as well as the implementation of regional infrastructure projects in the SCO. Also, Kazakhstan proposed to create a Partner network of large strategic ports and logistics centers.

Kazakhstan's initiative to adopt the document “On World Unity for Just Peace and Harmony”, which laid down the principles of strengthening confidence-building measures, maintaining stability and security at the global level. In addition, the SCO's traditional task of combating the “three forces of evil” and transnational crime remains in the focus of the chairmanship. Additionally, Kazakhstan's proposals include updated Cooperation Programs on countering terrorism, separatism and extremism for 2025-2027 and the adoption of the SCO Anti-Drug Strategy for 2024-2029 and an Action Program for its implementation.

Today, the SCO is a trans-regional international organization with the largest coverage area and the largest population in the world. This article analyzes the main decisions taken at the meeting of the Council of Heads of SCO Member States under the chairmanship of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Council of Heads of Government of the SCO Member States under the Chairmanship of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2023-2024.

**Key words:** Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Astana summit, Shanghai spirit, Kazakhstan, international organization, regional security, international cooperation, diplomacy

## **Introduction**

In 2024, Kazakhstan chaired six international organizations: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Islamic Organization for Food Security (IOF), the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). Currently, these organizations have a great influence on shaping the international agenda [1]. At the same time, in the history of each of them, Kazakhstan stood at the origins of the formation, and in some served as the initiator of the creation [2].

Kazakhstan is one of the founders of the SCO and one of its locomotives. The SCO was established in 2001 (it was preceded by the Shanghai Five in 1996). The organization has grown from the original 6 founding states to the current 10 member States (Kazakhstan, India, Iran, China, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Belarus), it also includes 2 observer States (Afghanistan and Mongolia), 14 dialogue partner countries (Turkey, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Armenia, Cambodia, Kuwait, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka), covering 26 countries on three continents, with a total area of more than 36 million square kilometers, that makes up more than 65% of the Eurasian continent [3]. The population of its member States exceeds 3.3 billion people, which is about 42% of the total world population [4]. And in 2023, five countries joined the SCO family as dialogue partners, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Maldives, Myanmar and the United Arab Emirates [5]. Kazakhstan assumed the chairmanship of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in July 2023 and headed it until June 2024 [2].

Over the years, the organization has gradually become multidisciplinary and multifunctional, where, thanks to the joint efforts of the member States, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization comprehensively promotes cooperation in six areas - in the political, security, economic, humanitarian spheres, in foreign policy cooperation and in institution-building [6]. It has achieved impressive results, paving the way for effective peaceful development, and has become an important barrier to security, a bridge of cooperation, bonds of friendship, and a force of constructiveness that helps the countries of the region achieve universal security and stability, as well as common development and prosperity, and has laid a model for building a new type of international relations [7].

## **Materials and Methods**

This article uses a comprehensive methodological approach, including qualitative and quantitative analysis. The main sources of data were the official documents of the Astana Summit in 2024. The main sources of information are the official documents of the summit, such as final declarations, minutes of meetings, signed agreements, as well as press releases and statements by participants.

Additionally, materials from government departments of the participating countries and international organizations covering the results of the summit were used.

The analysis used content analysis of official speeches and media materials, as well as expert assessments provided by leading political scientists and economists in the region. Additionally, a comparative analysis was carried out with previous summits, which made it possible to identify the dynamics of cooperation and changes in the priorities of the participating countries. The limitations of the analysis are based primarily on open sources and official documents, which limited the completeness of information about the internal dynamics of negotiations.

**Results**

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an international organization whose activities are aimed at strengthening peace, cooperation and good neighborliness. In the period from 2023 to 2024, the Republic of Kazakhstan chaired the SCO. This is the fourth time that Kazakhstan has led this organization. Our country previously chaired the Organization in 2004, 2010 and 2016.

Table 1. Comparison table of SCO summits in Kazakhstan (2004, 2010, 2016, 2024)

| Parameter / Year      | SCO Summit 2004 (Astana)  | SCO Summit 2010 (Astana)  | SCO Summit 2016 (Astana)   | SCO Summit 2024 (Astana)   |
|-----------------------|---|---|--|--|
| The main participants | Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan                             | The same + India and Pakistan in observer status                              | Russia, China, Kazakhstan, India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan         | The same, with an emphasis on deepening integration and coordination + Belarus |
| Key topics            | Formation of the foundations of the organization, regional security, economic cooperation | Strengthening security, combating terrorism, economic integration             | Strengthening economic cooperation, combating extremism, and developing infrastructure | Regional conflict resolution, Afghanistan, ecology, digitalization             |
| Main achievements     | Approval of the SCO Charter, creation of basic cooperation mechanisms                     | Adoption of security programs, development of joint anti-terrorist operations | Signing of strategic agreements, expansion of cooperation in energy and transport      | Conclusion of important agreements on safety, ecology and digital technologies |

|                           |  |  |   |  |
|---------------------------|--|--|---|--|
| Importance for the region | Creating a platform for dialogue and cooperation, enhancing the role of Kazakhstan | Strengthening trust and cooperation, expanding the powers of the SCO | Strengthening the SCO's role in regional policy, launching a new economic integration | Strengthening Kazakhstan's position, solving urgent problems of the region |
| Problems and challenges   | Lack of institutionalization, limited resources                                    | Uneven development of cooperation, geopolitical tensions             | Economic challenges, the need to adapt to new threats                                 | Geopolitical instability, difficulties in the implementation of agreements |

*Source: the table was prepared by the author based on the analysis of open data obtained from Internet resources.*

The 2004 SCO Summit in Astana was a historic event that marked the beginning of the organization's formation as a regional platform for cooperation in the fields of security, economics and politics. During this period, Kazakhstan acted as chairman for the first time, demonstrating its desire to strengthen interstate relations and create the institutional foundations of the SCO. The main tasks were the establishment of the charter and the formation of key mechanisms of interaction [2].

By 2010, the Astana summit was held in a more mature format with an expanded agenda, including an active fight against terrorism and deepening economic cooperation. At this stage, Kazakhstan maintained its leading role, contributing to the strengthening of trust between the participating countries and the development of joint programs [1].

The 2016 Summit showed significant progress in expanding economic ties and transport routes, as well as in coordinating efforts to counter extremism. Kazakhstan continued to strengthen its diplomatic position, contributing to the development of infrastructure projects and integration [5].

In 2024, Kazakhstan will once again chair the SCO, focusing on resolving acute regional conflicts, including the situation in Afghanistan, as well as environmental initiatives and digitalization. The summit demonstrates the growing maturity of the organization and efforts to adapt to new challenges, strengthening Kazakhstan's role as a key mediator and leader in the region [6]. The SCO summit in Astana has become an important stage in the development of this organization. It is characteristic that Kazakhstan effectively put an end to its chairmanship in the SCO, which has now passed to China. But it is also significant that Kazakhstani Nurlan Yermekbayev has become the new Secretary General. So this is, to some extent, continuity in the SCO projects and programs.

Within the framework of its SCO presidency for 2023-2024, Kazakhstan has identified six main priorities of its chairmanship in the organization:

1. Ensuring security and stability in the SCO space;
2. Expansion of trade and economic ties;
3. Strengthening energy cooperation;
4. Expanding cooperation in the digital sphere;
5. Strengthening cooperation in the field of ecology;
6. Development of cultural and humanitarian ties [7].

## **Discussion**

The fundamental thematic focus of the Astana SCO Summit was “Strengthening multilateral dialogue - striving for sustainable peace and development”. The modern development processes of the SCO are characterized by the interaction of the member countries in the field of maintaining peace and security, trade, transport, energy, digital technologies, etc. Speaking at the SCO summit in New Delhi, India, on July 4, 2023, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev stressed that “through joint efforts, the organization will be able to ensure the availability of digital technologies for all citizens of the participating states and give a new impetus to the innovative technological development of the economy” [2]. During Kazakhstan’s presidency, emphasis was placed on reducing the “digital divide” between countries and social groups. To achieve these goals, Kazakhstan proposed the creation of a Digital Hub in the SCO space [6].

The heads of the SCO member states paid great attention to the consideration and resolution of a wide range of topical issues of interaction. It is worth noting that the participating countries differ in different levels of economic development, therefore, it is important within the SCO to coordinate economic interests for equal partnership and mutually beneficial cooperation, and joint development and implementation of large-scale multilateral socio-economic projects is essential. It should be noted that the regular holding of forums with the participation of the Heads of the SCO member states helps to enhance the international image of the Organization [7].

The Astana Summit summed up the results of the Kazakh presidency and became a new stage in the expansion of the organization. The Republic of Belarus is a significant partner of many countries in the region within the framework of the EAEU and the CIS, and its accession to the SCO has not only increased the number of members and improved the gross economic indicators of the organization, but also included a country with significant intellectual potential and production base in the contour of trade and economic cooperation of this institution. Consequently, four out of five (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus) states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) have become SCO members. If we take into account the “expanded outline” of the SCO, including dialogue partners (including Armenia), then all the EAEU countries are working on this platform [1].

The Summit played an important role in strengthening the international position of the Central Asian region. The final declaration stated: “The Member States confirm that... Central Asia is the core of the SCO” [4]. The countries of the region, in turn, are strengthening their international subjectivity by participating in a dynamically developing organization, the agenda of which is gradually expanding [4].

Among the favorable factors for the further development of cooperation in the SCO are the following:

- geography that reduces the potential negative impact of third parties;
- the complementary structure and capabilities of the member countries’ economies;
- the understanding of the importance of further development of cooperation and the corresponding political will of the leadership of the SCO member states [8].

Kazakhstan’s chairmanship in the SCO contributes to the qualitative growth of the Organization in the system of integration development, strengthening multilateral dialogue and expanding interstate cooperation as factors of ensuring security and stability in the region [2].

Kazakhstan has held about 180 events during its presidency. Meetings and meetings between the ministries and departments of the SCO countries were held in different formats: online and offline. They touched upon the development of cooperation in the fields of healthcare, defense, security, law, agriculture and other areas. Such activity has noticeably revitalized the organization and brought it together in many areas. In particular, Kazakhstan, which is one of the founders of the SCO, has focused on promoting the green agenda. As a result, 2024 has been declared the SCO Year of Ecology [6].

At the initiative of the Head of State of Kazakhstan, 2024 was declared the Year of Ecology in the SCO. In the 21st century, environmental issues are one of the most important in international relations. Irreversible catastrophic environmental changes actualize global environmental security. Environmental protection, the salvation and protection of nature, the preservation of the animal and plant world are a necessary condition for the safe existence, development and further progress of mankind. Ensuring environmental safety involves a diverse interaction of States, an integrated approach to solving global security, economic and social development problems. Effective waste management and safe drinking water and sanitation are also important. The implementation of large-scale projects determines the development of infrastructure, environmental protection, and rational use of water resources [9, 10].

In 2024, the SCO member States paid special attention to environmental security issues related to impending global threats such as climate change, scarcity and uneven distribution of water resources, extreme natural disasters, floods and floods, soil degradation and desertification, as well as the topic of ensuring the



safety of drinking water and sanitation [12, 13]. To implement the Action Plan for the SCO Year of Ecology, various events were organized, including round tables, seminars, environmental and educational campaigns.

The concept of cooperation in the field of environmental protection of the SCO member States and the Action Plan have laid a solid legal foundation for the development of environmental cooperation [11].

Among the wide range of issues related to the environmental agenda, it is worth noting a number of documents that have opened a new page in environmental cooperation, namely:

1. Decision of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on the approval of the Program for the Development of Cooperation between States in the field of protected areas and Ecological tourism;
2. Statement of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on ensuring the safety of drinking water and sanitation;
3. Statement by the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on effective waste management;
4. Agreement between the Governments of the member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the Field of Environmental Protection [11].

Water conservation is one of the most important and priority areas of SCO environmental and conservation cooperation. The SCO member states face problems of water scarcity, uneven distribution and pollution to varying degrees. Water conservation is a priority of the SCO, coinciding with the global water paradigm, as well as modern environmental and climate policies in the SCO countries. The Member States attached great importance to this issue and considered a decision at the highest level. For example, the Republic of Kazakhstan is actively working on the development of the Water Code, which is a clear example of the transition from declared initiatives to the practical implementation of the stated proposals [14].

As SCO Secretary General Zhang Ming noted in his speech, the SCO Secretariat contributes to the implementation of initiatives of the SCO member states in the development of cooperation on environmental protection. Among the events held over the past year, the SCO Model Youth Conference, the round table on Environmental Safety in the SCO member States, and the SCO Year of Ecology 2024 forum in Qingdao (China, July 2024) should be noted, which includes two areas – the main environmental challenges and the practical experience of the SCO countries in overcoming them and the efforts of the SCO countries to manage global biodiversity. This creates another new platform for discussing environmental cooperation between Member States [9, 11].

It is important that the summit participants expressed united support for Kazakhstan's initiatives to establish the United Nations Regional Center for Sustainable Development Goals for Central Asia and Afghanistan, based in

Almaty, and the International Biosafety Agency, which reports to the UN Security Council [15].

Rational use of natural resources, issues of water policy and sustainable development are not a situational response to complex modern challenges, but a systematic progressive movement towards sustainable development, which is declared as the thematic status of the next 2025 SCO. This course has been adopted by all participating states, and it will be a key aspect during China's presidency of the SCO in 2025.

The thematic status of 2025 is the Year of Sustainable Development. In addition, the joint efforts of the SCO member states will be aimed at achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and the International Year of Glacier Conservation in 2025, announced by the UN General Assembly [16].

Kazakhstan is a very influential country that has its own position on topical issues on the international agenda. It is no coincidence that Kazakhstan is one of the middle powers that influence world politics. It is characteristic that at the end of May 2024, Euronews published an article by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on the role of the middle Powers in the modern world [17]. The middle Powers usually include Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa. This is a very impressive and honorable list, but it's worth noting that it needs to be matched. So Kazakhstan is quite active, putting forward many initiatives, some of which were included in the materials of the SCO summit in Astana. For example, the declaration included Kazakhstan's proposal to establish an SCO Investment Fund. In addition, it is worth noting the idea of establishing the UN Regional Center for Sustainable Development Goals for Central Asia and Afghanistan in Almaty.

This is important given that the SCO, in fact, began with security issues in Central Asia and emerged against the background of threats to this security in 1996 from Afghanistan, when the situation was extremely uncertain. Today, there are other tasks, but the region continues to play a major role, not only in geopolitics, but also in geo-economics. More and more transport corridors pass through Central Asia.

In particular, various development projects and new transport routes should play an important role in stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. In recent years, Kazakhstan has been helping to stabilize the situation in this country by supplying it with food, as well as supporting development projects. The SCO countries support an "independent, neutral and peaceful state free from terrorism, war and drugs" [11].

These are the minimum sufficient conditions to start interacting with the new Afghan authorities. But at the same time, this document states that "an inclusive government with broad participation of representatives of all ethnic and political groups of Afghan society is the only way to achieve lasting peace and stability in this country" [11]. This can be called a conditional maximum program.

## **Conclusion**

It was a very important event for Kazakhstan, it highlighted his role in the new international realities. When the situation is not too stable, the importance of international institutions and those countries that put forward a positive agenda increases.

The SCO member states have large labor, energy and mineral resources, and have great potential and opportunities for conducting profitable agro-industrial production. They also represent a huge growing market for consumer and investment goods.

During Kazakhstan's chairmanship in the SCO, much attention was paid to the environmental agenda. At the Astana Summit, it was noted that in the context of the development of the modern international space, it is important to strengthen joint work on attracting investments, the active participation of businesses, business structures and business circles in the implementation of economic, energy, and transport projects.

At the initiative of Kazakhstan, the SCO member states actively cooperated in the fields of scientific and technical cooperation, education, information exchange, green finance, environmental safety, biodiversity, climate change, waste management, energy conservation and emission reduction.

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**АСТАНА Өңірлік Дипломатия Орталығы:  
ҚАЗАҚСТАННЫҢ ШЫҰ - ҒА ТӨРАҒАЛЫҚ ЕТУІНІҢ  
БАСЫМДЫЛЫҚТАРЫНА ШОЛУ**

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**Аңдатпа.** 2001 жылы Құрылғаннан бері Шанхай Ынтымақтастық Ұйымы әрқашан өзара сенімнің, өзара тиімділіктің, теңдіктің, өзара консультациялардың, мәдени әртүрлілікті құрметтеудің және бірлескен дамуға ұмтылудың «Шанхай рухын» ұстанады және саяси өзара сенімді нығайтуды, тату көршілік пен достық қарым-қатынасты

кеңейтуді, аймақтық қауіпсіздікті бірлесіп қорғауды және практикалық ынтымақтастықты дамытуды жалғастыруда. Бұл оның ықпалының, бірлігі мен тартымдылығының тұрақты өсуіне ықпал етеді.

Саммит барысында Қазақстан Еуразиядағы сауда-экономикалық байланыстардың кеңеюіне қуатты серпін беретін ішкі өңірлік және трансконтиненталдық көліктік өзара байланысты дамытуға көп көңіл бөлді. «Белдеу және жол» Қытай бастамасының арқасында Астана Қытай бастамасы мен Транскаспий халықаралық көлік бағытын ұштастыруға, сондай-ақ ШЫҰ кеңістігінде өңірлік инфрақұрылымдық жобаларды іске асыруға көп көңіл бөлді. Практикалық шара ретінде Қазақстан ірі стратегиялық порттар мен логистикалық орталықтардың серіктестік желісін құруды ұсынды.

Сондай-ақ, басымдық шеңберінде Қазақстан «әділ бейбітшілік пен келісім үшін әлемдік бірлік туралы» құжатты қабылдау бойынша бастама көтерді, онда сенім шараларын нығайту, жаһандық деңгейде тұрақтылық пен қауіпсіздікті қолдау қағидаттары негізделді. Сонымен қатар, ШЫҰ – ның дәстүрлі міндеті – «үш зұлымдық күшімен» және трансұлттық қылмыспен күресу төрағалықтың назарында қалып отыр. Осы тұрғыда Қазақстанның ұсыныстары терроризмге, сепаратизмге және экстремизмге қарсы іс-қимыл жөніндегі 2025-2027 жылдарға арналған ынтымақтастықтың жаңартылған бағдарламаларын және ШЫҰ-ның 2024-2029 жылдарға арналған есірткіге қарсы стратегиясын қабылдауды және оны іске асыру жөніндегі іс-қимыл бағдарламаларын қамтиды.

Бүгінгі Таңда Шанхай Ынтымақтастық Ұйымы-ең үлкен қамту аймағы және әлемдегі ең көп халқы бар трансаймақтық халықаралық ұйым. Бұл мақалада Қазақстан Республикасының төрағалығымен ШЫҰ-ға Мүше Мемлекеттердің Басшылары Кеңесінің және 2023-2024 жылдары Қазақстан Республикасының Төрағалығымен ШЫҰ-ға Мүше Мемлекеттердің Үкімет Басшылары Кеңесінің отырысында қабылданған негізгі шешімдер талданады.

**Тірек сөздер:** Шанхай Ынтымақтастық Ұйымы, Астана саммиті, Шанхай рухы, Қазақстан, халықаралық ұйым, региональная безопасность, международное сотрудничество, дипломатия

## **АСТАНА ЦЕНТР РЕГИОНАЛЬНОЙ ДИПЛОМАТИИ: ОБЗОР ПРИОРИТЕТОВ ПРЕДСЕДАТЕЛЬСТВА КАЗАХСТАНА В ШОС**

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**Аннотация.** С момента своего создания в 2001 году Шанхайская организация сотрудничества всегда придерживалась «шанхайского духа»

взаимного доверия, взаимной выгоды, равенства, взаимных консультаций, уважения культурного разнообразия и стремления к совместному развитию и продолжает укреплять политическое взаимодоверие, расширять добрососедские и дружественные отношения, совместно защищать права человека. региональную безопасность и развивать практическое сотрудничество, что способствует постоянному росту его влияния, сплоченности и привлекательности.

Во время саммита большое внимание Казахстаном было уделено развитию транспортной взаимосвязанности, как внутрирегиональной, так и трансконтинентальной, которая придает мощный импульс расширению торгово-экономических связей в Евразии. Благодаря китайской инициативе «Пояс и путь» Астана привлекает большое внимания сопряжению китайской инициативы и Транскаспийского международного транспортного маршрута, а также реализации региональных инфраструктурных проектов на просторах ШОС. В качестве практической меры Казахстан предложил создать Партнерскую сеть крупных стратегических портов и логистических центров.

Так же, в рамках приоритета Казахстаном была выдвинута инициатива по принятию документа «О мировом единстве за справедливый мир и согласие», в котором были заложены принципы укрепления мер доверия, поддержания стабильности и безопасности на глобальном уровне. Кроме того, в фокусе председательства остается традиционная задача ШОС – борьба с «тремя силами зла» и транснациональной преступностью. В этом контексте предложения Казахстана включают обновленные программы сотрудничества по противодействию терроризму, сепаратизму и экстремизму на 2025-2027 годы и принятию антинаркотической стратегии ШОС на 2024-2029 годы и программы действий по ее реализации.

Сегодня Шанхайская организация сотрудничества – это трансрегиональная международная организация с самой большой территорией охвата и самой многочисленной численностью населения в мире. В данной статье анализируются основные решения, принятые на заседаниях Совета глав государств-членов ШОС под председательством Республики Казахстан и Совета глав правительств государств-членов ШОС под председательством Республики Казахстан в 2023-2024 годах.

**Ключевые слова:** Шанхайская организация сотрудничества, саммит в Астане, Шанхайский дух, Казахстан, международная организация, аймақтық қауіпсіздік, халықаралық ынтымақтастық, дипломатия

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## ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ ҚАТЫНАСТАР ТЕОРИЯСЫНДАҒЫ ЖАРИЯ ДИПЛОМАТИЯ МӘСЕЛЕСІ

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**Аңдатпа.** Бұл мақалада халықаралық қатынастар теориясындағы жария дипломатияның орны мен маңызы қарастырылады. Жария дипломатия – мемлекеттердің халықаралық аренадағы қатынастарын қалыптастыруда маңызды құрал ретінде пайдаланылады, оның негізінде ақпарат тарату, пікір алмасу және халықаралық қауымдастықты өз мақсаттары мен мүдделеріне тарту жатады. Мақалада жария дипломатияның теориялық аспектілері, оның халықаралық қатынастардағы рөлі мен тиімділігі, сондай-ақ, жаңа заман талаптарына сәйкес оның даму тенденциялары талданады. Сонымен қатар, жария дипломатияның қазіргі кезеңдегі өзектілігі мен оны пайдалану әдістері, ақпараттық технологиялар мен медианың әсері қарастырылады. Авторлар халықаралық саяси процестердегі жария дипломатияның жаңа формаларын зерттей отырып, оның жаһандық саясаттағы ықпалын, сондай-ақ, мемлекеттік имидж қалыптастырудағы маңыздылығын анықтайды.

**Тірек сөздер:** халықаралық қатынастар, жария дипломатия, теория, мемлекеттер, ақпараттық саясат, медиа, мемлекеттік имидж, халықаралық қауымдастық

### Кіріспе

Қазіргі кезеңде дипломатияның дәстүрлі формасының тиімділігінің азайғандығы, дипломатияның қазіргі заманғы үлгісінің қалыптасуы жайлы пікірлер айтылуда. Дипломатияның бүгінгі таңдағы дамуы ең алдымен әлемдік сахнада жүріп жатқан жаһандық өзгерістерге тәуелді, қазіргі әлемнің дамуына ықпал етуші факторлар дипломатия, сыртқы саяси шешімдерді қабылдау үрдістеріне де ықпал етпей қоймайды. Халықаралық қатынастардағы мемлекеттің ғана дербес субъект болуы кешегі күннің еншісіне қалып, ресми биліктер арасындағы ғана мемлекетаралық қатынастар өзінің тиімділігінің төмен екендігін көрсеткен уақытта дипломатияның дәстүрлі емес түрлеріне деген қызығушылық артты. Қазіргі таңда жария дипломатия халықаралық қатынастар саласындағы ғылыми зерттеулердің ғана емес, сарапшы саясаттанушылардың қызу талқылау нысанына да айналып отыр. Шетелдік қоғамдастықтармен қарым-қатынас жүргізу арқылы сыртқы саяси мақсаттарға жету мүмкіндігінің ғалымдар

мен сарапшылардың қызғушылығын артырып отыруының өзіндік себептері бар.

Жыл өткен сайын жаһандық өзара тәуелділіктің артуына, ұлттық шекаралардың көмескіленуі, әлемдік масштабта гуманистік және демократиялық құндылықтардың өсуіне байланысты мемлекеттер өзінің сыртқы саяси мүддесін қамтамасыз етуде тек әскери күш пен экономикалық ресурстарға ғана үміт арта алмайды. Постиндустриалдық қоғам жағдайында ақпараттың рөлі артып, қоғамның ақпарат көздеріне қол жетімділігін, ақпарат алмасуды қарапайымдандыра түсті, бұл өз кезегінде халықаралық ақпараттық кеңістікте басымдыққа ие идеялар, көзқарастардың маңызының артуына алып келді. Халықаралық саясаттың күн тәртібінде мемлекеттік деңгейде болсын, мемлекетаралық бірлестіктерде немесе үкіметтік емес ұйымдар деңгейінде болсын басты назар көбінесе жеке адамға, оның құқығы мен еркіндігіне, олардың қорғалуы мен кепілдігіне аударылатын болды. Саяси шешімдерді қабылдау процестерінде социумның және қоғамдық пікірдің рөліне назар көбірек аударылатын болды, сәйкесінше қатардағы азаматтардың көзқарастарына ықпал ету мүмкіндігі жайлы зерттеулердің маңызы да артып отыр. Осылайша, жария дипломатия зерттеулердің өзекті бағыты ретінде қалып отыр.

Бүгінгі таңда әлемдік сахнада халықаралық қатынастардың қатысушыларының саны артып отыр, қазір кәсіби дипломаттармен қатар, ішкі ведомстволар мен аймақтық және жергілікті институт шенеуніктері, мәдениет, білім және бизнес әлемінің өкілдері сияқты жаңа акторлар да белсенді әрекет етіп, шет елдердегі әріптестерімен өздерінің байланыс жүйелерін құруда. Әлемдік жаһандану жағдайында ішкі және сыртқы саясаттың арасындағы шекара бұзылып, олардың өзара тәуелділік жағдайы күшейе түсті.

Қазіргі ғылыми әдебиеттерде «жария дипломатия» және «жұмсақ күш» терминдерінің қолданыс жиілігі арта түсті. Аталған терминдерді қандай сөздермен атасақ та, олардың беретін ұғымы, айқындалатын анықтамасы – қалаған нәтижелерге күш қолданусыз өз еркіңмен қатысу, тартымдылық негізінде қол жеткізуге қабілеттілік, саяси биліктің бір формасы дегенге келіп саяды, яғни халықаралық сахнада күш жұмсап, әскер аттандырмай да қалаған нәтижеге қол жеткізуге болады, немесе шет мемлекет қоғамымен диалогтар жүргізу жүйесі.

Қазақстан Республикасы үшін жария дипломатия ұғымы теориялық жағынан таныс ұғым болғанымен де, дамыған мемлекеттер сияқты біздің елімізде дипломатияның аталған түрін танытуға аса мән беріліп отырған жоқ және жария дипломатияның институционалдық құрылымы жоқ, сондықтан жария дипломатияны болашақта тәжірибеде дамыту үшін оның теориялық бастауларымен танысудың мәні зор.

### **Материалдар мен әдістерді сипаттау**

Жария дипломатия – халықаралық қатынастардың дамып келе жатқан саласы болғанымен, оны зерттеуде нақты бір ғана әдіснама немесе теориялық бағыт қалыптаспаған. Бұл оның көпқырлылығы мен пәнаралық сипатымен түсіндіріледі. Сондықтан жария дипломатияны зерттеу барысында оны қалыптастыруға ықпал еткен негізгі бағыттар мен ғылыми мектептерге тоқталу, осы феноменнің тарихи және теориялық алғышарттарын түсінуге мүмкіндік береді. Мақалада жария дипломатияның пайда болу себептері мен оны зерттеудегі әртүрлі көзқарастарды салыстыра отырып, саланың дамуына ықпал еткен негізгі факторлар мен үрдістерге талдау жасалады.

Зерттеудің әдіснамалық негізін – шетелдік және отандық зерттеушілер еңбектерін, ресми құжаттар мен дереккөздерді кешенді талдау құрайды. Сонымен қатар, тақырыпты жан-жақты қамтитын пәнаралық әдістер кешені қолданылды. Біріншіден, зерттеу жұмысының әдіснамалық негізін отандық және шетелдік зерттеушілердің еңбектеріне, ресми құжаттарға, академиялық әдебиеттер мен дереккөздерге сүйене отырып жасалған кешенді талдау құрайды. Бұл тәсіл жария дипломатияға қатысты көзқарастар мен ұстанымдардың эволюциясын, олардың ұқсастықтары мен айырмашылықтарын ашуға мүмкіндік берді.

Екіншіден, зерттеу барысында жүйелік әдіс қолданылды, ол жария дипломатияны халықаралық қатынастар жүйесіндегі дербес құбылыс ретінде қарастыруға және оның ішкі құрылымдық элементтерін айқындауға жағдай жасады.

Үшіншіден, жария дипломатияның тарихи алғышарттарын, қалыптасу кезеңдерін және дамуын зерделеуде тарихилық әдісі пайдаланылды. Бұл әдіс құбылысты уақыт осінде қарастырып, оның қазіргі заманғы халықаралық қатынастар жүйесінде атқаратын рөлін түсінуге сеп болды.

Жалпы, зерттеуде қолданылған әдістер жария дипломатия ұғымының көпқырлылығын, оның ғылыми және практикалық маңызын тереңнен ашып көрсетуге мүмкіндік берді.

### **Нәтижелер**

Жария дипломатияны зерттеудің нақты жеке бір бағыты немесе әдіснамасы жоқ, сондықтан оны зерттеуде ұжымдық дипломатияның қалыптасуына бағытталған бағыттар мен мектептерге тоқталу арқылы оның пайда болу себептеріне тоқталу нәтижелірек болады.

Жария дипломатияны либералидык, неолибералдық парадигмамен байланыстыруымызға негіз бар.

Жария дипломатияның қолданысының, оған деген сұраныстың жоғарылауына транснационалистік ағымның әсері өте үлкен болды, яғни халықаралық қатынастарда мемлекет қана актор бола алмайды деген тұжырымның практикалық маңызының артуы дипломатияда оның бейресми

акторларының атынан жүргізілетін бейресми тармағының дамуына алып елді.

Жария дипломатияның қалыптасуында негіз болған тұжырымдардың бірі халықаралық өзара тәуелділік туралы тұжырым деуге болады. Әлемдік саясат дегеніміз бір-бірімен өзара тәуелділікте және бір контексте қарастырылатын жаһандық проблемалар, әлемдік саяси жүйенің қазіргі ахуалы және оның даму тенденциялары туралы ілім. Халықаралық өзара тәуелділіктің қатысушылары ретінде тек әлемдік саясаттың негізгі акторы ретінде мойындайтын мемлекетті ғана емес, үкіметаралық ұйымдарды ғана емес, басқа да күштер – үкіметтік емес ұйымдар, трансұлттық ұйымдар, мемлекетішілік аймақтар және т.б. да қарастырады және ішкі және халықаралық саясаттың қарама-қайшылығынан қашқақтайды.

Жария дипломатия тұжырымының халықаралық қатынастар ғылымында теориялық қолданылуынан да, іс жүзіндегі қолданысы белсендірек. Дегенмен, жария дипломатияның мемлекеттің сыртқы саясатында, халықаралық қатынастарда өзектілікке ие болуы либерализмнің халықаралық қатынастардағы мемлекет монополиясын жоққа шығарған ілімінен бастау алса, кейініректегі неолиберализмнің мемлекеттік емес ұйымдардың, жеке адамдардың да мемлекетаралық қатынастар акторы бола алатындығы туралы қорытындыларынан көрініс тауып, «жұмсақ күштің» іске асырылу формасы ретінде бағаланса, транснационализм, халықаралық өзара тәуелділік сияқты бағыттардағы негізгі идеялар да өз кезегінде елеулі ықпал етті. Жария дипломатияға қолданбалылық сипат көбірек тән. Жария дипломатия, «жұмсақ күш» сияқты жаңа түсініктердің халықаралық қатынастар жүйесіндегі рөлінің арта түсуі жаһандық саясаттың, халықаралық қатынастар жүйесінің сипатының өзгерістері, трансформацияланып, жаңаша сипатқа ие болғандығы туралы ойларды дәлелдей түседі.

### **Талқылау**

«Жария дипломатия» түсінігінің қазіргі бізге жеткенге жақын анықтамасын алғаш қалыптастырған Э.Галлион болды [1.506.]

Жария дипломатия – мемлекеттің шет елдермен ұзақ мерзімді қарым-қатынастар орнатуына, ұлттық сыртқы саясатты қорғауына, шетелде мемлекеттің құндылықтары мен институттарын түсінуіне бағытталған іс-әрекеттер. Жария дипломатия шет елдердегі қоғамдық пікірді тану арқылы, оны қалыптастырушыларды ақпараттандыру және оларға ықпал ету арқылы ұлттық мүддені қорғап, ұлттық қауіпсіздікті қамтамасыз етеді. Жария дипломатия бұқаралық аудиторияға бағытталған. Қоғамдық пікір өз үкіметі мен саяси жүйесіне едәуір ықпал етеді дегеннен келіп шыққан. Жария дипломатияның ерекшелігі «жұмсақ күшті» жүзеге асырудың құралы болып табылады [2.86.].

Кейбір зерттеушілер пікірінше, мәдениет, құндылықтар, елдің ішкі және сыртқы саясаты жария дипломатияның бірінші дәрежедегі объектілері бола алады және олардың шет елдік аудитория үшін тартымдылығы жеткілікті деңгейде болғанда ғана жария дипломатияның әдістері олардың сыртқы периметрге ұсынылуына қолайлы жағдай жасай алады, ал олардың шетелдік аудитория үшін тартымдылығы төмен болса әлемге деген танылу ұмтылыстары өзінің кері нәтижесін беруі мүмкін [3.18б.].

Жария дипломатияның объектілері: мәдениет, құндылықтар, шет елдік қоғамдастықтар, елдің ішкі және сыртқы саясаты.

Жария дипломатияның субъектілері: жеке адамдар, қоғамдық ұйымдар, мемлекеттік органдар, мәдени ұжымдар, бизнес топтар, ғалымдар, өнер қайраткерлері және т.б.

Жария дипломатия термині халықаралық қатынастарды зерттеу саласында жаңа ұғымдардың бірі болғанымен, мемлекетаралық қатынастарды жүргізуде «қатаң күштен» гөрі «жұмсақ күшке» сүйенудің тиімділігі туралы идеялар ерте кезден-ақ бастау алған болатын. Жария дипломатияны зерттеуде негіз болатын либералистік, неолибералистік теориялар десек, халықаралық қатынастардың либералдық парадигмасының бастауы болған Еуропалық ағартушылардың еңбектерінде, атап айтсақ, Жан Жак Руссоның «қоғамдық келісімі», Имманиул Канттың «Мәңгілік бейбітшілік» туралы идеяларының өзегінде әлемдік тәртіпті соғыссыз, тепе-теңдікті бұзбай-ақ, тираниясыз бейбіт жолмен шешу туралы көзқарастар маңызды рөл атқарды және осындай бейбіт қатар өмір сүру рационалды принциптерге, білім мен ғылымға негізделуі керектігі дәріптелген еді, яғни либерализмнің бастауында мемлекет қоғамдық эволюция өнімі деген түйін жатыр.

Либерализм мен неолиберализм парадигмасында халықаралық қатынастар жүйесінде мемлекеттен де тыс акторлардың болатындығы ғылыми зерттеулердің өзегіне айналған болатын.

Ғылыми зерттеу әдіснамасының негізі теория десек, жария дипломатия либералистік теорияның зерттеу проблемаларының жемісі деп айтуға негіз бар.

Өткен ғасырдың 60-70 жылдары саяси реализмнің ең негізгі тұжырымдарының бірі – тек мемлекеттің халықаралық актор ретіндегі рөліне қатысты ережесіне қатысты күмән туындайды. Халықаралық қатынастарда саяси реализм өкілдері сыртқы саясатты талдаудың негізі ретінде тәуелсіз мемлекеттерді алса, неолиберализм мектебінің өкілдері талдаудың негізі жеке тұлғалар, «жаңарған мемлекеттер», үкіметтік емес акторлар деп тұжырымдайды, яғни олар халықаралық қатынастар тек тәуелсіз мемлекеттер ғана емес тіпті жеке тұлғалар атынан да жүргізіледі деген байлам жасайды.



Жария дипломатияны либералидық, неолибералдық парадигмамен байланыстыруымызға американдық авторлар Ч.У.Кегли мен Ю.Р.Уитткопфтың халықаралық қатынастардың төрт негізгі теориялық бағыттарын белгілі бір критерийлер бойынша салыстырған кестесіне жүгіну арқылы дәлелдеуге болады. Кесте бойынша неолибералистік ағымға сипаттама берейік:

Талдаудың негізгі бірліктері: Жеке тұлғалар, «жаңаланған» мемлекеттер, үкіметтік емес ұйымдар..

Негізгі зерттеу аймағы: Даму үстіндегі мемлекетаралық ынтымақтастық; экономика, әлеуметтік және экологиялық проблемалар.

Негізгі проблемалары: Кешенді өзара тәуелділік; режимдер.

Әлемнің даму болашағына бағасы: Ынтымақтастықтың ары қарай дамуына, ғаламдық қауымдастықтың құрылуына сенеді.

Акторлардың мотивациясы: Жаһандық мүдделер, әділеттілік, бейбітшілік пен гүлдену, бостандық және адамгершілік.

Шешуші ұғымдар: Трансұлттық қатынастар, құқық, еркін нарық, өзара тәуелділік, интеграция, либералды басқару, адам құқығы.

Ұсыныстары: Жаһандық проблемаларды шешуде жария күш-жігерді үйлестіру үшін халықаралық режимді дамыту, демократия мен халықаралық институттардың кең таралуына ықпал ету[4].

Жария дипломатия ұғымының неолибералистік ағымға тән екендігін жоғарыдағы негізгі параметрлері бойынша айқындауға болады. Жария дипломатия түсінігінің кең қолданысы халықаралық қатынастардағы «жұмсақ күш» ұғымымен тығыз байланысты.

Жария дипломатияда негізгі қатынастар Джеффри Кован мен Амелиа Арсеноның бірлесіп жазған еңбектерінде бөліп көрсеткен үш деңгей: монолог, диалог, ынтымақтастық негізінде дамиды [5] және неолибералдардың өз теорияларының негізі етіп алған ынтымақтастық мәселесінің бірінші кезектегі мәнін көрсетеді, яғни жария дипломатия бір мемлекеттің басқа мемлекетпен қарым-қатынас орнатуындағы ынтымақтастықты қалыптастыруға бағытталады. Неолибералдар үшін халықаралық ынтымақтастық тұрақтылыққа, әлеуметтік прогресс пен әлемдік тәртіпке жетудің болуы мүмкін ғана емес, қажеттілік болып табылады.

Жария дипломатия терминінің алғашқы қолданысқа ие болған уақыты өткенғасырдың 60-70 жылдары десек, 1960 жылдар соңында саяси реализмнің негізгі ережелерінің бірі – мемлекеттің халықаралық қатынастардың акторы ретіндегі тұжырымы төңірегінде күмән туындап, мемлекеттік-орталықтық тұрғыны жақтаушылар мен олардың қарсыластары арасында қызу пікір сайыстар жанданады да дәл осы кезеңдерде неолиберализмнің бір тармағы транснационализм пайда болады. Саяси реализмді сынаушылардың ең алғашқыларының бірі кіші Джозеф Най мен Роберт Кохэн болды.

Олардың 1970 жылы бірлесіп жарыққа шығарған кітабының негізгі мазмұны халықаралық қатынастардың мемлекеттік-орталықтық бейнесінің дағдарысы және әлемдік саясаттағы мемлекет рөлінің әлсіреуі туралы болды. Авторлар әлемдік саясатты мемлекетті халықаралық жүйенің орталығынан перифериясына ығыстырып, оны әлемдік сахнадағы жай ойыншылардың біріне айналдыратын көпұлтты корпорациялар, трансұлттық қоғамдық қозғалыстар, халықаралық ұйымдар, қаржылық топтар және басқа да жеке акторлар сияқты халықаралық қарым-қатынастардың көпсанды және сан алуан қатысушыларын біріктіретін байланыстардың сан-салалы желісіне теңейді [6, 147 б].

Кіші Джозеф С. Най мен Роберт О.Кохэн өздерінің бірлесіп жазған «Трансұлттық қатынастар және әлемдік саясат» еңбегінің кіріспесінде «Халықаралық қатынастардың теориясында да, практикасында да әлемдік саясатқа мемлекеттік-орталықтық көзқарас үстемдік етеді. Бірақ дипломаттардың да әскерилердің де вакуумде әрекет етпейтіні белгілі. Олардың мінез-құлқына географиялық факторлар, ішкі саясаттың сипаты, ғылыми және техникалық прогресс ықпал етеді. Ядролық қарудың жасалуы XX ғасырдағы халықаралық қатынастардың сипатын түбірімен өзгерткеніне күмәнданатындар немесе мемлекетаралық қатынастарда ішкі саяси құрылымдардың мәнін жоққа шығаратындар көп емес. Мемлекеттік-орталықтық көзқарасты ұстанатындар үшін географиялық фактор, технология, ішкі саясат – бұл мемлекет өзара қарым-қатынасқа түсетін «қоршаған ортаның» аспектілері. Олар мемлекетаралық жүйеге үлес қосады, бірақ зерттеушілерге жайлы болу үшін сыйымсыз элементтер ретінде қарастырылады.

Бірақ, мемлекетаралық саясат қызмет ететін орта тек осы құдіретті және кең танымал күштерден ғана тұрмайды. Түрлі елдердің мемлекет бақылауынан тыс қауымдастықтарының тығыз өзара қарым-қатынастары үлкен саяси рөл атқарады. Мәселен, Батыстың ірі мемлекеттері арасындағы қатынастарда бұл өзара байланыстар сауда, жеке байланыстар, ақпарат алмасуды білдіреді. Осылайша, мемлекеттер әлемдік саясаттың жалғыз акторлары емес» [7, 151 б].

Халықаралық қатынастар жүйесінде, әлемдік саясатта өзара байланыстар тек мемлекеттер арасында ғана емес, әр мемлекет қоғамындағы түрлі қауымдастықтар арасында, тіпті жеке тұлғалар арасында да құрылатындығы бүгінгі күннің шындығына айналды. Жария дипломатияның негізгі мақсаты мемлекеттің саяси билігімен ғана байланыс орнату емес, шетелдік аудиторияға мақсатты бағытталған ықпалды күшейту, халықтар арасындағы біршама терең түсіністікті қалыптастыру; шетелдік аудиториямен ұзақ мерзімді және сенімді қатынастар құру; өз мемлекетінің құндылықтары мен институттарының шет елдерде жақсы түсіністік табуына қол жеткізу; өз мемлекетінің және шет мемлекеттер

азаматтары арасындағы диалогты кеңейту болуының өзі қазіргі әлемдік саясатта транснационалистік бағыттың тек теория ғана емес, практикалық мәнге ие болып отырғандығын және осындай тенденциялар күшеюіне қатысты дәстүрлі дипломатиямен қатар мемлекетаралық қатынастарды дамытуда жария дипломатия сияқты бейресми дипломатия түрлеріне де үлкен назар аударылып отыр.

Халықаралық қатынастардың, әлемдік саясаттың проблемалары, халықаралық аренада орын алып жатқан мәселелердің барлығы да қазіргі таңда бүкіл қоғамның назарында болса, ал сыртқы шешімдерді жүзеге асыру немесе дипломатия өткен ғасырдың екінші жартысы, жаңа ғасырдың басында әр мемлекет қоғамының бақылауына түсті. Бұл дипломатияның ашықтығы, бұқаралық ақпарат құралдарының мүмкіндіктері арқылы жүзеге асса, тағы бір себебі халықаралық аренаға мемлекеттік құрылымдармен салыстырғанда, этникалық, діни қозғалыстардың, қоғамдық ұйымдар мен академиялық орталардың жиі шығып, дәстүрлі дипломатиялық проблемалармен айналыса бастауы еді. Жиырмасыншы ғасырдың екінші жартысында кеңінен қолданысқа түскен бұл дәстүрдің нәтижесінде, жетпісінші жылдардың аяғы сексенінші жылдардың басында қызметтің айрықша бағыты немесе дипломатияның екінші бағыты, немесе бейресми дипломатия қалыптасады. Әлемдік саясаттың, халықаралық қатынастардың сипатының өзгеруі дипломатияның механизмдерінің, ақпараттық-коммуникативті функциясының мәнінің өзгеруіне алып келді. Қазіргі таңда дипломатияның ақпараттық-коммуникативтік қызметі ең алдымен мемлекеттің басқа елдермен диалог, ынтымақтастық орнатуына бағытталған. Дипломатиялық диалог басқа тараптың да өз мүдделері мен мақсаттары бар екендігін мойындауды білдіреді. Қарым-қатынастарды дамыту тұрғысынан бұл тек табиғи және заңдылық қана емес, өнімділіктің де факторы болып табылады [3, 328 б]. Жария дипломатияның да негізгі деңгейінің бірі осы дипломатиялық диалогты құру болып табылады, ынтымақтастыққа әр мемлекет осы сатылар арқылы қол жеткізе алады.

Жария дипломатияның қолданысының, оған деген сұраныстың жоғарылауына транснационалистік ағымның әсері өте үлкен болды, яғни халықаралық қатынастарда мемлекет қана актор бола алмайды деген тұжырымның практикалық маңызының артуы дипломатияда оның бейресми акторларының атынан жүргізілетін бейресми тармағының дамуына алып елді.

Транснационализмнің негізін салушы кіші Джозеф Най 1990 жылдары халықаралық қатынастардағы «жұмсақ күш» ұғымын енгізу арқылы өз идеясын ары қарай дамыта түсті. Дж. Най 1990 жылы жарық көрген «Жетекшілікке шақыру: американдық күштің құбылмалы табиғаты (Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power)» еңбегінде «жұмсақ күш» (soft power) ұғымын енгізіп, анықтама берсе 2003 жылғы АҚШтың

Иракқа әскер енгізуінен кейін жарық көрген «Жұмсақ күш. Әлемдік саясатта табысқа қалай жетуге болады (Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics)» еңбегінде «жұмсақ күш» (soft power) ұғымын әрі қарай дамытып, жетілдіре түсті [9]. Най бойынша, «жұмсақ күш» - қалағаныңа мәжбүрлеу арқылы емес, тартымдылықпен, қызықтыра отырып қол жеткізу қабілеті, яғни билік материалдық, күштік ресурстарға емес, идеялардың тартымдылығына, мәдениет, идеология, үкіметтік емес институттарға халықаралық қатынастарда барынша назар аударуы қажет екен. Ықпал етудің «жұмсақ күші» сәйкесінше, әдетте әскери күш-қуат және экономикалық әлеует сияқты материалдық ресурстармен байланысты «қатаң күшке» қарама-қарсы ұғым болып табылады, бірақ екеуінің де міндеті халықаралық қатынастардың субъектісі ретінде басқа акторлардың мінез-құлқына ықпал ету арқылы алдыға қойылған мақсатқа қол жеткізу. «Жұмсақ күш» пен «қатаң күш» арасындағы қарама-қарсылық сипат олардың тарапынан қолданылатын құралдарда. «Қатаң күш» өз еркін басқаларға күшпен таңу, еріксіз мәжбүрлеу арқылы (экономикалық ресурс немесе күш қолдану қауіпі) мақсатына қол жеткізетін болса, «жұмсақ күш» сыртқы саяси акцияларды келісу арқылы және ынтымақтастыққа қызықтыра отырып тарту арқылы алдыға қойылған мақсаттарын жүзеге асырады. «Жұмсақ күштің» мемлекет саясатына, елдің үкіметіне тәуелділігі төмен, ал «қатаң күш» саяси билікке тікелей тәуелді.

Транснационалистер үшін ішкі және сыртқы саясаттың өзара тәуелділігі тұжырымына көзқарастары бойынша, қазір мемлекеттер арасындағы қатынастар әлемдік саясаттың негізі болып саналмайды, өзара қарым-қатынастардың үкіметаралық, үкіметтік емес ұйымдар, кәсіпорындар, әлеуметтік қозғалыстар, алуан текті ассоциялар және жекелеген тұлғалар сияқты қатысушыларының көптүрлілігі, оның мәдени және ғылыми ынтымақтастық, экономикалық алмасулар, туыстық қатынастар, кәсіби байланыстар сияқты түрлері мен университетаралық әріптестік, конфессияаралық байланыстар, ассоциялар ынтымақтастығы сияқты арналарының көптігі мемлекетті халықаралық байланыстың орталығынан ығыстырып, қарым-қатынастардың транснационалистік түрі қалыптасады екен. Көп санды жаңа акторлар үшін ұлттық шегара деген жоқ. Біздің көз алдымызда саясаттың ішкі және сыртқы болып бөлінуінің еш мәні қалмайтын жаһандық әлем қалыптасады екен [9].

Транснационалистерге ұқсас көзқарастарды структуралистерге де тән, олардың көзқарастары бойынша біздің заманымызда мемлекет өзінің бұрынғы мәнінен айрылып, әлемдік саясаттағы рөлінен айрылған, алдыңғы орынға халықаралық қатынастардың үкіметаралық, үкіметтік емес ұйымдар, транұлттық корпорациялар, әлеуметтік және саяси қозғалыстар сияқты акторлары шығады екен, олардың рөлінің артуы қазіргі таңдағы интеграциялық үрдістердің жандануымен түсіндіріледі.

Дегенмен, транснационалистік, структуралистік бағыттың халықаралық қатынастардың акторларының мемлекеттен де басқа түрлерінің көбеюі, олардың рөлінің артуы туралы көзқарастары жария дипломатия тұжырымын түсіндіруде маңызды болғанымен, мемлекеттің ішкі және сыртқы саясатының маңызы жоқтығы туралы ойлары жария дипломатияның мақсаттарына кереғар, себебі жария дипломатияның мақсатының өзі:

- ұлттық мүддені, ұлттық қауіпсіздікті қамтамасыз ету, мемлекет сыртқы саясатының мақсаттарын қорғау;

- шетелдік аудиторияға мақсатты бағытталған ықпалды күшейту, халықтар арасындағы біршама терең түсіністікті қалыптастыру;

- шетелдік аудиторияда мемлекет тарапынан жүргізіліп отырған ішкі және сыртқы саясаттың мақсаты мен барысына деген жағымды көзқарастарды қалыптастыру болып табылады екен.

Сондықтан жария дипломатияның қалыптасуында негіз болған тұжырымдардың бірі халықаралық өзара тәуелділік туралы тұжырым деуге болады. Әлемдік саясат дегеніміз бір-бірімен өзара тәуелділікте және бір контексте қарастырылатын жаһандық проблемалар, әлемдік саяси жүйенің қазіргі ахуалы және оның даму тенденциялары туралы ілім. Халықаралық өзара тәуелділіктің қатысушылары ретінде тек әлемдік саясаттың негізгі акторы ретінде мойындайтын мемлекетті ғана емес, үкіметаралық ұйымдарды ғана емес, басқа да күштер – үкіметтік емес ұйымдар, трансұлттық ұйымдар, мемлекетішілік аймақтар және т.б. да қарастырады және ішкі және халықаралық саясаттың қарама-қайшылығынан қашқақтайды.

Ұлттық мемлекеттерде сыртқы саясаттың қалыптасуының өзі қазіргі таңда шашыраңқылانған, швейцарлық ғалым Филлип Брайар пікірінше, уақыт өткен сайын кез-келген елде сыртқы саясат сыртқы істер министрлігінің уысынан шығып барады. Барынша күрделі де, сан түрлі проблемаларды бірлесіп басқару қажеттілігі артқан сайын сыртқы саясат басқа да мемлекеттік құрылымдар мен ведомстволар саласына айналды. Ұлттық бюрократияның халықаралық келіссөздерге қатысы бар түрлі топтары өздерінің шетелдік әріптестерімен тікелей байланыс жасауға жиі талпыныс жасайды. Бұл ішкі және халықаралық салалардың өзара өткізгіштігін күшейте түседі.

Р.Кохэн «қырғи-қабақ соғыстың аяқталуы «қырғи-қабақ жауласушылар» мен кеңес-американ қатынастарын зерттеушілердің көпшілігінде бағдарларынан айрылуына алып келсе, әлемдік экономиканың интернационализациясы ішкі және сыртқы саясаттың шегарасын шайғандығы сонша, бұл салаларды бір-бірінен жеке қарастыру барған сайын күрделеніп келеді» деп тікелей айтты. Сондықтан да сыртқы саясатты болжаудың қазіргі әдістері немесе шешім қабылдау үрдісін зерттеуге, немесе ішкі саясаттың саласындағы басқа аспектілері мен жақтарын талдауға сүйенуі кездейсоқтық емес. Және керісінше ішкі саяси үрдістерді

талдау халықаралық жүйедегі өзгерістердің оларға ықпалын есептен тыс қалдыра алмайды.

Сондай-ақ, Р.Кохэн «мемлекет ішілік және халықаралық институттар бір-бірін нығайта отырып өзара байланысады. Демократиялық ішкі саясат және халықаралық қауымдастықтың кеңейуі халықаралық институттардың санының артуымен тығыз байланысты; халықаралық қауымдастық және институттар ішкі таңдауды іске асырудың «кеңістігін» жасайды», - деп көрсетеді [7, 152 б].

Либералдық парадигманы жақтаушылардың қортындыларына сүйенсек, халықаралық қатынастар әр мемлекеттің ішінде болып жатқан өзгерістерге белсенді ықпал етеді және саяси өмірдің ішкі және сыртқы факторларының айырмашылығы өте үлкен емес.

Халықаралық өзара тәуелділік мәселесі халықаралық қатынастар ғылымының шеңберіндегі бәсекелес парадигмалардың ғана емес, басқа пәндер тарапынан да қарастырылады. Заң ғылымы тұрғысынан сыртқы саясаттың ортасы халықаралық жария құқықтың айрықша нормалар жүйесімен реттелетін егеменді мемлекеттер мен үкіметаралық ұйымдардың халықаралық қауымдастығы. Тарихшылар болса, керісінше, ішкі және сыртқы саясат арасында айырмашылық та, өткізбес шектеулер де жоқ, ал олардың бір-бірімен өзара қарым-қатынастары бар, бірақ бұл байланыста біреуі басқасынан үстемдігі байқалады, - деп санаған. Екі ғылым саласының өкілдері де әлемдік сахнадағы өзара қарым-қатынастарды да, халықаралық қатынастардың табиғаты да мемлекеттер, ең бастысы ұлы державалар тарапынан анықталады, - деп санайды.

### **Қорытынды**

Жария дипломатия тұжырымының халықаралық қатынастар ғылымында теориялық қолданылуынан да, іс жүзіндегі қолданысы белсендірек. Қазақстан үшін Димаш феномені қазақстандық жария дипломатияның бір көрінісі деп айтуға болады.

Дегенмен, жария дипломатияның мемлекеттің сыртқы саясатында, халықаралық қатынастарда өзектілікке ие болуы либерализмнің халықаралық қатынастардағы мемлекет монополиясын жоққа шығарған ілімінен бастау алса, кейініректегі неолиберализмнің мемлекеттік емес ұйымдардың, жеке адамдардың да мемлекетаралық қатынастар акторы бола алатындығы туралы қорытындыларынан көрініс тауып, «жұмсақ күштің» іске асырылу формасы ретінде бағаланса, транснационализм, халықаралық өзара тәуелділік сияқты бағыттардағы негізгі идеялар да өз кезегінде елеулі ықпал етті. Жария дипломатияға қолданбалылық сипат көбірек тән. Жария дипломатия, «жұмсақ күш» сияқты жаңа түсініктердің халықаралық қатынастар жүйесіндегі рөлінің арта түсуі жаһандық саясаттың, халықаралық қатынастар жүйесінің сипатының өзгерістері,



трансформацияланып, жаңаша сипатқа ие болғандығы туралы ойларды дәлелдей түседі.

Жария дипломатия – мемлекеттің шет елдермен ұзақ мерзімді қарым-қатынастар орнатуына, ұлттық сыртқы саясатты қорғауына, шетелде мемлекеттің құндылықтары мен институттарын түсінуіне бағытталған іс-әрекеттер. Жария дипломатия шет елдердегі қоғамдық пікірді тану арқылы, оны қалыптастырушыларды ақпараттандыру және оларға ықпал ету арқылы ұлттық мүддені қорғап, ұлттық қауіпсіздікті қамтамасыз етеді. Жария дипломатия бұқаралық аудиторияға бағытталған. Қоғамдық пікір өз үкіметі мен саяси жүйесіне едәуір ықпал етеді дегеннен келіп шыққан. Яғни, жария дипломатияның ерекшелігі қоғамдық пікір халықаралық саясаттағы негізгі әсер етуші фактор дегенімен анықталады.

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## **ПРОБЛЕМА ПУБЛИЧНОЙ ДИПЛОМАТИИ В ТЕОРИИ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ**

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**Аннотация.** В данной статье рассматриваются место и значение публичной дипломатии в теории международных отношений. Публичная дипломатия используется как важный инструмент формирования отношений государств на международной арене, основой которой является распространение информации, обмен мнениями и привлечение международного сообщества к своим целям и интересам. В статье анализируются теоретические аспекты публичной дипломатии, её роль и эффективность в международных отношениях, а также тенденции её развития в соответствии с требованиями современности. Кроме того, рассматривается актуальность публичной дипломатии на современном этапе, её методы использования, влияние информационных технологий и средств массовой информации. Авторы, исследуя новые формы публичной дипломатии в международных политических процессах, определяют её влияние на глобальную политику, а также значимость в формировании имиджа государства.

**Ключевые слова:** международные отношения, публичная дипломатия, теория, государства, информационная политика, медиа, государственный имидж, международное сообщество

## **THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

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**Abstract.** This article examines the place and significance of public diplomacy in the theory of international relations. Public diplomacy is used as an important tool in shaping the relations of states on the international stage, based on the dissemination of information, exchange of opinions, and engaging the international community in its goals and interests. The article analyzes the theoretical aspects of public diplomacy, its role and effectiveness in international relations, as well as trends in its development in accordance with the demands of modernity. In addition, the relevance of public diplomacy at the present stage, its methods of implementation, and the impact of information technologies and mass media are discussed. The authors, by exploring new forms of public diplomacy in international political processes, determine its influence on global politics, as well as its importance in shaping the image of the state.

**Keywords:** international relations, public diplomacy, theory, states, information policy, media, state image, international community

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**‘SOFT POWER’ AS A TOOL FOR EXPANDING FOREIGN POLICY  
CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN  
AND THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA:  
PECULIARITIES AND PROSPECTS**

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**Abstract.** The present article aims to study the particularities and prospects of the utilisation of ‘soft power’ as a tool to strengthen and expand foreign policy cooperation between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The central objective of this study is to identify the distinctive characteristics and common elements in the utilisation of ‘soft power’ by these two nations, in addition to determining the potential for further enhancement of Kazakh-Saudi collaboration. The scientific value of the study lies in addressing the lacunae in the existing literature concerning the utilisation of ‘soft power’ instruments in the diplomatic relations between Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia. The practical value of the study lies in the formulation of recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of bilateral initiatives and consolidate the international image of both countries. The methodological framework of the article was underpinned by a comparative analysis, a content analysis of official documents and speeches by the leaders of the states, a historical approach, and an examination of statistical data on trade turnover and interaction in the spheres of education and culture. The study’s primary findings indicate that both Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia are actively utilising ‘soft power’ instruments such as cultural diplomacy, educational exchanges and economic initiatives, which has resulted in a consistent enhancement in mutual cooperation and an improvement in their international image. The findings emphasise the necessity for further expansion of engagement through the development of new initiatives and programmes aimed at strengthening bilateral relations. The practical significance of the work lies in the possibility of applying the proposed recommendations in the formation of foreign policy strategies of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as well as establishing cooperation with other states of Central Asia and the Middle East.

**Key words:** ‘soft power’, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, cultural diplomacy, foreign policy, cooperation, Gulf, international image

## **Introduction**

In the contemporary context of international relations, the notion of ‘soft power’ has gained significant prominence and is regarded as a pivotal instrument of foreign policy. For the Republic of Kazakhstan (hereinafter RK) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (hereinafter KSA), the utilisation of ‘soft power’ resources engenders novel prospects for the deepening of bilateral cooperation, thereby complementing the conventional mechanisms of ‘hard power’ (military and political pressure, economic coercion) (Sadyrbayeva, 2025). The relevance of the topic is conditioned by the increasing role of cultural and humanitarian ties, educational exchanges and image initiatives in the foreign policy strategy of both states against the background of global geopolitical changes. The present study sets out to analyse the nature of bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and KSA, with a particular focus on the utilisation of ‘soft power’ instruments within these relations. The objective of this paper is to comprehensively analyse the particularities and potential of utilising ‘soft power’ as a means of augmenting foreign policy collaboration between the RK and KSA. In order to achieve this objective, the following tasks must be completed: firstly, to reveal the theoretical basis of the concept of ‘soft power’ and its differences from ‘hard power’; secondly, to identify the main directions and examples of the implementation of ‘soft power’ in the relations between the two countries; thirdly, to conduct a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of these tools; and finally, to identify promising areas for further development of cooperation on the basis of ‘soft power’.

## **Materials and Methods**

The utilisation of ‘soft power’ in the realm of international relations, particularly in the context of foreign policy strategies employed by KSA and RK, continues to be a subject of profound academic discourse. This section of the article presents the main studies on the topic, covering conceptual approaches, regional specifics and key challenges to the use of soft power.

The seminal conceptualisation of ‘soft power’ is attributed to Joseph Nye, who theorised that states can achieve their objectives through not only military and economic capabilities, or ‘hard power’, but also by leveraging the appeal of their culture, political values, and foreign policy (Nye, 2004, 2011; Lebedeva, 2017).

Subsequent scholars have adapted this concept to analyse the foreign policy strategies of various states, including those in Central Asia and the Middle East (Nye, 2021; Wilson, 2008). Concurrently, researchers have observed that for countries such as the RK, ‘soft power’ functions not only as a tool of influence

but also as a mechanism for ensuring reputational security in the context of multilateral external challenges (Cull, 2018; Zhunissova, 2023; Bakhtiyarova, 2024; Akbarova, 2024).

Researchers within the KSA, in the context of 'soft power', emphasise the significance of the religious factor as a key tool of influence (Ramadhan & Aydın, 2025). The KSA, in its capacity as the custodian of the two major Islamic shrines of Mecca and Medina, has utilised Islamic diplomacy to extend its influence in the Muslim world for decades. This has been manifested through the provision of financial support to madrassas, Islamic educational centres, and the construction of mosques in various countries (Ahmed & Karim, 2024). However, a notable shift in Saudi foreign policy has been observed in recent years, with the Vision 2030 programme directing its attention towards cultural diplomacy, sports, and high-tech industries. This strategic realignment reflects the kingdom's ambition to modernise its 'soft power' (AlSaeed, 2025; Jagodzinski, 2023).

The utilisation of 'soft power' in Central Asia, notably in Kazakhstan, is perceived through the lens of post-Soviet transformation and the imperative to enhance the nation's international reputation (Feigenbaum, 2024). Since gaining independence, Kazakhstan has pursued a strategy of 'soft power', characterised by the implementation of educational and cultural initiatives. Notable examples include the Bolashak programme, which attracts foreign students to Kazakhstan's universities, and the organisation of international events such as the OSCE 2010 summit and EXPO 2017 (Akbarova, 2024). Research indicates that these initiatives have contributed to consolidating Kazakhstan's position as an influential actor in the region (Nourzhanov & Peyrouse, 2021). Nevertheless, the sustainability of the impact of these initiatives and Kazakhstan's international policy in a competitive environment remains an open question.

A number of studies have emphasised the competition of 'soft power' in Central Asia. Historically, Russia's influence in Central Asia has been rooted in its linguistic and cultural proximity, while China has utilised economic instruments in conjunction with educational programmes (Cull, 2018; Pirimkulov, 2023). In contrast to these actors, Saudi Arabia has historically relied on religious influence. However, there has been a diversification of its 'soft power' tools, including through the expansion of the tourism sector and sports diplomacy (Ahmed & Karim, 2024).

Another aspect of research is to assess the effectiveness of 'soft power'. According to the Global Soft Power Index, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is ranked 24th in the world on this indicator, while Kazakhstan remains in a less prominent position (Jagodzinski, 2023), indicating that the potential of 'soft power' remains unfulfilled and requires further efforts from the state institutions of both countries. In particular, research (Hudson, 2022) suggests that Kazakhstan needs to better adapt its strategies to international standards of public diplomacy.

The analysis of extant literature confirms that 'soft power' constitutes a



pivotal element of the foreign policy of both Kazakhstan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). However, the approaches and mechanisms of its implementation differ significantly between the two states.

The present study employed a range of both general scientific and specialised analytical methods to provide a comprehensive examination of the utilisation of 'soft power' in the context of bilateral relations between the RK and KSA. A comparative analysis was employed to identify the particularities and overarching trends in the utilisation of 'soft power' by each nation within the context of their cultural, educational, economic and humanitarian initiatives. Case studies of bilateral relations were also conducted, and an interdisciplinary perspective informed by theories of international relations, with a particular emphasis on neoliberal concepts and constructivism, was adopted. This perspective highlighted the role of intangible factors in influencing outcomes. The method of content analysis was used to study documents, official statements and media materials reflecting bilateral cooperation. The employment of a historical approach facilitated the delineation of the evolution of interaction between the nations from the inception of diplomatic relations to the contemporary era. In addition, tabular analysis was employed to demonstrate the dynamics and key directions of bilateral interaction. The author of the concept of 'soft power', J. Nye, along with studies on public diplomacy and cultural interaction, provided the theoretical foundation for the study. The empirical data on Kazakhstan-Saudi relations was then combined with these theoretical findings. This methodological approach ensured the study's comprehensiveness.

## **Results and Discussion**

***The following analysis will examine the utilisation of 'soft power' in the context of bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia. Historical and cultural foundations of co-operation.*** The initial basis for the bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and KSA was a substantial cultural and historical proximity and mutual sympathy. Historical analysis demonstrates that Saudi Arabia was among the first Muslim countries to recognise Kazakhstan's independence following the dissolution of the USSR, with Riyadh formally acknowledging Kazakhstan's sovereignty on 30 December 1991. The establishment of official diplomatic relations between the two countries was formalised on 30 April 1994, with the signing of a protocol by both parties. The protocol was followed by the inaugural official visit of President Nursultan Nazarbayev to Saudi Arabia in September 1994, which signalled a new phase in the bilateral interaction between the two nations. The Saudi side reciprocated with the visit of Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz to Kazakhstan in 2000, which laid the foundation for regular political dialogue. By the mid-1990s, both countries had established embassies in each other's capital cities. Kazakhstan established an embassy in Riyadh in 1995 (and later a consulate general in Jeddah in 2007), while Saudi

Arabia established an embassy in Astana (Nur-Sultan) in 1997 (Chen, 2023).

The historical proximity of the two nations is largely determined by common cultural and civilisational values (Chen, 2023). Both states belong to the Islamic world: Islam is the predominant religion in Kazakhstan and the basis of the KSA's state religious identity. In this context, Saudi diplomats have emphasised that the historical ties between the two nations extend back to the advent of Islam in Kazakhstan, thus underscoring the appeal of their spiritual connections, which span centuries. A notable illustration of this historical depth can be observed in the career of Kazakh diplomat Nazir Torekulov, who served in Saudi Arabia during the 1930s and became the inaugural Kazakh-born diplomat to be appointed as the Soviet ambassador to Jeddah (Satubaldina, 2022). This historical evidence suggests that the foundations for cultural dialogue between peoples were established long before the establishment of modern relations.

The common Islamic values that characterise the region have created a favourable background for the development of 'soft power' in the context of bilateral ties. An annual increase in the number of Kazakh citizens undertaking the pilgrimage (hajj and umrah) to Saudi Arabia is observed, with Mecca and Medina being the primary destinations. This has been identified as a significant factor in the strengthening of religious and humanitarian contacts. According to the Embassy of Kazakhstan, the number of citizens of Kazakhstan visiting the KSA annually has reached up to 20,000, with previous visits primarily focused on pilgrimage. In recent years, there has been an expansion in the geographical and cultural scope of these visits, with Kazakh tourists no longer being limited to places of worship, but also exploring the Kingdom's cultural and historical attractions, such as Riyadh and the historical sites of Al-Ula. Conversely, the interest of Saudi citizens in Kazakhstan as a tourism destination is growing, with natural landscapes, mountains and historical cities attracting approximately 7,000 Saudis per year. These exchanges, involving tourism and pilgrimage, serve as significant components of 'people's diplomacy', fostering mutual understanding and sympathy between the peoples of the two countries (Alhamawi, 2025).

***The following essay will explore the notion of cultural diplomacy and image initiatives in the context of international relations.*** The cultural dimension of 'soft power' in the relations between Astana and Riyadh is manifested through events and projects that demonstrate the rich heritage and values of both countries. Kazakhstan, positioning itself as a secular state with a predominantly Muslim population, actively promotes images of tolerance and intercultural dialogue. Since 2003, Astana has played host to the regular Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions, an international platform inviting KSA representatives (clerics, experts on interreligious dialogue). The participation of Saudi Arabia in this Kazakh initiative is indicative of its acknowledgement of Kazakhstan's pivotal role in fostering interfaith comprehension, a significant component of its 'soft power'.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is recognised as the custodian of Islam's two holy shrines, a position that bestows upon it a distinctive cultural and religious authority. For Kazakhstan, cooperation with the Kingdom in the cultural and religious sphere is seen as a means of strengthening its own status in the Islamic world. In 2011, Kazakhstan chaired the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (hereinafter - OIC), receiving support from Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries in its initiatives. For instance, the active involvement of Kazakhstan in the OIC led to the establishment in 2016 of the Islamic Food Security Organisation, a specialised institution designed to address the humanitarian challenges of food security in countries of the Muslim world, with its headquarters located in Astana. This multilateral engagement exemplifies Kazakhstan's contribution to the shared values of the Ummah (global Muslim community), thereby augmenting its 'soft power' and receiving a favourable reception from Saudi Arabia.

The field of media and communications, as a growing channel of cultural diplomacy, merits separate consideration. In 2022, during official contacts, bilateral agreements on cooperation in the field of media were signed (memorandum signed between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Ministry of Media of Saudi Arabia, 2022), which creates prerequisites for holding Days of Culture, exchange of TV and radio programmes, joint media projects aimed at familiarising the population of the two countries with the life and achievements of each other. There has been a notable increase in Kazakhstan's presence in the Arabic-language information space, with officials of Kazakhstan participating in interviews with Saudi publications and Russian- and English-speaking journalists in Riyadh covering Kazakhstani topics. Conversely, Kazakhstan is also demonstrating an interest in the Saudi press and content, as evidenced by the translation of materials pertaining to the Kingdom's modernisation programme, entitled 'Vision 2030'. The utilisation of digital diplomacy, encompassing social networks and online platforms, facilitates direct communication with audiences in foreign countries, circumventing the constraints imposed by language barriers and official channels, a practice that both parties are increasingly adopting.

***Educational and scientific co-operation.*** The promotion of educational and scientific cooperation is a key component of the foreign policy of many nations. The exchange of educational programmes and the collaboration in scientific and technical domains represent a significant aspect of 'soft power', contributing to the long-term rapprochement of elites and societies. Since gaining independence, Kazakhstan has relied on training national personnel abroad, for example, the Bolashak programme has allowed more than 12,000 young professionals to study abroad (Sadyrbayeva, 2025). While the majority of scholarship holders have pursued their studies in Western and Asian countries, there is also an area of cooperation with Middle Eastern universities. Saudi Arabia, for instance, has extended scholarships to Kazakh students wishing to pursue their education at

universities within the Kingdom. According to the Ministry of Education of Saudi Arabia, grants are available for Kazakhs to study in both secular and Islamic educational institutions in the KSA, with the stated objectives of strengthening academic and professional ties and promoting intercultural understanding. Each year, numerous Kazakh students are sent to prominent Saudi universities, including the Islamic University of Medina and the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST), among others. These students participate in internships and collaborative research projects, fostering scientific collaboration between the two nations (Salem, 2024).

Recent years have seen the emergence of novel forms of collaboration in the domains of science and technology. A notable example is a joint project in the field of digital education: in 2024, the Kazakh startup CodiPlay signed an agreement with the Saudi company AILA to implement innovative educational solutions based on artificial intelligence in 200 schools in Saudi Arabia (Salem, 2024). This initiative, which is supported by the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology of KSA and the Embassy of Kazakhstan, is in alignment with the objectives of the Vision 2030 programme for human capital development (Nakispekova, 2024). Such collaborative endeavours in the high-tech sector not only facilitate the penetration of the Saudi Arabian market by Kazakhstani IT developments, but also serve to portray Kazakhstan as a nation that is receptive to modern, innovative solutions and eager to share its expertise. Conversely, Saudi Arabia exemplifies an openness to external knowledge and technologies, a stance that aligns with its reform strategy and serves to fortify its 'soft power', characterised by its commitment to education and advancement.

Furthermore, both countries advocate for the establishment of direct connections between academic institutions and research centres. Memoranda of co-operation are concluded between educational institutions, for example between Nazarbayev University and prominent Saudi universities. Furthermore, there is a regular exchange of scientists between the two countries, with specialists participating in conferences, both as speakers and as attendees. These conferences are often held on the margins of major events in either Kazakhstan or Saudi Arabia. This ongoing exchange fosters the establishment of a network of personal contacts and trust between the intellectual communities of the two countries, thereby contributing to a robust human capital base that is crucial for the enhancement of bilateral relations.

***The role of economic diplomacy and humanitarian projects in the context of bilateral relations.*** Economic interaction is widely regarded as the cornerstone of bilateral ties, yet it is evident that 'soft power' elements also play a significant role in this area, especially when it comes to the implementation of development programmes and humanitarian initiatives. Kazakhstan, with its abundant natural resources (oil, uranium, grain, etc.), is of particular interest to the KSA as a prospective investment and trade partner. Conversely, Saudi Arabia,

a global leader in financial resources, has emerged as a significant source of capital investment and assistance in infrastructure development projects. Astana perceives this as a pivotal area of collaboration.

Over the span of three decades, the KSA has made a substantial contribution to the development of Kazakhstan's infrastructure and social facilities, thereby reinforcing its positive image. Saudi investors have financed the construction of several landmark facilities, including the Parliament building in Kazakhstan (\$10 million), a cardiology centre in Almaty (\$5 million), a cardiology centre in Astana (\$8 million), and financial support for the Zhas Ұлан military school (\$1 million). The Saudi Fund for Development has provided grants and soft loans to Kazakhstan for projects in communications and public utilities (Chen, 2023). These examples demonstrate that Riyadh has utilised financial and humanitarian instruments to consolidate friendly relations. Such investments are perceived in Kazakhstan not only as an economic benefit, but also as a gesture of goodwill that increases sympathy for KSA.

Conversely, the manifestation of economic 'soft power' is evident in the RK's aspiration to function as a valuable partner for the KSA. The RK's substantial agricultural land and abundant agrarian potential position it as a prospective contributor to food security in the Arab region. Recent years have seen a marked intensification in the scope and nature of collaborative efforts between the two nations in the agricultural sector. This is evidenced by ongoing discussions concerning the initiation of joint ventures for the cultivation of grain and meat, as well as the establishment of agro-enterprises with the involvement of Saudi capital within the Kazakhstani context. As Ambassador M. Menilbekov has observed, the objective is to implement the principle of 'win-win' – one large project in Kazakhstan and one project in Saudi Arabia, mutually beneficial to both economies. For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, investments in Kazakhstan's agriculture correspond to the task of diversification and strengthening food security. For Kazakhstan, Saudi investments mean the inflow of technology and the development of underdeveloped regions (Alhamawi, 2025).

In addition to the agricultural sector, energy has become an important area of economic diplomacy. Historically, both countries are oil exporters, and their cooperation in this sphere is evident in the OPEC+ format. Kazakhstan has been participating in OPEC+ production control agreements since 2016, while Saudi Arabia, as the OPEC leader, assumes a coordinating role in these agreements. However, in the context of 'soft power', interaction in the field of renewable energy and 'green diplomacy' is more indicative. In 2024, a joint investment project was agreed upon, involving the construction of a large wind farm with a capacity of 1 GW in Kazakhstan, with the participation of the Saudi company ACWA Power. This agreement was reached following negotiations between President K.-J. Tokayev and the Minister of Energy of KSA, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman Al Saud (Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement in Akorda



on wind power plant in the Zhetysu region, 2024). The project is economically beneficial and symbolically significant: cooperation in green energy demonstrates a shared commitment to sustainable development and improves the image of both countries on the world stage as responsible partners who care about the environment.

The humanitarian dimension is also manifested in the provision of mutual support in difficult moments. Kazakhstan appreciates the assistance provided by KSA in the 1990s-2000s to overcome the social problems of the transition period. There is evidence of Saudi Arabia providing humanitarian cargoes and charitable donations, such as sending food through organisations of the Islamic world, assistance in the restoration of mosques and historical monuments. For its part, the RK, despite its more modest capabilities, has also participated in humanitarian initiatives under the auspices of the OIC, supporting, in particular, a number of Saudi aid programmes for the poorest countries of the Muslim world. Such actions create an atmosphere of mutual support and solidarity that goes beyond purely pragmatic calculations.

***A comparative analysis of the effectiveness of 'soft power' in bilateral cooperation.*** The experience of Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia in the application of 'soft power' tools is distinguished by the different scale and role of the two states. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a prominent regional power with considerable resources for projecting its influence. In contrast, Kazakhstan adopts a multi-vector foreign policy, seeking to consolidate its status as a peace-loving and stable partner. In the context of bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and KSA, the strategies employed by these two states are, in numerous ways, complementary: the offerings of one are met with demands by the other, and vice versa.

For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its relationship with the Republic of Kazakhstan presents a valuable opportunity to consolidate its influence in the strategically pivotal Central Asian region. Historically, Riyadh has pursued a strategy of 'soft power' in Muslim countries through religious diplomacy and the financial support of development projects. Conversely, Kazakhstan's legislative framework demonstrates a resolute stance against foreign preachers and organisations, driven by concerns regarding the infiltration of radical ideologies. For instance, the direct funding of local Muslim organisations may be interpreted as a potential threat to the export of non-traditional forms of Islam. The country has been consistent in promoting the concept of 'traditional' moderate Islam (Hanafi madhab) and has legally restricted the activities of unregistered religious groups. Consequently, the Saudi leadership has been compelled to recalibrate its diplomatic approach, shifting the focus from direct missionary endeavours to the utilisation of official channels. A notable example of this shift is the Islamic Development Bank (hereinafter IDB), which is predominantly financed by KSA capital and has invested \$1.6bn in the Kazakh economy, primarily into infrastructure and agricultural projects (totaling approximately



70 projects) that have been endorsed by the Kazakh government (as reported in the meeting between Kazakhstan's Foreign Minister and the IDB President in 2024). Moreover, in 2024 the IDB entered into accords to provide financing for a water resources development project with an estimated budget of \$1.153 billion, including a grant of \$3.5 million earmarked for the development of Kazakhstan's water sector. This project represents the most substantial financial commitment in the 51-year history of the bank (Zhandos, 2024). Concurrently, projects of a religious nature (e.g. construction of madrasas, financing of religious buildings) in Kazakhstan are seldom supported by Saudi funds, as official Astana permits only limited external involvement in the religious sphere (Biard, 2019).

It is evident that Saudi Arabia has successfully reoriented its 'soft power' from a purely spiritual to a socio-economic plane, which has proven to be more efficacious. Investments through the IDB and other instruments have resulted in tangible improvements in infrastructure, particularly roads and communications, and have been positively received by Kazakh society.

The economic relations between KSA and KR are characterised by a high degree of effectiveness. The strategic investment in iconic social facilities (parliament, hospitals, etc.) has yielded a disproportionate return on investment in terms of symbolic capital for Riyadh. In turn, Kazakhstan perceives Saudi Arabia as a dependable collaborator, poised to contribute to its developmental agenda. This mutual trust has been instrumental in facilitating new economic agreements. Significantly, by the 2020s, bilateral relations had reached an 'unprecedented level' according to the estimation of the Kazakh President Kasym-Jomart Tokayev. This enhancement in the relationship can be attributed, at least in part, to a steady progression in collaborative endeavours within the 'soft' domains of culture, humanitarian affairs and investment. In addition, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia stands to benefit from the strengthening of ties with Kazakhstan, which serves to expand its diplomatic support for its voice in international organisations and its position as an ally in the Central Asian region. Furthermore, the KSA gains the opportunity to diversify its investments, including in Kazakhstan's mining sector and renewable energy. Empirical evidence demonstrates that investments in material infrastructure, complemented by a respect for local values, have been instrumental in establishing Saudi Arabia as a sought-after investor. For instance, the involvement of ACWA Power in the construction of wind farms was facilitated by a foundation of shared trust and strategic congruence. The RK seeks green investment opportunities, while the KSA aims to enhance its reputation as a 'green investor' and thereby expand its international influence (Ward, 2024).

In the context of its engagement with Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan has achieved notable outcomes through the utilisation of 'soft power'. The potential for expanding the scale of its resources is a salient consideration. Kazakhstan has effectively positioned itself in the eyes of the Saudi leadership as a stable and friendly state that shares common values of Islamic solidarity and is open to

cooperation. The country's multi-vector diplomacy has enabled it to function as a 'cultural bridge' between East and West. For instance, the country's active role in promoting dialogue among civilizations, as evidenced by its involvement in the Congress of Religious Leaders and various peacekeeping initiatives, including the 2010 OSCE summit and the Astana talks on Syria, has contributed to the formation of a positive image of Kazakhstan as a peacemaker. The KSA recognises this reputation and frequently supports Kazakhstan's international initiatives. For instance, Riyadh refrained from criticising Kazakhstan's chairmanship of the OSCE, despite the apparent irrelevance of this organisation to KSA. The mere fact of leadership by a Muslim country was welcomed. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia extended support to Kazakhstan's nomination as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the 2017-2018 term, signifying a notable political rapprochement characterised by mutual trust.

While the cultural and humanitarian presence of Kazakhstan in Saudi Arabia remains less pronounced, some progress is evident. The Kingdom is home to a small Kazakh diaspora, including descendants of migrants and contract labourers, who are becoming a carrier of Kazakh culture. The Embassy of the RK has organised cultural evenings and presentations of Kazakh art, especially during national holidays. Furthermore, there has been an increase in the number of stories about Kazakhstan being broadcast on Saudi television channels, with a particular focus on the country's tourism opportunities, reflecting a growing interest among the audience. In the field of education, Kazakhstani students in KSA act as ambassadors for their country, and upon returning home, they bring a deeper understanding of the Arab world, thereby further developing ties between the two regions. In this sense, Kazakhstani engagement with the Arab world is conducive to the enhancement of bilateral relations.

In evaluating the efficacy of contemporary programmes and initiatives, it is evident that a substantial proportion of the planned projects are being implemented or are in an active phase. The 13 intergovernmental agreements signed in 2022 in the fields of energy, tourism, sports, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, media and financial services have not remained on paper – practical work has begun on many of them. For instance, in the domain of renewable energy, wind farms are already in the implementation stage; in tourism, there has been an increase in tourist traffic; and information agencies are establishing content exchange. Educational cooperation is being strengthened by expanding the Saudi scholarship programme for Kazakh citizens. The utilisation of 'soft power' as a mutually beneficial resource has been demonstrated. Kazakhstan, in particular, stands to benefit from increased investments and support for its initiatives, while Saudi Arabia gains new allies and expanded spheres of influence. Notably, these relations are evolving without coercion, but rather on a voluntary and friendly basis.

Concomitantly, challenges persist. The political systems of secular Kazakhstan and the Sharia kingdom differ, and this has an impact on cultural

exchanges, for example in the format of mass entertainment events. Concurrently, the cultural events in Saudi Arabia, initiated within the framework of the ‘Vision 2030’ programme, have contributed to a rapprochement between the two nations. The Kazakh ambassador has observed an increase in the number of Kazakh citizens visiting Riyadh for reasons beyond religious devotion, including sporting and cultural events organised as part of the ‘Riyadh Season’. The event was inaugurated in 2019 by the General Entertainment Authority as part of the broader Saudi Seasons initiative, which is in support of Saudi Vision 2030. This development is indicative of the growing appeal of contemporary Saudi culture among foreign audiences. In a similar vein, Kazakhstan is seeking to enhance its image as a dynamic Eurasian nation by participating in significant exhibitions and fairs. For instance, Expo-2017 in Astana garnered favourable attention in the Arab media.

In conclusion, the efficacy of ‘soft power’ in fostering cooperation between Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia is manifest in the gradual yet consistent expansion of collaborative domains, the growth of mutual trust and empathy, and the augmentation of people-to-people interactions. The long-term trust, which is based on cultural and value affinity, has complemented pragmatic interests and resulted in the fact that bilateral relations today are characterised as strategically important and unprecedentedly valuable.

***The outlook for the enhancement of interaction between the two nations appears promising.*** The analysis indicates that the potential of ‘soft power’ has not been fully realised, and that in the near future there will be an even deeper intertwining of economic, educational, humanitarian, cultural and digital ties between the RK and KSA (Table 1). The following discussion will focus on the most promising areas.

Table 1 - Main areas of application of ‘soft power’ of Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia

| Direction of co-operation               | Examples of initiatives  | Results and impact   |
|---|--|--|
| Cultural diplomacy                      | Astana Congress of Leaders of World Religions; cultural exhibitions. | Intercultural dialogue, strengthening of positive image.             |
| Educational and scientific co-operation | Saudi Arabia’s scholarship programmes; exchanges of scholars.        | Formation of human resources potential, scientific contacts.         |
| Humanitarian initiatives                | Financial assistance of Saudi Arabia in social projects.             | Increase in mutual trust and positive perception.                    |
| Tourism and pilgrimage                  | Visa-free regime, pilgrimage (hajj, umrah).                          | Increase in tourist traffic and development of ‘people’s diplomacy’. |
| Economic diplomacy                      | ACWA Power wind farm project, agricultural projects.                 | Increased investment, economic development.                          |

***The deepening of cultural and scientific exchanges is of paramount importance.*** In the cultural sphere, the continuation of the Days of Culture of

Kazakhstan in Saudi Arabia and vice versa is recommended, encompassing the screening of films, exhibitions of artists, and tours of musical and theatre groups. Such events have the potential to facilitate a more profound and comprehensive understanding of the cultural heritage of both nations among the respective populations, thereby fostering mutual sympathy and strengthening the bonds between them. Furthermore, joint studies by historians and ethnographers on historical contacts between the peoples of Central Asia and Arabia could also play a significant role, emphasising long-standing ties and continuity. The enhancement of academic exchanges is also recommended, with the introduction of quotas for student exchange programmes and the establishment of joint educational programmes (e.g. double degrees) between universities being advocated. The establishment of Culture and Language Centres could be a promising step in this direction, with the opening of a Kazakh Cultural Information Centre in Riyadh and an Arab Culture Centre in Astana or Almaty. These centres could offer language courses in Kazakh in the KSA and Arabic in Kazakhstan, in addition to thematic seminars, thus facilitating a systematic development of cultural relations between the countries. In the scientific sphere, cooperation could be elevated to a new level through the establishment of joint laboratories on subjects such as renewable energy, agriculture in arid zones, and the study of Islamic art. These laboratories would facilitate collaborative research between Kazakh and Saudi scientists on issues of mutual importance.

***The development of media presence and digital diplomacy.*** In the current era of digital communications, it appears imperative to augment the presence of Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia in each other's information space. A potential initiative to this end could be the initiation of a regular exchange of television programmes, encompassing the broadcast of documentaries pertaining to contemporary Saudi Arabia, its cultural heritage and economic accomplishments, within the Kazakh media sphere, and vice versa. The existing accords on media collaboration should be complemented with substantive content, such as the conception of a collaborative television programme or the establishment of an internet portal dedicated to bilateral cooperation. The utilisation of social networks as a platform for 'soft power' is another potential avenue for bilateral cooperation, with the activity of embassies on Twitter (X), Facebook, Instagram, etc. facilitating the rapid dissemination of positive information. The utilisation of authoritative influencers should be expanded, for instance, by inviting prominent Kazakhstani religious figures to address Saudi platforms, and vice versa, and by inviting Saudi experts to contribute to Kazakhstani media to discuss subjects of mutual interest (spiritual and moral values, youth development, innovations). Special attention could be paid to joint youth projects in the digital environment, such as organising competitions for bloggers and hackathons dedicated to solutions to social problems with teams from KR and KSA. These initiatives are congruent with the strategic documents of both countries that prioritize youth and

innovation (Kazakhstan - 'Strategy 2050', Saudi Arabia - 'Vision 2030').

***New forms of cooperation within the framework of international organisations have emerged.*** The RK and KSA are already partners in a number of multilateral organisations (UN, OIC, IDB, etc.). A promising development is the institutionalisation of the Central Asia-Gulf Cooperation Council dialogue. The inaugural summit between the heads of Central Asia and the Gulf States was convened in Jeddah in July 2023, with the participation of all five Central Asian presidents and the leadership of Saudi Arabia. This summit culminated in the adoption of a Joint Roadmap for the expansion of cooperation in trade, investment and security. The plan is for these forums to become a regular occurrence, with a summit in Samarkand expected in 2025 (Ward, 2024). Within this new platform, Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia could propose collaborative projects, such as the establishment of a specialised fund, Gulf Capital, to facilitate cultural exchanges and support entrepreneurial ventures focused on both regions. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia could potentially become involved in other initiatives promoted by Kazakhstan in Asia, such as the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, where Riyadh is still an observer. Furthermore, the joint participation in UN peacekeeping and humanitarian operations could represent a new facet of cooperation. Kazakhstan has experience in peacekeeping operations, as evidenced by its involvement in Lebanon and Afghanistan, while Saudi Arabia has both the necessary resources and a vested interest in the stability of the Muslim world. In the long term, there is a strong possibility of coordination between the two countries on global challenges, such as climate change, given their shared urgent problems of desertification and the need for effective water management. A notable example of this cooperation is the 'One Water Summit', which was co-organised by Kazakhstan and France with the support of the Saudi prince Mohammed bin Salman in 2024 in Riyadh (Abuova, 2024). Such events not only address pressing issues, but also serve to consolidate the standing of Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia as proactive leaders poised to collectively spearhead international initiatives.

Another promising form of interaction could be cooperation within the framework of major international events organised by the parties. For instance, Saudi Arabia is preparing to host the Expo 2030 World Exhibition in Riyadh and the 2034 FIFA World Cup. Kazakhstan, which has experience in hosting Expo 2017 and a major OIC summit, could offer its expertise and active participation in these events. Such involvement would present an opportunity to showcase Kazakhstan's achievements to a broad global and Saudi audience, while demonstrating support for the Kingdom's significant endeavours. In return, Saudi Arabia could support Kazakhstan's aspirations to host new international forums or competitions. For example, Astana has applied to host Expo-2025 and, although it was not successful in its bid, it may submit a bid for other international events in the future. The mutual support on global platforms to which this would



give rise is likely to result in a strengthening of the political bond between the two countries.

The final point to consider is the role of 'soft power' in fostering international relations. The two countries have been increasingly focusing on the 'human dimension' in their foreign policies, evident through measures such as the protection of their citizens abroad, the liberalisation of visas since 2022, the restoration of visa-free travel for Saudi citizens for up to 30 days by Kazakhstan, and the launch of an electronic visa for Kazakhstanis by Saudi Arabia. This is further supported by the development of tourism, as evidenced by the introduction of the Saudi Visa for Kazakhstan Citizens in 2024. This development signifies an augmentation in the number of individuals from both states who will be directly engaged in mutual interactions. While the current figures of 7,000 Saudis and 20,000 Kazakhs may appear modest, it is anticipated that these numbers will increase exponentially in the coming years, particularly with the introduction of direct air travel and the promotion of tourist routes. Consequently, the concept of 'soft power' is progressively transitioning from the domain of abstract notions to the tangible experience of numerous individuals, thereby shaping the future of friendship and partnership between Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia. The extent to which this experience is positive will significantly influence the trajectory of these bilateral relations.

### **Conclusion**

This study corroborates the notion that 'soft power' constitutes an efficacious instrument for the enhancement of foreign policy collaboration between the RK and KSA. Theoretical analysis has demonstrated that, by leveraging the allure of culture, values, educational and humanitarian initiatives, states can attain outcomes that are beyond the reach of pressure methods alone. The historical commonalities between Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia, including their shared Islamic heritage and Silk Road traditions, have created a conducive environment for the application of 'soft power'. The political determination of the leadership of both countries has further facilitated this process, ensuring that it is purposeful and effective.

In the context of bilateral interaction, Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia have employed a diverse array of instruments, ranging from cultural diplomacy (exchanges, joint events, image projects) and educational cooperation (scholarships, scientific exchanges) to economic and humanitarian initiatives (investments in social facilities, assistance in infrastructure development). A detailed analysis of specific examples, including Saudi Arabia's financing of significant facilities in Kazakhstan, the increase in tourist and pilgrimage trips, and joint projects in renewable energy and digital education, demonstrates the growth of mutual trust and interest. The utilisation of 'soft power' has been instrumental in elevating relations to the level of a strategic partnership, which is



founded on more than mere calculations, but also on authentic friendship.

It is imperative to accentuate that the utilisation of ‘soft power’ is characterised by its bilateral nature, engendering reciprocal benefits for both states. In turn, Kazakhstan has been able to diversify its foreign relations, attract investment and gain the support of an influential partner in the Islamic world. Conversely, Saudi Arabia has consolidated its presence in Central Asia, expanded its network of allies, and improved its image by demonstrating contributions and respect for its partners. A thorough evaluation of ongoing programmes reveals that numerous initiatives have yielded substantial outcomes, including an augmentation in trade turnover, the initiation of investment projects, and an escalation in bilateral contacts at the citizen level.

The prospects for the development of bilateral relations through the prism of ‘soft power’ appear favourable. New initiatives in the cultural and educational spheres, cooperation in media and digital technologies, and joint leadership in international organisations could take the partnership to an even higher level. The RK and KSA have different but complementary ‘soft power’ resources, and combining them is key to forging strong ties for decades to come. It can be predicted that as the strategic programmes (‘Kazakhstan-2050’ and ‘Vision 2030’) are implemented, the importance of intangible factors in the foreign policy of the two countries will grow, making ‘soft power’ an integral element of their diplomatic toolkit.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the experience of relations between Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia clearly demonstrates that ‘soft power’ can overcome geographical distance and differences in political systems, creating a basis for mutually beneficial co-operation. Building on respect, culture and knowledge, both countries are building a partnership model that enhances their status on the international stage and contributes to stability and prosperity regionally and globally. In the face of 21st century challenges - from geopolitical turbulence to global development issues - it is ‘soft power’ tools that may prove key to building the trust and solidarity that the global community so desperately needs. Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia, using the advantages of ‘soft power’, are laying a solid foundation for the future of their bilateral relations and demonstrating an example of how great foreign policy goals are achieved through culture and co-operation.

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**«ЖҰМСАҚ КҮШ» ҚАЗАҚСТАН РЕСПУБЛИКАСЫ МЕН  
САУД АРАБИЯСЫ КОРОЛЬДІГІНІҢ СЫРТҚЫ САЯСИ  
ЫНТЫМАҚТАСТЫҒЫН КЕҢЕЙТУ ҚҰРАЛЫ РЕТІНДЕ:  
ЕРЕКШЕЛІКТЕРІ МЕН ПЕРСПЕКТИВАЛАРЫ**

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**Аңдатпа.** Бұл мақала Қазақстан Республикасы мен Сауд Арабиясы Корольдігінің сыртқы саяси ынтымақтастығын нығайту және кеңейту құралы ретінде «жұмсақ күш» қолданудың ерекшеліктері мен перспективаларын зерделеуге бағытталған. Жұмыстың негізгі мақсаты екі мемлекеттің жұмсақ күшті іске асыру тәсілдерінің ерекшелігі мен жалпы ерекшеліктерін анықтау, сондай-ақ Қазақстан-Сауд ынтымақтастығын одан әрі тереңдету перспективаларын айқындау болып табылады. Зерттеудің ғылыми маңыздылығы Қазақстан мен Сауд Арабиясы арасындағы қарым-қатынаста «жұмсақ күш» құралдарын қолдануды зерттеудегі жеткіліксіз талдаумен байланысты олқылықтардың орнын толтырудан тұрады. Практикалық құндылық-екіжақты бастамалардың тиімділігін арттыру және екі елдің халықаралық имиджін нығайту бойынша ұсыныстар әзірлеу. Мақаланың әдіснамалық негізі салыстырмалы талдау, Ресми құжаттар мен мемлекет көшбасшыларының сөйлеген сөздерін контент-талдау, Тарихи тәсіл, сондай-ақ тауар айналымы және білім беру мен мәдениет салаларындағы өзара іс-қимыл туралы статистикалық деректерді зерделеу болды. Зерттеудің негізгі нәтижелері Қазақстан мен Сауд Арабиясының мәдени дипломатия, білім беру алмасулары және экономикалық бастамалар сияқты «жұмсақ күш» құралдарын белсенді пайдаланатынын көрсетеді, бұл өзара ынтымақтастықтың тұрақты өсуіне және олардың халықаралық имиджінің жақсаруына әкелді. Алынған тұжырымдар екіжақты қатынастарды нығайтуға бағытталған жаңа бастамалар мен бағдарламаларды дамыту арқылы өзара іс-қимылды одан әрі кеңейту қажеттігін көрсетеді. Жұмыстың практикалық маңыздылығы Қазақстан Республикасы мен Сауд Арабиясы Корольдігінің сыртқы саяси стратегияларын қалыптастыру кезінде ұсынылған ұсынымдарды қолдану, сондай-ақ Орталық Азия мен Таяу Шығыстың басқа мемлекеттерімен ынтымақтастықты жолға қоюда жатыр.

**Тірек сөздер:** «жұмсақ күш», Қазақстан, Сауд Арабиясы, мәдени дипломатия, Сыртқы саясат, ынтымақтастық, шығанақ, халықаралық имидж

## **«МЯГКАЯ СИЛА» КАК ИНСТРУМЕНТ РАСШИРЕНИЯ ВНЕШНЕПОЛИТИЧЕСКОГО СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВА РЕСПУБЛИКИ КАЗАХСТАН И КОРОЛЕВСТВА САУДОВСКОЙ АРАВИИ: ОСОБЕННОСТИ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ**

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**Аннотация.** Данная статья направлена на изучение особенностей и перспектив применения «мягкой силы» как инструмента укрепления и расширения внешнеполитического сотрудничества Республики Казахстан и Королевства Саудовской Аравии. Основной целью работы является выявление специфики и общих черт подходов двух государств к реализации мягкой силы, а также определение перспектив дальнейшего углубления казахстанско-саудовского сотрудничества. Научная значимость исследования состоит в восполнении пробелов, связанных с недостаточным анализом в исследовании применения инструментов «мягкой силы» в отношениях Казахстана и Саудовской Аравии. Практическая ценность заключается в выработке рекомендаций по повышению эффективности двусторонних инициатив и укреплению международного имиджа обеих стран. Методологической основой статьи стали сравнительный анализ, контент-анализ официальных документов и выступлений лидеров государств, исторический подход, а также изучение статистических данных о товарообороте и взаимодействии в сферах образования и культуры. Основные результаты исследования свидетельствуют о том, что Казахстан и Саудовская Аравия активно используют инструменты «мягкой силы», такие как культурная дипломатия, образовательные обмены и экономические инициативы, что привело к устойчивому росту взаимного сотрудничества и улучшению их международного имиджа. Полученные выводы подчеркивают необходимость дальнейшего расширения взаимодействия через развитие новых инициатив и программ, направленных на укрепление двусторонних отношений. Практическое значение работы заключается в возможности применения предложенных рекомендаций при формировании внешнеполитических стратегий Республики Казахстан и Королевства Саудовская Аравия, и также налаживанию сотрудничества с другими государствами Центральной Азии и Ближнего Востока.

**Ключевые слова:** «мягкая сила», Казахстан, Саудовская Аравия, культурная дипломатия, внешняя политика, сотрудничество, Залив, международный имидж

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## **THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PROMOTING WATER DIPLOMACY IN CENTRAL ASIA**

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**Abstract.** The transboundary water resources of Central Asia serve as a fundamental element for maintaining regional stability and achieving sustainable development in modern times. The research evaluates international organizations including the UN, World Bank, EU, OSCE and IFAS to develop water diplomacy for managing Amudarya and Syrdarya river basins. Content analysis of regulatory legal acts together with expert reports and comparative statistics on financing and water security have been used to identify three main areas of their activity which include developing a legal framework and financing infrastructure projects and mediating water disputes. The quantitative analysis reveals that infrastructure modernization receives more than 70% of funding but institutional development programs and local specialist training receive less than 10% of the total funds. The large discrepancies in water resources between Tajikistan at 8,500 m<sup>3</sup>/year per person and Uzbekistan at less than 3,000 m<sup>3</sup>/year create intensified interstate conflicts which proves the necessity of effective diplomatic efforts. The EU-Central Asia Water Cooperation initiatives and OSCE mediation activities show that project success depends heavily on political party commitment and strategic alignment. The development of human potential receives special focus through training initiatives and negotiation platforms establishment. The research data allows to suggest improvements for the legal framework alongside funding diversification that focuses on educational programs and enhanced international organization coordination with regional governments. The research findings provide essential information to develop sustainable long-term strategies for climate change adaptation and water resources management in Central Asia.

**Key words:** water diplomacy, international organizations, transboundary water resources, Central Asia, international cooperation, stakeholder engagement, basin commissions, environmental risks

### **Introduction**

A literature review on the topic of water diplomacy in Central Asia demonstrates the importance of international organizations in managing the region's water resources. Research shows that transboundary rivers such as the Amudarya and Syrdarya are a source of both cooperation and conflict between the countries of the region. International organizations play a key role in shaping legal norms, providing financial support and platforms for negotiations.

The influence of international organizations on water diplomacy According to a study by Allouche (2007), international organizations, including the United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union and the OSCE, contribute to the development of water diplomacy in the region. They provide financial support, contribute to the modernization of infrastructure and provide technical advice [1]. For example, the European Union, through the EU-Central Asia Water Cooperation Program, supports regional initiatives to improve water resources management [3].

Regional initiatives and their analysis studies by Dukhovny and De Schutter (2011) show that regional organizations such as the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) operate in Central Asia, which seek to coordinate the efforts of countries on water resources management. However, their effectiveness is often limited by political differences and lack of funding [4].

International organizations as intermediaries in the settlement of water conflicts - Schmeier (2013) emphasizes that international organizations play a key role in preventing conflicts related to the allocation of water resources. The OSCE and the World Bank have repeatedly acted as intermediaries in negotiations between the Central Asian countries, which contributed to the conclusion of a number of agreements and the modernization of hydraulic structures [4]. Empirical data and comparative analysis - According to the UNDP (2019), water availability per capita in Tajikistan is about 8,500 cubic meters per year, while in Uzbekistan it is less than 3,000 cubic meters. This imbalance leads to interstate tensions [5]. In a comparative analysis of the approaches of international organizations, it is noted that the UN focuses on legal norms, the World Bank on infrastructure projects, and the European Union supports regional cooperation through financial programs [7].

According to the World Bank report (2019), one of the main challenges in the region is the uneven distribution of water resources: Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have major water reserves, while Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are experiencing water shortages. This creates the basis for potential conflicts and makes water diplomacy an important tool for crisis prevention [6].

In addition, the impact of climate change on the water balance in Central Asia continues to grow. According to ADB (2021), the reduction of glaciers in the region leads to a decrease in the flow of large rivers such as the Amudarya and Syrdarya, which increases competition for water resources [8]. International organizations such as the UNDP and the GEF are actively developing projects on adaptation to a changing climate and sustainable use of water resources [9].

Conclusions from the literature review - an analysis of the existing literature shows that international organizations have a significant impact on water diplomacy in Central Asia. They contribute to the development of strategies, conflict prevention and modernization of water management systems [10]. However, the effectiveness of these efforts depends on the political will of



the countries of the region, the level of coordination between the organizations and the availability of financial resources.

### **Materials and methods**

This study uses an interdisciplinary approach combining both qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis. The main focus is on the study of documentary sources, including regulatory legal acts, international agreements, official reports of international organizations (UN, World Bank, OSCE, European Union, etc.), as well as strategic programs regulating transboundary water resources management in Central Asia. The use of content analysis made it possible to identify the key areas of activity of these organizations, as well as to determine the degree of their influence on the processes of water diplomacy in the region. A comparative analysis was used to identify differences and similar trends in the strategies of international organizations. Special attention is paid to various approaches to the legal regulation of water resources, financial support mechanisms, institutional cooperation and infrastructural initiatives. In addition, individual examples of international cooperation in this field have been studied. The case study method allowed us to consider specific cases of participation of international organizations in water resources management, including the activities of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, as well as mediation and coordination functions performed by the OSCE and the World Bank. To substantiate the revealed patterns, quantitative methods were used, including the analysis of statistical data characterizing the level of water availability in the countries of the region, the volume of international financing and the effectiveness of implemented programs. Additionally, a qualitative analysis of expert opinions presented in analytical reports, scientific publications and conference materials on water diplomacy and cross-border cooperation was carried out. The integrated application of these methods provided a holistic assessment of the contribution of international organizations to the development of water diplomacy in Central Asia. The revealed patterns and factors influencing the effectiveness of international cooperation make it possible to identify promising areas for further development of this area.

### **Results**

An analysis of the collected data showed that international organizations have a significant impact on water diplomacy in Central Asia. The study revealed that such structures as the UN, the World Bank, the OSCE and the European Union are most active. Their activities cover three key areas: regulatory and legal regulation, financial support and mediation in the settlement of water conflicts.

International organizations have both direct and indirect influence on the water policy of the countries of the region. For example, the World Bank plays a leading role in the modernization of hydraulic structures, financing major

infrastructure projects. At the same time, the UN, through its UN-Water program, coordinates the development of water resources management strategies at the global level, which helps strengthen the international legal framework. The OSCE, in turn, promotes the peaceful resolution of water conflicts by organizing negotiation platforms and diplomatic initiatives.




Figure-1. Distribution of international project financing [7, 11]

The presented diagram (Figure 1) shows the distribution of financial resources allocated by various international organizations for the implementation of projects. The leading position is occupied by the World Bank, whose contribution amounts to USD 750 million, which significantly exceeds the funding of other organizations. The European Union has provided \$500 million, and the United Nations (UN) has provided \$300 million, making them the second and third largest donors. Comparatively smaller amounts were provided by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – \$ 200 million and the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) - \$ 150 million. An even smaller amount of funding was recorded for bilateral cooperation programs (\$100 million), the Global Environment Facility (GEF) (\$90 million) and the Asian Development Bank (\$80 million). The analysis of the presented data allows us to conclude that the most significant financing is provided by the World Bank and the European Union, which underlines their leading role in supporting international initiatives. At the same time, the amount of funding from other organizations indicates a significant variety of sources involved in the development of these projects.

Financing from international organizations is crucial for the sustainable management of water resources. However, the analysis shows that most of the funds are allocated to infrastructure projects, while institutional development and educational programs receive less than 10% of the total funding.




Figure-2. Distribution of water resources per capita in the countries of the region [3, 12]

Figure 2 illustrates the average volume of available water resources per capita in various countries (m³/year). Tajikistan is the leader in water resources (8,500 m³/year), which is due to significant glacial reserves and mountain rivers. Kazakhstan (6,000 m³/year) and Kyrgyzstan (5,500 m³/year) also have relatively high rates due to the presence of large reservoirs and mountain springs. Turkmenistan (4,000 m³/year) and China (Xinjiang) (4,200 m³/year) are in the middle range, but face the problem of uneven distribution of water resources. Mongolia (3,500 m³/year), Uzbekistan (2,800 m³/year) and Afghanistan (2,500 m³/year) have the lowest water reserves per capita, which indicates a higher water burden and the need for effective water resources management. Thus, the data confirm that water resources are unevenly distributed, which can have an impact on the economy, agriculture and ecosystem sustainability in the region. Differences in water availability create significant imbalances in access to water resources and affect the economic development of countries in the region. For example, in Uzbekistan, where per capita water availability is one of the lowest, high dependence on transboundary water sources reinforces the need for international cooperation. Figure 3 presents a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of various international programs, expressed in the percentage of successfully implemented initiatives. The World Bank’s programs demonstrate the highest effectiveness (72%), which indicates a high level of project planning and implementation. The programs of the European Union (65%) and the

initiatives of the United Nations (60%) also demonstrate a significant level of success. OSCE mediation (55%) and regional initiatives of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (50%) have moderate effectiveness, which may be due to the complexity of coordination and specific regional challenges. Bilateral cooperation programs (45%) and initiatives of the Global Environment Facility (48%) have a relatively low percentage of successful projects, which may indicate the need to improve control mechanisms and adapt strategies. The Asian Development Bank's water initiatives demonstrate 52% efficiency, reflecting the complexity of water resources management in the region. In general, the data emphasize that the success of international programs varies depending on the organizational structure, field of activity and implementation mechanisms.




Figure-3. Effectiveness of international initiatives [13, 14]

Table -1. Main directions of investments in water management (in millions of US dollars) [15, 18]

| Investment direction   | Investment volume (\$million) |
|--|-------------------------------|
| Infrastructure projects  | 800                           |
| Legal regulation   | 200                           |
| Research and monitoring  | 150                           |
| Environmental initiatives  | 120                           |
| Educational programs   | 100                           |
| Development of new water treatment technologies                        | 180                           |
| Development of a system for collecting and analyzing hydrological data | 140                           |

Table-1 shows the distribution of investments in various areas of water management. The largest investments are directed to infrastructure projects (USD 800 million), which underlines the priority of developing water management facilities such as dams, reservoirs and irrigation systems. Legal regulation (\$200 million) and development of new water treatment technologies (\$180 million)

They also receive significant funding, which indicates the need to modernize legislation and introduce innovative solutions to improve the quality of water resources. Comparatively smaller but important investments are aimed at research and monitoring (\$150 million), the development of a system for collecting and analyzing hydrological data (\$140 million), environmental initiatives (\$120 million) and educational programs (\$100 million). These areas provide an integrated approach to water management, including environmental protection, improved monitoring of water resources, and increased public awareness. Overall, the data show that water management requires comprehensive financing combining infrastructural development, scientific research, legal mechanisms and educational programs to achieve sustainable use of water resources.

**Discussion**

The case study of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) has demonstrated that, despite significant funding from international structures, its effectiveness is limited by political differences between the countries of the region and insufficient coordination between stakeholders. At the same time, the OSCE’s mediation role in the water negotiations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan has shown positive results, contributing to the conclusion of a number of agreements on joint water resources management.




Figure-4. Financing of projects to improve water management [15]

Figure 4 shows the directions of financing projects aimed at improving water management. The largest investments (USD 130 million) are aimed at the development of a water conservation system, which underlines the urgency of the problem of rational use of water resources. Modern technologies for monitoring water resources (\$115 million) They are also a priority area, as they help to track changes in water reserves and predict the water balance. Comparatively smaller but significant funds have been allocated for ecosystem services and restoration of reservoirs (\$90 million), sustainable agricultural practices (\$85 million) and

joint research programs of the countries of the region (\$75 million). These areas contribute to the long-term conservation of aquatic ecosystems and the sustainable development of agriculture.




Figure-5. Dynamics of changes in water resources (decrease in reserves in % over 10 years) [16, 17]

Figure 5 shows data on the decline of water reserves in the countries of the region over the past 10 years. The largest decrease in water resources was recorded in Turkmenistan (15%) and Uzbekistan (12%), which indicates a high degree of water stress in these countries. The main reasons for this reduction are the intensification of agricultural water use, low efficiency of irrigation systems, and climate change. Kazakhstan (8%), Kyrgyzstan (6%) and Tajikistan (5%) are also experiencing a decrease in water resources, but the rate of decline in these countries is slightly lower. This may be due to more favorable climatic conditions, less stress on water systems, and more efficient water resource management methods. These tables emphasize the need to implement strategies for sustainable water use, such as upgrading irrigation systems, increasing water conservation in agriculture, and developing regional cooperation for the rational allocation of water resources.

Table-2. The main factors affecting the water balance of the region (% of total resource loss) [19, 20]

| The influence factor                           | Contribution to the loss of water resources (%) |
|--|---|
| Climate change                                 | 40%   |
| The growth of water consumption in agriculture | 30%   |
| Industrial use of water                        | 15%   |
| Demographic growth and urbanization            | 10%   |
| Losses due to outdated infrastructure          | 5%  |



Table-2 shows the key factors affecting the water balance of the region, expressed as a percentage of the total loss of water resources. Climate change has the greatest impact (40%), causing a decrease in the level of rivers and reservoirs, a decrease in groundwater reserves and an increase in evaporation. The increase in agricultural water consumption (30%) is also a significant factor, as most of the region's water resources are used for irrigation, often with low efficiency. Industrial water use (15%) includes the needs of manufacturing, energy and mining industries, which increases the burden on water resources. Demographic growth and urbanization (10%) lead to an increase in domestic water consumption, an increase in the need for infrastructure and an increased burden on water treatment systems. The least contribution (5%) is due to water losses due to outdated infrastructure, including leaks in pipelines and low efficiency of water supply systems. The data highlight the need for comprehensive water resource management measures, including adaptation to climate change, improved water use in agriculture, and infrastructure modernization.

### **Conclusion**

International organizations play an important role in shaping water diplomacy strategies in Central Asia, offering legal, financial and institutional mechanisms for managing transboundary water resources. The effectiveness of their work depends on the degree of coordination between organizations and national Governments, as well as on the political will of the countries of the region. The main areas of international engagement include regulatory frameworks (UN), financing of infrastructure projects (World Bank), support for regional cooperation (EU) and mediation in negotiations (OSCE). Despite some success, many initiatives face difficulties in implementation due to political differences and limited financial resources. In the future, it is necessary to strengthen coordination between the countries of the region and international organizations, as well as to develop long-term mechanisms for sustainable water resources management, taking into account economic and environmental factors. The expansion of educational programs and research is required to raise awareness of modern methods of water resources management and to increase the level of international cooperation. An important area of further research is to evaluate the effectiveness of existing international programs and develop new tools for more flexible and sustainable water resources management in a changing climate. The development of modern water treatment technologies and hydrological data monitoring systems should be considered as promising areas of investment in sustainable water resources management.

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## **ОРТАЛЫҚ АЗИЯДА СУ ДИПЛОМАТИЯСЫНЫҢ ДАМУЫНДАҒЫ ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ ҰЙЫМДАРДЫҢ РӨЛІ**

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**Аңдатпа.** Орталық Азияның трансшекаралық су ресурстары өңірлік тұрақтылықты сақтау және біздің заманымызда орнықты дамуға қол жеткізу үшін іргелі элемент ретінде қызмет етеді. Зерттеу Амудария және Сырдария өзендерінің бассейндерін басқару үшін су дипломатиясын дамыту мақсатында БҰҰ, Дүниежүзілік банк, ЕО, ЕҚЫҰ және ХҚЕС қоса алғанда, Халықаралық ұйымдарға баға берді. Нормативтік құқықтық актілердің

Контент-талдауы сараптамалық қорытындылармен және қаржыландыру және су қауіпсіздігі бойынша салыстырмалы статистикамен бірге құқықтық базаны әзірлеуді, инфрақұрылымдық жобаларды қаржыландыруды және су дауларында делдалдықты қамтитын олардың қызметінің үш негізгі бағытын анықтау үшін пайдаланылды. Сандық талдау көрсеткендей, қаржыландырудың 70% - дан астамы инфрақұрылымды жаңғыртуға бөлінеді, бірақ институционалдық даму бағдарламалары мен жергілікті мамандарды даярлауға қаражаттың жалпы көлемінің 10% - дан азы бөлінеді. Тәжікстан (бір адамға жылына 8500 м3) мен Өзбекстан (жылына 3000 м3-тен аз) арасындағы су ресурстарындағы үлкен айырмашылықтар мемлекетаралық қақтығыстардың шиеленісуіне әкеліп соғады, бұл тиімді дипломатиялық күш-жігердің қажеттілігін дәлелдейді. ЕО-ның Орталық Азия елдері арасындағы су ынтымақтастығы жөніндегі бастамалары мен ЕҚЫҰ-ның делдалдық қызметі жобаның табысы негізінен саяси партиялардың міндеттемелері мен стратегиялық келісімге байланысты екенін көрсетеді. Адами әлеуетті дамытуға оқыту және келіссөздер платформаларын құру жөніндегі бастамалар шеңберінде ерекше назар аударылады. Бұл зерттеулер құқықтық базаны жетілдіруді, сондай-ақ білім беру бағдарламаларына бағытталған қаржыландыруды әртараптандыруды және халықаралық ұйымдардың өңірлік үкіметтермен үйлестіруін күшейтуді ұсынуға мүмкіндік береді. Зерттеу нәтижелері Орталық Азиядағы климаттың өзгеруіне бейімделу мен су ресурстарын басқарудың тұрақты ұзақ мерзімді стратегияларын әзірлеу үшін маңызды ақпарат береді.

**Тірек сөздер:** су дипломатиясы, халықаралық ұйымдар, трансшекаралық су ресурстары, Орталық Азия, халықаралық ынтымақтастық, мүдделі тараптарды тарту, бассейндік комиссиялар, экологиялық тәуекелдер

## **РОЛЬ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЙ В РАЗВИТИИ ВОДНОЙ ДИПЛОМАТИИ В ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ АЗИИ**

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**Аннотация.** Трансграничные водные ресурсы Центральной Азии служат фундаментальным элементом для поддержания региональной стабильности и достижения устойчивого развития в наше время. В исследовании дана оценка международным организациям, включая ООН, Всемирный банк, ЕС, ОБСЕ и МФСА, в целях развития водной дипломатии для управления бассейнами рек Амударья и Сырдарья. Контент-анализ нормативных правовых актов вместе с экспертными заключениями и сравнительной статистикой по финансированию и

водной безопасности был использован для определения трех основных направлений их деятельности, которые включают разработку правовой базы, финансирование инфраструктурных проектов и посредничество в водных спорах. Количественный анализ показывает, что на модернизацию инфраструктуры выделяется более 70% финансирования, но на программы институционального развития и подготовку местных специалистов выделяется менее 10% от общего объема средств. Большие различия в водных ресурсах между Таджикистаном (8500 м<sup>3</sup>/год на человека) и Узбекистаном (менее 3000 м<sup>3</sup>/год) приводят к обострению межгосударственных конфликтов, что доказывает необходимость эффективных дипломатических усилий. Инициативы ЕС по водному сотрудничеству между странами Центральной Азии и посредническая деятельность ОБСЕ показывают, что успех проекта в значительной степени зависит от приверженности политических партий и стратегического согласования. Развитию человеческого потенциала уделяется особое внимание в рамках инициатив по обучению и созданию переговорных платформ. Данные исследования позволяют предложить усовершенствования правовой базы, а также диверсификацию финансирования, направленную на образовательные программы и усиление координации международных организаций с региональными правительствами. Результаты исследования предоставляют важную информацию для разработки устойчивых долгосрочных стратегий адаптации к изменению климата и управления водными ресурсами в Центральной Азии.

**Ключевые слова:** водная дипломатия, международные организации, трансграничные водные ресурсы, Центральная Азия, международное сотрудничество, вовлечение заинтересованных сторон, бассейновые комиссии, экологические риски

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## РЕГИОНАЛЬНАЯ БЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ В СОВРЕМЕННОМ ГЕОПОЛИТИЧЕСКОМ ХАОСЕ: ПРОБЛЕМЫ И ВОЗМОЖНОСТИ

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**Аннотация.** В данной работе авторами рассмотрены основные вызовы и риски, характеризующие сложившийся геополитический хаос в масштабах мирохозяйственной системы. Исходя из современной геополитической неопределенности и напряженности, в статье выделены проблемы и возможности обеспечения безопасности на региональном уровне с учетом особенностей и различий в развитии стран Центральной Азии (ЦА), а также их общих политико-экономических интересов на современном этапе. При этом особое значение уделяется вопросам достижения коллективной безопасности. Обеспечение безопасности и стабилизации национальных экономик государств ЦА основывается на укреплении дву- и многостороннего сотрудничества и взаимодействия со всеми заинтересованными сторонами.

Обоснована необходимость оценки системных проблем внутристранового и регионального характера при координации усилий всех стран центрально-азиатского сообщества. С учетом новой реальности миропорядка обуславливается необходимость государственных реформ, разработки актуальных направлений внешнеполитического сотрудничества Казахстана и стран ЦА на основе принципов и методов конструктивной и политической дипломатии. В условиях нарастания геополитических потрясений, по мнению авторов, правомерно сосредоточить внутренние ресурсы субъектов ЦА на решение внутренних проблем социально-экономического развития, а также обеспечения национальной безопасности. Правильно выстроенная повестка в данном направлении имеет важное значение для выработки общерегиональной совместной политики жизнеобеспечения, сохранения стабильности и устойчивости на всем центрально-азиатском пространстве.

**Ключевые слова:** Центральная Азия, региональная безопасность, риски, вызовы, сотрудничество, центрально-азиатское сообщество, геополитическая нестабильность, устойчивое развитие

**Финансирование:** Статья подготовлена в рамках Программы целевого финансирования МНВО РК «Многостороннее сотрудничество Центральной Азии и Китая: от ранних этапов взаимодействия к стратегическому партнерству» ИРН: BR24993008



## **Введение**

В сложившихся условиях современного геополитического хаоса внимание и действия ведущих игроков на международном поле ориентируются на Восточное направление. Речь идет о формировании новых векторов взаимодействия с развивающимися государствами Азиатского континента [1].

В геополитическом измерении регион Центральной Азии (ЦА) представляется достаточно молодым, поскольку на данном пространстве продолжают осуществляются этапы и стадии развития институциональных структур, не завершились процессы формирования культурно-политической идентичности и т.д.

Несмотря на то, что место и роль ЦА в мировом сообществе еще четко не обозначены, регион в настоящий период вынужден принимать участие в определенных межрегиональных и глобальных процессах и проектах. Почему вынужден? Это объясняется, прежде всего, вызовами и угрозами реального времени развития мирового сообщества. С одной стороны, геополитическая ситуация обостряется борьбой и ужесточением конкуренции между ведущими игроками мира, а с другой – перед пятью субъектами центрально-азиатского сообщества (ЦАС) стоит главная задача, состоящая в решении внутренних проблем обеспечения коллективной безопасности и устойчивого развития национальных экономик. Отсюда вытекает целый ряд других вопросов, касающихся региональной интеграции, основанной, в первую очередь, на взаимопонимании, взаимопомощи, доверительности, добрососедстве и др. Именно эти вопросы обозначают формат достижения основ региональной безопасности.

## **Описание материалов и методов**

С учетом того, что страны центральноазиатского сообщества (ЦАС) исторически рассматриваются как единое территориальное пространство нами сделана попытка выявить общие и совместные тренды обеспечения региональной безопасности. В процессе работы использованы основные базы созданных интегрированных информационных ресурсов. Системная источниковая база классифицирована по основным направлениям исследования. Для решения поставленных задач цели были использованы статистические методы, методы сравнения и сопоставления, методы контент-анализа информационных ресурсов: научных работ, экспертных оценок, аналитических исследований.

## Обсуждение

К проблемам внешнеполитического характера правомерно отнести войну России против Украины, неопределенность вопросов, связанных с перемирием, последующее развитие ситуации в Украине, Афганистане и Иране, водные споры с ИРА, пограничные конфликты и др. В этой связи регион будет оставаться сферой пересечения интересов и стратегий как самих государств ЦА, так и внешних геополитических игроков, прежде всего, РФ, США, КНР, стран ЕС, Ирана, Турции.

Внутренние проблемы включают наличие авторитарной власти, коррупцию, возможные природные катаклизмы, явления и процессы [2]. Под воздействием целого спектра *внутренних факторов* (низкий уровень социально-экономического развития, политическая неопределенность, неравномерность процессов государственного строительства) внутрирегиональная обстановка и динамика взаимоотношений государств постоянно меняются; кроме того, существует множество внешних рисков, обусловленных близостью Афганистана (прохождение через регион наркотрафика, активность религиозных экстремистов и транснационального криминалитета), войной РФ против Украины и др.

Военное вторжение России в Украину обусловило необратимые масштабные изменения в геополитическом ландшафте центрально-азиатского региона [3] и вызвало беспрецедентные трансформации в глобальном мироустройстве. При этом страны ЦАС, вследствие географического фактора и длительных отношений с РФ, больше, чем другие региональные субъекты, пострадали от затяжных военных действий России против Украины.

Сегодня интерес РФ в том, чтобы сохранить и расширить существующие связи, в частности, через коридор Север-Юг, проходящий через ЦА. Практически это единственная возможность для РФ в условиях войны и изоляции. В сложившихся условиях ЦАС испытывает значительные сложности в установлении баланса взаимоотношений между РФ, Турцией, КНР, странами ЕС, США. Перед странами ЦАС стоит вопрос координации экономической и политической повестки действий по дальнейшему сотрудничеству с внешними игроками. Кроме того, речь идет о поддержании в регионе стабильности как основного приоритета выживания ЦА в условиях новых вызовов и рисков, а также недопустимости изоляционизма стран региона вследствие сотрудничества с РФ.

В сложившихся условиях в целях обеспечения своей безопасности государства Каспийского региона формируют новые союзы на западе, востоке и юге. Президенты стран ЦА участвуют в саммитах с лидерами крупных держав. О том, что интерес мировых держав к ЦА возрос, свидетельствует следующее:

- КНР планирует инвестировать в ЦА \$4 млрд.
- Активизируются встречи и переговоры лидеров крупных держав и союзов с Президентами 5 стран ЦА в формате C5 + ...:
- США;
- ЕС;
- Германии, Франции, Турции, Ирана, Пакистана, Индии и стран Персидского залива;
- формирование совместного подхода к третьим странам [4] и др.

Результатами можно назвать заключение соглашений о миллиардных инвестициях.

траны ЦА укрепляют транскаспийское сотрудничество (речь о странах Кавказа). Сегодня грузопоток по Транскаспийскому коридору в обход РФ значительно возрос и страны Кавказа и ЦА укрепляют совместное сотрудничество.

Лидеры ЦА продолжают политику институционализации сотрудничества через а) ежегодные саммиты и б) выработки общего подхода к третьим странам, как отметил проф. Австралийского Ун-та Аделаиды Р. Помфрет, на платформе East Asia Forum [5]. При этом основное место занимали вопросы экономического плана.

На фоне затяжной войны РФ особое внимание уделяется Срединному коридору (Транскаспийскому маршруту), соединяющему Китай и Европу через ЦА и Азербайджан (как альтернативой железной дороге через РФ). В инфраструктуру данного коридора, по прогнозам ЕБРР, ЕС инвестирует €18,5 млрд.

В советском прошлом республики ЦА были экономически связаны с РФ цепочками поставок, проходившим по автотрассам, железным дорогам и трубопроводам с севера на юг, то вследствие начатой войны РФ против Украины региону пришлось строить новую инфраструктуру. ЦА проводит многовекторную политику, находит новые рынки сбыта и решает вопросы транспорта и логистики. РФ еще является партнером, но уже не крупный импортер, экспортер/инвестор в ЦАС [6], поэтому в краткосрочном периоде важно расширение сотрудничества внутри самого региона.

По его мнению, агрессия РФ против Украины усилила пересмотр экономических связей региона, поэтому страны ЦАС разработали инфраструктурный план по укреплению связей между Востоком и Западом. Речь идет о модернизации портов на Каспии, развитии железных и автомобильных дорог между Западным Казахстаном и Узбекистаном.

Определение перспектив развития ЦА во многом зависит от состояния текущей политики и долгосрочных стратегий этих и других игроков, влияющих на ситуацию и безопасность в центразиазском регионе. И здесь необходимо отметить, что все проблемы, связанные с безопасностью ЦАС, имеют межрегиональный и глобальный характер.

Развитие ЦАС идет на фоне продвижения многообразных, -уровневых и зачастую противоречащих друг другу интеграционных проектов, за которыми стоят ведущие геополитические акторы, причем каждый из них имеет свои интересы и цели. Ниже нами приведены следующие основные предпосылки, которые представляют определенный интерес мировых акторов (рис. 1):




Рис. 1 – Политический контур региона ЦА на кратко- и среднесрочную перспективу

Таблица 1 – Социально-экономическая характеристика стран ЦА\*

| Показатели                                   | Казахстан | Кыргызстан | Таджикистан | Туркменистан | Узбекистан |
|--|-----------|------------|-------------|--------------|------------|
| Площадь страны, тыс. км <sup>2</sup>         | 2725      | 199,9      | 143,1       | 491,21       | 448,9      |
| Место в мире по площади                      | 9         | 87         | 96          | 53           | 57         |
| Население, млн. чел. (2024)                  | 20,0      | 7,2        | 10,3        | 7,1 (2023)   | 36,8       |
| Место в мире по населению (2024)             | 65        | 107        | 89          | 104          | 43         |
| ВВП, млрд. долл. США (2023)                  | 262,642   | 13,988     | 12,061      | 60,629       | 101,592    |
| ВВП на душу населения (долл. США PPP) (2023) | 12,919    | 1,977      | 1,161       | 8,233        | 2,850      |
| Объем торговли, млн. долл. США, (2023)       | 140562,7  | 14812,8    | 7044,7      | Нет данных   | 53894,4    |

|  |        |       |       |            |        |
|--|--------|-------|-------|------------|--------|
| ВНД на душу населения, долл. США (2023)  | 34,680 | 7,010 | 6,230 | 19,670     | 11,020 |
| Ожидаемая продолжительность жизни (2023) | 75,1   | 72,0  | 76,5  | 68,5       | 74,7   |
| Доля молодежи по странам ЦА (2024)       | 29%    | 32%   | 36%   | Нет данных | 30%    |

*\*Таблица 1 составлена по данным источников: Межгосударственный статистический комитет СНГ [Электронный ресурс]. Режим доступа: <http://www.cisstat.com> (дата обращения: 12.04.2025); Population by Country [Электронный ресурс] // Worldometers. Режим доступа: <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/> (дата обращения: 12.04.2025); GDP by Country [Электронный ресурс] // Worldometers. Режим доступа: <https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-by-country/> (дата обращения: 12.04.2025); GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$) [Электронный ресурс] // The World Bank Data. Режим доступа: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD> (дата обращения: 12.04.2025).*

Исходя из данных табл. 1, социально-экономическая оценка стран центразиатского пространства представляется позитивной. По основным параметрам на 1-м месте располагается Казахстан. Быстрыми темпами развивается Республика Узбекистан, страна лидирует по численности населения с ежегодным приростом в 1 млн. чел. Однако, как уже отмечалось нами в предыдущих исследованиях [7] наиболее интересным, на наш взгляд, следует назвать такой показатель, как доля молодежи в составе населения, который варьирует в целом по региону от 29% (Казахстан) до 36% (Таджикистан). В странах ЦА молодые люди составляют значительную часть населения: в Узбекистане и Таджикистане молодёжь до 30 лет составляет более 60% населения, в Казахстане и Кыргызстане порядка 50%. Как известно, молодежь государства представляется его стратегическим ресурсом, поскольку именно эта часть населения определяет будущие векторы развития этих стран. Политико-экономическая устойчивость стран ЦАС, региональная безопасность и конкурентоспособность стран ЦА в условиях глобальных вызовов, цифровой трансформации, масштабного развития искусственного интеллекта и социально-экономических трансформаций будут обусловлены тем, насколько эффективно в перспективе будут использованы потенциал и ресурсы молодого поколения этих стран.

В целом, как видим, этот уникальный регион обладает значительным геостратегическим, а также и экономическим потенциалом в глобальном и межрегиональном измерении. В связи с этим, на наш взгляд, анализ, оценка, решение проблем и формирование приоритетных тенденций успешного внешнеполитического взаимодействия стран ЦА при обеспечении

региональной безопасности субъектов центразиатского содружества особенно важны и актуальны.

В условиях современного глобального хаоса, усиления нездоровой конкуренции на мировой арене, обострения транснациональных рисков, вызовов и потрясений субъекты центрально-азиатского пространства решают проблемы выстраивания собственных внешнеполитических стратегий и закрепления своих позиций во внутрирегиональном, межрегиональном и международном масштабах.

В настоящее время каждая республика ЦА имеет свое видение политического обустройства, национального и экономического развития на перспективу. К сожалению, эти прогнозы не коррелируют между собой, в связи с чем это обуславливает взаимную нестыковку планов и прогнозов, непонимание и недоверие между субъектами региона и не способствует совместному и эффективному решению экономических, социальных, экологических проблем и, самое главное не отвечает обеспечению безопасности в регионе. Кроме того, страны ЦА ослабляет региональная конкуренция.

Ниже нами представлены общие черты, характерные всем странам ЦАС и краткая характеристика каждой страны:

***Общие черты, характерные всем странам ЦАС:***

- общее цивилизационное родство
- общее историческое прошлое;
- сохранение фундаментальных цивилизационных ценностей в Кыргызстане, Узбекистане, Туркменистане и Таджикистане);
- общие экономические проблемы, оставшиеся после распада СССР (высокий уровень инфляции, безработица, низкий уровень доходов населения и т.д.);
- авторитарный тип правления;
- высокий уровень теневой экономики и коррупции;
- экономики, ориентированные на добычу полезных ископаемых и др.

*Отличительные черты стран ЦАС* сформированы, исходя из анализа следующих работ [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14], кроме того использованы оценки следующих специалистов, экспертов и аналитиков, а именно: И. Акылбаев, исполнительный директор Казахстанского совета международных отношений (Казахстан); Р. Бурнашев, проф. Казахско-немецкого университета (Казахстан); Ф. Толипов (директор негосударственного научно-образовательного учреждения «Караван знаний» Узбекистан), Э. Байсалов (Независимый исследователь Кыргызстан). Э. Джуроев, проф. политологии Академии ОБСЕ (Бишкек, (Кыргызстан), Ш. Ризоён, политолог (Таджикистан), Р. Мятиев, гл. редактор TurkmenNews (Туркменистан) и др.

***Казахстан:***

В Казахстане основное внимание направлено на изменения в сфере государственного управления, политическим реформам и решению экономических проблем. Таким образом, страна:



геоэкономических вызовов и рисков, влияние различных внешних сил и ведущих мировых держав;

- лидер в ЦА;
- пытается изменить вектор внешнеполитического развития;
- преобразует политико-экономическую систему;
- взят курс на рост экономики,
- определенная либерализация;
- стабильность внешнеполитических приоритетов;
- крупнейший получатель ПИИ, стимулирующих развитие страны;
- пытается извлечь максимум пользы из: а) сотрудничества с ЕС, КНР и РФ и б) активного участия в международных процессах.
- последовательно проводит многовекторную внешнюю политику;
- реализуется в качестве евразийского интеграционного моста.

Узбекистан:

- многомиллионная страна ЦА; позитивный демографический потенциал;
- авторитарный режим, персонализация власти президента, контроль над всеми процессами в стране;
- высокая бедность и безработица;
- значительное место в экономике занимают денежные перечисления трудовых мигрантов.
- значительный нереализованный экономический потенциал; в аграрной (овощи, фрукты, хлопок), промышленной (пищевая, химическая) и энергетической (газ) отраслях.

Внешиеполитический курс страны зависит от изменений геополитической конъюнктуры;

- РУз пытается лавировать между РФ и ЕС, меняя акценты военно-политической ориентации и параллельно налаживая связи с КНР (в основном в торгово-экономической области);

- непостоянство в вопросах участия в интеграционных (международных и региональных) и военно-политических структурах; в 2020 г. РУз присоединился к ЕАЭС в статусе наблюдателя;

- РУз не имеет общих границ с РФ, КНР, Ираном и другими крупными странами (препятствие реализации его потенциала). Однако геостратегически выгодное расположение (граничит со всеми странами ЦА и ИРА) оказывает значительное политико-экономическое влияние на ЦАС и РУз претендует на региональное лидерство;

- в стране реализуется проект «1 миллион программистов»;
- с 2020 г. механизм ежегодных двусторонних консультаций с США преобразован в Диалог стратегического партнерства по вопросам сотрудничества в политико-экономико-культурно-образовательной сферах, безопасности, человеческого измерения.

### **Кыргызстан:**

- в политическом плане страна представляется как не совсем стабильное государственное образование; системный социально-экономический кризис обуславливает сохранение социальной и межэтнической напряженности.

- для внешней политики характерны неустойчивость и частая смена внешних векторов, связанные с политикой РФ и США, пытающимися влиять на Бишкек.

- внешнеполитический курс Кыргызстана обуславливает многовекторность сотрудничества с РФ, США, КНР и РК;

- Кыргызстан не обладает достаточным политическим весом;

- возможности страны ограничены влиянием и давлением соседних государств, а также существующими территориальными спорами с Узбекистаном;

- страна не располагает достаточным и необходимым военно-силовой мощью и потенциалом;

- экономически это индустриально неразвитая страна с низким уровнем жизни и высокой безработицей, стимулирующей трудовую эмиграцию; денежные перечисления трудовых мигрантов занимают значительное место в нацэкономике;

- при этом республика обладает не до конца реализованным экономическим потенциалом, прежде всего в аграрной (фрукты, овощи), энергетической (гидроэлектроэнергия) и ресурсной (вода, золото) отраслях, а также определенным человеческим капиталом, активно участвующим в региональной трудовой миграции (низкоквалифицированные специалисты).

### **Таджикистан:**

- в политическом плане это нестабильное государство; подвержено внутривнутриполитическим колебаниям и социально-политическим кризисам; в стране действуют религиозно-экстремистские и криминальные группы, контролирующей наркотрафик из ИРА; политическая ситуация осложнена системными социально-экономическими проблемами, вызывающими напряженность и кризис власти;

- экономически РТ – индустриально неразвитая страна с низким уровнем жизни и высокой безработицей; экономика зависит от денежных переводов мигрантов (низкоквалифицированные специалисты); не полностью реализован экономический потенциал в аграрной, энергетической (гидроэл. эн.) и ресурсной (вода, золото) сферах;

- внешнеполитический курс РТ направлен на многовекторное взаимодействие с РФ, США, ЕС, КНР и Ираном (от них сильно зависит экономически и политически). Основные военно-политические приоритеты связаны в основном с развитием сотрудничества с РФ, а также США и ЕС (по линии НАТО);

- в торгово-экономико-инвестиционной деятельности РТ опирается на отношения с КНР и Ираном; через решает проблемы, в основном по

инфраструктурному обустройству;

Таджикистан имеет сравнительно слабый политический потенциал; подвержен сильному влиянию Узбекистана и ИРА; имеет политические и территориальные споры с (Узбекистаном). С Кыргызстаном на сегодня приграничные вопросы улажены.

Туркменистан:

- в политическом плане страна представляется как государство с относительно стабильной социально-политической ситуацией, обеспечиваемой закрытостью страны, жестким внутренним курсом и достаточно высоким (в региональном масштабе) уровнем жизни; С 2021 г. в Туркменистане действует двухпалатный парламент;

- Туркменистан наименее подвержен внешнему давлению, однако неустойчивость юридических норм и неотработанность механизма передачи президентской власти осложняют внутреннюю политическую обстановку;

- в экономическом плане Туркменистан является страной с достаточно высоким уровнем жизни, который обеспечивается в целом через экспорт газа и нефти;

- страна делает упор на масштабное и активное развитие инфраструктуры, особенно в сфере транспорта и телекоммуникаций;

- высокого уровня развития достигла сфера обслуживания, которая растет значительно быстрее промышленного и аграрного секторов;

- в основе внешнеполитического курса Туркменистана лежит принцип нейтралитета: страна не принимает участия в деятельности международных и региональных интеграционных структур, а отношения с различными государствами выстраивает исключительно на двусторонней основе;

- приоритетные интересы страны – а) привлечение в энергопроекты крупных инвестиций из КНР, Ирана и Европы; б) развитие многовекторных транспортных коридоров (в КНР, Индию, Иран и Европу), в т. ч. и трубопроводных, в обход РФ.

Таким образом, исходя из проведенного анализа, позиции и курсы стран ЦАС относительно внутрирегионального взаимодействия и сотрудничества можно представить следующим образом:




Рис. 2 – Позиции ЦАС и возможности внутрирегионального взаимодействия

## Результаты

Нами выделены основные позиции стран ЦА на возможности расширения и укрепления сотрудничества между собой. В целом страны региона декларируют необходимость интеграционных отношений, но большее значение они придают налаживанию сотрудничества с внешними игроками. Таким образом, это одна сторона вопроса, другая – состоит в геополитической оценке безопасности ЦА. Безопасность ЦАС имеет многоуровневую структуру, на которую оказывают воздействие определенные субъекты мирового сообщества и внешние факторы. В связи с этим страны ЦА участвуют в различных региональных и межрегиональных организациях, при чем, в вопросах безопасности связаны одновременно с различными геополитическими структурами.

В силу транснационального характера рисков и угроз, а также недостаточного собственного ресурса противостояния (военно-силовых ресурсов, уровню социально-экономического развития) практически ни одна страна ЦА не может самостоятельно выстоять перед возникающими рисками и вызовами. Чтобы их предотвратить, обеспечить безопасность, предотвратить кризисные ситуации в регионе, необходима системная

интеграция ресурсов и усилий всех стран. Однако, по мнению экспертов, перспектива реальной интеграции ЦА (во всяком случае, до сих пор) пока не прослеживается вследствие:

- внешние проблемы, обусловленные современным геополитическим хаосом;
- экономической нестабильности (внутренних проблем, обусловленных социально-экономическими факторами каждой страны, ресурсосырьевых экономик стран ЦА, зависимых от влияния глобальной конъюнктуры);
- обострения внутривосточных процессов;
- определенного антагонизма между странами региона; речь идет о несовпадении позиций между руководствами стран ЦА по вопросам национальных интересов, приоритетов, целей и задач регионального развития;
- страны ЦАС имеют разные цели развития, зачастую кардинально противоположные;
- многие страны ЦА участвуют в различных межгосударственных институтах.
- существующих этноконфессиональных противоречий;
- высоких рисков конфликтогенности приграничного и территориального характера, распределения водных ресурсов;
- негативного развития миграционных процессов и др.

Все эти факторы в совокупности при своей противоречивости и неразрешимости являются взаимосвязанными и неразделимыми и усложняющими возможности решения многих межстрановых проблем.

В условиях геополитической напряженности рост взаимного недопонимания и недоверия между субъектами ЦА по многим внутривосточным проблемам имеет тенденцию к усилению. Тогда как, на наш взгляд, в системе внешнеполитических приоритетов стран ЦА налаживание взаимоотношений с соседями на принципах добрососедства и доверительности должны быть на первом месте. При этом основной вектор деятельности стран ЦА должен быть направлен в сторону создания основ и каркаса региональной безопасности, без которой все остальные формы взаимодействия в современных реалиях практически теряют смысл. Достижение этого практически невозможно без последовательности дипломатического выстраивания диалогово-переговорной формы обеспечения региональной безопасности ЦАС. При этом именно наша общая идентичность имеет огромное влияние при выстраивании новых форм диалога как основы взаимоотношений между народами стран ЦА.

Страны региона исходя из действующих механизмов коллективной безопасности никогда не вступали в прямые военные столкновения друг с другом. Сегодня в складывающихся условиях влияния внешних факторов и неустранения внутренних проблем существует возможность нарушения

сложившегося баланса сил в международном пространстве. Однако в этих условиях правомерно и необходимо сформировать продуктивную региональную диалоговую платформу, создать институты сотрудничества и выработать прочный фундамент безопасного общего будущего и устойчиво стабильного развития ЦАС. Это обуславливает интеграцию усилий всех сил и ресурсов: политических, экономических, культурно-гуманитарных, научно-экспертно-аналитических и т.д. Особое внимание при этом следует уделить привлечению молодежи ЦАС во все политические, общественные, экономические, социо-культурные и др. проекты и процессы. Иными словами, речь идет о выстраивании новой молодежной политики на страновом и региональном уровнях.

То, в какую сторону пойдет в своем развитии ЦА, зависит отнюдь не только от самих стран региона; на его позиционирование и стабильность влияет внешнее окружение: ведущие игроки в международной системе координат, цели и задачи проводимой ими политик и предпринимаемых действий, международные, межрегиональные и региональные институты и т.д.

### **Заключение**

За более чем 30 лет самостоятельного развития не все страны ЦАС осознали, что именно скоординированное совместное и неконфликтное движение в совместно выработанном направлении (не обязательно в рамках интеграционного союза) позволит усилить ЦА и подготовить ее к новым рискам и вызовам.

Для того, чтобы ЦА состоялась и позиционировалась как отдельный самостоятельный политико-экономико-социокультурный субъект, на наш взгляд, необходимо и правомерно следующее:

- корректная оценка руководством стран ЦАС глобального расклада внешних сил влияния;
- выработка совместной концепции (идеологемы) развития центрально-азиатского пространства с учетом приоритетных трендов развития и ситуации на Азиатском континенте в целом;
- в развитии данной концепции особое место занимает основная идея присоединения стран ЦАС к тюркскому пространству в краткосрочном периоде и к объединению с тюркским миром в целом в среднесрочной перспективе;
- и далее, на основе такой концепции представляется важной разработка Комплексной программы сотрудничества взаимодействия ЦАС на кратко-, средне- и долгосрочную перспективы по всем направлениям политического и социально-экономического развития. При этом не столь важно, как будет называться данная Программа – План перспективного развития стран региона, Дорожная карта, Стратегия развития ЦАС и т.д.;



- налаживание тесного экономического сотрудничества субъектов ЦА, развитие совместных производств на принципах взаимовыгодного партнерства и стратегического сотрудничества;
- продолжение проведения последовательной многовекторной внешнеполитической стратегии ЦАС;
- отход от борьбы за лидерство в регионе и недобросовестной конкуренции;
- рост взаимного межстранового сближения культур, духовности, нравственности и т.д.;
- сохранение и преумножение идентичности стран ЦАС, обусловленной общим историческим прошлым и современным глобальными вызовами в целях обеспечения региональной безопасности.

И, самое главное, все вышеперечисленные задачи страны ЦА должны решать, прежде всего, опираясь на собственные политические и экономические ресурсы и силы. При этом важным условием является признание всеми субъектами ЦАС безальтернативного варианта экономически устойчивого развития стран региона на основе кооперации (прежде всего промышленной и затем экономической) в среднесрочной перспективе.

Странам ЦАС необходимо сегодня сосредоточиться на решении первостепенных внутренних проблем по примеру многих преуспевающих государств миросообщества. Окрепнув экономически изнутри, выстроив собственные устойчиво стабильные национальные экономики, создав военно-силовой потенциал в страновом и внутрирегиональном масштабах, страны ЦАС смогут создать и выстроить основу для формирования государственной и внутрирегиональной безопасности.

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## **ҚАЗІРГІ ГЕОСАЯСИ ХАОСТАҒЫ АЙМАҚТЫҚ ҚАУІПСІЗДІК: ПРОБЛЕМАЛАР МЕН МҮМКІНДІКТЕР**

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**Аңдатпа.** Бұл жұмыста авторлар жаһандық экономикалық жүйе ауқымында қалыптасып келе жатқан геосаяси хаосты сипаттайтын негізгі қиындықтар мен тәуекелдерді қарастырады. Мақалада қазіргі геосаяси белгісіздік пен шиеленісті негізге ала отырып, Орталық Азия (ОА) елдерінің даму ерекшеліктері мен айырмашылықтарын, сондай-ақ олардың қазіргі кезеңдегі ортақ саяси және экономикалық мүдделерін ескере отырып, аймақтық деңгейде қауіпсіздікті қамтамасыз етудің проблемалары мен мүмкіндіктері көрсетілген. Осыған байланысты ұжымдық қауіпсіздікке қол жеткізу мәселелеріне ерекше назар аударылуда. Орталық Азия мемлекеттерінің қауіпсіздігі мен ұлттық экономикасын тұрақтандыруды қамтамасыз ету екіжақты және көпжақты ынтымақтастық пен барлық мүдделі тараптармен өзара іс-қимылды нығайтуға негізделген.

Орталық Азия қауымдастығының барлық елдерінің күш-жігерін үйлестіре отырып, ішкі және аймақтық сипаттағы жүйелі проблемаларды бағалау қажеттілігі негізделеді. Әлемдік тәртіптің жаңа шындығын ескере отырып, мемлекеттік реформалар жүргізу, конструктивті және саяси дипломатияның принциптері мен әдістеріне негізделген Қазақстан мен Орталық Азия елдерінің сыртқы саяси ынтымақтастығының ағымдағы бағыттарын дамыту қажеттілігі туындады. Геосаяси сілкіністердің күшеюі

жағдайында, авторлардың пікірінше, Орталық Азия аймақтарының ішкі ресурстарын әлеуметтік-экономикалық дамудың ішкі мәселелерін шешуге, сондай-ақ ұлттық қауіпсіздікті қамтамасыз етуге шоғырландыру заңды. Осы саладағы дұрыс құрылымдалған күн тәртібі бүкіл Орталық Азия аймағында өмірді қолдаудың, тұрақтылық пен тұрақтылықты сақтаудың жалпы өңірлік бірлескен саясатын құру үшін үлкен маңызға ие.

**Тірек сөздер:** Орталық Азия, аймақтық қауіпсіздік, тәуекелдер, сын-қатерлер, ынтымақтастық, Орталық Азия қауымдастығы, геосаяси тұрақсыздық, тұрақты даму

**Қаржыландыру:** Мақала Қазақстан Республикасы Ғылым және жоғары білім министрлігінің нысаналы қаржыландыру бағдарламасы аясында дайындалды: «Орталық Азия мен Қытай арасындағы көпжақты ынтымақтастық: өзара әрекеттестіктің бастапқы кезеңдерінен стратегиялық әріптестікке дейін», Жобаның тіркеу нөмірі: BR24993008.

## REGIONAL SECURITY IN MODERN GEOPOLITICAL CHAOS: PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES

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**Abstract.** In this work, the authors examine the main challenges and risks that characterize the current geopolitical chaos on the scale of the global economic system. Based on the current geopolitical uncertainty and tension, the article highlights the problems and opportunities for ensuring security at the regional level, taking into account the characteristics and differences in the development of the Central Asian (CA) countries, as well as their common political and economic interests at the present stage. In this regard, special attention is paid to issues of achieving collective security. Ensuring security and stabilization of the national economies of Central Asian states is based on strengthening bilateral and multilateral cooperation and interaction with all interested parties.

The need to assess systemic problems of an intra-country and regional nature while coordinating the efforts of all countries of the Central Asian community is substantiated. Taking into account the new reality of the world order, there is a need for state reforms, development of current directions of foreign policy cooperation between Kazakhstan and the Central Asian countries based on the principles and methods of constructive and political diplomacy. In the context of increasing geopolitical upheavals, according to the authors, it is legitimate to concentrate the internal resources of the Central Asian regions on solving internal problems of socio-economic development, as well as ensuring national security. A properly structured agenda in this area is of great importance for developing a pan-regional joint policy for life support, maintaining stability and sustainability throughout the Central Asian region.

**Key words:** Central Asia, regional security, risks, challenges, cooperation, Central Asian community, geopolitical instability, sustainable development

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## STRATEGIC HEDGING BY MIDDLE POWERS IN A FRAGMENTED BIPOLAR ORDER

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**Abstract.** This article reconceptualizes strategic hedging as a rational, multidimensional, and sustainable foreign policy strategy pursued by middle powers in response to a fragmented bipolar order. Using structured-focused comparison, it analyzes ten Global South countries, India, Türkiye, Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, Argentina, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand, to evaluate the causal impact of three enabling conditions: structural asymmetry, institutional pluralism, and identity elasticity. The findings reveal that middle powers strategically exploit asymmetric dependencies, diverse institutional memberships, and discursive flexibility to hedge across economic, security, and institutional domains. The study offers a mid-range theory that integrates material, institutional, and ideational mechanisms to explain variation in the scope, depth, and durability of hedging behavior across cases.

**Key words:** strategic hedging, middle powers, multipolarity, institutional pluralism, identity elasticity, Global South, foreign policy, strategy

### Introduction

In the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war and the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry, many middle powers from the Global South have adopted strikingly ambiguous foreign policy positions. Contrary to the predictions of conventional international relations (IR) theory, these states have avoided clear alignment with either side of the emerging bipolar order. Countries such as India, Turkey, Indonesia, Brazil, and South Africa abstained from sanctioning Russia, continued diplomatic engagement with rival great powers, and maintained participation in both Western-led and alternative multilateral institutions. Their behavior reflects not passivity or indecision but a pattern of multidomain engagement and rhetorical ambiguity.

This trend presents a fundamental puzzle. If polarity sharpens incentives for alliance formation, and if institutional affiliation or identity should constrain policy choices, why do so many middle powers actively diverge across economic, security, and institutional domains? Moreover, why does the intensity and durability of such divergence vary across seemingly comparable states?

Existing theories offer only partial explanations. Realism's binary logic of balancing and bandwagoning cannot account for sustained engagement with multiple rival powers. Liberal institutionalism assumes norm convergence within regimes but

overlooks the instrumental use of institutional pluralism. Constructivism emphasizes identity-based constraints but tends to view discursive inconsistency as incoherence, not strategy. Meanwhile, much of the hedging literature remains regionally and conceptually narrow, focusing primarily on Southeast Asia without offering a generalizable theory of sustained ambiguity.

This article addresses that gap by reconceptualizing strategic hedging as a rational, multidimensional strategy pursued by middle powers operating under conditions of fragmented bipolarity. It argues that hedging behavior emerges and varies based on the interplay of three enabling conditions: structural asymmetry (material dependence on different powers across distinct domains), institutional pluralism (simultaneous participation in ideologically divergent organizations), and identity elasticity (discursive capacity to perform multiple diplomatic roles). When these conditions align, states are more likely to engage in calibrated ambiguity across security, economic, and institutional arenas.

The central objective of this study is to explain variation in the scope, depth, and durability of strategic hedging. It proposes a mid-range causal theory rooted in the interaction of material, institutional, and ideational mechanisms, and tests it through a structured comparison of ten analytically selected middle powers: India, Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, Argentina, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand.

This article contributes to three key debates. First, it advances a generalizable theory of hedging that applies beyond Southeast Asia and accounts for variation in behavior. Second, it bridges theoretical traditions in IR by integrating structural, institutional, and discursive explanations into a single framework. Third, it repositions middle powers as autonomous strategic actors capable of maneuvering within and shaping the emerging world order through sustained ambiguity.

### **Materials and Methods**

This study employs a structured-focused comparative research design to test its mid-range theory of strategic hedging. This method, developed by George and Bennett (2005), is particularly well-suited for hypothesis-driven analysis across a moderate number of cases. It enables the systematic application of a common theoretical framework while allowing for variation in outcomes and causal mechanisms. The goal is not universal generalization but theoretical refinement through comparative inference.

The empirical focus is on ten middle powers from the Global South: India, Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, Argentina, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand. These cases were selected based on their shared structural position, states with moderate material capabilities and autonomous foreign policy traditions, but differing patterns of hedging behavior. All ten countries qualify as middle powers according to standard indicators: GDP size, regional influence, diplomatic outreach, and multilateral participation.

Importantly, the cases are not limited to a single region. They span Asia (India, Indonesia, Thailand), the Middle East (Turkey, Saudi Arabia), Africa (South Africa, Nigeria), and Latin America (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina). This cross-regional design

enables the theory to be tested beyond the often-analyzed Southeast Asian context and ensures that findings are not artifacts of local strategic cultures or region-specific institutions.

All selected cases meet the scope conditions of the theory: 1) they operate in a fragmented international system marked by institutional proliferation and geopolitical competition; 2) they are exposed to multiple great powers (primarily the U.S., China, and Russia); 3) they possess the diplomatic capacity to diversify their external alignments.




Figure 1. The Ten Middle Powers

The inclusion of variation in hedging behavior, from deep and sustained ambiguity to clear alignment, facilitates both positive and negative testing of the hypotheses. For instance, Mexico, widely considered to be firmly embedded in the U.S.-led order, serves as a crucial negative case. By contrast, India and Turkey represent high-intensity hedgers, allowing the theory to be tested at its upper bound.

#### Unit of Analysis and Time Frame

The unit of analysis is the state, and the main focus is on foreign policy behavior across three domains:

1. Security (e.g., defense cooperation, arms imports),
2. Economics (e.g., trade, infrastructure, energy ties), and
3. Institutional alignment (e.g., membership in formal and informal multilateral forums).

The time frame of analysis spans 2010 to 2023, capturing a period of systemic turbulence marked by the rise of U.S.–China competition, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Russia–Ukraine war. This window provides a meaningful test of whether hedging is durable under external pressure and strategic shocks.

Empirical data are drawn from harmonized secondary sources, including: 1) UN Voting Behavior on the Russia-Ukraine War; 2) Economic Alignment Data: Trade and Investment Exposure; 3) Security and Technology Cooperation; 4) The Cooperation Under Autonomy dataset, which catalogs informal intergovernmental organization (IIGO) membership and participation, capturing institutional pluralism.

Each case is evaluated based on the presence or absence of the three enabling conditions, structural asymmetry, institutional pluralism, and identity elasticity, and scored across the three dimensions of hedging: scope, depth, and durability. This framework allows for both within-case analysis (how each mechanism operates in a given context) and cross-case comparison (how combinations of mechanisms produce different levels of hedging).

This research design ensures internal coherence, theoretical symmetry, and empirical tractability, offering a robust basis for testing the causal logic of strategic hedging in the Global South.

#### Operationalization of Variables

To evaluate the causal logic of strategic hedging, the dependent and independent variables in this study are disaggregated into observable indicators and systematically coded using a uniform ordinal framework. The operationalization strategy draws on original comparative analysis of publicly available data from four principal sources: 1) UN Voting Behavior on the Russia–Ukraine War; 2) Economic Alignment Data: Trade and Investment Exposure; 3) Security and Technology Cooperation; 4) The Cooperation Under Autonomy dataset, which catalogs middle power participation in informal regional and transregional forums. This combined dataset captures both formal and informal dimensions of institutional pluralism and foreign policy behavior. All data were synthesized and recoded into original summary tables to ensure comparability across the ten middle power cases.

#### DV: Strategic Hedging Behavior

Strategic hedging is operationalized as a multidimensional outcome encompassing three interrelated components: domainial scope, depth of divergence, and temporal durability. Each dimension is coded on an ordinal scale ranging from 0 to 2.

Domainial Scope refers to the number of foreign policy arenas (security, economics, institutions) in which a state maintains divergent alignments.

Score of 2: Engagement with rival great powers in  $\geq 2$  domains.

Score of 1: Divergence in only one domain.

Score of 0: No observable divergence; exclusive alignment.

Depth of Divergence captures the substantive intensity of engagement with rival actors in each domain.

Indicators: Arms transfers, bilateral trade volumes, energy infrastructure, Huawei 5G integration, institutional leadership.

Score of 2: Deep entanglement with both U.S./Western and Chinese/alternative systems.

Score of 1: Tactical or moderate divergence.

Score of 0: Shallow or exclusive dependence on one pole.

Temporal Durability assesses whether hedging behavior is sustained over time (2010–2023).

Indicators: Repeated abstentions, consistent parallel partnerships, lack of realignment or alliance shift.

Score of 2: Durable and sustained behavior across  $\geq 4$  years.

Score of 1: Episodic or unstable hedging.

Score of 0: Clear pivot or reversal.

Each case's strategic hedging profile is constructed by triangulating across these three dimensions to classify the intensity and coherence of the strategy.

IVs

This study identifies three enabling conditions hypothesized to support hedging: structural asymmetry, institutional pluralism, and identity elasticity. Each is operationalized independently and coded on the same 0–2 ordinal scale.

Structural Asymmetry

This variable capture whether a state’s strategic dependencies are distributed asymmetrically across multiple great powers.

Indicators: Arms suppliers, top trade and FDI partners, energy relationships, technological infrastructure.

Score of 2: Cross-cutting dependencies across  $\geq 2$  distinct domains.

Score of 1: Partial or sectoral asymmetry.

Score of 0: Heavy or exclusive dependence on a single pole.

Institutional Pluralism

This variable measure participation in ideologically divergent institutional arrangements, encompassing both formal IGOs and informal IIGOs.

Indicators: Dual membership in Western-led and counter-hegemonic institutions (e.g., G20 + BRICS, Quad + SCO); involvement in informal groupings such as IBSA, NAM, D-8, MIKTA, and ASEAN+.

Score of 2: Active and recurrent participation in both blocs across multiple domains.

Score of 1: Limited or asymmetric engagement.

Score of 0: Exclusive alignment with one institutional camp.

Institutional pluralism is interpreted as a mechanism of compartmentalization and redundancy, enabling states to sustain issue-specific ambiguity.

Identity Elasticity

This variable captures the extent to which a state performs flexible foreign policy identities across venues to justify divergent alignments.

Indicators: Rhetorical shifts between civilizational, democratic, post-colonial, or Global South identities; use of sovereignty and non-alignment frames; ability to maintain credibility across audiences.

Score of 2: High elasticity; consistent identity switching across settings.

Score of 1: Moderate flexibility; context-bound identity adjustment.

Score of 0: Fixed, monolithic, or ideologically constrained identity.

Discursive flexibility serves as the legitimation mechanism that allows middle powers to reconcile strategic ambiguity with reputational coherence.

| Table 1. Variable Coding Scheme |   |  |   |
|---------------------------------|---|--|---|
| Variable                        | Definition  | Indicators   | Coding Scale                                |
| Strategic Hedging (DV)          | Multidimensional pattern of parallel engagement across rival powers | Composite of scope, depth, and durability                            | 0–2 composite scale (summed or typologized) |
| Domainal Scope                  | Extent of divergence across $\geq 2$ foreign policy domains         | Divergent alignments in multiple domains (e.g., arms, trade, forums) | 0 = none, 1 = partial, 2 = full             |

| Variable                      | Definition   | Indicators  | Coding Scale   |
|-------------------------------|--|---|--|
| Depth of Divergence           | Substantive entanglement with rival powers in key domains            | Huawei 5G presence, arms suppliers, trade/FDI flows, defense pacts            | 0 = shallow, 1 = moderate, 2 = deep                      |
| Temporal Durability           | Sustained hedging behavior over the 2010–2023 period                 | UN voting patterns, policy consistency, long-term institutional alignment     | 0 = episodic, 1 = moderate, 2 = sustained                |
| Structural Asymmetry (IV1)    | Cross-domain dependencies on different great powers                  | Top arms supplier ≠ top trade partner; China–U.S. dual dependence             | 0 = single-pole, 1 = partial, 2 = cross-cutting          |
| Institutional Pluralism (IV2) | Simultaneous participation in ideologically diverse IGOs/IIGOs       | Membership in G20, BRICS, SCO, NAM, D-8, MIKTA, ASEAN+                        | 0 = exclusive bloc, 1 = asymmetrical, 2 = full pluralism |
| Identity Elasticity (IV3)     | Capacity to perform multiple foreign policy identities across venues | Shifts between Global South, civilizational, democratic, post-colonial frames | 0 = fixed identity, 1 = moderate, 2 = high elasticity    |

This study employs a structured-focused comparison methodology, which offers an optimal balance between theoretical rigor and empirical manageability for evaluating mid-range theories across a moderate number of cases. The approach ensures three analytical advantages. First, it provides theoretical symmetry, as all cases are assessed using a uniform causal framework. Second, it enables cross-case comparability through the consistent application of operationalized indicators, allowing for controlled variation. Third, it ensures empirical coherence by drawing from harmonized, cross-national data sources rather than piecemeal country-specific archives.

The primary empirical foundation is drawn from 1) UN Voting Behavior on the Russia–Ukraine War; 2) Economic Alignment Data: Trade and Investment Exposure; 3) Security and Technology Cooperation. Their comprehensive coverage across ten middle powers minimizes the inconsistencies that would arise from compiling disparate primary sources. Supplemented by the Cooperation Under Autonomy dataset on IIGO participation, this approach facilitates a consistent and analytically tractable examination of strategic hedging across diverse geopolitical contexts.

### ***Literature Review and Theoretical Framework***

Conventional international relations theories offer limited explanatory power when it comes to understanding the strategic ambiguity of middle powers in today’s fragmented global order. Realism, liberal institutionalism, and constructivism each highlight important drivers of foreign policy behavior, yet none adequately account for the persistence and variation of strategic hedging.



Neorealist and offensive realist approaches view states as constrained by the structure of the international system, which compels them to balance against or bandwagon with dominant powers to ensure survival (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001). Within this binary framework, middle powers are treated as reactive actors, expected to align with stronger states based on threat perceptions or opportunity structures.

However, the empirical record diverges sharply from these predictions. Countries such as India, Turkey, and Indonesia engage simultaneously with rival great powers, maintaining defense ties with the United States while deepening economic and diplomatic relationships with China and Russia. This multidomain ambiguity is neither balancing nor bandwagoning; rather, it is a deliberate effort to avoid entrapment and preserve autonomy. Realist theories also struggle to explain cross-regional variation: why do similarly situated middle powers hedge differently? By flattening agency and overemphasizing polarity, realism cannot explain the strategic maneuvering evident in Global South diplomacy today.

Liberal institutionalist perspectives emphasize the constraining effects of international institutions. States are expected to internalize institutional norms and align their behavior accordingly (Keohane, 1984; Ikenberry, 2001). Middle powers, in this tradition, are cast as ideal multilateralists, promoting liberal values, pursuing soft power, and reinforcing rule-based global governance. The behavior of traditional Western middle powers such as Canada, Australia, or the Nordic countries seems to confirm this logic.

Yet emerging middle powers in the Global South display a more instrumental approach to multilateralism. Countries like Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa engage both Western-led and alternative forums, not to converge toward a shared normative agenda, but to maximize flexibility and geopolitical leverage. Institutional pluralism becomes a tool for compartmentalizing relationships, not a path to norm diffusion. As Mahrenbach (2019) and Morse and Keohane (2014) show, “selective multilateralism” and “contested multilateralism” have become defining features of middle power behavior, enabling states to resist institutional entrapment while preserving diplomatic reach. Liberal institutionalism, in assuming norm convergence, overlooks this strategic functionality.

Constructivist theories, by focusing on identity and norm-driven behavior, contribute valuable insights into how states interpret their interests and roles (Wendt, 1999; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). In this tradition, middle powers are often portrayed as “norm entrepreneurs” or “good international citizens” whose foreign policy reflects stable, value-driven identities.

However, many contemporary middle powers exhibit discursive agility rather than identity coherence. States such as Indonesia and Turkey adopt multiple roles depending on the forum and audience: democratic partner, Islamic actor, Global South leader, or neutral mediator. These shifts are not signs of confusion but deliberate performances used to justify divergent alignments. Mainstream

constructivism often treats this flexibility as an analytical problem, labeling it “instability” or “role incoherence”. This study, by contrast, views such identity elasticity as a strategic resource.

Emerging critical and post-structuralist approaches to constructivism (e.g., Pouliot, 2010; Cornut & Pouliot, 2015) suggest that identity can be performed, sequenced, and localized depending on context. These tools are especially relevant for middle powers seeking to legitimize multidomain divergence while avoiding reputational backlash. Yet these insights remain underutilized in hedging theory and broader IR debates.

Dominant IR theories tend to misread or overlook the logic of strategic hedging. Realism overstates structural constraint, liberalism misinterprets institutional engagement, and constructivism under-theorizes discursive flexibility. This article builds on and departs from each paradigm by treating hedging not as a deviation from theoretical expectations but as a rational strategy enabled by specific material, institutional, and ideational conditions.

The conventional understanding of middle powers, shaped largely by the behavior of Western democracies, fails to capture the strategic conduct of their counterparts in the Global South. Traditional middle power theory characterizes these states as multilateralist, norm-driven actors that support the liberal international order through peacekeeping, human rights advocacy, and rule-based cooperation (Cooper et al., 1993; Chapnick, 2000; Ingebritsen, 2002). Countries like Canada and Australia exemplify this model, leveraging institutions to amplify their influence while reinforcing hegemonic stability.

However, this model does not travel well. Emerging middle powers such as India, Turkey, Brazil, and Indonesia do not behave as passive norm entrepreneurs or guardians of multilateralism. Instead, they pursue strategic autonomy through transactional diplomacy, selective multilateral engagement, and rhetorical agility. These states do not merely absorb institutional norms, they exploit institutional fragmentation to increase maneuverability and avoid binding commitments. The dichotomy proposed by Jordaan (2003) between “traditional” and “emerging” middle powers was an early recognition of this divide, but it fell short of offering a generalizable theory of how and why such actors pursue ambiguous foreign policy strategies.

This conceptual gap is compounded by the limitations of the hedging literature itself. While the concept of hedging has gained traction, particularly in the context of Southeast Asia’s navigation of U.S.-China rivalry, its analytical development remains incomplete. Hedging is often defined loosely as a mix of engagement and balancing (Goh, 2007; Kuik, 2008), or as a pragmatic alternative to alignment and neutrality. Yet this definitional flexibility risks turning hedging into a residual category, an umbrella term for any behavior that does not fit existing alliance models.

Three major weaknesses limit the current literature on hedging. First, it

is regionally narrow. Most empirical studies focus on Southeast Asia, offering little insight into comparable behavior in Africa, Latin America, or the Middle East. This regional bias limits theoretical generalizability and leaves a blind spot in comparative analysis. Second, the literature lacks causal precision. It often describes what hedging looks like but fails to explain its variation across cases or its durability over time. Third, hedging remains under-theorized. Few studies engage with broader paradigms in international relations or generate testable hypotheses. The result is an empirically rich but conceptually shallow body of work.

Some recent efforts, such as those by Lim and Cooper (2015) and Destradi (2010), have begun to move the discussion toward more systematic categorization and causal analysis. Yet even these contributions fall short of integrating material, institutional, and ideational mechanisms into a unified explanatory framework. The field still lacks a mid-range theory that explains not only the emergence of hedging but also its variation across domains, its strategic logic, and the conditions under which it becomes a sustainable foreign policy choice.

This article addresses these lacunae by developing a comparative theory of strategic hedging tailored to the empirical conditions faced by Global South middle powers. It treats hedging not as indecision or ambiguity, but as a rational response to systemic fragmentation. It draws on a broader range of cases across Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, and develops falsifiable hypotheses rooted in material asymmetries, institutional pluralism, and discursive flexibility. In doing so, it bridges gaps in both middle power theory and hedging scholarship, offering a generalizable framework for understanding the foreign policy strategies of states navigating uncertainty in a multipolar, contested international system.

This article advances a mid-range theory of strategic hedging as a deliberate and multidimensional foreign policy strategy employed by middle powers in a fragmented bipolar system. It theorizes that strategic hedging emerges and persists when three enabling conditions co-occur: structural asymmetry, institutional pluralism, and identity elasticity. These conditions provide, respectively, the incentives, arenas, and discursive tools necessary for states to pursue calibrated ambiguity across multiple domains of foreign policy.

Strategic hedging is defined here as a sustained pattern of engagement with rival great powers across at least two key policy domains (security, economics, and institutional affiliation) without fully committing to either side. It differs from neutrality (which implies detachment), balancing (which implies opposition), and bandwagoning (which implies submission). Hedging is neither transitional nor incoherent; it is a strategic response to uncertainty and interdependence under conditions of fragmented polarity.

Unlike previous approaches that treat hedging as tactical or reactive, this framework conceptualizes it as a rational strategy that varies systematically

across states based on identifiable enabling conditions. The dependent variable, hedging behavior, is disaggregated into three analytical dimensions: 1) Domianial Scope: the number of foreign policy arenas where divergence is sustained; 2) Depth of Divergence: the intensity of engagement with rival poles; 3) Temporal Durability: the persistence of this behavior over time.

#### Enabling Condition 1: Structural Asymmetry

The first condition, structural asymmetry, refers to a state's dependence on multiple great powers in distinct strategic domains. For example, a country may rely on the U.S. for military protection, China for trade and infrastructure, and Russia for energy or arms. When no single pole dominates all areas of dependence, the state has incentives to avoid exclusive alignment and instead hedge to preserve access to benefits from multiple actors.

This asymmetry generates a strategic dilemma: alignment with one pole risks losing access to critical resources from others. In such cases, hedging becomes a rational mechanism to manage these cross-cutting dependencies and avoid overexposure to any one patron.

#### Enabling Condition 2: Institutional Pluralism

The second condition, institutional pluralism, captures a state's simultaneous participation in ideologically divergent multilateral arrangements, such as G20 and BRICS, NATO and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, ASEAN and IPEF. Institutional pluralism expands the set of arenas in which states can compartmentalize engagement, signal ambiguity, and recalibrate alignments.

Rather than viewing institutions as convergence mechanisms that constrain behavior, this framework treats them as enabling infrastructures that facilitate flexibility. Overlapping institutional memberships allow states to send different signals to different audiences, reducing the reputational costs of multidomain divergence. This compartmentalization is especially potent when informal or low-commitment organizations, such as IIGOs, are used to broaden participation without binding obligations.

#### Enabling Condition 3: Identity Elasticity

The third condition, identity elasticity, refers to the discursive ability of states to construct and perform multiple, sometimes contradictory, foreign policy roles across venues and audiences. Middle powers like Turkey, India, and Indonesia invoke different identities, such as democratic partner, civilizational actor, or Global South leader, depending on the context. These identity performances allow states to justify divergent behavior while preserving reputational coherence.

Building on critical constructivist insights (Pouliot, 2010; Cornut & Pouliot, 2015), this study treats identity not as a stable, path-dependent constraint but as a performative resource. Identity elasticity is what allows states to transform apparent contradictions into legitimate flexibility, shielding them from domestic and international backlash when they diverge from expected roles.

### Results

This section presents the empirical findings from a structured-focused comparison of ten middle powers: India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Argentina, Thailand, and Mexico. Three core hypotheses were tested to evaluate the influence of structural asymmetry, institutional pluralism, and identity elasticity on the depth, scope, and durability of strategic hedging behavior investment, or Saudi Arabia’s oil alignment with China and military ties to the U.S.

#### Structural Asymmetry and Depth of Divergence

Hypothesis 1: Middle powers are more likely to pursue deep strategic hedging when they are structurally asymmetric, i.e., when their material dependencies are distributed across rival great powers in distinct issue areas.

Structural asymmetry was coded based on divergence across three domains:

1. Top arms suppliers (U.S., Russia, China)
2. Major trade and FDI partners
3. Technological or energy dependencies (e.g., Huawei 5G, oil trade, infrastructure)

The dependent variable – depth of divergence – measures the intensity of engagement with competing powers. A high score reflects simultaneous entanglement with rival poles, such as India’s reliance on Russian arms and U.S. investment.

Table 2. Structural Asymmetry and Depth of Divergence

| Country      | Struct. Asymmetry | Depth of Divergence | Key Asymmetric Dependencies                              |
|--------------|-------------------|---------------------|--|
| India        | 2 (High)          | 2 (High)            | Russian arms, U.S. investment, Iran energy               |
| Türkiye      | 2 (High)          | 2 (High)            | NATO + S-400 (Russia), China trade, Western FDI          |
| Saudi Arabia | 2 (High)          | 2 (High)            | Oil exports to China, U.S. military protection           |
| Indonesia    | 2 (High)          | 1 (Moderate)        | Chinese infrastructure, U.S. arms                        |
| Nigeria      | 1 (Moderate)      | 1 (Moderate)        | China FDI, mixed U.S. and China military ties            |
| South Africa | 1 (Moderate)      | 1 (Moderate)        | China trade, BRICS institutional links                   |
| Brazil       | 1 (Moderate)      | 1 (Moderate)        | China trade, minor U.S. security ties                    |
| Thailand     | 1 (Moderate)      | 1 (Moderate)        | U.S. treaty ally, China trade, Huawei                    |
| Argentina    | 1 (Moderate)      | 1 (Moderate)        | Chinese infrastructure, limited defense ties             |
| Mexico       | 0 (Low)           | 0 (Low)             | U.S. dependence across security, trade, and institutions |

#### Institutional Pluralism and Domanial Scope

Hypothesis 2: Middle powers are more likely to engage in broad-spectrum hedging, spanning multiple foreign policy domains, when they are embedded

in ideologically diverse institutional environments, including both formal IGOs and informal IIGOs.

Institutional pluralism was measured by:

1. Dual membership in formal organizations (e.g., BRICS, SCO, G20, IPEF)
2. Participation in informal IGOs (e.g., MIKTA, IBSA, NAM, OIC, D-8, CELAC)

Domainal scope was coded by identifying the number of foreign policy domains (security, economics, institutions) in which a state maintains divergent alignments.

Table 3. Institutional Pluralism and Domainal Scope

| Country             | U.S.-led IGOs              | China-led IGOs           | Southern/ Non-Aligned IGOs | Hybrid / Bridge Forums | Inst. Pluralism | Domainal Scope | Key Forums Used for Hedging |
|---------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------------------|
| <b>India</b>        | Quad, IPEF                 | SCO                      | NAM, IBSA                  | BRICS, G20             | High (2)        | High (2)       | BRICS, Quad, SCO, NAM       |
| <b>Türkiye</b>      | NATO, MIKTA                | None                     | D-8, OIC                   | G20                    | High (2)        | High (2)       | NATO, G20, OIC, D-8         |
| <b>Brazil</b>       | IPEF (observer)            | None                     | CELAC, IBSA                | BRICS, G20             | High (2)        | High (2)       | BRICS, G20, CELAC           |
| <b>South Africa</b> | None                       | None                     | IBSA, NAM                  | BRICS, G20             | High (2)        | High (2)       | BRICS, IBSA, NAM            |
| <b>Indonesia</b>    | IPEF                       | None                     | D-8, NAM, ASEAN+           | G20                    | High (2)        | High (2)       | G20, ASEAN+, NAM            |
| <b>Saudi Arabia</b> | IPEF (exploratory), G20    | BRICS (2024)             | OIC, D-8                   | —                      | High (2)        | Moderate (1)   | G20, BRICS, OIC             |
| <b>Thailand</b>     | APEC, IPEF                 | None                     | ACD, ASEAN+                | —                      | Moderate (1)    | Moderate (1)   | ASEAN+, APEC                |
| <b>Nigeria</b>      | —                          | —                        | NAM, OIC, D-8              | AU                     | Moderate (1)    | Moderate (1)   | NAM, OIC                    |
| <b>Argentina</b>    | G20                        | BRICS (2023 application) | CELAC                      | —                      | Moderate (1)    | Low (0)        | G20, CELAC                  |
| <b>Mexico</b>       | OECD, IPEF (observer), G20 | None                     | MIKTA                      | —                      | Low (0)         | Low (0)        | G20 only                    |



Identity Elasticity and Temporal Durability

Hypothesis 3: Middle powers are more likely to sustain strategic hedging over time when they possess high identity elasticity, that is, the rhetorical and ideological flexibility to perform divergent foreign policy roles across different audiences and institutional settings.

Identity elasticity was coded based on:

- 1. Discursive framing in multilateral forums (e.g., UN, BRICS, NAM, G20)
- 2. Public justification of abstention or dual alignment
- 3. Use of post-colonial, religious, democratic, or sovereignty-based narratives

Temporal durability was measured by continuity in hedging behavior, especially voting patterns on key UN resolutions related to the Russia–Ukraine war (2022–2023).

Table 4. Identity Elasticity and Hedging Durability

| Country      | Identity Elasticity | Temporal Durability | Identity Frames Used                                       |
|--------------|---------------------|---------------------|--|
| India        | 2 (High)            | 2 (High)            | Civilizational, democratic, post-colonial, sovereignty     |
| Türkiye      | 2 (High)            | 2 (High)            | Neo-Ottomanism, Islamic, anti-Western populist             |
| Saudi Arabia | 2 (High)            | 2 (High)            | Islamic conservatism, Vision 2030 pragmatism               |
| Brazil       | 1 (Moderate)        | 1 (Moderate)        | Global South solidarity, democratic variability            |
| Indonesia    | 1 (Moderate)        | 2 (High)            | Islamic pluralism, Global South, neutrality rhetoric       |
| South Africa | 1 (Moderate)        | 1 (Moderate)        | Anti-colonial, Global South, ANC liberation legacy         |
| Nigeria      | 1 (Moderate)        | 1 (Moderate)        | Pan-African, religious, democratic                         |
| Argentina    | 1 (Moderate)        | 1 (Moderate)        | Peronist Third Way, post-colonial                          |
| Thailand     | 0 (Low)             | 1 (Moderate)        | Technocratic, non-ideological                              |
| Mexico       | 0 (Low)             | 0 (Low)             | Regionally bound, U.S.-oriented, fixed democratic identity |

Table 5. Middle Powers’ Positions on the War in Ukraine

| Country      | UN ES-11/1 | UN ES-11/2 | UN ES-11/3 | UN ES-11/4 | UN ES-11/5 | UN ES-11/6 | Sanctions on Russia (2022) | Military Assistance to Ukraine |
|--------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| India        | Abstained  | Abstained  | Abstained  | Abstained  | Abstained  | Abstained  | No                         | No                             |
| South Africa | Abstained  | Abstained  | Abstained  | Abstained  | Abstained  | Abstained  | No                         | No                             |
| Thailand     | In Favor   | In Favor   | Abstained  | Abstained  | Abstained  | In Favor   | No                         | No                             |
| Brazil       | In Favor   | In Favor   | Abstained  | In Favor   | In Favor   | In Favor   | No                         | No                             |
| Indonesia    | In Favor   | In Favor   | Abstained  | In Favor   | Abstained  | In Favor   | No                         | No                             |
| Nigeria      | In Favor   | In Favor   | Abstained  | In Favor   | Abstained  | In Favor   | No                         | No                             |

| Country             | UN ES-11/1 | UN ES-11/2 | UN ES-11/3 | UN ES-11/4 | UN ES-11/5 | UN ES-11/6 | Sanctions on Russia (2022) | Military Assistance to Ukraine |
|---------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Saudi Arabia</b> | In Favor   | In Favor   | Abstained  | In Favor   | Abstained  | In Favor   | No                         | No                             |
| <b>Mexico</b>       | In Favor   | In Favor   | Abstained  | In Favor   | In Favor   | In Favor   | No                         | No                             |
| <b>Argentina</b>    | In Favor   | In Favor   | In Favor   | In Favor   | In Favor   | In Favor   | No                         | Yes                            |
| <b>Türkiye</b>      | In Favor   | In Favor   | In Favor   | In Favor   | In Favor   | In Favor   | No                         | Yes                            |

Table 6. Cross-Case Comparison of Causal Mechanisms and Outcomes

| Country      | Struct. Asymmetry | Inst. Pluralism | Identity Elasticity | Hedging Intensity | Typology       |
|--------------|-------------------|-----------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------------|
| India        | 2 (High)          | 2 (High)        | 2 (High)            | High              | High-Intensity |
| Türkiye      | 2 (High)          | 2 (High)        | 2 (High)            | High              | High-Intensity |
| Saudi Arabia | 2 (High)          | 2 (High)        | 2 (High)            | High              | High-Intensity |
| Indonesia    | 2 (High)          | 2 (High)        | 1 (Moderate)        | High              | Doctrinal      |
| Brazil       | 1 (Moderate)      | 2 (High)        | 1 (Moderate)        | Moderate-High     | Doctrinal      |
| South Africa | 1 (Moderate)      | 2 (High)        | 1 (Moderate)        | Moderate          | Doctrinal      |
| Nigeria      | 1 (Moderate)      | 1 (Moderate)    | 1 (Moderate)        | Moderate          | Doctrinal      |
| Argentina    | 1 (Moderate)      | 1 (Moderate)    | 1 (Moderate)        | Moderate          | Tactical       |
| Thailand     | 1 (Moderate)      | 1 (Moderate)    | 0 (Low)             | Moderate          | Tactical       |
| Mexico       | 0 (Low)           | 0 (Low)         | 0 (Low)             | Low               | Non-Hedger     |

## Discussion

The empirical findings presented above confirm the theoretical expectations developed in this study. The variation in hedging behavior across the ten Global South middle powers—its depth, scope, and durability—can be causally linked to the presence or absence of three enabling conditions: structural asymmetry, institutional pluralism, and identity elasticity. These mechanisms are not only individually powerful but mutually reinforcing. When they align, they enable states to pursue a coherent and sustained strategy of calibrated ambiguity in the face of systemic fragmentation.

### Structural Incentives and Deep Divergence

The findings offer strong confirmation of Hypothesis 1. States with cross-cutting strategic dependencies, those dependent on rival great powers across different domains such as arms, trade, infrastructure, and energy, exhibit the deepest forms of hedging. India, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, the top scorers on both structural asymmetry and depth of divergence, maintain high-stakes engagements with the U.S., China, and Russia across military, economic, and institutional arenas. These states hedge not in spite of material entanglement,

but because of it. Structural exposure becomes a source of strategic leverage, allowing them to avoid full alignment and extract benefits from multiple poles.

Where dependencies are concentrated, most clearly in Mexico, divergence is sharply constrained. Mexico's structural exposure is overwhelmingly oriented toward the United States across security, economic, and institutional dimensions, producing a foreign policy of exclusive alignment and effectively precluding a hedging strategy. This contrast illustrates the enabling, not merely constraining, role of asymmetric interdependence in foreign policy maneuvering.

#### **Institutional Pluralism and Multidomain Scope**

Hypothesis 2 is supported by the data. States that participate in ideologically divergent institutional arrangements, including both formal IGOs and informal IIGOs, are significantly more likely to hedge across multiple domains. India, Turkey, Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia all maintain memberships in Western-led, counter-hegemonic, and Global South forums, including BRICS, G20, Quad, NAM, SCO, and IBSA. These institutional linkages enable compartmentalization—economic engagement with one bloc, security cooperation with another, normative alignment with a third.

Importantly, institutional pluralism is not limited to formal treaty organizations. Informal IGOs (IIGOs), such as MIKTA, D-8, ASEAN+, and IBSA, play a particularly critical role. These forums allow states to maintain ambiguous alignments and engage multiple partners without incurring binding commitments or reputational costs. Indonesia, for instance, simultaneously participates in D-8, NAM, ASEAN+, and IPEF, enabling it to signal alignment flexibility across regional and global venues.

The comparative absence of institutional pluralism corresponds with a narrow scope. Mexico, again, stands out as a negative case. Its institutional environment is dominated by U.S.-led organizations, G20, OECD, MIKTA, with minimal participation in counter-hegemonic or Global South groupings. This institutional exclusivity limits its ability to compartmentalize engagement or diversify partnerships, contributing to its status as a non-hedger.

#### **Identity Elasticity and Temporal Durability**

The third hypothesis, concerning identity elasticity and hedging durability, is also confirmed. The three states that scored highest on identity elasticity, India, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, also maintained the most sustained hedging strategies over the 2010–2023 period. These countries consistently performed multiple diplomatic identities across institutional and normative contexts: India invokes democratic solidarity in the Quad, civilizational discourse in BRICS, and sovereignty narratives at the UN; Turkey oscillates between NATO partner, Islamic leader, and Eurasian actor; Saudi Arabia combines Islamic conservatism with Vision 2030 modernization rhetoric.

Identity elasticity allows these states to reconcile contradictory alignments and justify strategic ambiguity across diverse audiences. It functions as a

discursive mechanism that sustains hedging by insulating states from domestic and international backlash. The UN General Assembly voting record on the Russia–Ukraine war reinforces this pattern: India and South Africa abstained on all major resolutions, while Turkey and Argentina voted in favor of each, confirming the role of rhetorical flexibility in enabling durable non-alignment.

States with limited identity elasticity, such as Mexico and Thailand, exhibit predictable alignment behavior. Their diplomatic narratives, liberal democratic for Mexico, technocratic and non-ideological for Thailand, lack the flexibility to justify sustained ambiguity. Consequently, they either align with one bloc or adopt weak, episodic forms of hedging.

#### Synthesis and Strategic Typology

The cross-case comparison in Table 6 confirms the meta-hypothesis: when structural asymmetry, institutional pluralism, and identity elasticity co-occur, states are most likely to engage in high-intensity strategic hedging. India, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia exemplify this ideal type, combining deep material entanglement, broad institutional participation, and high discursive flexibility to construct coherent and sustainable hedging strategies. Their divergence is not tactical or ad hoc, but systematic and durable.

The typology derived from this synthesis classifies middle powers into four categories:

1. High-Intensity Hedgers (India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia): Fulfill all three enabling conditions and pursue deep, broad, and sustained divergence. Hedging is doctrinal and proactive.
2. Doctrinal Hedgers (Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria): Fulfill two conditions and hedge consistently across selected domains, but with less comprehensiveness.
3. Tactical Hedgers (Argentina, Thailand): Fulfill one or two conditions but hedge reactively or inconsistently, often due to elite turnover or crisis response.
4. Non-Hedger (Mexico): Lacks enabling conditions and maintains exclusive alignment.

This typology not only captures variation in intensity but also strategic logic. High-intensity and doctrinal hedgers treat ambiguity as a core element of their foreign policy doctrine. Tactical hedgers hedge episodically and often incoherently. Non-hedgers align structurally, institutionally, and rhetorically with a dominant pole.

#### Explaining Deviant and Borderline Cases

Some cases deviate from expectations or sit near category boundaries. Argentina, while exhibiting some economic asymmetry and institutional pluralism, fails to sustain strategic ambiguity due to elite-driven foreign policy volatility. Its hedging is inconsistent and vulnerable to political turnover. Indonesia, despite moderate identity elasticity, demonstrates high hedging durability, likely a reflection of its layered institutional affiliations and non-

confrontational diplomatic style.

Saudi Arabia, traditionally viewed as a U.S. client state, now exhibits all three enabling conditions. Its entry into BRICS, expanded ties with China, and calibrated distancing from Washington signal a shift toward high-intensity hedging. The case illustrates how identity performance, through Vision 2030, Islamic legitimacy, and selective sovereignty narratives, can transform an alignment-dependent state into a hedger.

The findings of this study refine and challenge dominant paradigms in International Relations. Realism's binary assumptions about balancing and bandwagoning are inadequate to explain sustained engagement with rival powers. Liberal institutionalism overstates the constraining effects of multilateralism and underestimates the strategic utility of institutional pluralism. Mainstream constructivism, focused on identity coherence, often fails to recognize the deliberate and performative nature of diplomatic role-switching.

Instead, this study offers a synthetic framework, one that integrates material incentives, institutional structures, and discursive practices, to explain how middle powers navigate a fragmented and contested international system. Strategic hedging emerges not as residual behavior, but as a coherent and rational response to multipolarity, regime complexity, and normative ambiguity.

## **Conclusion**

This study has reconceptualized strategic hedging as a rational, multidimensional, and sustainable foreign policy strategy pursued by middle powers navigating a fragmented bipolar order. Contrary to prevailing theories that frame hedging as indecision, opportunism, or tactical ambiguity, this research demonstrates that hedging can be systematically explained as the outcome of three enabling conditions: structural asymmetry, institutional pluralism, and identity elasticity. When these conditions align, states do not merely react to systemic pressure, they actively shape their strategic environment through calibrated engagement across rival poles.

Using a structured-focused comparison of ten analytically selected middle powers, this study tests three core hypotheses and one meta-hypothesis. It finds strong empirical support for the claim that variation in hedging behavior, its scope, depth, and durability, can be predicted by variation in material dependencies, institutional entanglements, and rhetorical flexibility. The analysis reveals that high-intensity hedgers (e.g., India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia) consistently diverge across domains and sustain that behavior through strategic use of institutions and identity narratives. In contrast, tactical hedgers (e.g., Argentina, Thailand) and non-hedgers (e.g., Mexico) lack the structural and discursive resources to pursue such calibrated ambiguity.

Theoretically, this study bridges gaps across realism, institutionalism, and constructivism by synthesizing material, institutional, and ideational mechanisms into a unified framework. It corrects the blind spots of each tradition:

realism's binary determinism, liberalism's over-socialization of institutions, and constructivism's under-theorized discursive plasticity. In doing so, it contributes a mid-range theory that is generalizable across regions, falsifiable across cases, and operationally precise.

Empirically, this study expands the geography of hedging beyond Southeast Asia to encompass the Global South, capturing the strategic logic of states in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. The use of cross-national indicators, original coding schemes, and harmonized data from 1) UN Voting Behavior on the Russia–Ukraine War; 2) Economic Alignment Data: Trade and Investment Exposure; 3) Security and Technology Cooperation, and the IIGO dataset ensures comparability and analytical rigor. By moving beyond regionally bounded typologies and into systematic causal inference, the study offers a replicable model for future research.

Conceptually, it reframes middle powers not as passive norm followers or bridge-builders but as autonomous actors capable of sequencing identities, managing institutional complexity, and manipulating systemic ambiguity to advance their interests. Strategic hedging, as theorized here, is not an exception to the international order: it is a core strategy of maneuver within it.

This research also carries implications for both scholars and policymakers. For scholars, it offers a testable framework that invites further exploration of how emerging powers navigate fragmented orders and institutional overlap. For policymakers, it highlights that strategic ambiguity is not indecision to be punished, but agency to be understood. Misreading hedging as defiance risks undermining relationships with pivotal states whose behavior is structurally conditioned and rationally constructed.

As great power competition intensifies and regime complexity deepens, strategic hedging will likely become more, not less, central to global politics. Future research should explore the feedback loops between hedging and systemic change, examine variation within middle power coalitions, and investigate how digital diplomacy, elite turnover, or economic shocks affect the durability of hedging strategies. This study provides a theoretical foundation for those inquiries, and a conceptual roadmap for understanding the strategic logic of calibrated ambiguity in the twenty-first century.

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## **ФРАГМЕНТТЕЛГЕН БИПОЛЯРЛЫҚ ТӘРТІП ЖАҒДАЙЫНДА ОРТА ДЕРЖАВАЛАРДЫ СТРАТЕГИЯЛЫҚ ТЕЖЕЛЕНУІ**

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**Аңдатпа.** Бұл мақала Орта Державалардың фрагменттелген биполярлы жүйеде қолданатын стратегиялық шарбақтану саясатын рационалды, көпқырлы және орнықты сыртқы саясат стратегиясы ретінде

қайта қарастырады. Зерттеу құрылымдалған салыстырмалы талдау әдісімен Үндістан, Түркия, Индонезия, Бразилия, Оңтүстік Африка, Мексика, Аргентина, Нигерия, Сауд Арабиясы және Таиланд секілді он жаһандық оңтүстік елдерін зерттейді. Зерттеуде үш фактордың әсері бағаланады: құрылымдық асимметрия, институционалдық плюрализм және өздік икемділік. Нәтижелер көрсеткендей, орта державалар экономикалық, қауіпсіздік және институционалдық салаларда стратегиялық маневр жасау үшін өзара тәуелділікті, институттық әртүрлілікті және риторикалық бейімделуді тиімді қолданады. Мақала материалдық, институционалдық және идеялық механизмдерді біріктіретін орта деңгейлі теория ұсынады.

**Тірек сөздер:** стратегиялық тежелену, орта державалар, мультиполярлық жүйе, институционалдық плюрализм, тұлғалық икемділік, жаһандық оңтүстік, сыртқы саясат, стратегия

## СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКОЕ СДЕРЖИВАНИЕ СРЕДНИХ ДЕРЖАВ В УСЛОВИЯХ ФРАГМЕНТИРОВАННОГО БИПОЛЯРНОГО ПОРЯДКА

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**Аннотация.** В статье предлагается новое понимание стратегического хеджирования как рациональной, многомерной и устойчивой стратегии внешней политики, используемой государствами средней мощности в условиях фрагментированного биполярного порядка. С применением структурированного сравнительного анализа исследуются десять стран Глобального Юга – Индия, Турция, Индонезия, Бразилия, Южная Африка, Мексика, Аргентина, Нигерия, Саудовская Аравия и Таиланд – для оценки влияния трех ключевых факторов: структурной асимметрии, институционального плюрализма и эластичности идентичности. Результаты показывают, что государства средней мощности осознанно используют асимметричные зависимости, участие в различных институтах и гибкость идентичности для хеджирования в экономической, военной и институциональной сферах. Исследование предлагает среднюю теорию, объединяющую материальные, институциональные и идеологические механизмы объяснения вариативности стратегий сдерживания.

**Ключевые слова:** стратегическое сдерживание, государства средней мощности, мультиполярность, институциональный плюрализм, эластичность идентичности, Глобальный Юг, внешняя политика, стратегия

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## ОРТАЛЫҚ АЗИЯДАҒЫ ЕҢБЕК МИГРАЦИЯСЫНЫҢ ЕРЕКШЕЛІКТЕРІ: ӘЛЕУМЕТТІК-ЭКОНОМИКАЛЫҚ ЖӘНЕ ҚҰҚЫҚТЫҚ АСПЕКТІЛЕРІ

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**Аңдатпа.** Бұл зерттеуде Орталық Азиядағы еңбек көші-қонын ұлттық және өңірлік деңгейлерде саяси-құқықтық реттеу ерекшеліктері қарастырылады. Зерттеудің мақсаты — аймақ елдеріндегі еңбек көші-қонына байланысты негізгі үрдістерді, проблемаларды және қиындықтарды анықтап, көші-қон үдерістерін реттейтін құқықтық тетіктерді талдау. Зерттеудің негізгі бағыттарына еңбек көші-қонын реттейтін халықаралық және ұлттық құқықтық актілерді сараптау, көші-қон саясатының институционалдық тетіктері мен тәжірибелерін анықтау, саяси факторлар мен мемлекетаралық өзара әрекеттестіктің көші-қон үдерістеріне әсерін зерттеу жатады. Зерттеудің өзегі — еңбек көші-қонын тиімді басқаруға бағытталған, донор және реципиент елдердің мүдделерін ескеретін үйлестірілген тәсілдің қажеттігін негіздеу. Зерттеудің ғылыми және практикалық маңызы — Орталық Азиядағы еңбек көші-қонын құқықтық реттеудің қазіргі жай-күйіне кешенді талдау жасап, оны жетілдіруге бағытталған ұсынымдар әзірлеуде болып табылады. Методологиялық негізі ретінде салыстырмалы құқықтану, саяси талдау, жүйелік және институционалдық әдістерге негізделген пәнаралық тәсіл қолданылды. Зерттеу нәтижесінде еңбек көші-қонын құқықтық қамтамасыз етудегі олқылықтар мен қайшылықтар анықталды, сондай-ақ аймақ елдері арасында көші-қон саясатын үйлестіру мүмкіндіктерінің шектеулілігі көрсетілді. Еңбек көші-қонын басқарудың тиімділігін арттыру мақсатында құқықтық нормаларды үйлестіру және институционалдық ынтымақтастықты күшейту қажеттігі туралы қорытынды жасалды. Жүргізілген зерттеудің құндылығы — көші-қон саясатына қатысты мәліметтерді жүйелеу және тұжырымдамалық тұрғыда пайымдау арқылы Орталық Азиядағы көші-қон үдерістерін ғылыми тұрғыда тереңірек түсіндіру. Жұмыстың практикалық мәні — алынған қорытындыларды нормативтік құқықтық актілерді әзірлеуде, сонымен қатар көші-қон саясаты стратегияларын қалыптастыруда және көші-қон мәселелерімен айналысатын мемлекеттік органдардың қызметінде пайдалануға болады.

**Тiрек сөздер:** еңбек миграциясы, Орталық Азия, көшi-қон саясаты, құқықтық реттеу, еңбек нарығы, халықаралық көшi-қон, аймақтық қауiпсiздiк, көшi-қон институттары

### **Кiрiспе**

Орталық Азия аймағы Еуразиядағы еңбек миграциясының ең iрi көздерiнiң бiрi болып табылады. Жұмыссыздықтың жоғары деңгейi, өнеркәсiптiң нашар дамуы және елдер iшiнде жұмыспен қамтудың шектеулi мүмкiндiктерi негiзiнен Ресейге, Қазақстанға, сондай-ақ Парсы шығанағы елдерi мен Оңтүстiк Кореяға бағытталған тұрақты көшi-қон ағындарының қалыптасуына ықпал еттi. Көшi-қон процестерiнiң ерекшелiктерiн зерттеудiң маңыздылығы олардың әлеуметтiк-экономикалық тұрақтылыққа, демографиялық көрсеткiштерге және аймақ елдерiнiң iшкi саясатына айтарлықтай әсер етуiне байланысты.

Орталық Азиядағы көшi-қон процестерi өңiрдiң әлеуметтiк-экономикалық дамуының ажырамас бөлiгi болып табылады және соңғы онжылдықтарда тұрақты сипатқа ие болды. Халықтың туған мемлекеттерiнен тыс жерлердегi жаппай еңбек қозғалысы экономикалық, демографиялық, әлеуметтiк және саяси-құқықтық себептер шешушi рөл атқаратын факторлар кешенiне байланысты.

Зерттеудiң өзектiлiгi Орталық Азия өңiрлерiнiң әлеуметтiк-экономикалық дамуындағы еңбек миграциясының өсiп келе жатқан рөлiне, сондай-ақ көшi-қон ағындарын құқықтық және ұйымдастырушылық реттеудiң тиiмдi әдiстерiн iздеуден туындап отыр. Жаһандану, көшi-қон процестерiн күшейту және мигранттардың құқықтарын қорғау қажеттiлiгi жағдайында аймақтың негiзгi ерекшелiктерiн анықтау, ағымдағы сын-қатерлердi анықтау, сондай-ақ мемлекетаралық ынтымақтастықтың тиiмдiлiгiн арттыру және теңдестiрiлген көшi-қон саясатын қалыптастыру үшін ұсынымдар әзiрлеу маңызды.

Экономикалық тұрғыдан алғанда, көшi-қонның негiзгi ынталандырушысы аймақ елдерiнде, әсiресе ауылдық жерлерде және мемлекеттiк еңбек нарығында жалақының төмен деңгейi, сондай-ақ жұмыспен қамтудың шектеулi мүмкiндiктерi мен экономиканың төмен өнiмдiлiгi болып табылады. Iшкi еңбек нарықтары еңбекке қабiлеттi азаматтардың өсiп келе жатқан санын жұмыспен қамтамасыз ете алмайды, бұл сыртқы жұмыспен қамтуға, оның iшiнде маусымдық және уақытша тұрақты тәуелдiлiктi қалыптастыруға ықпал етедi.

Орталық Азия елдерiнiң демографиялық құрылымы жалпы халықтағы жастардың жоғары үлесiмен сипатталады. Әсiресе Өзбекстан мен Тәжiкстанда жылдам демографиялық өсу еңбек нарығына қысымды күшейтiп, ең алдымен Ресей, Қазақстан және Таяу Шығыс елдерi бағытындағы көшi-қон ағындарын ынталандырады.

Әлеуметтік факторлар да маңызды рөл атқарады: халықтың көп бөлігі үшін еңбек миграциясы отбасының негізгі қажеттіліктерін қамтамасыз етудің жалғыз әдісі болып табылады. Жұмыссыздықтың жоғары деңгейі, әсіресе жастар мен әйелдер арасында, әлеуметтік қорғаудың төмен деңгейімен және мемлекеттік қолдау жүйесінің әлсіздігімен бірге үй шаруашылықтарының еңбек мигранттарының ақша аударымдарына тәуелділігін күшейтеді, олар бірқатар елдерде (мысалы, Тәжікстан мен Қырғызстанда) жалпы ішкі өнімнің үштен біріне құрайды.

Ақырында, саяси-құқықтық факторлар, мысалы, тұрақсыздық, сыбайлас жемқорлық, құқықтық институттардың әлсіздігі және еңбек мигранттарының құқықтарының шектеулі қорғалуы, шығу және келу елдерінде, заңды және қауіпсіз көші-қон үшін қосымша кедергілер жасайды. Тиімді нормативтік-құқықтық базаның болмауы, мемлекетаралық координация механизмдерінің жоқтығы, сондай-ақ бюрократиялық және сыбайлас жемқорлық тәжірибелерінің басым болуы еңбек мобильділігінің тұрақты және қорғалған моделін қалыптастыруға кедергі келтіреді.

Осылайша, Орталық Азия елдерінен көші-қон ұлттық, сондай-ақ өңірлік және халықаралық деңгейлерде кешенді саяси-құқықтық талдауды талап ететін күрделі және көп қырлы процесс болып табылады.

### **Материалдар мен әдістерді сипаттау**

Зерттеудің әдіснамалық негіздері статистикалық деректерді, нормативтік құқықтық актілерді, сондай-ақ әлеуметтанулық әдістерді талдау мен түсіндіруді қамтитын әдістердің жүйелік кешенін пайдалануға негізделген. Атап айтқанда, Орталық Азия елдерінің нормативтік құжаттар мен құқықтық актілерді талдау, өңір елдерінің көші-қон режимдері мен құқықтық жүйелерін салыстырмалы талдау, сондай-ақ мигранттардың құқықтық жағдайы мен еңбек жағдайларының практикалық аспектілерін анықтау. Көші-қон ағындарының динамикасын анықтау үшін статистикалық ақпараттың сандық талдауы, ал ағымдағы шаралардың тиімділігін бағалау үшін бағдарламалар мен нормативтік бастамалардың сапалық талдауы пайдаланылды.

Талдау негізінен ұйымның құқықтық порталында орналастырылған ЕАЭО құжаттарына және ұйымның басты веб-сайтында - Еуразиялық экономикалық комиссияда, Қазақстан Республикасы Президентінің ресми веб-сайтында, талдамалық есептерде, сондай-ақ отандық және Орталық Азия сарапшыларының сараптамалық пікірлерінде түсіндірілетін негізгі оқиғаларды талдауға негізделген.

Мұндай кешенді әдіснамалық тәсіл көші-қон процестерінің ерекшеліктері мен проблемаларын жан-жақты зерттеуге, сондай-ақ оларды реттеу мен дамыту бойынша негізделген ұсыныстарды қалыптастыруға мүмкіндік берді.



## **Нәтижелер**

Зерттеу барысында Орталық Азия өңіріндегі еңбек миграциясының негізгі үрдістері, құқықтық реттеу ерекшеліктері және мемлекетаралық ынтымақтастықтың деңгейі айқындалды.

Миграциялық ағындардың сипаты: Қазақстан еңбек мигранттарын қабылдаушы басты ел болып табылады, ал Өзбекстан, Қырғызстан және Тәжікстан - негізгі мигрант жіберуші елдер ретінде ерекшеленеді. Түрікменстанда болса, миграция көбіне бақылаудан тыс, бейресми сипатта жүріп жатыр.

Құқықтық және институционалдық тетіктер: еңбек миграциясын реттеуде елдер арасында айтарлықтай айырмашылықтар бар. Қазақстанда шетелдік жұмыс күшін квоталау және рұқсат жүйесі жұмыс істейді, Өзбекстан мен Қырғызстанда мигранттарды қолдау мақсатында арнайы агенттіктер мен бағдарламалар енгізілген. Тәжікстанда еңбек, көші-қон және жұмыспен қамту министрлігі негізгі рөл атқарады. Түрікменстанда бұл салада тиімді институттардың болмауы байқалады.

Мемлекетаралық келісімдер: Зерттеу барысында анықталғандай, көптеген елдер Ресеймен және ЕАЭО шеңберінде еңбек мигранттарының құқықтарын реттейтін келісімдерге қол қойған. Қосымша келісімдер Корея, Түркия, Германия сияқты елдермен де жасалған.

## **Талқылау**

Анықталған нәтижелер Орталық Азияда еңбек миграциясы экономикалық тұрақтылық пен халықтың әл-ауқатына ықпал ететін маңызды фактор екенін көрсетеді. Алайда осы үдерісті тиімді басқару үшін елдердің құқықтық базасы мен институционалдық тетіктерін үйлестіру қажет.

Аймақтық теңсіздік: Елдер арасындағы құқықтық және ұйымдық айырмашылықтар мигранттардың құқықтық қорғалуы мен әлеуметтік кепілдіктер деңгейінде теңсіздікке алып келеді. Бұл жағдай көлеңкелі экономика мен бейресми жұмыспен қамтылудың кеңеюіне жол ашады.

Келісімдердің тиімділігі: Екіжақты және көпжақты келісімдер мигранттардың құқықтарын қорғауға бағытталғанымен, олардың нақты орындалуы көбінесе жеткіліксіз. Мысалы, ЕАЭО шеңберіндегі миграциялық еркіндік Қырғызстан мен Қазақстан үшін мүмкіндіктер тудырғанымен, өзге елдер үшін толық пайдаланылмай отыр.

Зерттеу нәтижелері негізінде еңбек миграциясын басқаруға қатысты келесі бағыттар ұсынылады:

- Аймақтық келісімдер шеңберінде құқықтық нормаларды үйлестіру;
- Мигранттарды даярлау және бейімдеу бағдарламаларын кеңейту;
- Цифрлық платформалар арқылы миграциялық процестерді бақылау және талдау;
- Мемлекетаралық ынтымақтастықты күшейту.

Жалпы алғанда, қазіргі жаһандану жағдайында Орталық Азия елдері

үшін еңбек миграциясын тиімді және әділ түрде реттеу – әлеуметтік тұрақтылық пен өңірлік дамудың маңызды алғышарты болып табылады.

Орталық Азиядағы еңбек миграциясына байланысты артықшылықтар күмән тудырмаса да, бұл процесс негізінен реттелмеген. Визасыз режим туралы кең таралған ережелер және аймақ елдерінің географиялық жақындығы көбінесе маусымдық сипаттағы стихиялық, қысқа мерзімді, «айналмалы» көші-қонды ынталандырады. Мигранттардың құқықтық хабардар болу деңгейі әдетте төмен. Олар қабылдаушы елге заңды түрде келуі мүмкін, бірақ көбінесе тиісті еңбек шартынсыз заңсыз жұмысқа орналасады. Бұл оларды әлеуметтік қорғаудан айырады, ал мемлекет олардың еңбек кірістеріне салынатын салықтардан айырады. Заңды уақытша жұмысқа орналасуды ынталандыратын, оның ішінде елге кірудің және одан шығудың оңайлатылған тәртібін көздейтін құқықтық нормалар талап етіледі.

Қазақстан 2006 жылы елге сол жылдың маусымына дейін келген мигранттарға үш жыл мерзімге заңды мәртебе берілген рақымшылық туралы заң қабылдап, заңсыз еңбекші көшіп келушілерді заңдастыру жолында маңызды қадам жасады. 2006 жылдың соңына қарай 165 000 заңсыз еңбек мигранттары заңдастырылды, бұл Қазақстан үшін үлкен жетістік және ТМД тәжірибесіндегі бірегей жағдай болды [1].

2013 жылы Қазақстан үй қызметкерлерін жалдауға қатысты бірқатар жалпыұлттық заңдарға түзетулер енгізді, бұл тағы да бұрын заңсыз мигранттардың едәуір бөлігін заңдастыруға және сонымен бірге мигранттардан алынатын салық алымдары есебінен бюджет кірістерін арттыруға мүмкіндік берді. Бірақ бұл-Орталық Азия үшін ерекше жағдайлар. Жалпы, Орталық Азия елдеріндегі көші-қонның институционалдық базасы әлсіз күйінде қалып отыр. Ұлттық заңнама жеткіліксіз дамыған және әрқашан халықаралық стандарттарға сәйкес келе бермейді.

Сондай-ақ, мигранттардың баратын елдердегі еңбек нарығына қол жеткізуін жеңілдету үшін жұмыспен қамту тетіктерін неғұрлым нақты институттандыру қажеттілігі бар. Еңбекші-мигранттардың құқықтарын құрметтеу заңды, өркениетті көші-қонның маңызды алғышарты болып табылады, бірақ бұл құқықтар үнемі сақталмайды.

Үкіметтер мен азаматтық қоғам арасындағы көші-қон және өзге де проблемаларды шешудегі ынтымақтастық жеткіліксіз дамыған, бұл тоталитарлық өткеннің мұрасы болып табылады. Еңбек ресурстарының ұтқырлығын қамтамасыз етуде және көші-қон процестерін басқаруда ынтымақтастықтың жаңа тетіктерін құру мүмкіндіктерін зерделеу үшін халықаралық ұйымдардың, сарапшылар мен БАҚ-тың қатысуымен диалог қажет. Мұндай тетіктер, атап айтқанда, заңдарды әзірлеу жөніндегі жұмыс топтары, қоғамдық тыңдаулар, заңдардың орындалуын мониторингілеу, сондай-ақ бағдарламалар мен жобаларды бағалау жөніндегі миссиялар

болуы мүмкін. Мигранттарға және олардың қоғам мен ұлттық экономиканы дамытуға қосқан үлесіне қатысты мәселелер бойынша зерттеулерге, ақпараттық-ағарту жұмыстарына, қоғамдық пікірді қалыптастыруға және танымал ету науқандарына ерекше назар аудару қажет.

Еңбек миграциясы процестерін басқаруда шыққан елдер межелі елдерге қарағанда белсенді әрекет етуі керек. Олар мигранттардың келу алдындағы кәсіби және тілдік дайындығын, олардың құқықтық сауаттылығын қамтамасыз етіп, баратын елдің мәдениеті мен дәстүрлері туралы хабардар етуі керек. Еңбек нарығына қолжетімділікті тек мигранттардың өзара көмегінің ішкі тетіктері арқылы ғана емес, мемлекет тегін қамтамасыз етуге тиіс.

Жоғарыда аталған мәселелерге қарамастан, көші-қонды басқару саласында зерттеуге және қайталауға лайық бірқатар оң бастамалар жүзеге асырылды. Қазақстан жоғарыда аталған 2006 жылғы көші-қон рақымшылығына және 2013 жылғы заңнамалық түзетулерге қосымша еңбек миграциясын реттеу және көшіп-қонушылардың құқықтарын қорғау мәселелері бойынша Қырғызстанмен және Тәжікстанмен бірқатар реадмиссия туралы келісімдерге және екіжақты шарттарға қол қойды. Соңғылардың экономикалық және әлеуметтік құқықтарын қорғау туралы келісімдерге ТМД және Еуразиялық одақ шеңберінде қол қойылды [2].

Сипатталған тәжірибе Ресейге және заңсыз мигранттардың едәуір бөлігі келетін басқа елдерге пайдалы болуы мүмкін. Оны барынша тиімді пайдалану үшін министрліктер, үкіметтік ведомстволар, сарапшылар, үкіметтік емес және халықаралық ұйымдар, соның ішінде халықаралық көші-қон ұйымы, Халықаралық еңбек ұйымы және Еуропадағы қауіпсіздік және ынтымақтастық ұйымы (ЕҚЫҰ) арасындағы одан әрі трансшекаралық ынтымақтастық талап етіледі.

Ең танымал бағыттар Ресей мен Қазақстан болып қала береді, онда мигранттар көбінесе құрылыста, ауыл шаруашылығында, қызмет көрсету саласында және коммуналдық шаруашылықта жұмыс істейді. Еңбек миграциясы негізінен маятниктік, маусымдық және уақытша болып табылады, мигранттардың едәуір бөлігі заңсыз жұмыс істейді, бұл құқықтық реттеу мен әлеуметтік қорғауға қиындықтар туғызады.

Соңғы онжылдықта посткеңестік кеңістік әлемдегі негізгі көші-қон аймақтарының біріне айналды. Еңбек миграциясы бұрынғы кеңестік республикалар арасындағы интеграция элементтерінің біріне айналды. Алайда, мемлекеттің әрекеті жеткіліксіз болды, өйткені жіберуші де, қабылдаушы да елдер көші-қон мәселелерінде ынтымақтаспады, көші-қонның артықшылықтарын елемеді және мигранттардың өмірін қиындатты. Көші-қон процестерінің объективті дамуына ТМД-ның әртүрлі елдерінің еңбек нарығындағы ахуал, атап айтқанда, Өзбекстан мен Қазақстан мысалында байқауға болатын еңбекпен қамтамасыз ету мәселелеріндегі елеулі саралау ықпал етеді.

Еңбек миграциясы Орталық Азияда, реципиент елдерде – негізінен Ресей мен Қазақстанда саяси проблема ретінде қарастырылады. Мигранттар әлеуметтік-экономикалық ортаға, содан кейін саяси ортаға қысым жасай алады. Сонымен қатар, ірі жөнелтуші (донор) ел болып табылатын Өзбекстан Республикасы өңірлік кездесулерде еңбек миграциясы мәселелерін талқылауға үнемі тосқауыл қояды. Еңбек миграциясы процестерінің әсері демография мен экономикадан асып түседі. О. Д. Комарова мен В. А. Тишков дұрыс атап өткендей, «халықтың ішкі және сыртқы – елден тыс көші-қоны қоғамда және мемлекетте болып жатқан этносаяси және әлеуметтік-саяси процестердің маңызды көрсеткіштерінің бірі болып табылады» [3].

Занды еңбек миграциясының қабылдаушы ел ретінде Қазақстан үшін көптеген оң әлеуметтік-экономикалық әсерлері бар. Мысалға ала келсек, жұмысшы-мигранттардың қатысуымен 2022 жылдың соңына Қазақстанның ЖІӨ-нің шамамен 2,8% - ы құрады [4] .

Еңбек миграциясы жіберуші мемлекеттер үшін де айтарлықтай әсер етеді. Ең алдымен, бұл Қазақстаннан еңбек мигранттарынан олардың туыстары мен отбасыларына түсетін ақша аударымдарының айтарлықтай ағыны. Еңбек мигранттары елдің ЖІӨ-нің 5-тен 10% - на дейін құратынына қарамастан, ТМД-да еңбек бөлінісінің процестеріне әрдайым дұрыс түзетулер енгізбейтін және қабылдаушы елдердің еңбек нарықтарының белгілі бір кәсіби деформациясын енгізетін еңбек миграциясының кері нәтиже беретін түрі қалыптасты, бұл заңсыз жұмысқа орналасуға алғышарттар жасайды. Орталық Азия елдерінен келген еңбек мигранттарының басым бөлігі диаспоралар құрған ірі өнеркәсіптік және сауда орталықтарына, «тарту нүктелеріне» тартыла отырып, стихиялық режимде бөлінеді.

Маңызды әлеуметтік және гуманитарлық аспект – заңсыз еңбек миграциясы мәселесі. Бұл көші-қон процестерін реттеудің негіздерін бұзады, жұмыс күшінің мемлекетаралық көші-қонының тиімділігін айтарлықтай төмендетеді және қабылдаушы мен жіберуші елдердің демографиялық қауіпсіздігіне қауіп төндіреді, сайып келгенде, жіберуші және қабылдаушы елдердің еңбек саласындағы интеграциясына қол жеткізудің орындылығы мен мүмкіндігіне күмән келтіреді. Көші-қон процестерін құқықтық реттеу әртүрлі деңгейде жүзеге асырылады. Жөнелтуші елдерде мигранттарды даярлау жөніндегі бағдарламалар іске асырылады, мемлекетаралық келісімдер жасалады. Мысалы, Өзбекстанда сыртқы еңбек миграциясы агенттігі құрылды, Германия, Түркия және басқа елдермен ынтымақтастық жүргізілуде. Тәжікстан мигранттардың құқықтарын қорғау туралы екіжақты келісімдер жасай отырып, Ресеймен белсенді өзара іс-қимыл жасайды, бірақ құқықтық қорғау жеткіліксіз болып қала береді. Қырғызстан ЕАЭО шеңберінде өз азаматтарының еркін жүріп-тұруын және жұмысқа орналасуын қамтамасыз етеді, бұл көші-қон бағыттарын әртараптандыруға ықпал етеді. Ресей мен Қазақстан сияқты реципиент елдер әртүрлі реттеу құралдарын пайдаланады: квоталар, патенттік жүйелер, жұмысқа

рұқсаттар. Қазақстанда патенттер мен квоталар жүйесі жұмыс істейді, алайда мигранттардың құқықтарын бұзу практикасы, кемсітушілік пен сыбайлас жемқорлық құқықтық тетіктерді жетілдіруді және мигранттардың құқықтарын қорғауды күшейтуді талап етеді.

Орталық Азиядағы интеграция мен көші-қон аймақтың әлеуметтік-экономикалық дамуының әртүрлі аспектілері аясында қарастырылады:

- Еңбек нарығына әсері. Еңбек миграциясы ұлттық экономиканың кейбір сегменттерінде жұмыс күшінің жетіспеушілігі мен кадрлардың көптігін теңестіреді.

- Әлеуметтік дамуға әсері. Көші-қон процестері отбасылық құндылықтарға, білім сапасына және мәдени саладағы алмасуға айтарлықтай әсер етеді.

- Аймақтық интеграция мен ынтымақтастықтағы рөлі. Орталық Азиядағы көші-қон процестері халықаралық қатысушылардың жақындасуына ықпал етеді, өңірлік істердегі ынтымақтастық пен өзара алмасуды күшейтеді.

- ЕАЭО-ға интеграциялау контекстінде көші-қон компоненті. Көші-қон интеграцияның басқа аспектілеріне әсер ететін және бірлестікке мүше болып табылмайтын Орталық Азия елдерінің интеграциялық әлеуетін арттыратын негізгі аспектілердің бірі болып табылады.

*1-кесте. Орталық Азия елдерінің еңбек миграциясы саласындағы мемлекетаралық келісімдері мен ынтымақтастық бағыттарын салыстырмалы талдау*

| Мемлекет атауы      | Мемлекетаралық келісімдер және ынтымақтастық бағыттары  | Ішкі шаралар / органдар   |
|---------------------|---|---|
| <b>Өзбекстан</b>    | - Ресей Федерациясымен (2007) еңбек қызметі және азаматтардың құқықтарын қорғау туралы келісім - Корея Республикасымен, Түркиямен, Германиямен келісімдер (GIZ) | - Сыртқы еңбек миграциясы агенттігі<br>- Еңбек миграциясы стратегиясы (2020-2030)     |
| <b>Тәжікстан</b>    | - Ресей Федерациясымен еңбек қызметі туралы келісім (2004) - Қазақстанмен, Беларусьпен, БАӘ-мен, Катармен уағдаластықтар  | - Еңбек, көші-қон және жұмыспен қамту министрлігі<br>- Көші-қонды даярлау орталықтары |
| <b>Қырғызстан</b>   | - ЕАЭО-ға қатысу (2015 жылдан бастап): еркін орын ауыстыру және жұмысқа орналастыру - Ресей Федерациясымен (2014), Оңтүстік Кореямен, Түркиямен келісім         | - Еңбек және көші-қон министрлігі<br>- Мигранттарды даярлау жөніндегі бағдарламалар   |
| <b>Қазақстан</b>    | - Өзбекстанмен, Қырғызстанмен, Тәжікстанмен келісімдер - ЕАЭО-ға қатысу   | - Шетелдік жұмыс күшін квоталау<br>- ШЖК тартуға рұқсаттар                            |
| <b>Түрікменстан</b> | - Шектеулі ынтымақтастық: Түркиямен, ТМД-мен келісімдер<br>- Еңбек миграциясы негізінен заңдастырылмаған  | - Дамыған институттардың болмауы<br>- Халықтың шығуын қатаң бақылау                   |

Еуразиялық кеңістіктегі интеграциялық процестер ЕАЭО-ның барлық «төрт бостандығының» (тауарлар қозғалысы, қызметтер қозғалысы, жұмыс күшінің қозғалысы және капитал қозғалысы) даму конвергенциясын қоса алғанда, бірлестік мүшелерінің ынтымақтастығы мен жақындасуына көзқарастардың эволюциясы мен трансформациясының нәтижесі болып табылады [5]. Қазіргі уақытта ЕАЭО Еуразиядағы жалғыз тиімді экономикалық интеграциялық бірлестік болып табылады, ал көші-қон құрамдас бөлігі басқа үш елдің экономикасына әсер етіп, осы бірлестіктерге мүше емес Орталық Азия елдерінің интеграциялық әлеуетін арттыратын негізгі аспектілердің бірі болып табылады.

Қазіргі еуразиялық интеграция тартылған елдер мен серіктес ұйымдардың өзара іс-қимылының белгілі бір саяси және мәдени-гуманитарлық аспектілері аясында үнемі дамып, өзгеріп отыратын экономикалық және әлеуметтік процестер кешенімен ұсынылған.

ЕАЭО ішіндегі және одан тыс көші-қон процестері ішкі жағдайлар мен сыртқы ынтымақтастықты кеңейтуге байланысты маңызды аспект болып табылады. Еңбек миграциясы процестерінің орнықтылығының өсуі ЕАЭО мүшелері үшін ғана емес, көші-қон жүйесіне толық тартылған, бірақ оның мүшелері болып табылмайтын Орталық Азия елдері үшін де (Түркіменстанды қоспағанда) елеулі мәселе болып табылады.

Одақтың негізгі мақсаты – негізгі әріптестер арасындағы сауданы оңтайландыру және ЕАЭО елдерінің ұлттық экономикаларының мүдделеріне сәйкес өз өндірісін ынталандыру арқылы қатысушы елдердің бәсекеге қабілеттілігін арттыру. Бұл, сонымен қатар, еңбек ресурстарының қозғалысын реттеудің тиімді платформасы болып табылады.

Сыртқы контур бойынша біз тұрақты әлеуметтік-саяси және экономикалық тенденцияларды, сондай-ақ Одақтың периметрі бойынша және оның барлық елдерінде пандемиядан кейінгі әсерлер мен өзгерген геосаяси жағдайды байқаймыз. Бұл өзгерістер Еуразиялық кеңістіктегі халықаралық қатынастардағы жаңа полярлықты және Ресей Федерациясына қарсы санкциялардың әсерін көрсетеді, бұл ЕАЭО-ның жаңа тәсілдеріне деген қажеттілікті туындатады. Ауғанстан Одақ үшін де, Орталық Азия елдері үшін (әсіресе Тәжікстан мен Өзбекстан үшін) елеулі сын-тегеурін болып қала береді. Бұл жақындасуға кедергі келтіретін маңызды факторлар болып табылады, бірақ сонымен бірге интеграцияны дамыту үшін жаңа мүмкіндіктерді де ашады [6].

Ішкі контурда әлі де бар экономикалық кедергілер мен қатысушы елдер экономикаларының әртүрлі құрылымын атап өту маңызды. Сондай-ақ, тартылған ұлттық құрылымдардың толық үйлестірілмеуі әлі де байқалады. Мемлекеттік және мемлекетаралық деңгейлерде белгілі бір сенімді қадамдар жасалғанына қарамастан, халықтың сенімінің төмен деңгейі және Одақ елдерінде сараптамалық деңгейде жүзеге асырылуы мен



табысқа жетуiне қатысты пессимизм бар. Одақтың маңызды мiндеттерiнiң бiрi – үнемі өзгерiп отыратын шындыққа бейiмделу, сондай-ақ «жедел әрекет ету» деп аталатын стратегияны қолдану қажеттiлiгi, бұл әрдайым жағдайды алдын ала жоспарлау мен модельдеуден тұра бермейдi. Осы үрдiстер аясында iшкi әлеуеттi күшейту құрылымды нығайтуда, одаққа қатысушы барлық елдердiң тұрақты өзара iс-қимылында, тұрақты жұмыста және қызметтiң негiзгi бағыттары бойынша тетiктердi жетiлдiруде көрiнедi. Бұл мiндет маңызды және күрделi болып табылады, бiрақ оны шешу үшiн тұрақты жұмыс жүргiзiлуде. Еуразиялық интеграцияның жай-күйiн және тұтастай алғанда Одақтың қызметiн бағалай отырып, бiз экономикалық жақындасу мен институционализацияны тереңдету, тұрақтылық пен тетiктердi жетiлдiру контекстiнде атқарылған жұмыстар мен нәтижелердi атап өтемiз.

Сарапшылармен белгiленген және нормативтiк-құқықтық базамен расталған қызметтiң негiзгi бағыттарын дамыту және iлгерiлету жөнiндегi iс-шаралардың тұтас кешенiн атап өткен жөн. Одақтың iшкi шекараларында кедендiк бақылау жойылды, бiрыңғай кедендiк тарифтiң орташа өлшенген мөлшерлемесi айтарлықтай төмендетiлдi, iшкi нарықты қорғау жөнiндегi шаралардың бiрыңғай жүйесi әзiрлендi және қолданысқа енгiзiлдi. ЕАЭО шеңберiнде техникалық реттеудiң бiрыңғай жүйесi жұмыс iстейдi, ал 2017 жылғы қаңтардан бастап ЕАЭО Бiрыңғай кеден кодексi енгiзiлдi [6]. 2018 жылдың соңында Жоғары Еуразиялық экономикалық кеңес (ЖЕЭК) ЕАЭО шеңберiнде интеграциялық процестердi одан әрi дамыту туралы Декларация қабылдады, оның ережелерi ғарыш, ядролық энергетика, жаңартылатын энергия көздерi, экология және медицина сияқты салаларды қоса алғанда, ғылым мен экономиканың озық салаларында ынтымақтастық үшiн мүмкiндiктердi кеңейттi. 2019 жылдың қазан айында ЕАЭО-ның жалпы қаржы нарығының тұжырымдамасы бекiтiлдi [7].

Осылайша, Одақтың iшкi құрылымындағы тұрақты институционалдық процестер оның тек тұрақты дамуына ғана емес, сонымен қатар трансформацияға да негiз болатынын атап өтуге болады. Ресейге қарсы енгiзiлген санкциялар Одақ үшiн маңызды және күрделi сынақ болып табылады. Бiр жағынан, санкциялар Одақтың барлық мүшелерi үшiн айтарлықтай қиындық туғызады, ал екiншi жағынан, олар ЕАЭО-ның бiрыңғай экономикалық саясатын әзiрлеу мен жүзеге асыруға ынталандырушы күш болуы тиiс.

Iшкi құрылымды нығайту жаһандық экономикадағы өзгерiстер мен жаңа мүмкiндiктердi iздеуде маңызды рөл атқарады, сондай-ақ кәсiпорындардың көлiк-логистикалық тiзбектердегi қиындықтарды жеңiп, қаржылық қызметтердегi шектеулердi еңсеруiне көмектеседi. Сонымен қатар, халықаралық саудадағы есеп айырысулардың цифрландырылуы, сондай-ақ Еуропалық Одақ iшiнде, әсiресе жастар арасында Одақтың оң

имиджін нығайту бойынша жұмыстарды жалғастыру қажеттігі туындайды. Санкциялар мен геоэкономикалық жағдайлардың жылдам өзгеруі аясында әлеуетті арттыру Одақтың халықаралық қатынастарын кеңейтуге жол ашады. Бұл тек Одақтың қатысушы елдері үшін ғана емес, сонымен бірге Одаққа қатысуды көздейтін Қазақстан мен Қырғызстан, сондай-ақ басқа Орталық Азия елдері үшін де маңызды.

Еңбек миграциясы саласындағы маңызды қадамдардың бірі — БҰҰ құрылымдарымен, ТМД-мен, ҰҚШҰ, ШЫҰ, ХКУ сияқты халықаралық және өңірлік ұйымдармен ынтымақтастық туралы меморандумдарға қол қою болып табылады. Перспективалар, өз кезегінде, экономикалық жеңілдікті режим аясында серіктестер санын ұлғайту арқылы сауда-экономикалық ынтымақтастықты кеңейту мүмкіндігін арттыруда жатыр. Сонымен қатар, жаңа серіктестіктер тұрғысынан жаңа логистикалық шешімдерді іздеу тәсілдерін қарастыру қажет.

Қытай Халық Республикасымен сауда-экономикалық ынтымақтастық туралы келісім күшіне енді, ал Сербия мен Сингапурмен ынтымақтастық жөніндегі келісімдер мен Индонезиямен ынтымақтастық туралы меморандумдарға қол қойылды. Сонымен қатар, Тынық мұхиты альянсымен серіктестік туралы декларацияға қол қойылды. 2019 жылы ЕАЭО мен Иран арасында еркін сауда аймағын құруға әкелетін уақытша келісім күшіне енгенін ерекше атап өту қажет. 2022 жылдың 14 наурызында оның қолданылу мерзімін үш жылға ұзарту туралы немесе еркін сауда туралы келісім күшіне енгенге дейін уақытша келісімге хаттамаға қол қойылды. Бұл оқиғалар ЕАЭО-ның сыртқы экономикалық қызметінің негізгі бағыттарын бекіту мен халықаралық ынтымақтастықты дамытудағы жаңа және маңызды кезең болды. 2023 жылы Бішкекте өткен іс-шаралар бұл бағыттағы іс-қимылдарды одан әрі нығайтуға үлес қосқан маңызды қадам болды [9]. Негізгі басымдықтар ТМД елдерімен және басқа да көршілес мемлекеттермен өзара іс-қимылды нығайту болып табылады. Бұл бағыттың маңызы көші-қон ағындарының жіберуші және реципиент елдердің экономикаларына айтарлықтай әсер етуінде. Мигранттардың ақша аударымдары жөнелтуші елдер үшін валюталық түсімдердің маңызды көзі болып табылады: Тәжікстанда олардың үлесі ЖІӨ-нің 30%-ын, ал Қырғызстанда шамамен 24%-ын құрайды [10]. Бұл каражат отбасыларды қамтамасыз етуге, шағын бизнесті дамытуға және өмір сүру деңгейін жақсартуға бағытталады.

Сонымен қатар, Шанхай Ынтымақтастық Ұйымы (ШЫҰ), Оңтүстік-Шығыс Азия мемлекеттерінің қауымдастығы (АСЕАН), Еуропалық Одақ (ЕО), БРИКС және Меркосур елдерімен үлкен еуразиялық әріптестік аясында жүйелі диалогты дамыту маңызды екендігі атап өтілді.

Дегенмен, білікті кадрлардың жаппай кетуі ішкі экономикаға теріс әсер ететін «білімді адамдардың шетелге көшуі (мидың кетуі)» әкеледі. Реципиент

елдер үшiн көшi-қон жұмыс күшiнiң тапшылығы мәселесiн шешедi, әсiресе құрылыс, ауыл шаруашылығы, қызмет көрсету салаларында. Сонымен қатар, заңсыз мигранттардың жоғары үлесi әлеуметтiк тәуекелдердi, қоғамдағы шиеленiстi тудырады және көшi-қон ағындарын бақылауды қиындатады.

Орталық Азиядағы еңбек миграциясы Қазақстан сияқты қабылдаушы елдерге де, мигранттар шыққан кедей елдерге де пайдалы, алайда оны реттеуге байланысты проблемаларды шешу шартымен ол екi тарапқа да үлкен пайда әкелуi мүмкiн.

Кеңес Одағының ыдырауынан кейiнгi Орталық Азиядағы экономикалық дағдарыстың онжылдығында жаңадан құрылған барлық тәуелсiз республикаларда-Қазақстан, Қырғызстан, Тәжiкстан, Түрiкменстан және Өзбекстанда – жұмыс күшiнiң шетелге кетуi байқалды. 1990 жылдардағы бiлiктi мамандардың едәуiр санының нәтижесi «мидың кетуiне» әкелдi, оның салдары осы уақытқа дейiн аймақта сезiлiп келедi.

Қазақстан экономикасы бiрiншi болып қалпына келтiру жолына түстi. Шамамен 2000 жылы бұл ел басқа Орталық Азия республикаларынан келген еңбек мигранттары үшiн тартымды бағытқа айналды. Экономикалық даму мен өмiр сүру деңгейiнiң теңгерiмсiздiгi, сондай-ақ Тәуелсiз Мемлекеттер Достастығындағы (ТМД) географиялық жақындық пен визасыз режим (кейбiр ерекшелiктердi қоспағанда) жалақысы төмен жұмыс күшiнiң көптiгi байқалған iргелес Орталық Азия елдерiнен келген жұмысшыларды тек Ресейге ғана емес, оның оңтүстiгiндегi көршiсiне де қоныс аударуға итермеледi ел.

2000 жылдардың ортасында Қазақстанға еңбек мигранттары ретiнде жыл сайын миллионнан астам адам келдi, олардың үлесiне елдiң жалпы iшкi өнiмiнiң (ЖИӨ) 10-нан 12 пайызына дейiн тиесiлi болды. Соңғы жылдары олардың саны Экономикалық даму қарқынының баяулауы салдарынан азайғанымен, Қазақстан оның аумағында жұмысшы-мигранттардың болуынан экономикалық пайда табуды жалғастыруда. Бұл шыққан елдерге де пайдалы. Дүниежүзiлiк банктiң мәлiметiнше, мигранттар Орталық Азияның кедей елдерiне, Қырғызстан мен Тәжiкстанға ресми түрде аударған қаражат 2013 жылы осы елдердiң ЖИӨ-нiң 32 және тиiсiнше 49 пайызын құрады [8]; бейресми түрде әкелiнген ақша қаражаттары мен тауарлардың көлемi одан да жоғары.

Орталық Азия елдерiнiң экономикалық белсендi тұрғындарының едәуiр бөлiгi шетелде жұмыс iстейдi: осылайша, осы санатқа жататын Өзбекстан тұрғындарының iшiнен, аймақ халқының саны бойынша ең үлкен, шамамен 20 пайызы Ресейде, Қазақстанда немесе батыс елдерiнiң кез келгенiнде жұмыс iстейдi. Шамадан тыс жұмыс күшiнiң эмиграциясы әлеуметтiк шиеленiстер мен толқулардың алдын алып, жергiлiктi еңбек нарығында тепе-теңдiктi сақтауға ықпал етедi. Мигранттар үшiн шетелде жұмыс iстеудiң басты артықшылығы-олардың отбасыларының

экономикалық жағдайын жақсарту. Сонымен қатар, олар кәсіби және әлеуметтік тәжірибеге ие болады және отанына оралғаннан кейін жақсы жұмысқа орналасу мүмкіндігі жоғары.

Айта кету керек, Орталық Азия елдері Батыс санкциялары аясында Ресей экономикасындағы өзгерістерге өте сезімтал, өйткені еңбек мигранттарының ақша аударымдары осы елдерде қаржыландырудың маңызды көзі болып табылады. Сонымен қатар, ақша аударымдары ішкі сұраныстың артуының себептерінің бірі ретінде әрекет етеді, бұл өз кезегінде өндірістің өсуіне және жұмыс орындарының құрылуына ықпал етеді [11]. Айта кету керек, Тәжікстан мен Қырғызстан жалпы ішкі өнімдегі ақша аударымдарының үлесі бойынша ең ірі алушылардың бестігіне кіреді, бұл аталған елдердің еңбек мигранттарына тәуелділігін көрсетеді [13]. Дүниежүзілік Банктің мәліметтері бойынша, 2021 жылы Қырғызстандағы барлық ақша аударымдарының 82% - ы Ресейден түскен. Тәжікстанда Ресейден аударымдардың жалпы көлеміндегі ақша аударымдарының үлесі 76%, Өзбекстанда – 56%, Қазақстанда - 44% құрады [14].

Осылайша, Ресей-Украина қақтығысы, сондай-ақ оның батыстық санкциялар түріндегі салдары Ресейдегі және Орталық Азия елдеріндегі экономикалық жағдайға әсер ететін аймақтағы көші-қон көрінісін айтарлықтай өзгертеді. Ақша аударымдарының күрт төмендеуі Орталық Азиядағы кедейліктің артуына әкелуі мүмкін.

Осылайша, Ресей Федерациясында бұрын жұмыс істеген, азаматтығын алған немесе Ресей Федерациясының аумағында уақытша өмір сүрген Өзбекстан мен Тәжікстаннан келген еңбек мигранттарының орташа білікті және төмен білікті жұмыс күшінің ағындарын Ресей Федерациясынан қайта бағыттау келген мигранттардың біліктілігі мен мамандануы мен еңбек нарығында қалыптасқан жұмыс күшіне сұраныс параметрлері арасындағы құрылымдық теңгерімсіздікке әкелуі мүмкін. Орталық Азия елдерінде жұмыссыздық деңгейін арттыру. Бұл ретте шетелдік жұмыс күшінің жоғары ағыны жергілікті жұмысшылар мен жұмыс іздеп жүрген азаматтарға бәсекелестік қысымның өсуіне әкелуі мүмкін. Ең алдымен, бұл жұмыссыздарға, еңбек нарығына алғаш рет шығатын жастарға, жұмыс іздеп ірі қалаларға қоныс аударған ішкі мигранттарға қауіп төндіреді. Тәуекел-оларды жұмысқа орналастыру проблемасын және жақсы еңбек жағдайлары мен лайықты жалақысы бар тұрақты жұмыс орындарының тапшылығын күшейту. Сонымен қатар, ресейліктердің болуын ұзақ мерзімге ұзарту және көлеңкелі экономиканы дамыту үшін жалған еңбек шарттарын жасасу арқылы тәуекелдер болуы мүмкін. Сонымен қатар, Орталық Азия елдерінің еңбек нарығы халық санының озық өсуін жұмыс орындарымен қамтамасыз ете алмайды [15]. Егер бұрын артық еңбек ресурстары Ресейге жіберілген болса, онда жаңа жағдайларда еңбек мигранттарын Қазақстанға қайта бағыттауға болады. Сонымен қатар, егер Ресейде тіркеудің мерзімі

өтiп кеткен немесе жұмысқа орналасуға тиiстi құжаттардың болмауы үшiн депортациялануы мүмкiн еңбек мигранттарына қатысты қатаң көшi-қон саясаты жүргiзiлсе, онда Қазақстанда көшi-қон саясаты либералды болып табылады, ол әлсiз көшi-қон бақылауымен сипатталады, бұл заңсыз иммиграция мен жұмысқа орналасуды дамытуға жақсы жағдай жасайды [12].

Айта кету керек, соңғы жылдары көшi-қон бағыттарының әртараптандырылуы байқалады: Батыс, Таяу Шығыс және Шығыс Азия елдерiне қоныс аударушылар санының артуы, сондай-ақ жаңа әрiптес елдермен ынтымақтастықтың кеңеюi. Сонымен бiрге заңсыз көшi-қон проблемасы, мигранттардың құқықтық сауаттылығының төмендiгi, көшi-қон және құқықтарды қорғау мәселелерi бойынша елдер арасындағы өзара iс-қимылдың әлсiздiгi сақталуда. Негiзгi сын-қатерлерге мигранттарды заңсыз жұмыспен қамту мен қанаудың жоғары деңгейi, құқықтық қорғау мен әлеуметтiк қамсыздандырудың жеткiлiксiздiгi, аймақтар арасындағы үйлестiрудiң әлсiздiгi, сондай-ақ мигрант әйелдердiң гендерлiк аспектiлерi мен кемсiтушiлiк пен зорлық-зомбылыққа осалдығы жатады.

Көшi-қон процестерiн реттеудiң тиiмдiлiгiн арттыру үшiн ұлттық заңнамаларды үйлестiру және ЕАЭО және ТМД шеңберiнде бiрыңғай нормативтiк негiздер құру, мигранттарды кәсiби даярлау жүйелерiн дамыту, олардың құқықтары мен мiндеттерi туралы хабардар ету, сондай-ақ қайтып келе жатқан мигранттарды әлеуметтiк қорғау тетiктерi мен қайта интеграциялау бағдарламаларын құру қажет. Халықаралық ынтымақтастықты нығайту, мигранттардың құқықтарын және олардың мүдделерiн қорғауды қамтамасыз ететiн екiжақты және көпжақты келiсiмдердi дамыту өңiрдiң орнықты дамуына маңызды қадам болып табылады.

### **Қорытынды**

Қорытындылай келе, Орталық Азиядағы еңбек миграциясы - өңiр мемлекеттерiнiң әлеуметтiк-экономикалық дамуы мен құқықтық тұрақтылығына елеулi әсер ететiн күрделi және көп қырлы құбылыс. Жүргiзiлген талдау барысында еңбек нарықтарының сыртқы жұмыс күшiне тәуелдiлiгiн, бейресми жұмыспен қамтудың жоғары үлесiн, сондай-ақ мигранттарды құқықтық қорғау тетiктерiнiң тиiмдiлiгiнiң жеткiлiксiздiгiн қоса алғанда, көшi-қон процестерiнiң Негiзгi ерекшелiктерi анықталды. Қолданыстағы заңнамалық және институционалдық негiздер трансшекаралық ынтымақтастықты, еңбек құқықтарын қорғауды және кемсiтушiлiкке қарсы күрестi қоса алғанда, қазiргi заманғы сын-қатерлерге үйлестiру мен бейiмделудi талап ететiнi анықталды.

Зерттеудiң ғылыми жаңалығы еңбек миграциясын тек экономикалық қана емес, сонымен бiрге аймақтың саяси-құқықтық трансформациясының факторы ретiнде кешендi бағалау болып табылады. Жұмыстың практикалық



маңыздылығы нормативтік-құқықтық базаны, сондай-ақ мемлекетаралық өзара іс-қимыл мен мигранттардың әлеуметтік интеграциясының институционалдық тетіктерін жетілдіру үшін бағыттарды ұсынудан тұрады.

Осылайша, еңбек миграциясын тиімді реттеу Орталық Азия елдерінің келісілген күш-жігерін, интеграциялық бастамаларды дамытуды, көшіп-қонушылардың құқықтық қорғалуын қамтамасыз ету жөніндегі жүйелі шараларды және екіжақты және көпжақты ынтымақтастықты кеңейтуді талап етеді. Тек кешенді, пәнаралық тәсіл көші-қонды әлеуметтік осалдық көзінен тұрақты даму, аймақтық тұрақтылық және қауіпсіздік ресурсына айналдыра алады.

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## **ОСОБЕННОСТИ ТРУДОВОЙ МИГРАЦИИ В ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ АЗИИ: СОЦИАЛЬНО-ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЕ И ПРАВОВЫЕ АСПЕКТЫ**

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**Аннотация.** В настоящем исследовании рассматриваются особенности трудовой миграции в Центральной Азии в контексте политико-правового регулирования на национальном и региональном уровнях. Целью работы является выявление ключевых тенденций, проблем и вызовов, связанных с трудовой миграцией, а также анализ существующих нормативно-правовых механизмов, обеспечивающих регулирование миграционных процессов в странах региона. Основные направления исследования включают: анализ международных и национальных правовых актов, регулирующих трудовую миграцию; выявление институциональных механизмов и практик миграционной политики; изучение влияния политических факторов и межгосударственного взаимодействия на миграционные процессы. В центре внимания — идея необходимости выработки согласованного подхода к регулированию трудовой миграции, учитывающего интересы как стран-доноров, так и стран-реципиентов трудовых ресурсов. Научная и практическая значимость исследования заключается в комплексном анализе современного состояния правового регулирования трудовой миграции в Центральной Азии и разработке рекомендаций по его совершенствованию. Методологическая база работы основывается на междисциплинарном подходе, включающем методы сравнительного правоведения, политического анализа, системного и институционального подходов. В результате исследования выявлены пробелы и противоречия в правовом обеспечении трудовой миграции, а также ограниченные возможности координации миграционной политики

между государствами региона. Сделан вывод о необходимости гармонизации правовых норм и усиления институционального сотрудничества в целях повышения эффективности управления трудовой миграцией. Ценность проведенного исследования заключается в систематизации данных и концептуальном осмыслении миграционной политики Центральной Азии, что позволяет углубить научное понимание миграционных процессов и разработать рекомендации, применимые как в научной, так и в практической плоскости. Практическое значение итогов работы выражается в возможности использования полученных выводов при разработке нормативных правовых актов, стратегий миграционной политики и в деятельности государственных органов, занимающихся вопросами миграции.

**Ключевые слова:** трудовая миграция, Центральная Азия, миграционная политика, правовое регулирование, трудовой рынок, международная миграция, региональная безопасность, миграционные институты

## **FEATURES OF LABOR MIGRATION IN CENTRAL ASIA: SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS**

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**Abstract.** This article explores the specifics of labor migration in Central Asia in the context of political and legal regulation at the national and regional levels. The aim of the work is to identify key trends, problems and challenges related to labor migration, as well as to analyze existing regulatory mechanisms that regulate migration processes in the countries of the region. The main research areas include: analysis of international and national legal acts regulating labor migration; identification of institutional mechanisms and practices of migration policy; study of the influence of political factors and interstate interaction on migration processes. The focus is on the need to develop a coordinated approach to regulating labor migration that takes into account the interests of both donor and recipient countries. The scientific and practical significance of the research lies in a comprehensive analysis of the current state of legal regulation of labor migration in Central Asia and the development of recommendations for its improvement. The methodological basis of the work is based on an interdisciplinary approach, including methods of comparative law, political analysis, systemic and institutional approaches. The study revealed gaps and contradictions in the legal provision of labor migration, as well as limited opportunities for coordinating migration policy between the states of the region. It is concluded that there is a need to harmonize legal norms and strengthen institutional cooperation in order to improve the effectiveness of labor migration management. The value of the conducted research lies in the systematization of

data and conceptual understanding of the migration policy of Central Asia, which makes it possible to deepen the scientific understanding of migration processes and develop recommendations applicable both in scientific and practical terms. The practical significance of the results of the work is expressed in the possibility of using the findings in the development of regulatory legal acts, migration policy strategies and in the activities of government agencies dealing with migration issues.

**Key words:** labor migration, Central Asia, migration policy, legal regulation, labor market, international migration, regional security, migration institutions

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**HAITI – THE BLACK SHEEP OF THE CARIBBEAN:  
HISTORICAL ROOTS AND CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVES  
ON STATE FRAGILITY**

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**Abstract.** This paper explores Haiti's contemporary political and economic challenges through the lens of its historical development and constructivist theory in international relations. Rather than attributing Haiti's persistent marginalization solely to material shortcomings or governance failures, the study emphasizes the importance of socially constructed perceptions and historical narratives that have shaped both Haiti's domestic institutions and its position in the international system. It argues that international norms, colonial legacies, and discursive practices have consistently portrayed Haiti as an anomaly within the Caribbean and global order. The paper analyzes how the Haitian Revolution, post-independence isolation, and repeated foreign interventions have contributed to a collective international perception of Haiti as politically unstable and economically fragile. Drawing on constructivist insights, the study underscores the significance of ideational forces—such as identity, reputation, and legitimacy—in understanding how Haiti is governed internally and perceived externally. Ultimately, the paper calls for a reevaluation of international engagement with Haiti that takes into account not only structural reforms but also the transformation of embedded global narratives.

**Key words:** constructivist theory, state fragility, Haiti, Human Rights Issues, security, CARICOM, “black sheep” of the Caribbean, Caribbean region

**Introduction**

In international relations discourse, Haiti is frequently positioned as a political and economic anomaly within the Caribbean region. While its neighbors have generally achieved varying degrees of political stability and regional integration, Haiti remains marked by governance crises, humanitarian emergencies, and endemic violence. This paper examines the underlying causes of Haiti's exceptional status through a constructivist lens, emphasizing the role of historical memory, identity construction, and international socialization in shaping state behavior and global perceptions. Constructivist theory, as articulated by Alexander Wendt (1992), posits that international realities are not fixed by material capabilities alone but are co-constituted through shared understandings,

norms, and discourses. In this context, Haiti's identity as the "black sheep" of the Caribbean is not merely descriptive but performative, reinforced through historical marginalization, diplomatic isolation, and normative judgments embedded in global governance practices. This paper seeks to analyze how such ideational structures, in tandem with material constraints, have reproduced Haiti's fragility and limited its agency in the international system.

### **Materials and Methods**

This paper employs a constructivist theoretical framework within the field of International Relations (IR) to examine Haiti's political history and its persistent marginalization within the international system. Constructivism challenges the materialist assumptions of dominant IR theories such as realism and liberalism by emphasizing the importance of socially constructed meanings, collective identities, and normative structures [2, p.890-892]. From a constructivist perspective, state behavior and global outcomes are not simply the result of material capabilities or institutional configurations but are shaped by inter-subjective understandings – the shared beliefs and expectations that govern how states perceive themselves and others [3, p.223-228]. Central to constructivist thought is the idea that sovereignty, legitimacy, and statehood are not fixed entities, but are continuously constructed and contested through discourse, norms, and interactions [4, p.133-140]. States do not exist in a vacuum; their identities are formed and re-formed through historical processes, symbolic narratives, and the normative judgments of powerful international actors. As Wendt famously argued, "anarchy is what states make of it," meaning that the structure of the international system is not given but made through social practice [1, p.398-402].

This framework is especially pertinent to the Haitian context, where the state's international identity has been shaped by a complex history of racialized exclusion, revolutionary defiance, and normative disqualification from the Euro-American liberal order. Haiti's post-revolutionary isolation, its recurring portrayal as a "failed state," and its dependence on international aid and interventions are not merely material conditions, but also products of enduring ideational constructs [5, p.224-228]. These constructs are maintained and reproduced by international organizations, donor states, and NGOs, which often impose normative models of governance, development, and legitimacy rooted in Western epistemologies [6, p.301-304]. This process reflects what Finnemore and Sikkink describe as norm diffusion – the transmission of specific standards of appropriate behavior by powerful actors to weaker states.

In this context, Haiti's marginalization can be understood as a constructed identity – a role assigned and reinforced through repeated interactions with external actors. These interactions often assume and reproduce notions of Haitian incapacity, fragility, and dependence, thereby undermining both internal legitimacy and external sovereignty. The constructivist lens thus provides a



critical analytical tool for interrogating not only Haiti's material vulnerabilities, but also the symbolic and normative hierarchies that define its place in the global order. By focusing on the interplay of ideas, norms, and identity, this approach sheds light on how Haiti came to be seen – and to see itself – as the “black sheep of the Caribbean”.

In analyzing Haiti's complex political and social landscape, it is useful to engage with several key concepts from International Relations and social theory. First, norm diffusion refers to the process through which ideas, values, and behavioral expectations spread across states and societies, shaping their actions and policies [2, p.98-104]. In Haiti's case, global norms related to governance, development, and human rights have been introduced through international organizations and foreign actors, often influencing domestic reforms and international perceptions, sometimes contentiously.

Second, the concept of performative identity helps explain how Haiti's international and domestic identity—as the “Black Sheep of the Caribbean” or a “failed state” – is not merely a static label but an ongoing social performance. This identity is continuously constructed and reinforced through discourse, media representations, and political practices which in turn affect how Haiti is treated by others and how it views itself [7, p.618-620].

Lastly, tutelary sovereignty captures the constrained nature of Haitian sovereignty, whereby external powers, under the justification of protection or aid, exert considerable influence over its internal affairs. Historical and contemporary interventions exemplify this condition, revealing how Haiti's autonomy is limited by the tutelage of international actors. Together, these concepts illuminate the layered dynamics shaping Haiti's position in the international system and its enduring challenges [8, p.110-119].

## **Results**

**Historical Context.** The historical development of Haiti is essential to understanding the structural foundations of its present-day political instability, economic underdevelopment, and constrained sovereignty. Unlike other post-colonial states in the Caribbean, Haiti emerged not through negotiated independence but through revolutionary violence against one of the most brutal plantation systems in the colonial world. The legacy of this rupture—both symbolic and material—has had enduring consequences for Haiti's position in the international system and for the internal coherence of the Haitian state.

**The Colonial Economy and Social Hierarchy.** As the French colony of Saint-Domingue, Haiti was once the most lucrative plantation economy in the world, producing vast quantities of sugar, coffee, and indigo through the brutal exploitation of enslaved Africans. By the late 18th century, enslaved Africans constituted over 90% of the population. The colony's wealth was built on extreme social stratification and racialized violence, laying the foundations for enduring

social divisions. This economic model created an extractive, unsustainable structure that benefited a narrow elite and left no infrastructure for inclusive development or governance.

The Haitian Revolution and Its Aftermath (1791–1804). From a constructivist perspective in International Relations, the Haitian Revolution (1791–1804) was not only a material rupture in colonial power but a profound challenge to the dominant ideational structures of the 18th and early 19th centuries. It contested prevailing norms of racial hierarchy, colonial legitimacy, and the presumed incompatibility of black sovereignty with “civilized” statehood. Saint-Domingue, then the most profitable colony in the French empire, was sustained by a racialized system of exploitation that normalized slavery as both economically necessary and morally justified [5, p.220-226]. The Revolution—initiated by the enslaved population—disrupted this hegemonic social order. Inspired by the Enlightenment and the French Revolution’s ideals of liberty and equality, the Haitian insurgents reinterpreted these universalist principles through their own lived realities, thereby reconstructing the meaning of freedom, citizenship, and human rights. The leadership of Toussaint Louverture exemplifies the constructivist notion that actors are shaped by, but also shape, the social structures around them. Louverture navigated complex identities—as a former slave, military leader, and quasi-statesman—to articulate a new vision of a post-slavery society that retained ties to France while asserting local autonomy. The eventual declaration of independence by Jean-Jacques Dessalines in 1804 marked a symbolic and normative rupture: Haiti was the first modern state to explicitly construct its national identity around blackness, anti-slavery, and anti-colonialism. However, the revolutionary redefinition of sovereignty and equality was not readily accepted by the international community. Prevailing norms of racial superiority and Eurocentric conceptions of legitimacy led to Haiti’s isolation. The refusal of recognition by major powers—particularly the United States and France—was not merely a matter of strategic interest but reflected deep-seated normative resistance to a black republic. France’s imposition of the 1825 indemnity for the “loss” of slave property further illustrates how material practices were embedded in ideational frameworks that denied full legitimacy to non-European states.

In constructivist terms, Haiti’s emergence posed an existential threat to the international normative order. The Revolution forced states to confront the contradictions in their professed liberal values and exposed the racial and imperial biases underpinning the “standard of civilization” used to determine state legitimacy. The global response to Haiti was thus not simply a product of material calculation but a defensive reaction to a normative shift that threatened entrenched identities and power structures.

Ultimately, the Haitian Revolution illustrates how ideas and identities can transform international politics, and how marginalized actors, by asserting

alternative norms, can provoke structural change—even if that change is met with long-term resistance.

**Nineteenth-Century Fragmentation and Weak State Formation.** The post-revolutionary period in 19th-century Haiti was marked by intense internal fragmentation and chronic weak state formation—a condition often interpreted through materialist lenses such as economic underdevelopment, institutional decay, or foreign isolation. However, from a constructivist perspective in International Relations, these dynamics are better understood as consequences of contested national identity, legitimacy, and the social construction of authority within a revolutionary state rejected by the dominant international order [9, p.130-140].

Following independence in 1804, Haiti confronted not just the task of nation-building but the more complex challenge of defining what kind of nation it could become in a world that denied its normative legitimacy. The revolution had inverted colonial racial hierarchies and declared the black republic a sovereign equal to European states, but this ideological rupture remained largely unrecognized abroad and unsettled at home. Haiti was, in effect, a state without normative anchoring in the global system—a pariah in an international society premised on Eurocentric ideals of civilization, whiteness, and property.

Domestically, this uncertainty materialized in the disintegration of a coherent national identity. Competing visions of governance emerged: the north under Henri Christophe pursued monarchical centralization with quasi-feudal labor policies, while the south under Alexandre Pétion embraced republicanism and land redistribution. These contrasting political models reflected competing constructions of what post-colonial sovereignty should entail, shaped by different understandings of legitimacy, authority, and the role of race and class in the new republic.

This internal ideological fragmentation prevented the emergence of stable national institutions. Instead of consolidating a unified political community, Haiti became a contested social space where multiple elites vied to define the meaning of statehood. Leaders were not merely competing for power—they were competing for normative legitimacy, attempting to bind the population to a particular vision of order and belonging. Frequent coups, assassinations, and regime changes were not solely power struggles; they signaled the absence of a shared social contract rooted in a widely accepted national identity.

Constructivism also draws attention to how Haiti's perceived deviance from international norms reinforced internal instability. Lacking recognition from major powers and burdened by the French indemnity, Haitian leaders were caught between asserting a proud anti-colonial identity and seeking external validation by mimicking European forms of governance. This identity tension inhibited the formation of an autonomous, confident state. Instead, Haitian governance became reactive and unstable, shaped by a persistent crisis of legitimacy both internally and externally.

Moreover, the international system during the 19th century did not operate as a neutral arena but actively socialized new states into a Eurocentric order. Haiti's marginalization functioned as a powerful normative signal to other postcolonial movements: that black sovereignty was aberrant and punishable. This reinforced a cycle in which Haiti's attempts at asserting legitimacy were met with rejection, deepening the state's fragility and isolation.

In sum, a constructivist reading of 19th-century Haiti reveals that its fragmentation and weak state formation were not merely outcomes of material constraints but were rooted in deep ontological insecurity—a failure to solidify a cohesive identity in a world that denied its very right to exist on equal terms. Understanding Haiti's historical trajectory thus requires attention to the social meanings, ideational conflicts, and constructed boundaries of legitimacy that shaped both its domestic politics and its place in the international system [9, p.140-146].

U.S. Occupation and the Reconfiguration of Sovereignty (1915–1934). The U.S. occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934 is often interpreted through realist or liberal paradigms, emphasizing strategic interests, economic motivations, or institutional development. However, a constructivist approach foregrounds the normative reconstruction of Haitian sovereignty during this period—how ideas of race, civilization, and state legitimacy were contested and reshaped through international and domestic interactions.

The occupation was justified by the United States as a civilizing mission aimed at stabilizing a “failed state”. But from a constructivist lens, this intervention reveals how sovereignty is not a fixed legal status, but a socially constructed institution defined by dominant norms and identities. The U.S. acted not merely to protect economic assets or geopolitical interests, but to reassert a Euro-American model of governance that racialized Haitians as incapable of modern self-rule. Thus, the occupation functioned as a normative imposition of Western standards of order, discipline, and development—redefining what constituted a “legitimate” Haitian state.

Haiti's internal political instability prior to 1915 was framed by American officials as evidence of inherent incapacity rather than as a legacy of foreign-imposed isolation and structural injustice. This framing enabled a normative reclassification of Haiti from a sovereign equal to a “protectorate-like” entity subject to external tutelage. The 1915 U.S.-Haiti treaty, which granted the U.S. control over Haitian finances and police, was not simply a legal arrangement but a symbolic reconfiguration of Haitian identity in the global order—from revolutionary black republic to dependent ward of the West.

Domestically, the occupation profoundly shaped Haitian political culture. The U.S. imposed a new constitution in 1918 that, among other things, reversed Haiti's historic prohibition against land ownership by foreigners—a cornerstone of its post-independence identity. This shift signified more than just

a legal reform; it represented a discursive rupture in the foundational values of Haitian sovereignty, which had been constructed in direct opposition to foreign domination and exploitation. Resistance to the occupation, particularly the Caco insurgency reflected not only a material struggle against foreign troops but a normative defense of Haitian self-definition.

Constructivist analysis also highlights how the occupation altered Haiti's social hierarchies and national identity narratives. The U.S. administration privileged the lighter-skinned urban elite and imported segregationist attitudes that reinforced existing racial and class divisions. In doing so, its re-inscribed colonial patterns of legitimacy, where proximity to whiteness and Western norms became the benchmark for political authority and social worth. These ideational legacies endured beyond the occupation, shaping elite nationalism and further alienating the rural black majority from the state.

Importantly, the occupation's end in 1934 did not signify the restoration of sovereignty in any complete sense. The long-term internalization of externally imposed norms left Haiti with a state apparatus that was Western in form but alienated from its social base. From a constructivist viewpoint, this produced a kind of "hollow sovereignty" – formal independence without the normative coherence or internal legitimacy that true self-rule requires.

In essence, the U.S. occupation of Haiti illustrates how international interventions are not just about control of territory or resources, but about control over meaning – about who is deemed fit to govern, which political forms are considered legitimate, and whose norms define the structure of the international system. Haiti's experience during 1915–1934 underscores the power of ideational hierarchies in global politics and the lasting effects of normative subjugation on state identity and sovereignty [9, p.147-152].

Political Landscape and Governance. Following the collapse of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, Haiti embarked on a turbulent path toward democratization. Despite initial enthusiasm, the post-authoritarian era has been defined by persistent political instability, including repeated electoral crises, fragile institutions, and the recurrence of extralegal governance. The rise and fall of populist leaders, such as Jean-Bertrand Aristide, have highlighted the tension between popular mobilization and elite resistance, often exacerbated by international interventions. As Finnemore and Sikkink suggest, norm diffusion does not occur in a vacuum but is mediated through local institutional and cultural filters. Haiti's institutions, historically weakened and externally shaped, have lacked the normative coherence and autonomy to internalize democratic norms fully [2, p.198-201].

Clientelism and corruption have further undermined public trust and governance capacity. The performative aspect of elections, often supported by international donors, has led to what Charles Tilly might characterize as "regimes of limited capacity," where the formal trappings of democracy mask the absence of

substantive state-society relations. In the absence of effective institutionalization, Haiti has oscillated between fragile civilian governments and unaccountable power centers, including armed gangs and economic elites [10, p.399-404].

**International Influence and Aid Dependency.** Haiti's persistent aid dependency and exposure to international influence cannot be fully understood through materialist explanations alone. While poverty, weak institutions, and external shocks are undeniable factors, a constructivist approach in International Relations reveals how norms, identities, and discourses shape the structure and consequences of Haiti's dependency. Aid is not merely a transaction of resources—it is a normative practice that reflects and reinforces ideational hierarchies within the international system.

Drawing on the work of constructivists such as Martha Finnemore and Michael Barnett aid is seen as a form of norm diffusion where donors act as norm entrepreneurs, promoting models of “good governance,” “democratic consolidation,” and “institutional rationality” based on Western standards [6, p.133-136]. In Haiti, these models have been repeatedly imposed with limited local consultation, reflecting an underlying assumption that Haitian actors are either incapable or untrustworthy. This reveals what Alexander Wendt would describe as a socially constructed identity of inferiority—a role Haiti is assigned and expected to perform [1, p.394-396].

The response to the 2010 earthquake exemplifies this dynamic. Although over \$13 billion in aid was pledged, the Haitian government received only a fraction—less than 1% of direct relief funding in the early stages—while most was funneled through international NGOs and foreign agencies. This by-passing of state structures was rationalized by discourses of state fragility and corruption but had the normative effect of delegitimizing the Haitian state in the eyes of its own citizens. The international community reproduced a narrative in which sovereignty was conditional, not inherent—echoing the broader pattern of “tutelary sovereignty” identified by Finnemore and Barnett in their critique of international organizations [6, p.136-139].

Similarly, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), active from 2004 to 2017, operated as both a security presence and a normative agent. While it sought to maintain peace and rebuild institutions, its very existence signaled that Haitian self-rule was suspect. Moreover, the cholera outbreak caused by UN peacekeepers and the UN's initial denial of responsibility sparked widespread public resentment, revealing a disconnect between international authority and local legitimacy. This incident demonstrates what constructivist theorists would call a failure of norm internalization—the international presence was not perceived as legitimate because it lacked moral congruence with Haitian social expectations.

Haiti's aid dependency thus functions within a broader system of ideational control. The labels applied to Haiti—“fragile state,” “failed state,” “aid-dependent nation”—are not just descriptions; they are socially constructed categories that define Haiti's role in the international hierarchy. These labels also shape behavior:



Haitian officials often perform dependency to remain legible to donors, reinforcing a cycle of external reliance and internal disempowerment. This is consistent with Wendt's insight that "anarchy is what states make of it"; Haiti's marginalization is not a natural condition but a socially constructed one, sustained by a web of expectations and practices that continually undermine its sovereignty.

From a constructivist standpoint, Haiti's interactions with international donors, organizations, and states are shaped less by objective needs and more by contested understandings of legitimacy, identity, and order. The international aid regime becomes a mechanism of normative reproduction, in which the Haitian state is consistently denied full recognition as an equal and autonomous actor. This persistent denial reinforces Haiti's symbolic status as the "black sheep of the Caribbean" – an identity not rooted in geography or culture, but in the historical and ideational legacy of a black republic that defied colonial modernity and has since been normatively excluded from the global mainstream.

## **Discussion**

**Socio-Economic Challenges.** Haiti's economic underdevelopment, environmental degradation, and humanitarian crises are deeply intertwined with its political fragility. Chronic poverty, widespread unemployment, and inadequate social services persist despite decades of foreign aid and development initiatives. The 2010 earthquake, which killed over 200,000 people, further exposed the inadequacies of both state capacity and international responses. From a constructivist standpoint, the global response to Haiti's socio-economic crises has often been shaped by implicit normative hierarchies. As Hopf argues, identity constructions in international politics shape the behavior of actors. Haiti has been framed as a perpetual victim and a site of humanitarian emergency, which legitimizes exceptional measures such as direct foreign governance, while sidelining long-term structural reform and local agency [11, p.103-106].

From a constructivist perspective, Haiti's socio-economic difficulties cannot be solely explained by material deprivation or institutional failures; rather, they are deeply intertwined with the social construction of Haiti's identity and status within the international community. The persistent characterization of Haiti as a "failed state" or "basket case" is not an objective descriptor but a powerful normative narrative that shapes both international responses and internal self-perceptions. These narratives, rooted in historical legacies of colonialism, racialization, and revolutionary stigma, construct Haiti as inherently fragile, dependent, and incapable of sustainable development. This identity influences the behavior of international actors, who frame economic aid and development projects through a lens of paternalism and conditionality, prescribing solutions that often prioritize donor interests and Western developmental norms over local agency and knowledge.

Moreover, constructivism highlights how socio-economic policies and interventions are not merely technical fixes but sites of norm negotiation and identity (re)production. For example, structural adjustment programs imposed in

the 1980s and 1990s reflected global neoliberal ideas about market efficiency and governance, which clashed with Haiti's social realities and contributed to social dislocation. Such policies reproduced the notion that Haiti's socio-economic problems were a result of internal mismanagement, overshadowing the role of international economic structures and historical injustices.

At the societal level, this externally imposed identity influences how Haitians perceive their own potential and challenges. As constructivists argue, identities are performative and constitutive: Haitians, navigating both local realities and global expectations, may internalize or resist these imposed narratives, which in turn shapes social cohesion, political mobilization, and economic behavior. This has led to what Escobar calls the "development apparatus" – a system that depoliticizes poverty and recasts it as a technical problem solvable through external expertise. In doing so, it forecloses alternative pathways to development rooted in local knowledge, sovereignty, and political empowerment [12, p.140-146].

**The Crisis of the 2020s.** The assassination of President Jovenel Moise in 2021 marked a turning point in Haiti's descent into political and security collapse. With no functioning parliament, a judiciary in disarray, and an executive branch operating without electoral legitimacy, Haiti has entered a phase of profound governance void. Armed gangs now exert *de facto* control over large parts of the capital, and the state's monopoly on violence has effectively disintegrated. Constructivist IR theory helps to illuminate how the global response to this crisis continues to be filtered through ideational frames that emphasize instability, fragility, and incapacity. These discursive constructs shape not only how states respond to Haiti but also how Haitians are permitted to participate in international forums. The repeated exclusion of Haitian civil society from negotiations concerning their own political future underscores the marginalization of local agency within global governance frameworks.

**Human Rights Issues.** Over the last decade several human rights issues have been identified in Haiti including the wanton use of violence and illegal firearms, sexual violence against women including children, gang activity and corruption at all levels of society. According to the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights –Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, otherwise referred to as the Report the use of firearms and ammunitions in Haiti, a country that does not manufacture such weapons, has bolstered and empowered criminal gangs, enabling them to commit severe human rights abuses. These gangs have become more united and coordinated, often out-powering national security forces. This situation has dramatically worsened the nation's security, human rights, and humanitarian crises, while also presenting significant ripple effects for the broader region. As clashes between rival gangs declined throughout 2024, gang members increasingly turned their violence against the populations, brutally punishing those who defied their rules or were suspected of collaborating

with the police or self-defense groups, instilling fear within the population [13, p.13-16].

Since July 2024, armed violence has remained alarmingly high, fueled by gang attacks on the population, police operations targeting gangs, and “vigilante justice”. Human rights violations and abuses documented by OHCHR have included numerous killings, including targeted killings, kidnappings for ransom, rape and sexual exploitation, destruction of property, and severe restrictions on access to essential services, particularly healthcare and education.

Violence and firearms. What was once fragmented gang violence has become a coordinated assault on Haitian society. The Viv Ansanm (Living Together) gang coalition has seized key areas of Port-au-Prince, expanded from marginalized areas into downtown core and middle-class neighborhoods, and attacked institutions. Between July 2024 and February 2025, UN Human Rights documented 4,239 killings and 1,356 injuries. In one massacre alone, 207 people were executed over five days in Cite Soleil. Armed gangs use increasingly powerful weapons, some trafficked from United States of America ports in containers of frozen food or electronics.

“These weapons, which are increasingly sophisticated, are not manufactured in Haiti, but consistently flow in from elsewhere,” said UN Human Rights Chief Volker Turk. Firearms are central not only to killings, but also kidnappings, sexual assaults, and extortion. Checkpoints set up by gangs on major roads demand “circulation taxes” from anyone trying to pass through. Victims who resist are often shot.

Curbing the flood of illegal firearms is critical to stem gang violence. This would entail enforcing the UN arms embargo, including tightening port and border controls, and dismantling trafficking networks. Voluntary disarmament and buy-back schemes are also recommended. According to the Report, security firms, some of which have been linked to arms diversion, must face scrutiny and regulation.

Restoring security in Haiti, would also entail urgently equipping and providing adequate resources to the Haitian National Police, while ensuring accountability for officers involved in human rights violations. The Report also calls for the full deployment of the Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission to help reclaim gang-held areas and support national efforts.

Sexual violence and children in conflict. Women and girls are exposed to widespread sexual violence perpetrated by gangs. The report details cases of gang members abducting women from their homes or public transport, raping them in public, and in some cases, killing them afterwards. Others are held in exploitative ‘relationships’ under constant threat of violence. The sexual violence is mostly underreported, due to fear of retaliation, social stigma, and a lack of trust in public institutions.

The impact of gang violence on children is also staggering. Thousands cannot attend school, many have witnessed the most horrific acts of violence, including killings, and some are trafficked and exploited by gangs, and provided with firearms. Millions of them have witnessed violence that no child should ever have to see. According to the Report, young girls who have survived sexual violence have spoken of the horrors they suffered at the hands of gangs. However, like many Haitians, they have not been broken.

To start overcoming this grave situation a comprehensive support system for victims needs to be created, including immediate and long-term medical care; psychological counselling; legal assistance; and social reintegration programs, the report states. In March 2025, with the support of UN Human Rights, the authorities announced the creation of two specialized task forces that will enable a more rigorous and expedited handling of mass killings, including sexual violence [13, p.18-20].

Internal displacement and humanitarian crisis. Gangs control essential roads, disrupting commerce and humanitarian aid, and armed attacks on facilities such as hospitals and schools have deepened the crisis. The Report states that more than 1 million people have been displaced in Haiti, many multiple times, 40,000 of whom have been forced to move in the past few weeks alone. One in every two Haitians – 5.5 million people – face acute food insecurity. Two million people face emergency levels of hunger. Nearly 6,000 displaced people are living in famine-like conditions. The Report also advocates that internally displaced people should be relocated to safe and appropriate facilities, where the enjoyment of essential rights such as food, education and healthcare is ensured, even in gang-controlled areas. Health workers and humanitarian personnel face frequent attacks and need support [13, p.21-24].

Corruption, impunity and law enforcement failures. Impunity for human rights violations and abuses prevails. Courts remain underfunded and are frequently targeted by gangs. Judges are under threat or have fled the country, and major cases linked to massacres have made little progress. The Report recommends that financial and political backers of the gangs must pay a price for their crimes, including the freezing of bank accounts, assets and visas. Internal accountability is weak. Only three out of 23 cases of police abuse were referred to the justice system. While the Haitian National Police have carried out operations to confront gangs in very challenging conditions, the report raises concerns about the lack of measures to prevent and protect from an unnecessary or disproportionate use of lethal force.

Over the last three years, more than 2,000 people were killed or injured in law enforcement operations against gangs, a 60 per cent increase compared to the last six months of 2022. At least one third of those killed were hit when they were not involved in acts of violence, often struck by stray bullets while in the streets or at home [13, p.23-26].

Regional and global calls for urgent action. Despite it all, the Haitian people continue to hope and resist. In some areas, the deployment of the UN-backed MSS has allowed schools and clinics to reopen. But needs remain immense. The solutions are straightforward and well known. The nations of the world must provide the Multinational Security Support mission led by Kenya what it needs to succeed. If there is too much procrastination, there could be precious little left of Haiti to save. The United Nations Security Council must see the Haitian situation as urgent and confront it head on. Recently, the Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR) of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was held in Basseterre, Federation of Saint Kitts and Nevis from 8 to 9 May 2025, under the chairmanship of the Right Honorable Dr. Denzil Douglas, Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Trade, Industry, Commerce and Consumer Affairs, Economic Development and Investment of Saint Kitts and Nevis.

At that meeting, Foreign Ministers received a report on the situation in Haiti and expressed deep concern about the worsening of the security crisis, the growing mistrust of the Transitional Presidential Council amongst Haitians and the insufficiency of international support, including for humanitarian relief. Ministers reaffirmed the importance of the Community's Good Offices role through the efforts of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG), in engaging with key Haitian stakeholders and supporting peace and stability in Haiti; and called for greater international attention and support.

There was agreement that CARICOM would continue to advocate within the halls of power and in upcoming multilateral fora to mobilize critical humanitarian, financial and human resource aid for Haiti, in addition to the urgency of long-term support for the country, in light of the flagging support for the funding of the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSSM) and deep concern over the delay of the United Nations Security Council in responding to the proposal of the UN Secretary-General to deploy a hybrid mission to Haiti to address the insecurity situation.

Amidst grave concern regarding the conditions for the effective holding of the referendum and its delay, and the implication of this delay for the general elections later this year, Ministers underlined the importance of integrity, effectiveness and good governance in facilitating the progress of the transition process in attaining its major objectives. These objectives focused on security, the referendum and elections, and retaining the necessary confidence of the international community ([caricom.org](http://caricom.org)).

It must be noted though that Haiti's membership in CARICOM and participation in COFCOR illustrate the tension between formal regional inclusion and substantive marginalization. While constructivist theory suggests that regional organizations can foster identity convergence and norm internalization, Haiti's experience has often been one of conditional belonging. Through COFCOR,

CARICOM states coordinate foreign policy and present a unified regional voice. Yet, Haiti is often the object, rather than the author, of regional diplomacy. This reflects deeper assumptions about who embodies Caribbean norms, and who deviates from them. Haiti's recurring crises become not just political failures, but discursive tools used to reinforce its outsider status within the regional order.

**Comparative and Regional Analysis.** Compared to other Caribbean nations, Haiti's experience is distinct in both its revolutionary origins and its sustained exclusion from regional political and economic frameworks. While countries such as Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago have managed to integrate into global and regional institutions with varying degrees of success, Haiti remains peripheral.

Constructivism posits that such differentiation is not merely the result of material capacity but also of social labeling and normative differentiation [14, p.320-322]. Haiti's identity as a failed or fragile state has become internalized within the international community, shaping its interactions and opportunities. Regional bodies like CARICOM have historically struggled to integrate Haiti fully, reflecting both linguistic and cultural divides and deeper normative hesitations.

A constructivist perspective on Haiti's position within the Caribbean and broader Latin American region emphasizes the role of shared and divergent identities, historical narratives, and normative frameworks in shaping inter-state relations and regional dynamics. Rather than focusing solely on material indicators such as GDP or military capacity, constructivism directs attention to how regional identities and collective meanings influence how states perceive themselves and each other, and how these perceptions affect cooperation, conflict, and hierarchies.

Haiti's unique history-as the first Black republic born out of a successful slave revolt-has led to its construction as an "other" within the Caribbean and Latin American communities. This identity, embedded in racialized and postcolonial discourses, has contributed to Haiti's social and political marginalization within regional institutions and forums. While other Caribbean states have aligned with Western liberal norms and market-based development models, Haiti has often been cast as a normative outlier, a symbol of instability or failure, which affects its ability to forge regional partnerships on equal footing.

One key example is Haiti's integration into the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Although Haiti became a full member in 2002, decades of political instability, economic hardship, and differences in language and culture meant its inclusion was met with ambivalence. Many CARICOM states framed Haiti's membership through a discourse of conditional inclusion, emphasizing governance reforms and economic development as prerequisites for meaningful participation [15, p.13-16]. This reflects what constructivists describe as a normative gatekeeping process, where collective identity is maintained by



defining who fits the regional “in-group” and who remains marginal [16, p.133-136].

Additionally, regional responses to crises such as the 2010 earthquake reveal how normative constructions affect solidarity. While there was an outpouring of humanitarian support, some regional actors maintained a distance based on perceptions of Haiti’s “fragility” and governance issues, limiting longer-term regional integration efforts. The earthquake also catalyzed debates within the region about the role of shared Black identity and historical solidarity versus pragmatic concerns about state capacity and political stability.

Diplomatic relations between Haiti and its neighbors further illustrate this dynamic. For instance, the historically tense relationship with the Dominican Republic is partly rooted in mutually constructed national identities shaped by race, colonial histories, and border politics. These identities influence cross-border cooperation, migration policies, and security practices, reflecting broader regional patterns of inclusion and exclusion.

From a constructivist standpoint, such examples show that Haiti’s regional marginalization is not predetermined by material factors alone but is continuously constructed through shared norms, identities, and historical narratives. The regional community’s social practices reproduce Haiti’s status as an outsider, while Haiti’s own identity narratives respond to, resist, or sometimes reinforce this marginalization. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for fostering more inclusive regional cooperation and reframing Haiti’s place in the Caribbean and Latin America.

**Toward a Way Forward.** A constructivist approach to Haiti’s persistent challenges reveals that sustainable progress hinges not only on addressing material deficiencies but also on transforming the social constructions, identities, and normative frameworks that shape Haiti’s domestic governance and international relations [17, p.30-46]. Moving beyond narratives of fragility and failure requires a concerted effort to redefine Haiti’s identity in ways that empower both Haitians and their partners in the international system.

**Changing International Norms and Narratives:** International actors—states, multilateral organizations, and donors—must critically examine the discourses and assumptions that inform their policies toward Haiti [18, p.23-26]. Development frameworks often embed Western-centric ideas about governance, stability, and economic models that may clash with Haitian realities and values, reinforcing dependency and exclusion [19, p.47-56]. By adopting more reflexive and culturally sensitive approaches, international stakeholders can move from paternalistic interventions toward partnerships based on mutual respect and dialogue (Price & Reus-Smit 1998). This includes recognizing Haiti’s historical contributions, cultural strengths, and agency as a sovereign actor, rather than solely viewing it through a deficit lens [5, p.13-16]. **Fostering Regional Solidarity and Inclusion:** At the regional level, Caribbean institutions such as CARICOM must reconfigure

regional norms to explicitly include Haiti as an equal partner [16, p.23-25]. This means dismantling exclusionary practices and discourses that frame Haiti as an outsider or exception, often rooted in racialized and postcolonial legacies [20, p.35-36]. A constructivist approach encourages regional actors to embrace shared histories of anti-colonial struggle and Black solidarity, reinforcing a collective Caribbean identity that values diversity and resilience [21, p.55-59]. Regional initiatives could prioritize capacity-building and cultural exchange programs that elevate Haitian voices and experiences within the Caribbean community.

**Empowering Domestic Identity Reconstruction:** Within Haiti, leaders, civil society, and cultural institutions should actively engage in reclaiming and reshaping national identity to counter externally imposed labels of instability or backwardness. Constructivist theory highlights how identities are performative and dynamic; thus, promoting narratives centered on Haiti's revolutionary legacy, creativity, and resilience can strengthen social cohesion and political legitimacy [3, p.213-216]. Encouraging inclusive dialogue across Haiti's diverse social groups can foster a sense of shared purpose and collective ownership of development paths.

#### **Policy Recommendations:**

##### **International Actors:**

- Implement development programs that prioritize local knowledge and participatory decision-making, ensuring Haitian stakeholders shape policy design and implementation.
- Support initiatives that challenge negative stereotypes of Haiti through media, education, and diplomatic channels, emphasizing its cultural richness and historical significance

##### **Regional Institutions:**

- Facilitate regular forums for Haitian participation in regional policy-making beyond economic issues, including culture, security, and migration
- Promote regional identity-building campaigns that celebrate Haitian contributions to Caribbean heritage and history

##### **Haitian Government and Civil Society:**

- Invest in education and cultural programs that foster national pride and inclusive historical narratives
- Encourage inclusive governance practices that engage marginalized communities in political processes, strengthening democratic legitimacy

Undoubtedly, addressing Haiti's socio-political and economic challenges requires transforming the ideational structures that shape perceptions and interactions at multiple levels. By shifting the narratives and norms that have long framed Haiti's position in the Caribbean and the world, there is an opportunity to build a future grounded in mutual respect, equity, and genuine partnership-paving the way for sustainable development and regional integration.

## **Conclusion**

Haiti's reputation as the "black sheep" of the Caribbean is not an inevitable outcome of its internal conditions, but a socially constructed identity shaped by centuries of colonial trauma, racialized international norms, and exclusionary regional politics. A constructivist lens reveals that these perceptions are maintained not only through material inequalities but also through the repeated performance of normative judgments that deny Haiti full political subject-hood.

To alter this trajectory, international and regional actors must commit to both policy reform and ideational change. CARICOM, as the Caribbean's principal regional body, must do more than offer rhetorical solidarity. It should foster integrative diplomacy that meaningfully includes Haiti in regional decision-making processes, not merely as a beneficiary of assistance but as a co-equal partner. COFCOR, as CARICOM's foreign policy engine, has a critical role to play in reshaping how Haiti is represented on the global stage-advocating for language and strategies that support Haitian sovereignty and counteract the narratives of perpetual crisis. The United Nations, long involved in Haiti through peacekeeping and development missions, must also reflect critically on its practices. A constructivist policy shift would require the UN to prioritize Haitian-led governance reforms, avoid reinforcing tutelary sovereignty, and support discursive spaces in which Haiti can redefine its own identity within the international community.

Ultimately, changing Haiti's fortunes requires more than external aid or technical fixes-it demands a transformation in the norms, narratives, and power relations that govern Haiti's place in the world. Constructivist-informed policymaking, rooted in mutual respect and discursive inclusion, offers a pathway toward recasting Haiti not as a problem to be solved, but as a sovereign actor with agency, history, and voice.

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## ENDNOTES

Haiti, officially the Republic of Haiti, is a country on the island of Hispaniola in the Caribbean Sea, east of Cuba and Jamaica, and south of the Bahamas. It occupies the western three-eighths of the island, which it shares with the Dominican Republic. Haiti is the third largest country in the Caribbean, and with an estimated population of 11.4 million, is the most populous Caribbean country. The capital and largest city is Port-au-Prince. Haiti became the Caribbean Community's (CARICOM) newest member on 2 July 2002 some four years after provisional membership had been granted.

The **Caco Insurgency** was a series of rural rebellions in Haiti during the early 20th century, notably opposing the U.S. occupation from 1915 to 1934. The Cacos were peasant militias drawn mainly from impoverished rural communities who resisted foreign military presence and the central government's attempts to consolidate control. Employing guerrilla tactics such as ambushes and hit-and-run attacks, the Cacos utilized Haiti's rugged terrain to challenge U.S. forces and their allied Haitian troops. Despite being ultimately suppressed, the insurgency became a powerful symbol of Haitian nationalism and popular resistance to foreign intervention, reflecting deeper social and political tensions between rural populations and central authorities. The legacy of the Caco insurgency highlights Haiti's enduring struggle for sovereignty and the resilience of grassroots movements against external domination.

CARICOM and COFCOR are both key regional institutions in the Caribbean. CARICOM (Caribbean Community) -CARICOM is a regional organization founded in 1973 through the Treaty of Chaguaramas. It brings together 15 member states and 5 associate members in the Caribbean to promote economic integration, coordinate foreign policy, and support cooperation in various areas such as education, health, security, and culture.

Key goals of CARICOM include:

Creating a single economic space (the CARICOM Single Market and Economy – CSME)

Coordinating foreign policy among member states

Promoting human and social development

Enhancing regional resilience and security

Members include countries like Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Haiti (which joined in 2002).

COFCOR is one of the principal organs of CARICOM. It is made up of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of CARICOM member states. COFCOR is responsible for:

- Coordinating the foreign policies of CARICOM countries
  - Establishing common positions in international forums
  - Managing CARICOM's external relations with countries and organizations outside the region
  - Overseeing diplomatic initiatives and foreign service training
- Essentially, COFCOR operationalizes CARICOM's foreign policy and represents the region's interests on the global stage.

### **ГАИТИ – КАРИБ АЙМАҒЫНЫҢ МАРГИНАЛ МЕМЛЕКЕТІ: МЕМЛЕКЕТТІҢ ӘЛСІЗДІГІНІҢ ТАРИХИ ТАМЫРЛАРЫ МЕН КОНСТРУКТИВИСТІК КӨЗҚАРАСТАРЫ**

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**Аңдатпа.** Бұл мақалада Гаитидің қазіргі саяси және экономикалық мәселелері тарихи даму жолы мен халықаралық қатынастардағы конструктивизм теориясы тұрғысынан қарастырылады. Авторлар Гаитидің Кариб бассейніндегі және жаһандық жүйедегі шеттетілген жағдайын тек материалдық жетіспеушілікпен немесе басқару кемшіліктерімен түсіндіру жеткіліксіз екенін, бұл құбылыстың әлеуметтік тұрғыда қалыптасқан түсініктер мен тарихи нарративтер арқылы пайда болғанын алға тартады. Мақалада халықаралық нормалар, отаршыл мұралар және дискурстық тәжірибелер Гаитиді ерекше және жүйеден тыс мемлекет ретінде қалыптастыруға қалай әсер еткені талданады. Гаити революциясы, тәуелсіздік алғаннан кейінгі оқшаулау және шетелдік араласулар елдің ішкі тұрақсыздығы мен экономикалық әлсіздігі жөніндегі халықаралық көзқарасты күшейтті. Конструктивистік көзқарас негізінде бұл зерттеу идеялды күштердің – ұлттық болмыс, бедел мен легитимдіктің – Гаитидің ішкі басқару жүйесі мен халықаралық имиджін қалыптастырудағы рөлін ашады. Зерттеу нәтижесі халықаралық қауымдастықтың Гаитиге деген қатынасын қайта қарауды ұсынады, тек құрылымдық реформаларды емес, сонымен бірге қалыптасқан ғаламдық нарративтерді өзгерту қажеттігін атап көрсетеді.

**Тірек сөздер:** конструктивистік теория, мемлекеттің нәзіктігі, Гаити, адам құқықтары мәселелері, қауіпсіздік, КАРИКОМ, Кариб Теңізінің маргинал мемлекеті, Кариб теңізі аймағы



## **ГАИТИ – СТРАНА МАРГИНАЛ КАРИБСКОГО БАССЕЙНА: ИСТОРИЧЕСКИЕ КОРНИ И КОНСТРУКТИВИСТСКИЕ ВЗГЛЯДЫ НА ХРУПКОСТЬ ГОСУДАРСТВА**

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**Аннотация.** В данной статье рассматриваются современные политические и экономические проблемы Гаити через призму исторического развития и конструктивистской теории в международных отношениях. Авторы утверждают, что маргинализация Гаити в Карибском регионе и в мировой системе объясняется не только материальной бедностью или неэффективным управлением, но и социально сконструированными нормами, историческими нарративами и международной практикой, которые последовательно формировали образ Гаити как «исключения». Анализируя Гаитянскую революцию, изоляцию после обретения независимости и многочисленные иностранные интервенции, статья показывает, как эти факторы способствовали формированию устойчивого представления о Гаити как о нестабильной и экономически уязвимой стране. Используя конструктивистский подход, авторы подчеркивают значение идеальных факторов — идентичности, репутации и легитимности — в понимании как внутреннего управления страной, так и её внешнего восприятия. В заключение статья призывает к переосмыслению международного подхода к Гаити, который должен учитывать не только институциональные реформы, но и необходимость изменения укоренившихся глобальных нарративов.

**Ключевые слова:** конструктивистская теория, хрупкость государства, Гаити, проблемы прав человека, безопасность, КАРИКОМ, страна маргинал Карибского бассейна, Карибский регион

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**POWER BALANCE IN CENTRAL ASIA:  
EXTERNAL POWERS IN THE REGION**

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**Abstract.** This article explores the evolving balance of power in Central Asia through an in-depth examination of external state actors and the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It begins by establishing the theoretical framework of the balance of power in international relations, highlighting its historical evolution and its application in contemporary geopolitical contexts. The core of the article is divided into two main analytical sections.

The first section examines the involvement of external powers – primarily Russia and China – in Central Asia. It details Russia's enduring influence through historical, economic, and military ties, including its use of energy infrastructure and regional security cooperation frameworks like the CSTO. China's growing footprint is assessed through the lens of the Belt and Road Initiative, large-scale infrastructure investments, and increasing trade and energy cooperation. The paper outlines how both powers strategically compete and sometimes cooperate in shaping Central Asia's political and economic future.

The second section delves into the SCO's institutional role in recalibrating regional geopolitics. It assesses the organization's contributions to regional security, economic cooperation, and multilateral diplomacy. The article argues that the SCO serves as a stabilizing framework that helps mediate external influence while offering Central Asian states a platform to assert collective interests.

Using historical analysis, contemporary data, and institutional review, the article concludes that Central Asia's balance of power is dynamically shifting, with China gaining increased influence alongside Russia's traditional dominance. The SCO, while often perceived as an extension of Chinese and Russian interests, also offers a mechanism for regional countries to navigate these power dynamics with greater agency.

**Key words:** Central Asia, balance of power, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Russia, China, regional security, geopolitical strategy, energy politics

**Introduction**

The balance of power theory in international relations has roots dating back to ancient times, but it gained prominence as a concept during the Renaissance and

early modern period in Europe. However, it is difficult to attribute the theory to a single individual, as it developed over centuries and was articulated by various scholars and statesmen. Some of the early thinkers associated with the balance of power concept include the Greek historian Thucydides, who wrote about power dynamics among states in his work “History of the Peloponnesian War” around 400 BCE [1]. Additionally, the Italian diplomat and political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli explored the concept in his writings during the Renaissance.

In the modern era, the balance of power theory became a central concept in international relations theory, particularly during the 17th and 18th centuries in Europe. The Peace of Westphalia marked a crucial turning point in the evolution of the modern state system. Its recognition of state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs laid the groundwork for the development of international law and the establishment of diplomatic norms. Moreover, the treaties established mechanisms for resolving conflicts through negotiation and diplomacy, setting a precedent for future diplomatic processes. The idea of the balance of power, which emerged in the aftermath of the Peace of Westphalia, has been a fundamental principle guiding the conduct of states in international relations [2]. Figures such as Cardinal Richelieu of France and, later, British statesmen like Henry Kissinger and scholars such as Hans Morgenthau contributed significantly to the development and application of the balance of power theory [3].

The concept of “balance of power” refers to a situation in which various nations or entities within a system maintain relatively equal levels of military, economic, or political strength to prevent any one entity from dominating the others. It is a fundamental principle in international relations and political theory. The balance of power theory suggests that when one nation becomes too powerful, it can pose a threat to the stability and security of other nations in the system. Therefore, other nations may form alliances, build up their own capabilities, or engage in diplomatic maneuvers to counterbalance the power of the dominant nation [4]. The balance of power can be maintained through various means, including alliances, treaties, arms control agreements, and the distribution of resources. It is often seen as a stabilizing force in international relations, helping to prevent conflicts and maintain peace by discouraging aggression and expansionism.

The balance of power has been a key factor in shaping the dynamics of international politics throughout history and continues to be relevant in the contemporary world [5]. In a state of quasi-anarchy, characterized by the absence of a highly developed and efficient government, law enforcement, legal systems, and supranational community, a current ally has the potential to transform into a future adversary [6].

The balance of power in Central Asia is a complex and evolving dynamic shaped by historical, geopolitical, economic, and cultural factors. Central Asia is a region comprising five former Soviet republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan [7]. The region is strategically significant due to its vast energy resources, geopolitical location, and historical importance as a crossroads of civilizations. The region has been historically influenced by various empires and powers, including the Persians, Mongols, Russians, and Chinese. These historical legacies continue to shape the region's dynamics and relationships. The Central Asian countries have established various regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) to foster economic cooperation, security coordination, and political dialogue among member states. These platforms influence the balance of power by shaping regional dynamics and alignments [8].

This paper comprises two comprehensive sections aimed at dissecting the geopolitical landscape of Central Asia. The first section meticulously examines the intricate involvement of external powers within the region, exploring their strategies, interests, and impact on regional dynamics. In contrast, the second section delves into the multifaceted role and significance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in recalibrating the balance of power across Central Asia. By scrutinizing the SCO's mechanisms, initiatives, and diplomatic endeavors, this section unveils its evolving influence and its implications for regional stability and cooperation.

### **Materials and Methods**

This study adopts a qualitative, multi-method approach to analyze the shifting balance of power in Central Asia, focusing on the roles of Russia, China, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The research design integrates three primary methodological components: historical analysis, document analysis, and secondary data synthesis.

First, historical analysis serves to contextualize the theoretical foundations of the balance of power concept. This involved a critical review of classical and modern texts in international relations theory, including works by Thucydides, Machiavelli, Morgenthau, and others. The goal was to trace the conceptual evolution of balance of power theory and its applicability to current geopolitical dynamics in Central Asia.

Second, a document analysis method was applied to official statements, policy papers, bilateral agreements, SCO summit communiqués, and speeches by political leaders from Russia, China, and Central Asian countries. These sources were selected from government websites, think tanks, and multilateral organizations to provide insight into strategic intentions and foreign policy narratives. Specific attention was given to SCO charters, resolutions, and regional cooperation programs to understand the organization's institutional role.

Third, secondary data synthesis utilized quantitative datasets from reputable

sources such as the UN Comtrade Database, the China Global Investment Tracker, and reports by international institutions, including the OSW (Centre for Eastern Studies) and Routledge publications. Economic indicators, trade volumes, and infrastructure investment figures were used to substantiate claims about China's and Russia's economic presence in the region.

By triangulating these methods, the study ensures analytical rigor and empirical validity. The multi-method approach allows for both macro-level theoretical reflection and micro-level examination of policies and practices. This framework provides a comprehensive understanding of how power is distributed, exercised, and contested in contemporary Central Asia.

## **Results and Discussions**

Central Asia has historically been a region of strategic importance, situated at the crossroads of major civilizations and trade routes. It's bordered by Russia to the north, China to the east, Iran to the southwest, and Afghanistan and the Caspian Sea to the south. This geographic position has made it a focal point for external powers throughout history, and it continues to be so in the contemporary geopolitical landscape. The rich natural resources of Central Asia have significantly contributed to the region's attractiveness for external powers. The region is endowed with significant oil and gas reserves, particularly in countries like Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. These resources are vital for energy security and economic development, making these countries attractive partners for energy-hungry nations [7].

Central Asia possesses abundant mineral and metal resources, including gold, uranium, copper, and rare earth elements. These resources are essential for various industries, including manufacturing, electronics, and construction, driving interest from countries with high demand for these materials. The presence of these natural resources makes Central Asia an attractive destination for investment and strategic partnerships for external powers seeking access to energy, minerals, water, and agricultural products. However, competition over resource extraction, control, and transportation routes can also lead to geopolitical tensions and rivalries in the region.

Russia has a significant historical, cultural, economic, and political presence in Central Asia. The region was part of the Russian Empire during the 19th century. Russia's expansion into Central Asia was motivated by strategic, economic, and geopolitical interests, including access to trade routes and the desire to counter British influence in the region. This influence persisted through the Soviet era, during which Central Asian republics were part of the Soviet Union.


Russia maintains significant economic ties with Central Asian countries, particularly in energy. Natural gas is a key component of Russia's economic ties with Central Asia. Countries like Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan possess vast natural gas reserves, and Russia serves as a major market and transit



route for their gas exports. Gazprom, Russia’s state-controlled gas giant, has long-term contracts with Central Asian producers for the purchase and transit of natural gas, which contributes to Russia’s energy security and economic interests. In addition to natural gas, Central Asian countries also export oil to Russia [9]. Kazakhstan, in particular, is a significant oil producer in the region, and Russian companies have invested in oil exploration and production projects there. Russia’s oil refineries process crude oil from Central Asia, and the two regions engage in bilateral trade of oil and petroleum products.

Since Gazprom lost a significant part of its European market, the Russian company has been looking for opportunities to export natural gas to new destinations, including Central Asia. Since the autumn of 2022, Russia has stepped up its diplomatic efforts, extending an offer to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to form a so-called gas union, the main aim of which is to ensure that Gazprom gains access to Central Asia’s transmission infrastructure. For their part, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are interested in obtaining Russian gas in view of the inefficient development of their own fields, which do not produce enough gas to meet their high domestic demand while meeting their obligations to export their own gas to the People’s Republic of China.

The first tangible result of Russia’s efforts came in October, when it started exporting gas to Uzbekistan. Russia will deliver 2.8 bcm of gas per year under a two-year contract that was signed in June 2023 [10]. Its unique feature is that the gas flows in reverse, transiting Kazakhstan via the Soviet-era Central Asia-Center pipeline; historically, it was the Central Asian countries that supplied gas to Russia.



Kazakhstan via the Soviet-era Central Asia-Center pipeline; historically, it was the Central Asian countries that supplied gas to Russia.

Chart – Russia and Central Asia Trade (UN Comtrade Database <https://comtradeplus.un.org/>)

Russia plays a crucial role in security cooperation with Central Asian states. It is a member of several regional security organizations, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is a key framework for security cooperation among Russia and several Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The CSTO was established in 1992 to address common security threats and challenges in the region, with a focus on counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and border security. Russia plays a leading role within the CSTO, providing military support, training, and equipment to member states [11]. Russia maintains military bases in several Central Asian countries, which serve as strategic assets for regional security and the projection of Russian power. For example, Russia operates the 201st Military Base in Tajikistan and the Kant Air Base in Kyrgyzstan. These bases support various functions, including border security, counterterrorism operations, and peacekeeping missions. They also serve as hubs for training exercises and joint military drills involving Russian and Central Asian forces [12].

In addition to military cooperation, Russia engages in regional diplomacy to promote security and stability in Central Asia. Russia participates in multilateral forums and diplomatic initiatives aimed at addressing regional security challenges, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) [13] and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Through these forums, Russia seeks to foster dialogue, cooperation, and confidence-building measures among Central Asian states and other regional stakeholders.

Overall, Russia's involvement in Central Asia is multifaceted, spanning economic, security, cultural, and diplomatic dimensions. While Russia continues to maintain its influence in the region, it also faces competition from other external actors, including China and the United States, which also have significant interests in Central Asia [14].

Central Asia has traditionally been within the sphere of influence of Russia, especially since the Soviet era. However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the region became more open to external influences. China's increasing presence in Central Asia serves as a counterbalance to Russian influence, providing the Central Asian states with an alternative partner and reducing their dependence on Russia.

China's presence and influence in Central Asia have been growing steadily over the past few decades. Central Asia holds strategic significance for China due to its vast energy resources, geographical proximity, and potential as a market for Chinese goods. China has been investing heavily in Central Asian countries through infrastructure projects, such as roads, railways, pipelines, and energy facilities. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) plays a significant role in this

regard, as it aims to enhance connectivity and trade between China and Eurasian countries [15].

The region is rich in natural resources, particularly oil and natural gas. China has been investing in energy projects in the region to secure its energy needs. For example, China has constructed pipelines like the China-Central Asia Gas Pipeline network to import natural gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. China has become one of the major trading partners for Central Asian countries. Bilateral trade between China and Central Asian states has increased substantially over the years, driven by China's demand for natural resources and Central Asia's need for Chinese goods and investments [16].

According to the China Global Investment Tracker the total volume of Chinese investments and contracts within the BRI in 2013 – 2020 was USD 755.17 billion (as of November 20, 2020), of which 297 billion was in the energy sector, 185.34 billion in transport, 73.22 billion in real estate, 57.44 billion in metals, 22.58 billion in utilities and 15.67 billion in chemicals. At present, trade between China and the five Central Asia republics has risen from US\$ 1.8 billion in 2000 to more than US\$ 30 billion in 2016, while the five states' trade with Russia amounted to only \$23 billion [17].




Chart – China and Central Asia Trade  
(UN Comtrade Database <https://comtradeplus.un.org/>)

China has also engaged in security cooperation with Central Asian countries, particularly in the areas of counterterrorism and regional stability. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), of which China is a founding member, serves as a platform for security dialogue and collaboration among its Central Asian members (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) as well as Russia and China [9].

China's engagement in Central Asia is part of its broader strategy to expand its sphere of influence beyond its immediate borders. By investing in infrastructure projects and forging economic ties with Central Asian countries, China seeks to increase its political and economic influence in the region, thereby enhancing its role as a global power.

Central Asia occupies a strategic geographical position, linking China to Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia [7]. Through its investments in infrastructure, such as the development of transportation corridors and pipelines, China aims to enhance connectivity between these regions, facilitating trade and economic integration. This strategic connectivity also strengthens China's position as a key player in global trade and geopolitics. Central Asia is an area of geopolitical importance due to its proximity to Afghanistan, Iran, and other volatile regions. China's engagement in Central Asia includes security cooperation aimed at promoting regional stability and combating common threats such as terrorism, separatism, and extremism. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), in which China plays a leading role, serves as a platform for security dialogue and cooperation among Central Asian states and other member countries [18].

China's presence in Central Asia is also driven by its efforts to diversify its supply routes for energy imports and exports. By developing alternative transportation corridors and pipelines through Central Asia, China reduces its dependence on maritime routes, which are vulnerable to geopolitical tensions and disruptions [19].

In general, China's engagement in Central Asia is shaped by a complex interplay of geopolitical, economic, and strategic considerations. By investing in infrastructure, forging economic ties, and promoting security cooperation, China seeks to enhance its influence in the region while securing access to vital resources and strengthening its position in global geopolitics.

## Conclusion

The geopolitical landscape of Central Asia is undergoing a significant transformation, marked by a dynamic interplay between traditional and emerging powers. The region's strategic location, abundant natural resources, and historical ties to major powers like Russia and China have positioned it at the center of 21st-century geopolitical calculations. This article has examined how the balance of power theory continues to offer a relevant analytical framework for understanding these shifting dynamics.

Russia's historical, economic, and military presence remains deeply embedded in the region, rooted in both the legacy of the Soviet Union and ongoing institutional connections such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Its continued investments in energy infrastructure, security cooperation, and regional diplomacy underscore its intent to preserve its sphere of influence. However, Russia's grip is no longer unchallenged.

China's rapid rise as a global power has introduced a compelling counterbalance to Russian dominance in Central Asia. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has extended its economic reach into the region, financing and constructing large-scale infrastructure projects, developing trade corridors, and becoming a key energy partner. This shift is reflected not only in trade volumes and investments but also in the political alignment of several Central Asian states that increasingly view China as a strategic alternative to Russia.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) emerges in this context as a crucial regional institution that embodies the complex interdependence among Central Asian states and their powerful neighbors. While often criticized for being dominated by China and Russia, the SCO nonetheless provides a platform for dialogue, conflict de-escalation, and multilateral engagement. It offers Central Asian countries a forum through which they can assert their interests, participate in shaping regional norms, and engage with external powers on more balanced terms.

In conclusion, the balance of power in Central Asia is not static but fluid, shaped by both historical legacies and contemporary geopolitical ambitions. Russia and China remain the dominant actors, but their roles are increasingly defined by both cooperation and competition. At the same time, Central Asian states are not mere passive recipients of foreign influence; they actively navigate these dynamics, seeking to preserve autonomy and leverage competing interests to their advantage. The region's future will likely continue to be shaped by this delicate balancing act, in which institutions like the SCO play an increasingly significant role in maintaining stability and enabling regional agency in a multipolar world.

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## **ОРТАЛЫҚ АЗИЯДАҒЫ КҮШТЕР ТЕПЕ-ТЕҢДІГІ: ӨНІРДЕГІ СЫРТҚЫ КҮШТЕР**

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**Аңдатпа.** Бұл мақалада сыртқы мемлекеттік субъектілерді және Шанхай ынтымақтастық ұйымының (ШЫҰ) рөлін терең зерттеу арқылы Орталық Азиядағы дамып келе жатқан күштер балансы зерттеледі. Ол халықаралық қатынастардағы күштер тепе-теңдігінің теориялық негізін құрудан, оның тарихи эволюциясын және қазіргі геосаяси контексттерде қолданылуын көрсетуден басталады. Мақаланың өзегі екі негізгі аналитикалық бөлімге бөлінген.

Бірінші бөлімде сыртқы державалардың, ең алдымен Ресей мен Қытайдың Орталық Азияға қатысуы қарастырылады. Ол Ресейдің тарихи, экономикалық және әскери байланыстары арқылы, оның ішінде энергетикалық инфрақұрылымды және ҰҚШҰ сияқты аймақтық қауіпсіздік саласындағы ынтымақтастық шеңберін пайдалану арқылы тұрақты ықпалын егжей-тегжейлі сипаттайды. Қытайдың өсіп келе жатқан ізі «Белдеу және жол» бастамасы, ауқымды инфрақұрылымдық инвестициялар және сауда мен энергетика саласындағы ынтымақтастықты арттыру арқылы бағаланады. Бұл мақалада екі державаның Орталық Азияның саяси және экономикалық болашағын қалыптастыруда стратегиялық бәсекелестігі және кейде ынтымақтастығы туралы айтылады.

Екінші бөлім ШЫҰ-ның аймақтық геосаясатты қайта калибрлеудегі институционалдық рөлін зерттейді. Ол ұйымның аймақтық қауіпсіздікке, экономикалық ынтымақтастыққа және көпжақты дипломатияға қосқан үлесін бағалайды. Мақалада ШЫҰ Орталық Азия мемлекеттеріне ұжымдық мүдделерді бекіту үшін платформа ұсына отырып, сыртқы әсерге делдалдық жасауға көмектесетін тұрақтандырушы негіз ретінде қызмет ететіні айтылады.

Тарихи талдауды, заманауи деректерді және институционалдық шолуды пайдалана отырып, мақала Орталық Азияның күштер балансы динамикалық түрде өзгеріп жатыр, Қытай Ресейдің дәстүрлі үстемдігімен қатар ықпалды күшейтеді деген қорытындыға келеді. ШЫҰ көбінесе Қытай мен Ресей мүдделерінің кеңеюі ретінде қабылданса да, аймақтық елдерге осы қуат динамикасын үлкен агенттікпен басқару механизмін ұсынады.

**Тірек сөздер:** Орталық Азия, күштер тепе-теңдігі, Шанхай ынтымақтастық ұйымы, Ресей, Қытай, өңірлік қауіпсіздік, геосаяси стратегия, энергетикалық саясат

## БАЛАНС СИЛ В ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ АЗИИ: ВНЕШНИЕ ИГРОКИ В РЕГИОНЕ

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**Аннотация.** В этой статье рассматривается меняющийся баланс сил в Центральной Азии посредством углубленного изучения внешних государственных субъектов и роли Шанхайской организации сотрудничества (ШОС). Она начинается с установления теоретической основы баланса сил в международных отношениях, подчеркивая ее историческую эволюцию и ее применение в современных геополитических контекстах. Основная часть статьи разделена на два основных аналитических раздела.

В первом разделе рассматривается участие внешних держав — в первую очередь России и Китая — в Центральной Азии. В нем подробно описывается устойчивое влияние России через исторические, экономические и военные связи, включая использование ею энергетической инфраструктуры и региональных структур сотрудничества в области безопасности, таких как ОДКБ. Растущий след Китая оценивается через призму инициативы «Один пояс, один путь», крупномасштабных инвестиций в инфраструктуру и растущего торгового и энергетического сотрудничества. В статье описывается, как обе державы стратегически конкурируют, а иногда и сотрудничают в формировании политического и экономического будущего Центральной Азии.

Во втором разделе рассматривается институциональная роль ШОС в перекалибровке региональной геополитики. В нем оценивается вклад организации в региональную безопасность, экономическое сотрудничество и многостороннюю дипломатию. В статье утверждается, что ШОС служит стабилизирующей структурой, которая помогает опосредовать внешнее влияние, предлагая государствам Центральной Азии платформу для отстаивания коллективных интересов.

Используя исторический анализ, современные данные и институциональный обзор, статья приходит к выводу, что баланс сил в Центральной Азии динамично меняется, при этом Китай приобретает все большее влияние наряду с традиционным доминированием России. ШОС, хотя ее часто воспринимают как продолжение китайских и российских интересов, также предлагает региональным странам механизм для управления этой динамикой сил с большей степенью свободы действий.

**Ключевые слова:** Центральная Азия, баланс сил, Шанхайская организация сотрудничества, Россия, Китай, региональная безопасность, геополитическая стратегия, энергетическая политика

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**IV БӨЛІМ. ЗЕРТТЕУ ӘДІСТЕМЕСІ МЕН ӘДІСТЕРІ**  
**РАЗДЕЛ IV. МЕТОДИКА И МЕТОДЫ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙ**  
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**БАЛАНС МЕЖДУ ТРАДИЦИОННЫМИ И ИННОВАЦИОННЫМИ  
МЕТОДАМИ В ИССЛЕДОВАНИИ И ПРЕПОДАВАНИИ  
ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОЙ ДИПЛОМАТИИ**

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**Аннотация.** В быстро меняющемся и развивающемся мире происходит переосмысление накопленного опыта, затрагивающего всех сферы жизнедеятельности человека. Преподаватели переосмысливают устоявшиеся методы обучения, стремятся использовать новые методы, позволяющие проводить углубленный анализ и визуализировать его для совершенствования образовательного процесса с формированием соответствующих компетенций. Наряду с традиционными методами преподавания экономической дипломатии, как количественный и качественный, используются такие инновационные методы, как инструменты искусственного интеллекта, применяемые также и в ее исследовании, выстраивая баланс между этими методами. На примере индекса политической стабильности в Казахстане и Турции показано влияние этого показателя на развитие экономической дипломатии. Выборка показателей «экспорт – импорт» Казахстан-Турция, как и показатели политической стабильности Всемирного банка производилась традиционным методом, а создание графических изображений проводилось с помощью инструментов искусственного интеллекта, включая библиотеки *pandas*, *matplotlib*. Показано, что на основе теории реализма и либерализма в кейсе Казахстан-Турция между индексом политической стабильности и торгово-экономическим сотрудничеством существует определенная связь. Полученные данные могут быть использованы для преподавания экономической дипломатии и дальнейшем ее научном исследовании. Исследовательский потенциал в этом контексте будет содействовать формированию преподавательского сообщества по экономической дипломатии.

**Ключевые слова:** экономическая дипломатия, Казахстан, Турция, политическая стабильность, методы преподавания, теория реализма, теория либерализма, образовательный процесс

**Финансирование:** Статья выполнена в рамках проекта грантового финансирования Комитета науки Министерства науки и высшего образования РК «Тенденция экономизации международных отношений и экономической дипломатии Нового Казахстана» (No. AP23490344).

### Введение

С увеличением национальных интересов каждое государство стремиться увеличить ВВП и промышленный потенциал, обеспечить диверсификацию экономики, развивать технологии и инновации, обеспечивая рост благосостояния населения, ухудшение положения которого может привести к разного рода конфликтам. Обеспечивая взаимосвязь политических, экономических и социальных и интересов, экономическая дипломатия служит целям и задачам максимизации своей национальной выгоды во всех сферах деятельности, включая торговлю, инвестиции и другие формы экономически выгодных обменов с участием различных заинтересованных сторон – от правительства до неправительственных организаций.

Английские исследователи Лондонской Школы экономики и политических наук (LSE) С. Вулкок и Н. Бейн определяют экономическую дипломатию как внешнеэкономическую деятельность, в которой участвуют различные акторы от государственных структур до неправительственных организаций, как проведение переговоров на международном уровне, принятие решений и взаимодействие этих процессов [1].

В ходе реализации проекта грантового финансирования МНВО РК «Тенденция экономизации международных отношений и экономическая дипломатия Нового Казахстана» (AP23490344) был сформулирован авторское всеобъемлющее определение экономической дипломатии в новых геополитических и геоэкономических условиях: «Экономическая дипломатия – это динамичный инструмент внешнеполитической стратегии государства, который адаптируется к меняющимся геополитическим и экономическим условиям. В условиях нарастающей взаимозависимости государств и усиления конкуренции за ресурсы, технологии и рынки экономическая дипломатия становится неотъемлемой частью успешной внешней политики. Она позволяет государствам не только защищать свои экономические интересы, но и формировать новые альянсы, искать альтернативные пути развития и адаптироваться к глобальным вызовам» [2]. Следовательно, экономическая дипломатия – это процесс, посредством которого страны взаимодействуют с внешним миром с привлечением различных субъектов к сотрудничеству. Эти субъекты играют активную роль в дипломатическом процессе и его потенциальных результатах.

На фоне геополитических и геоэкономических трансформаций, роста

влияния развивающихся рынков экономическая дипломатия в целях устойчивого развития является важнейшим инструментом дипломатии страны. Для исследования и преподавания экономической дипломатии применяются традиционные и инновационные методы как научные амбиции нового уровня.

Цель настоящей статьи – выявить влияние индекса политической стабильности Всемирного банка на развитие экономической дипломатии на примере Казахстана и Турции, используя количественный метод и ИИ, который становится неразрывно связанным с политическими, социально-экономическими структурами. С другой стороны, преподаватели из различных дисциплин переосмысливают устоявшиеся методы обучения и стремятся использовать методы, позволяющие проводить углубленный анализ и визуализировать его.

Исследования в области экономической дипломатии должны служить основой для преподавательской практики и наоборот. Результаты научных исследований должны быть включены в учебные программы, чтобы студенты были в курсе последних достижений в этой области. В свою очередь, студенты могут вносить свой вклад в исследования, проводя исследовательские проекты, анализируя данные или участвуя в сборе информации.

Таким образом, экономическая дипломатия требует педагогического и исследовательского подхода, который является как теоретическим, так и практическим.

### **Материалы и методы**

Методы и методики преподавания дисциплин в общем контексте социальных наук на национальном уровне занимались Р.С. Курмангужин и Р.Т.Саурамбаева, Н.И. Пустовалова, К.Ч.Байсултанова [3-5]. Последнее исследование посвящено применению искусственного интеллекта в социогуманитарных исследованиях. Методика и методы преподавания экономических дисциплин в университетской среде излагались в работах Г.Ф. Мешелевой, Н. Кучукова и Л.А. Талимовой [6-7], в которых выявлены отличительные особенности и достоинства интерактивных методов обучения. Инновациям в преподавании дисциплин в целом посвящены работы С.Р.Есимжановой и Е.А. Абеновой, С.С.Донцова [8-9].

На пространстве СНГ методике преподавания социальных наук и дипломатии отражены в работах Н.П. Полиеваевой, Е.С.Коренева [10-11] и др.. Методикой преподавания экономических дисциплин занимаются Л.В.Коваленко, К.И.Никитина [12-13] и др. Никитина обращает внимание на методы преподавания экономики, среди которых она выделяет объяснительно-иллюстративный метод, метод проблемного изложения, визуализацию и другие.

В международном масштабе методы преподавания в социальных науках разъясняются в работах Б.Бхатт, М.Гарнера [14-15], в которых



исследователи кроме комплекса эмпирических методов рекомендуют для достижения целей образования использовать методы коллективного исследования, тематические исследования, использование различных ресурсов.

Г. Брюер и Р. Хогарт анализировали вопросы формирования креативного мышления, предлагая ряд инновационных методов обучения, успешно применяемых преподавателями различных дисциплин и уровней образования. Например, использование сайтов социальных сетей, виртуальных игр, фильмов, анализа различных историй, архивных документов [16]. Работы П. Хохауса и Дж.-Ф.Херена «The future of teacher education innovations across pedagogies, technologies and societies» и С.-Б. Магги «Research methods for education in the digital age» связаны с будущими инновационными тенденциями в образовании в эру цифровых технологий [17-18]. На уровне Европейского Союза авторы С. Барончелли и Р. Фарнети рассматривают меняющийся образовательный контекст ЕС и стоящие перед ним задачи [19]. Они анализируют особенности методик преподавания, используя инновационные инструменты обучения, как симуляционные игры, электронное обучение, проблемное обучение, смешанное обучение и обучение с использованием социальных сетей.

Таким образом, в национальном и международном уровнях проводятся исследования по методике и методам преподавания дисциплин в общем контексте обучения, которые можно использовать при преподавании экономической дипломатии, или по экономическим дисциплинам и в сфере социальных наук.

Научные исследования по экономической дипломатии на национальном уровне представлены исследованием Г.М. Арыстанкуловой [20]. Это диссертация на соискание степени доктора PhD 2019 г. «Француз Республикасының сыртқы саясатындағы экономикалық дипломатия: Қазақстан Республикасы үшін тәжірибе», в которой выработаны предложения практического характера по возможности их применения в Республике Казахстан. К.Ч. Байсултанова и Л.Н. Нурсултанова Л.Н. анализируют современные тенденции развития экономической дипломатии [21]. На региональном уровне и уровне СНГ также проводятся исследования по данной тематике. Например, кыргызстанское «Экономическая дипломатия КР - состояние и перспективы» И.Рыскулова [22]. На пространстве СНГ проводится достаточно много исследований, посвященных экономической дипломатии, имеются исследования в общем контексте дипломатии и внешнеполитического курса государств. Это исследования И.А.Трояна, Ш.Н. Ганиевой, В. А Аваткова и других [23-25]. Такие исследователи как А.С.Савойский и Р.И.Хасбулатов посвящают исследования конкретно экономической дипломатии [26-27].

Зарубежные исследователи проводят много изысканий по теме экономической дипломатии. О профессорах Лондонской школы экономики С.Вулкоке и Н.Бейне мы писали в связи с определением концепта

«экономическая дипломатия» [1]. Исследователь Нидерландского института международных отношений Маайке Окано-Хейманс рассматривает экономическую дипломатию в междисциплинарном контексте, выделяя направления: цель и инструменты, сферы применения и процессы, ее стратегические и идеологические соображения [28]. Анализ феномена экономической дипломатии, поиск новых подходов сотрудничества государств в сфере экономической дипломатии находим в исследовании М. Т. Ислама и Б. Хоссена, которые отражают различные стороны экономической дипломатии разных стран [29]. Американский исследователь Дж. Пигман в монографии «Negotiating our Economic Future. Trade, Technology, and Diplomacy» утверждает о глобальном продвижении торговли на основе системы экономических и дипломатических принципов, которые приносят беспрецедентные экономические выгоды странам [30].

На национальном, региональном и международном уровнях имеется определенное количество работ по экономической дипломатии, однако по методам исследования и преподавания экономической дипломатии на национальном уровне количество работ ограничено.

Теоретические взгляды на связь между торгово-экономическим развитием и конфликтами фокусируются на основополагающей неоклассической теории торговли, которая предполагает, что государства будут в лучшем положении, если они будут торговать, чем воздерживаться от торговли [31]. Либеральная точка зрения утверждает, что торговля способствует миру [32]. Первоначально был проведен поиск, отбор и систематизация материалов для оценки методов преподавания и исследований по экономической дипломатии. Затем мы применили исследовательские методы системного анализа, качественный и количественный методы, статистический анализ для оценки влияния индекса государственной стабильности на развитие экономической дипломатии на примере Казахстан - Турция. Далее мы использовали инструменты ИИ для создания графических материалов, как pandas, matplotlib, дедуктивный контент-анализ позволил определить взаимосвязь между индексом государственной стабильности и развитием экономической дипломатии двух стран, и перспективы развития экономической дипломатии с использованием ИИ. Для проведения исследования использованы данные Банка развития Казахстана, Бюро национальной статистики РК, Всемирного банка, отечественные и зарубежные исследования по проблемам преподавания и исследования экономической дипломатии.

## **Результаты**

Интерес Турции к Казахстану и другим центральноазиатским республикам проявился с 1991 г., когда начала формироваться дипломатия двух стран, перетекающая в экономическую дипломатию, которая, расширяясь, приобретала свойственные ей характеристики и особенности.

Как пишет Байрам Балчи, научный сотрудник CERI Sciences Po (Париж), «... до советской эры, во времена Османской империи,

политические связи между Анатолией и Российским Туркестаном были ограниченными. Только к концу существования империи султаны, в частности Абдулхамид, попытались наладить более тесные связи с мусульманами России и Турции» [С тех пор прошло много времени [33]. Между Казахстаном и Турцией подписано около 40 межгосударственных и свыше 20 межведомственных договоров и соглашений. И сегодня мы являемся свидетелями международного взаимодействия двух стран.

Ежегодно, начиная с 1996 г., Всемирный банк проводит исследование по всемирным показателям управления (Worldwide Government Indicators / WGI) на основе 35 различных источников [34]. Исследовательская программа включает шесть показателей управления разных стран мира: учет мнения населения и подотчетность госорганов, политическая стабильность и отсутствие насилия/терроризма, эффективность государственного управления, качество регуляторной среды, верховенство закона, борьба с коррупцией.

Мы выбрали показатель «Политическая стабильность и отсутствие насилия/терроризма» для анализа влияния этого показателя на развитие экономической дипломатии между Казахстаном и Турцией. Этот показатель включает: вооруженные конфликты, демонстрации с применением насилия, социальные волнения, террористическая угроза, интенсивность внутренних конфликтов: этнических, религиозных или региональных, протесты и беспорядки, война между государствами, гражданская война, которая может оказать определенное влияние на государственную политику и другие.


Мы собрали данные по индексу политической стабильности, и данные по экспорту – импорту.



Рисунок 1 - Индекс политической стабильности Казахстана и Турции  
 Источник: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Percentile Rank // <https://data.worldbank.org/indicators/PV.EST?locations=KZ-TR>

В табличной форме указаны количественные показатели данного индекса.

Талица 1. Индекс политической стабильности Казахстана и Турции (в % от 90 %)




Источник: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Percentile Rank // <https://data.worldbank.org/indicators/PV.EST?locations=KZ-TR>

Отметим, что данные по индексу политической стабильности за 2024 и 2025 отсутствуют.

Турция проводит экономическую политику, направленную на решение макроэкономических и структурных проблем, в которой активную и большую роль играют холдинги. В число глобальных турецких холдингов, реализовавших и реализующих в Казахстане проекты в обрабатывающей промышленности и в рамках государственно-частного партнерства, входят Yıldız Holding, Yıldırım Holding, YDA Holding, Abdi Ibrahim, Aselsan, Anadolu Endüstri Holding, Borusan Holding, TAV Havalimanları Holding, Ulkar Holding и другие. Данные проекты охватывают такие отрасли, как легкая промышленность, машиностроение, фармацевтика, АПК, ГМК, инфраструктура и т.д. Турецкие холдинги в Казахстане стали стратегическим инструментом экономической дипломатии. В 2024 году Казахстан открыл торговое представительство в Турции и других ряде стран (Китай, ОАЭ, Индия, Иран), что позволяет более эффективно развивать внешнеэкономические связи с этими странами.


Сегодня Турция - один из ключевых партнеров во внешнеторговой деятельности с Казахстаном со своей структурой экспорта и импорта.

Таблица 2. Внешняя торговля Казахстан и Турции (2019-2025)



\*2025 г. – 1й квартал.

Таблица 3. Доля Турции во внешней торговле Казахстана, 2019- 2025 гг. (млрд.\$)



Источник: Банк развития Казахстана. <https://www.kdb.kz/analytics/analytical-portal-foreign-trade-of-the-RK/> \*2025 г. – 1й квартал.

В разные периоды Турция входила в десятку ведущих экспортеров и импортеров, занимая 4-5 позиции. За первый квартал 2025 г. Турция заняла

4-ю позицию по экспорту после Италии, Китая, России и Нидерландов. По импорту – 5-ю позицию [35].

Таблица 3. Основные страны РК в экспорт - импорте, 1 квартал 2025 г.

|                |         |       |          |            |        |            |
|----------------|---------|-------|----------|------------|--------|------------|
| <b>Экспорт</b> | Италия  | Китай | Россия   | Нидерланды | Турция | Узбекистан |
|                | 26,7%), | 15%   | 9,5%     | 5,2%       | 5,1%   | 4,7        |
| <b>Импорт</b>  | Россия  | Китай | Юж.Корея | Германия   | США    | Турция     |
|                | 29,1%   | 26,8% | 4,4%     | 4,2%       | 3 %    | 2,7%       |

(Таблица составлена автором)

Структура импорта из Турции в РК включает такие промышленные товары как оборудование и машины для обработки руд, камня, грунта, электротехническое оборудование и их части, что составляет 20% всего товарооборота, также товары легкой промышленности – 37%, продукты питания.

Структура экспорта из Казахстана в Турцию включает нефть и нефтепродукты - 52,3%, рафинированная медь и ее необработанные сплавы, руда и медный концентрат, ферросплавы - 3-5 % [36].

### Дискуссия

Данные торгового баланса за 2019 - 2025 (см. Таблица 2) показывают динамику экспорта товаров в Турцию до 2023 г. Начиная с 2023 г. идет снижение данных показателей, которое объясняется общемировым экономическим и энергетическим кризисом.

Экспорт Казахстана в Турцию продолжает носить сырьевой характер и состоит из нефтепродуктов и драгоценных металлов и изделия из них (медь и алюминий). Турция не располагает достаточным количеством нефтяных и газовых месторождений, потребление нефтепродуктов и газа выше, чем добыча. Поэтому большую часть страна импортирует из Казахстана, России, Ирака и других стран. Турция в 2024 г. импортировала из Казахстана в 1,6 раза меньше нефти и нефтепродуктов, на 14,1% меньше нефтяного газа [37].

Вместе с тем, турецкий импорт в Казахстан показывает динамику 2023 г., а 2024 г. показывает уровень 2022 г. В целом турецкий импорт сократился на 10,5 %, включая импорт одежды, текстиля и ковров. Данные показатели снижения по импорту объясняется ростом цен на товары, экономическим кризисом, введенных антироссийских санкций, которые оказали влияние на импорт Казахстана, когда поставки продукции из Турции в Россию осуществлялись через Казахстан, а также преобладанием потребления казахстанским населением продуктов питания, нежели товаров легкой промышленности.

Относительно 2025 года, исходя из данных экспорта-импорта за 1 квартал текущего года, прогнозируемый уровень может составить свыше



3 млрд. \$, что будет выше показателей предыдущих лет. В абсолютном выражении как в экспорте, так и в импорте наблюдалась неравномерная тенденция (особенно в экспорте).

Проанализировав показатели экономической дипломатии Казахстана и Турции, исследуем показатели политической стабильности Турции и Казахстана как вооруженные конфликты, демонстрации с применением насилия, социальные волнения, террористическая угроза.

За анализируемый период в Казахстане прошел транзит власти, которая была передана в марте 2019 г. К.-Ж.К.Токаеву. Транзит власти прошел мирно, выступлений, социальных конфликтов в Казахстане не наблюдалось. 5 января 2022 г. вошел в историю Казахстана как «Qandy Qantar» («кровавый январь»), когда, связанные с ростом цен на топливо жесткие беспорядки в Алматы и других городах потрясли страну. Массовые беспорядки охватили страну, для прекращения которых были привлечены казахстанские военнослужащие и силы ОДКБ. Было введено чрезвычайное положение с 5.01 по 19.01.2022 по всему Казахстану, городах Нур-Султан, Алматы, Шымкент. Была ограничена телефонная связь, имелись убитые и раненые. В последующие годы таких беспорядков в стране не наблюдалось.

Во всем мире терроризм и экстремистские тенденции достигли угрожающей интенсивности, представляющие угрозу международному миру и безопасности. Турция активно ведет борьбу с терроризмом, независимо от того с какой террористической организации и их идеями он отталкивался. Представители группировок религиозного экстремизма в различных городах Казахстана (Алматы, Атырау и др.), которые организуют собрания целях вербовки населения и распространяют специальную литературу, включая материалы на цифровых носителях, были задержаны и проводятся расследования.

За 2024 г. в Казахстане правонарушения за создание и руководство транснациональной организованной группой сократилось по сравнению с 2023 г. на 42,9% (8 случаев). За почти 5 месяцев 2025 г. за терроризм и религиозный экстремизм привлечены к ответственности и осуждено 43 человека, заблокирована попытка въезда зарубежным радикалам, выявлено и изъято много огнестрельного оружия, пресечены попытки провоза оружия и боеприпасов. Периодически происходили трансграничные конфликты Казахстана с Узбекистаном, Кыргызстаном.

Казахстан проводит целенаправленную работу по борьбе с религиозным экстремизмом. В Алматинской области реализуется проект по созданию анимационных комиксов на казахском и русском языках, направленный на борьбу с религиозным экстремизмом посредством знакомства читателей с историческими личностями и интеллигенцией страны [38].

Глобальный индекс организованной преступности (Global Organized Crime Index), созданный в 2021 г. Глобальной инициативой по борьбе с

транснациональной организованной преступностью (GI-TOC) показывает, что в 2023 г. Казахстан занимал позицию между 86-104 с индексом 6,5, а Турция – 7-20 с индексом 9,0 из 10 возможных.

В Турции в 2023 году прошли президентские выборы и парламентские выборы в два тура. Явных протестов в период выборов не было, но на избирательную кампанию повлияли последствия сильного февральского землетрясения в Газиантепе и Кахраманмараше. Население пострадавших регионов, несмотря на почти на 3 месяца после землетрясения, все еще нуждались в помощи.

До президентских выборов 2028 г. в Турции пока еще далеко, но арест мэра Стамбула Э.Имамоглу, кандидата от главной оппозиционной Республиканской народной партии / РНП вызвал волну протестов, которые могут иметь последствия за пределами страны, на региональном и международном уровнях. Нерешенный курдский вопрос в Турции, напряженность отношений Турция- Иран, Турция – Ирак, вторжение турецких войск в иракские районы Метина и Запа, нестабильность на турецко-сирийской границе могут стать причинами продолжительных внутренних и внешних конфликтов. Самороспуск Рабочей партии Курдистана в мае 2025 г. несколько «смягчили» напряженность в контексте преследования этой партии, просуществовавшей 47 лет. Однако партия может вести скрытую деятельность. Продолжаются внешние споры и конфликты на Кипре, с Грецией, Арменией или Сирией.

Отметим, что в Турции наблюдаются социально-экономические проблемы, в первую очередь, уровень инфляции, прогнозный сценарий которого на конец 2025 г. составит 24%, в Казахстане – до 10%.

Экономические проблемы и в Казахстане, и в Турции обусловлены кризисными явлениями в мировой экономике на протяжении последних трех лет, что влияет на развитие экономической дипломатии между двумя странами.

### **Заключение**

Мы поставили задачу в плане метода преподавания и исследования экономической дипломатии определить: является ли политическая нестабильность препятствием для бизнеса, для развития всех инструментов экономической дипломатии.

Такой индикатор, как политическая стабильность, является лучшим показателем оценки различных форм внутреннего и внешнего конфликтов. Конфликты наносят ущерб экономике любой страны: разрушение инфраструктуры, нарушение общественного порядка, перенаправление государственных расходов на деятельность по улучшению производства, потери доходов, отток капитала из страны. Реалисты и либералы пришли к следующим выводам по вопросу влияния показателя политической стабильности на торгово-экономические отношения:

- нулевое влияние: нет никакой связи,
- влияние конфликта на торговлю положительное,
- влияние конфликта на торговлю отрицательное.

Экономическая дипломатия между Казахстаном и Турцией развивается в двустороннем формате. Пример индекса политической стабильности Казахстан – Турция, проанализированный с использованием традиционных методов в сочетании с инструментами ИИ, показывает, что в данном кейсе прослеживается отрицательное влияние индекса политической стабильности и экономической дипломатией, обусловленное не сколько внутренними факторами, а внешними факторами, к которым относятся глобальный экономический и энергетический кризис. Эти данные могут применяться в исследовании и преподавании экономической дипломатии в вузах, которые должны подготовить будущих специалистов к работе в сложной и постоянно меняющейся среде, используя различные инструменты для обоснования своих решений.

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## **ЭКОНОМИКАЛЫҚ ДИПЛОМАТИЯНЫ ЗЕРТТЕУ МЕН ОҚЫТУДАҒЫ ДӘСТҮРЛІ ЖӘНЕ ИННОВАЦИЯЛЫҚ ӘДІСТЕР АРАСЫНДАҒЫ ТЕПЕ-ТЕҢДІК**

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**Аңдатпа.** Жылдам өзгертін және дамушы әлемде адам өмірінің барлық салаларына әсер ететін жинақталған тәжірибе қайта қарастырылады. Оқытушылар оқытудың қалыптасқан әдістерін қайта қарастырады, тиісті құзыреттерді қалыптастыра отырып, білім беру процесін жетілдіру үшін терең талдау жүргізуге және оны визуализациялауға мүмкіндік беретін жаңа әдістерді қолдануға тырысады. Сандық және сапалық сияқты экономикалық дипломатияны оқытудың дәстүрлі әдістерімен қатар, оны зерттеуде қолданылатын жасанды интеллект құралдары сияқты инновациялық әдістер қолданылады, осы әдістер арасында тепе-теңдік орнатылады. Қазақстан мен Түркиядағы саяси тұрақтылық индексінің мысалында бұл көрсеткіштің экономикалық дипломатияның дамуына әсері көрсетілген. Дүниежүзілік Банктің саяси тұрақтылық көрсеткіштері сияқты Қазақстан – Түркияның «экспорт-импорт» көрсеткіштерін іріктеу дәстүрлі әдіспен жүргізілді, ал графикалық бейнелерді жасау pandas,

matplotlib кітапханаларын қоса алғанда, жасанды интеллект құралдарының көмегімен жүргізілді. Қазақстан-Түркия кейсіндегі реализм мен либерализм теориясы негізінде саяси тұрақтылық индексі мен сауда-экономикалық ынтымақтастық арасында белгілі бір байланыс бар екендігі көрсетілген. Алынған мәліметтер экономикалық дипломатияны оқыту және оны одан әрі ғылыми зерттеу үшін пайдаланылуы мүмкін. Осы тұрғыда зерттеу әлеуеті экономикалық дипломатия бойынша оқытушылар қауымдастығын қалыптастыруға ықпал ететін болады.

**Тірек сөздер:** экономикалық дипломатия, Қазақстан, Түркия, саяси тұрақтылық, оқыту әдістері, реализм теориясы, либерализм теориясы, білім беру процесі

**Қаржыландыру:** Бұл мақала Қазақстан Республикасы Ғылым және жоғары білім министрлігі Ғылым комитетінің гранттық қаржыландыру жобасы аясында орындалды: «Халықаралық қатынастар мен Жаңа Қазақстанның экономикалық дипломатиясының экономикалану үрдісі» (№ AP23490344).

## **THE BALANCE BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND INNOVATIVE METHODS IN THE TEACHING AND RESEARCH OF ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY**

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**Absrtact.** In a rapidly changing and developing world, there is a rethinking of the accumulated experience affecting all spheres of human activity. Teachers rethink established teaching methods, strive to use new methods that allow for in-depth analysis and visualization to improve the educational process with the formation of appropriate competencies. Along with traditional methods of teaching economic diplomacy, both quantitative and qualitative, innovative methods such as artificial intelligence tools are used, which are also used in its research, building a balance between these methods. Using the example of the index of political stability in Kazakhstan and Turkey, the influence of this indicator on the development of economic diplomacy is shown. The Kazakhstan–Turkey export-import indicators, as well as the World Bank’s political stability indicators, were sampled using the traditional method, and graphic images were created using artificial intelligence tools, including pandas and matplotlib libraries. It is shown that based on the theory of realism and liberalism in the Kazakhstan-Turkey case, there is a certain relationship between the index of political stability and trade and economic cooperation. The data obtained can be used for teaching economic diplomacy and its further scientific research. The research potential in this context will contribute to the formation of a teaching community in economic diplomacy.

**Key words:** economic diplomacy, Kazakhstan, Turkey, political stability, teaching methods, realism theory, liberalism theory, educational process

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